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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines how the Supreme Court of Canada, across legal contexts, has tended
to conceptualize sexuality. It focuses primarily on areas of public law including sexual
assault law, equality for sexual minorities, sexual harassment and obscenity and
indecency laws. There were a number of trends revealed upon reviewing the
jurisprudence in this area. First, the Court’s decisions across legal contexts reveal a
tendency to conceptualize sexuality as innate, as a pre-social naturally occurring
phenomenon and as an essential element of who we are as individuals. This is true
whether one is speaking of the approach to gay and lesbian rights, the occurrence of
sexual harassment, or the sexual abuse of children. However, there is an exception to this
trend. The exception relates to the Court’s conceptual approach towards sexual violence
against adults. The research revealed, likely as a result of feminist activism both in the
legislative and judicial arenas, that there has been a shift in the way that the Court
understands sexuality in the context of sexual violence. It is a shift away from
understanding it as pre-social and naturally occurring towards understanding it as a
product of society, as a function of social context. This change in the Court’s conceptual
approach towards sexual violence has engendered a shift in the law’s moral focus as well
– a shift away from a moral focus on specific sexual acts and sexual propriety and
towards a moral focus on sexual actors and sexual integrity. The thesis weaves together
the analytical observations about the jurisprudence just described with a theoretical
argument that is both grounded in the case law and which draws upon a number of
different theorists. The argument developed suggests that the Court, regardless of the
legal issue involved, ought to conceptualize sexuality as socially constructed/
contextually contingent, that it ought to orient itself towards protecting sexual integrity,
and that it ought to understand this sexual integrity as a common interest.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction
Sexuality has been for centuries a site of religious, moral, theoretical, societal and
legal struggle. It has been described as a “transmission belt for a wide variety of needs
and desires: for love and anger, tenderness and aggression, intimacy and adventure,
romance and predatoriness, pleasure and pain, empathy and power.”1 Sex has been, and
continues to be, one privileged indicator of the difference between right and wrong.2 Law
is frequently the site where sexuality as privileged indicator of right and wrong is
revealed. But the relationship between law and sexuality extends far beyond simply the
use of law to make sexual norm based distinctions between right and wrong. Sexuality,
as will be argued throughout this thesis, is an aspect of human experience that is at once
produced through society, regulated by society, and used to regulate society. As such, the
intersection of law and human sexuality is both complex and profound.
Jeffrey Weeks identifies five areas as being integral to the social organization of
sexuality: “kinship and family systems, economic and social organization, social
regulation, political interventions and the development of cultures of resistance.”3 One
might just as easily identify these as the five areas integral to the social organization of
law, or as the five areas integral to the legal organization of sexuality. All of which is to
suggest that this complex intersection of law and sexuality truly pervades every area of
social and individual life.
Given this complexity, it is important to examine how courts tend to understand
sexuality, whether this is context dependent and whether the conceptual approach they
adopt best promotes legal reasoning that can account for and accommodate the
1

Jeffrey Weeks, Sexuality, 2nd ed., (Routledge: New York, 2003) at 1.
Ibid.
3
Ibid. at 21.
2
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complexity of issues, interests and perspectives that arise when law and sexuality
intersect.
Issues of sexuality are found in both public and private legal contexts: tort law,
contract law, constitutional law, family law, administrative law, education law,
immigration law, and criminal law.4 The intersection of law and sexuality has been
examined through feminist perspectives, critical race theory, liberal theories, post
modernism (and more specifically queer theory), gay liberation theory, gender theories,
cultural legal studies, law and economics, and political legal philosophy. There have
been debates over essentialism versus constructivism, liberty versus equality, sex versus
gender, assimilation versus subversion, assimilation versus resistance, universalism
versus particularism, universalism versus relativism, harm versus morality, and private
versus public.
Less examined is what, if any, connection exists between legal issues in terms of
the intersection of law and sexuality? Often discussions about ‘good sex’, sexual liberty
and the rights and/or oppression of sexual minorities tend not to also include focus on
issues such as rape, sexual violence and the ‘bad of sex’. Similarly, discussions about
sexual harm, about for example the sexual oppression of women and children, do not tend
to emphasize theories or legal approaches that are overly concerned with also recognizing

4

While the focus throughout this work will be mainly on public law (contexts such as criminal law, human
rights code provisions and constitutional law) there will be some examination of private law issues (such as
tortuous liability for breach of fiduciary duty – see Chapter Six). This focus on public law is not because the
ideas and arguments would not be applicable to private law matters. Rather it is a function of feasibility.
The argument developed throughout this work – a constructivist account of sexuality in which sexual
integrity is understood as a common good which the law ought to be oriented towards protecting - would
also beneficially inform private law matters such as contract law and family law. The implications of my
argument for private law matters are briefly touched upon in Chapter 8.
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and accommodating the good of sex, the benefit, joy and power produced through and by
sexuality.
Is there a discernible conceptual approach to sexuality developed and/or applied
by the courts, which is common to all areas of law and sexuality? Do courts reveal the
same understanding of sexuality regardless of whether they are dealing with issues of, for
instance, sexual liberty, equality, tolerance or individual and public safety? Related to
this, can there be one legal theory of human sexuality which accounts for the good of sex
but identifies and rejects the bad, which ensures equality without assimilation, diversity
without exclusion, and liberty without suffering?

I.

Trouble Me With Three Notes About Theories Incomplete
When I was fourteen years old I sat at the kitchen table and watched as my father

took his and my mother’s Sears credit cards and, with a black magic marker, crossed out
Sears and wrote ‘Queers’. He put the cards in an envelope, mailed them to the Sears
customer service department and informed us that our family no longer shopped at Sears this in response to the department store’s recent announcement that they would begin
granting spousal benefits to employees in same sex relationships. Apparently they were
one of the first nation wide companies in Canada to do this. For my father this was a sign
(of the apocalyptic variety) that the normative universe as he knew it was in serious
jeopardy – the Queers were taking over. In contrast, for those who willingly label
themselves with the intended slur smeared in black felt pen on his credit card, legal
activism aimed at issues such as the acquisition of pension and health benefits for gay and
lesbian couples is often considered a misallocated effort because it perpetuates
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conformity to social norms rather than subversion of them – for them it is misguided
because it is not queer enough. It can be troubling to think about how vast the space is
between the perspectives of my father and the Queers.
I recently attended a conference on feminist constitutionalism. Having breakfast
the second day I had the pleasure of sitting next to a professor who had given a
presentation the day before which offered an insightful feminist argument advocating for
certain reforms to the criminal law. At breakfast she was discussing Justice Wilson’s
ground breaking interpretive approach to section 1, based as it was on a contextual
analysis of proportionality. I mentioned the biography Judging Bertha Wilson by Ellen
Anderson in which, in her overwhelmingly positive treatment of Justice Wilson’s
jurisprudence, Anderson argues that Justice Wilson’s contextual approach was in a sense
post modern. This professor immediately dismissed Anderson’s book – a work which
seemed to me to be very consistent with her own argument but which used the term post
modern in its conceptual approach – with one statement. ‘Yes, well…her feminist
credentials are questionable.’ I was immediately troubled. I didn’t know whether I had
feminist credentials and if I did whether I had packed them. What if they asked me to
produce them?
Last year I was browsing through the queer theory section at Glad Day Bookshop
in Toronto. Glad Day describes itself as the first Canadian lesbian and gay bookstore –
they have been “serving the queer community since 1970”.5 I overheard a conversation
two aisles over between two men who looked to be in their late 40’s or early 50’s. They
were bemoaning the close mindedness and homophobia of western attitudes towards
Afghani Imam and their supposed practice of taking young Afghani boys as ‘lovers’.
5

Taken from their website: www.gladdaybookshop.com/about.html (accessed April 7, 2009).
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They expressed their disgust at western society’s failure to learn from the lessons of the
ancient Greeks and their ‘boylovers’. I had recently finished reading Khaled Hosseini’s
The Kite Runner and just the previous week had watched the movie based on his novel.
Images of the graphic depictions of the sexual interaction between the protagonist’s
young nephew and the Imam who had kidnapped him were still troubling me.
...
There are three broad theoretical approaches that have likely done the most work
in terms of theorizing concepts of sexuality in a legal context. They are liberal rights
theories, queer theory and branches of feminism, such as power feminism. (By power
feminism I am referring to that branch of feminism that argues that inequality between
men and women is itself sexualized and a function of social structure.) Each of these
approaches, in their various manifestations, offers significant insight into certain aspects
of the relationship between law and sexuality.
Equality theory provides a solid theoretical foundation to defeat laws that
discriminate against gays and lesbians. Equality theory provides strong support for the
assertion of rights to spousal benefits for the gay and lesbian employees of Sears; it is less
able, however, to provide a theoretical basis for the assertion that the distribution of
economic privileges ought not to be based on sexual relationship status or for the
argument that gay and lesbian pornography ought to be treated differently under the law
than heterosexual pornography. Nor will it avoid the model of exclusivity inherent to any
rights based social justice movement; a model whose identity politics demand that lines
be drawn in the sands of sexual normativity between which sexual deviants are in and

5

which are out, always at once constituting new sexual outlaws while at the same time
permitting sexual citizenship for some.6
Queer theory can avoid drawing such lines; it can, for example, provide the basis
for transgender folks to argue for the disruption of regulatory gender norms. But queer
theory cannot avoid its infinitely regressive inability to ever draw lines in the sands of
sexual normativity. It cannot, properly understood, provide a basis from which to argue
that homosexuals ought to be in and hebophiliac Imams out.
Power feminism ably theorizes the gendered power dynamics within families and
the disservice to women created by the social and legal distinction between public and
private. It offers a clear theoretical basis for the assertion that violent pornography is
anti-democratic (and that a failure to prohibit it is a failure to treat all citizens equally). It
fails, however, to treat equally, sexual minorities oriented towards consensual
sadomasochism. Nor does it handle well women who sexually harass men, women who
rape7 or female heterosexual subjectivity.8 It is a structural theory that excludes any
perspective that does not begin with a foundational and overarching assumption of male
super-ordination over female.
None of these approaches provide a particularly convincing theoretical basis from
which to argue in favour of a legal theory of sexuality that understands sexuality as a
collective interest, without, that is, an assertion of sexual morality.
Can there be a legal theory of human sexuality which cuts across the space
between good sex and bad sex, public sex and private sex, dominant sexual practices and
6

See Brenda Cossman, Sexual Citizens, (Stanford University Press: Stanford, 2007).
See Janet Halley, Split decisions: Taking a Break from Feminism,(Princeton University Press: Princeton,
2006).
8
See Carol Smart, “Desperately Seeking Post Hetero-sexual Women” in Janet Holland & Lisa Adkins, eds.,
Sex, Sensibility and The Gendered Body, (Macmillan Press: London, 1996) 222.
7
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minority sexual practices, assimilation and tolerance, suffering and desire? Is there a
theoretical approach that can resolve or reconcile all of these troubling tensions?
I doubt there is such a theory. It may be, however, that law does not need a theory
that can accomplish this. The ideas and theoretical approach developed throughout this
thesis are not an attempt to provide the answer, or resolve these tensions – quite the
opposite in fact. My objective, upon examining how the Supreme Court of Canada
currently conceptualizes sexuality, is to then offer one idea about how legal reasoning
should conceptualize sexuality, to provide argument in favour of this idea, and to make
the claim that so long as law is developed, interpreted, and applied in a manner that
acknowledges the social contingency of sexuality and tries to stay open to new ideas and
the possibility of new meaning there will always be trouble up ahead and that this may be
a good thing.

II.

There Is Trouble Up Ahead - Towards A Legal Theory Of Sexuality
Looking primarily at Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence, how does the Court

understand sexuality and does this understanding change depending on the type of legal
issues involved? (For example, is the Court’s conceptual approach different in the
context of sexual assault cases than it is in the context of gay and lesbian rights under
section 15 of the Charter?) Does the Court’s understanding of sexuality influence their
reasoning? Has the Court’s conceptual approach changed in recent years and if so what
has influenced this change? Finally is there a conceptual approach that is to be preferred
and if so why?

7

In exploring these questions I have focused primarily on areas of public law
including sexual assault law, equality for sexual minorities, sexual harassment claims and
obscenity and indecency laws. I reviewed all of the Court’s jurisprudence in these areas
in the past twenty years as well as a significant amount of the lower court case law on
these legal issues. The Court’s decisions across legal contexts reveal a tendency to
conceptualize sexuality as innate, as a pre-social naturally occurring phenomenon and as
an essential element constitutive of who we are as individuals. However, there is an
exception to this trend. There has been a shift in the way that the Court understands
sexuality in the context of sexual violence between adults. It is a shift away from
understanding it as pre-social and naturally occurring and towards understanding it as a
product of society, as a function of social context. This is an exciting development with
implications that have already begun to reveal themselves in cases in other legal contexts.
This change in the Court’s conceptual approach towards sexual violence has engendered a
shift in the law’s moral focus as well – a shift away from a moral focus on specific sexual
acts and sexual propriety and towards a moral focus on sexual actors and sexual integrity.
This thesis weaves together the analytical observations about the jurisprudence
just described with a theoretical argument that is both grounded in the case law and which
draws upon feminist, liberal and post-modern theories. The argument developed suggests
that the Court, regardless of the legal issue involved, ought to conceptualize sexuality as
socially constructed, that it ought to orient itself towards protecting sexual integrity, and
that it ought to understand this sexual integrity as a common interest.
As will be discussed in much greater detail in Chapter Two, sexuality is typically
conceptualized as either an innate, naturally occurring, pre-social and essential element
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constitutive of who we are, or as a product of norms, social practices, institutions and
structures – much like language. The intention of this discussion is to demonstrate,
through an examination of legal reasoning in different legal contexts in which issues of
sexuality arise, that constructivist conceptions of sexuality produce more nuanced, more
inclusive, more just legal reasoning, as well as to suggest one theoretical approach to
sexuality that might help to produce and promote legal reasoning that ascribes to such
constructivist conceptions. This will be achieved by advancing a number of claims each
intended to build on one another.
The first claim, which will be made in Chapter Two, is that in order to ascertain
the broader implications of a legal understanding of a sexual issue or behavior or
phenomenon it is important to identify and understand the conceptual framework
underpinning that legal understanding. Included in Chapter Two will be a discussion of
what is meant by the term social constructivism, an explanation of how different queer
and feminist theorists have used the concept and an argument as to why a constructivist
legal conception of sexuality is to be preferred over an essentialist conception.
The second main claim will be made in Chapter Three. Chapter Three will
demonstrate that, across different legal contexts, courts have tended towards an
essentialist conception of sexuality. This chapter will examine the Supreme Court of
Canada’s jurisprudence (as well as some lower court decisions) in four different legal
contexts –human rights complaints regarding sexual harassment, sexual minority claims
under section 15 of the Charter, the use of similar fact evidence in sexual assault trials,
and the criminal regulation of child pornography. Chapter Three will reveal how the
Court’s essentialist reasoning limits the availability of legal remedies for certain types of
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claimants, and precludes legal recognition of the social factors that produce problematic
and harmful sexual behavior.
The underlying argument established in these two chapters, and maintained
throughout the remaining chapters, is that legal conceptions of sexuality as socially
constructed are to be preferred over essentialist conceptions of sexuality. I will argue that
constructivist conceptions encourage legal reasoning that is less likely to understand and
measure every sexual act, desire and identity through a heterosexual paradigm, and better
able to accommodate the relational and contextual factors which contribute to the
regulation and production of sexuality.
Building on these first two claims will be the observations made in Chapters Four
and Five that where the Court has shifted towards a more constructivist account – such as
in the context of adult sexual violence - the law’s moral focus has also shifted.

It has

shifted from a concern over sexual acts to a concern over sexual actors, from a focus on
protecting sexual propriety to a focus on protecting sexual integrity.
Chapter Four will demonstrate the way in which the Court has adopted a feminist
influenced understanding of sexual violence. It is an approach that conceptualizes both
the perpetuation of sexual violence and the harm caused by sexual violence from a
constructivist perspective. Chapter Four will examine the way in which the concept of
sexual integrity has been incorporated into sexual assault law; it will argue that the law
ought to understand sexual integrity as a common good and be oriented towards
promoting and protecting this common good.
Chapter Five will demonstrate how, in the context of obscenity and indecency
laws, the feminist influenced constructivist perspective towards sexual violence adopted
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by the Court encourages legal reasoning focused on political morality rather than sexual
morality. Chapter Five will also reveal, through an examination of criminal laws
regulating sex work, how this change in the law’s moral compass has the capacity to
better protect individual sexual actors.
Following this will be the claim made in Chapter Six that despite these successes,
constructivist approaches – such as power feminism - that remain firmly anchored in a
specific structure fail to truly shift the law’s focus away from sexual morality and towards
political morality. Chapter Six, through an examination of the Court’s analytical
approach to sexual battery and to gay pornography, will argue that to avoid making
universal (and correspondingly sexually moralistic) claims, a theoretical approach must
be willing (and able) to introvert its constructivist analysis.
Chapter Seven will then add a cautionary note to the argument that a theoretical
approach to sexuality must introvert its constructivist analysis. Chapter Seven will argue
that while constructivist theories are methodologically invaluable (in that they
demonstrate the need for any just system or social structure to recognize that its fairness
depends on its ability to continually redefine and reinterpret itself and the social context
in which it operates), once unhinged from any structure or foundation they do not meet
the law’s need to establish or identify criteria by which to judge.
The final chapter will argue that the Court ought to continue its shift towards a
constructivist conception of sexuality and that it ought to do so by subscribing to the
notion that sexual integrity is a common good and that legal reasoning should be oriented
towards promoting and protecting this common good. Chapter Eight will consider what it
means to suggest that sexual integrity is a common good. It will then explore the concept
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of iconoclasm and suggest how it might be used to deploy the insights of pure social
constructivism while accommodating the reality of law’s judgment.
There are two key themes that run throughout all of these chapters. The first, as
suggested above, is that constructivist conceptions of sexuality better account for its
complexity and as a result lead to better legal reasoning. The second is that there is an
irreconcilable tension between the theoretical underpinnings of the claim that sexuality is
socially constructed and the acknowledgment that the legal regulation of sexuality, for it
not to be arbitrary, requires criteria by which to distinguish good sex from bad sex. The
purpose of this work is to suggest one account of how a legal conception of sexuality as
socially constructed might attempt to accommodate this tension - that is, the tension
between the recognition that what sexuality is is constituted through the norms, social
practices, relationships and discursive regimes that describe and regulate it and law’s
need, despite this, to use these norms, social practices and discourses to judge that which
is constituted through them. The approach suggested is that of a legal theory of sexuality
which conceptualizes sexuality as socially produced, a legal approach in which sexual
integrity is considered a common good that the law ought to protect through open ended
and infinite re-evaluation and reconstitution of the relationships and interactions which
constitute, promote and threaten this common good.

12

Chapter 2 – Legal Conceptions of Sexual Nature and Natural Sex

This chapter will examine the theoretical foundations for the assertion that
sexuality is a product of social practices and norms. The next chapter will then apply this
social constructivist theoretical approach to an examination of the Supreme Court of
Canada’s jurisprudence on sexual harassment, sexual minority rights, and sexual violence
against children to demonstrate that across legal contexts the Court often ascribes to an
essentialist understanding of sexuality. Chapter Three will also further the argument,
introduced in this chapter, that a constructivist approach would produce legal reasoning
that is more inclusive and that better reflects the complexity of sexuality.
Social and legal understandings of sexuality have typically been bound up in and
inextricably linked with perceptions about what is natural and what is unnatural. But for
morality (with which it is often married), the concept of nature is likely the most common
framework through which law has approached issues of sexuality, sexual identity and
sexual activity. Whether informed by natural law concepts, god’s law or the scientific
pursuits of the sexual enlightenment, the notion that sexuality is a force of nature has
influenced how law characterizes families, criminal offences, and equality claims, as well
as sexual actors, sexual identities and sexual acts. Another description of the notion that
sex is natural (or ‘of nature’) is the term sexual essentialism. Gayle Rubin, one of the
earliest ‘queer theorists’, defined sexual essentialism as “the idea that sex is a natural
force that exists prior to social life”.1 Sexual essentialism is the notion that sexuality is
innate, unchanging, ahistorical and pre-cultural.

1

“Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality” in Carole S. Vance, ed. Pleasure
and Danger: exploring female sexuality, (Pandora Press: London, 1989).

13

The most significant contribution to the theorization of sexuality made by queer
theory is its challenge to, and disruption of, the concept of sex as natural or pre-social.
Queer theory, in contrast to sexual essentialism, adopts a social constructivist conception
of sexuality. A social constructivist conception of sexuality suggests that “sexuality is as
much a human product as are diets, methods of transportation, systems of etiquette, forms
of labor, types of entertainment, processes of production, and modes of oppression”.2
Queer theory is premised on a specific characterization of this constructivist conception
of sexuality. Why is a queer or constructivist theoretical approach to legal analysis
significant?
It is not enough to simply ask how law regulates sexuality. To understand how
law regulates sexuality it is important to identify how conceptions of sexuality inform
legal reasoning and legal outcomes. To understand how sexuality conceptions of
sexuality inform law it is necessary to ask whether the Court understands sexuality as
immutable, as essential or as fluid and contextually contingent; it is necessary to ask what
aspects of sexuality are considered pre-social and whether this depends on the legal issue
the Court is addressing. To determine what the broader implications of a legal
understanding of a sexual issue or behavior or phenomenon are, it is important to identify
and understand the conceptual framework underpinning that legal understanding.
One issue which has received more attention than any other in the constructivist –
essentialist debate is the ‘cause of homosexuality’. The debate has often been
misunderstood as the debate between whether or not it is a choice to be gay. This is the
‘it’s a choice’ (and you should not choose it or you should not question it - depending on
one’s perspective) argument versus the ‘it’s not a choice’ (I was born this way or it’s not
2

Ibid. at 277.
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my fault - again depending on one’s perspective) argument. To take the argument that
homosexuality is socially constructed as saying homosexuality is chosen is to fail to grasp
the entirety or complexity of constructivist theories. To argue that an aspect of human
behavior or human ‘nature’ is a product of social construction and not mother nature is
not necessarily to suggest that it is mutable, or unstable. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick
suggests that underlying this widespread misapprehension of constructivist arguments is a
homophobic sentiment.
It seems ominously symptomatic that, under the dire homophobic
pressures of the last few years, and in the name of Christianity, the subtle
constructivist argument that sexual aim is, at least for many people, not a
hard wired biological given but, rather, a social fact deeply embedded in
the cultural and linguistic forms of many, many decades is being degraded
to the blithe ukase that people are free at any moment to … choose to
adhere to a particular sexual identity (say, at a random hazard, the
heterosexual) rather than to its other.3

Many queer theorists and pro-gay scholars have come to the conclusion that the
essentialist-constructivist debate is irresolvable4 and that regardless it asks the wrong
question.5 They say that instead of concerning ourselves with the cause of
‘homosexuality’ we ought to be concerned with the broader social and legal implications
of labeling someone, or being labeled, homosexual. Bruce MacDougall for example, who

3

Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, The Epistemology of the Closet (University of California Press, Los Angeles,
1990) at 41.
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isolating such a gene would still not resolve the causation question given the many social determinants that
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See Janet Halley, “Sexual Orientation and The Politics of Biology: A Critique of the Argument From
Immutability.” (1994) 46 Stanford Law Review 503 at 557.
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See for example Brenda Cossman, Sexual Citizens: The Legal and Cultural Regulation of Sex and
Belonging, (Stanford University Press: Stanford, 2007); Bruce MacDougall, Queer Judgments:
Homosexuality, Expression, and the Courts in Canada, (University of Toronto Press: Toronto, 2000)
[hereinafter Queer Judgments]; Jeffrey Weeks, Sexuality, 2nd ed., (Routledge: New York, 2003); Eve
Kosoksky Sedgwick, supra note 3.
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argues in favour of an essentialist conception of sexual identity, suggests that, “what
flows from that designation [homosexual] is much more significant. What is important is
the consequential meaning placed on a particular term. Why are some things regarded as
negative, so as to entail inferior characteristics or consequences? Can negative be made
positive or at least neutral?”6
Professor MacDougall’s argument in favour of abandoning the quest to determine
the source of homosexuality is persuasive. Determining the broader social and legal
implications of sexual categorization does seem more important than arguing about the
cause of homosexuality. Perhaps even the question ‘what causes homosexuality?’
privileges the concept of heterosexuality.7 However, a point should be made regarding
Professor MacDougall’s argument. The questions posed by Professor MacDougall
presume something of a social constructivist perspective. Implicit in his questions is the
assumption that regardless of the cause of homosexuality, what matters is the social
construction of homosexuality. Even if sexual orientation is a pre-social naturally
occurring phenomenon constituting part of one’s essence, as MacDougall argues, his
question concedes that what matters is the social and cultural interpretation of that
naturally occurring sexual preference. That is to say, even understandings of essentialism
are mediated through language, culture and politics.
Debating the cause of homosexuality may be ill advised both because a resolution
is unlikely and because to do so privileges the concept of heterosexuality. However, the

6

Bruce MacDougall, Queer Judgments, supra note 5 at 46.
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notion of social constructivism and its implications for understanding sexuality are much
broader than simply establishing ‘the cause of homosexuality’.
Understanding whether the law conceptualizes any particular aspect of sexuality
as essential or constructed will help to answer Professor MacDougal’s questions. It will
help to reveal “the consequential meaning placed on a particular term”8. Legal
distinctions between ‘the natural’ and ‘the unnatural' and legal conceptions concerning
the essentialist or constructed ‘nature’ of sexuality carry significant weight regarding
legal approaches to and regulation of sexual object preference. Moreover, the
significance of such distinctions extends far beyond simply the issue of sexual
orientation. “Appeals to nature, to the claims of natural, are amongst the most potent we
can make. They place us in a world of apparent fixity and truth. They appear to tell us
what and who we are, and where we are going. They seem to tell us the truth.”9
A constructivist perspective provides insight into the ways in which meaning,
constituted in and through particular social contexts, allow some sexual norms (concepts,
values, practices, subjects, orientations, traits, and desires) to become perceived as natural
(hegemonic), and correspondingly regulative, by excluding other norms. For this reason,
its analytical framework is useful for any examination of the legal regulation of sexuality,
aspects of which have often been understood through discourses of deviation from ‘the
norm’, or diacritical modes of knowing (i.e. unnatural means not natural, female means
not male, woman means not man, and gay means not straight). Queer theory, and
constructivist arguments generally, provide a powerful critique of laws, institutions,
social practices, and beliefs premised on models of essentialism by identifying many of

8
9
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Jeffrey Weeks, Against Nature, (Rivers Oram Press: London, 1991) at 87.
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the ‘naturalized’ assumptions about sex underpinning the Court’s jurisprudence. Social
constructivism provides an analytical lens through which to examine the Court’s
conceptions of sexuality and to understand how these conceptions influence legal
outcomes and legal reasoning.
This chapter does not include a critique of queer theory (or social constructivism
generally). This is not an oversight. An important critique highlighting the inherent
paradox of queer theory and suggesting that a whole-hearted adoption of this theoretical
approach is politically infeasible (and impossible) is found in Chapter Seven. In brief,
Chapter Seven will demonstrate how queer theory and the post-modern theories upon
which it is premised are unable to provide criteria by which to draw legal distinctions
between good sex and bad sex and cannot alone be relied upon as the basis for the
assertion that law conceptualize sexual integrity as a common interest.
Separating a discussion of the methodological insights provided by social
constructivist theories of sexuality from a discussion highlighting the unavoidable pitfalls
of these approaches, when considered to their full extent, was done intentionally. As
noted in Chapter One, the goal of this discussion is the development of a legal theory of
sexuality which conceptualizes sexuality as socially produced, a legal approach in which
sexuality is considered a common good which the law ought to protect through open
ended and indefinite re-evaluation and reconstitution of the relationships, and interactions
which constitute, promote and threaten this common good. To make this argument
requires a paradoxical analysis in which queer theory is both utilized for the insights it
provides and rejected (which, not coincidently, is reflective of the very paradox queer
theory presents for law).
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Throughout this introduction the terms queer theory and social constructivism
have both been used. This is intentional, but ought not to suggest that they are
synonymous. They are not. Queer theory relies on the conception that meaning is
socially constructed. However, as will be discussed, there are other social theories, such
as power feminism, which also rely on social constructivism but do not embrace the postmodern assertions regarding identity and subjectivity integral to queer theory. Queer
theory is a social constructivist theory. It is the theory that the categories of gender, sex
and sexuality are socially constructed. More specifically, they are constructed through
the reiterative citation of dominant gender, sex and sexual norms – norms which are
constituted through exclusion, through the discursive creation of binaries in which a
norm’s meaning stems from that which it is ‘not’, and its power from the ability to define
that ‘not’. Therefore, it is accurate to, in invoking the phrase social constructivism, also
be alluding to the ideas propagated by queer theory, and vice versa. However, given that
queer theory is a theory of social constructivism but not all theories of social
constructivism are queer theories, it could be confusing.
One of the ‘other’ theories of social constructivism typically asserted in the area
of sexuality is power feminism.10 Queer theory, which focuses on deviation, and power
feminism, which focuses on male dominance as manifested by and perpetuated through
the manner in which sexuality is socially constructed, are both examples of social
constructivism. As will be discussed in Chapter Six, the difficulty with power feminism
is its failure to introvert its analysis, to turn its focus inwards and reveal that its structural
foundation produces the very same type of effect that it critiques. In other words, its
10

Power feminism will be defined and discussed more thoroughly at the beginning of Chapter Four.
Briefly, the term refers to that branch of feminism, sometimes also referred to as ‘dominance feminism’,
which argues that inequality between men and women is itself sexualized.
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weakness or flaw is not in its assertion that sexuality is socially constructed in service of
male dominance. Its weakness is in not applying this same insight that meaning is
socially constructed to produce and perpetuate ‘technologies of power’ (including
technologies stemming from knowledge, to borrow from Foucault11) comprehensively.
While power feminism, like any theory, cannot reflect all sexual actors’ subjective
experiences, it serves as a ‘powerful’ example of how the insight into sexuality offered by
constructivist theories might be utilized in legal contexts. Power feminism offers a
political strategy that, as will be demonstrated by an examination of its intervention in the
area of sexual assault law in Canada, is/was, at a discrete moment, for a discrete segment,
of a particular society, successful. However, the social constructivism of power feminism
fails to adhere to the very process of deconstruction it sets in motion. This failure to turn
its constructivist analysis inwards creates a conceptual inconsistency. (As will be
explained in Chapter Six, it also perpetuates a link between power feminism and sexual
moralism.) Its weakness is the failure to recognize that once a social constructivist
conception of sexuality has been put into play it becomes impossible to coherently defend
an objective or Archimedean perspective on any aspect of sexuality.
This however leads to the conclusion that the critique of queer theory suggested
above (that is the suggestion that it is inherently paradoxical, and infinitely regressive
thus inhibiting its ability to provide criteria for judgment… which is needed in law12) is a
critique that actually applies to all (non-structural) social constructivist theories of
sexuality. Power feminism, once freed of its problematic structuralism, is susceptible to
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Michel Foucault, “Two Lectures”, in Michael Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and
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the same critique as is queer theory and constructivism generally. In this way queer
theory and other social constructivist approaches such as power feminism offer many of
the same insights and share many of the same conceptual difficulties.
Throughout this work a distinction is drawn between social constructivist
conceptions of sexuality and essentialist conceptions of sexuality. The argument made
throughout the remaining chapters is that legal reasoning ought to rely upon conceptions
of sexuality as socially contingent rather than arising from nature. The remainder of this
chapter will be devoted to a discussion of the basic theoretical arguments underpinning
the claim that sexuality is a social construct.
I. Sexuality As A Social Construct
Feminist writers, such as Gayle Rubin and Catharine MacKinnon began to
develop social constructivist theories of both gender and sexuality in the 1970’s and early
1980’s. The suggestion that sexuality is not an innate, naturally occurring and essential
constituent of the human individual was preceded by the feminist challenge to the
assumption that gender is an essential element of the self.13
Gayle Rubin, in her 1975 article “The Traffic of Women”, made the argument
that the biological distinctions between male and female (such as reproductive capacity)
have been transformed through social practice and systems into gender.14 She argued that
the division of labour, the sexual hierarchy both in family life and the economic and
political spheres are premised on gender differences, a cultural construct, and not sex (as
in male/female) differences. In other words, it is the cultural interpretation of the
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biological differences between male and female (i.e. gender) which have led to the
systemic oppression of women. Gender, she purported, is a cultural construct not an
essential element of the self; equality seeking feminists, she stressed, ought to be
concerned with reconstituting the meaning of gender.
MacKinnon also made one of the earliest and most significant contributions to the
development of an understanding of gender as socially constructed.15 She argued that the
categories of woman and of man were not a thing of nature. “Male is a social and
political concept, not a biological attribute. It has nothing whatever to do with inherency,
preexistence, nature, inevitability or body as such.”16 MacKinnon argued that what
‘woman’ is, is an expression of male sexual desire. She argued that the meaning of
woman is produced through cultural, social and legal institutions, norms and practices
defined and controlled by men in accord with male sexual desire – a sexual desire that is
oriented towards dominance and which correspondingly perpetuates women’s oppression.
In other words to be a woman is to be what men want and what men want is to dominate
women.17
What is often referred to as queer theory incorporated this same constructivist
approach, albeit without the structural foundation integral to feminist theories such as
MacKinnon’s, and applied it to a theory of sexuality intended to challenge those
hegemonies regulated through constructs of sexual deviance (rather than constructs of
gender and sexual difference).
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Thus in The History of Sexuality18 Michel Foucault suggested that sexuality,
sexual identities and sexual desire are products of power stemming from systems of social
and institutional organization.19 That is to say sexuality, rather than an innate human
libido, a natural urge or predisposition, is produced socially – through discourse to be
specific.
The notion of sexuality as a key component of our “true selves” is often described
in Freudian terms – the notion of sexuality as a turbulent sexual drive under which a
healthy conscience is charged with guarding against the sexual excesses of our sub
conscience. 20 Freud’s work and the essentialism of psychotherapy generally is certainly
something to which Foucault’s argument was directed. He references Freud and The
Three Essays throughout The History of Sexuality Volume I. A central theme of The
History of Sexuality Volume I, is a rejection of Freud’s ‘repressive hypothesis’ arguing
instead that what we think of as the "repression" of sexuality actually constituted
sexuality as a core feature of our identities, and produced a proliferation of discourse on
the subject. His central point was to suggest that instead of arguing in liberationist terms
- ‘look at how repressed we are about sex that we can’t even talk about it’ - we should
recognize how central sex has become to the institutional and systematic organization of
society because we can’t stop talking about it.

18
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What arises from Foucault’s theory of discursive formation is the possibility that
what constitutes the ‘essence’ of a sexual identity today might be inconsequential or
irrelevant at another time or in another culture.
In The History of Sexuality, Volume I and his two lectures on Power/Knowledge21
he described the emergence of what he identified as disciplinary and regulatory bio
power. His focus was on the social and institutional contexts in which particular bodies
of knowledge became intelligible and authoritative – hegemonic, if you will. He
suggested that, who is empowered to speak, how credibility of the speaker is assessed,
and which statements are taken seriously, delineate the formation of fields of knowledge
and in turn, these fields of knowledge govern what will and will not be the objects of
future discussion.22 He postulated that objects of discussion and investigation come into
existence only as the ability to discuss them is born. This would include the formation of
new sexual identities and sexual subjects.
Far from being only repressive, Foucault argued that the social organization of sex
– in which modern societies purported to consign sex to a “shadow existence” but then
actually “dedicated themselves to speaking of it ad infinitum, while exploiting it as the
secret”23 - was actually productive. That through the ways in which sex was socially
organized, different sexual identities were produced. Foucault suggested that most theory
and discourse concerning power has focused solely on juridical forms of power (“in
21
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political thought and analysis we still have not cut off the head of the King”24) and he
urged inquiries into the nature of power that extend beyond simply questions of
sovereignty, legitimacy and oppression. He suggested that devices of state sovereignty –
such as the courts, prisons, the army, and hospitals - have become both dependent upon,
and productive of, disciplinary and regulatory forms of power. Power relations, he
suggested, are formed through extensive, intricate social networks that do not transmit
power uni-directionally.25 That is to say, power is something exercised, not possessed. It
is a characterization of the way in which individuals and social institutions relate. Power
is not an object or an entity possessed by some and not others, but rather the relationship
of struggle. His theory of power is the foundation for his arguments regarding sexual
identity and the social regulation of sex.
For Foucault power was not simply a hierarchical system of domination but more
a pervasive and continuous web of relations between agents marked by continuous
struggle or resistance. It is not that he denied the existence of sovereign powers such as
the monarch, the father, or the judge. He acknowledged them as one type of power but
suggested that these negative forms of power have been taken over by a multitude of
productive force relations that function at a variety of levels. These disciplinary or
regulatory types of power cannot be understood within the hierarchical uni-directional
account of power contemplated by the ‘juridico-sovereign model’. Force relations do not
simply impose sanctions; they do not stand outside of the subjects employing them, and
they are instrumental to the production of knowledge.
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Foucault suggested that only thinking of power in terms of the juridical model
obfuscates all of these other power relations in our society.26 You cannot, he agued,
adequately object to the powerful effects of discipline simply by appealing to the right of
sovereignty, because discipline and sovereignty are both integral components of the
general mechanism of power in our society and these general mechanisms of power
actually produce our subjectivities.
Thus, he suggested that the species homosexualis for example, did not exist until it
had been medicalized, therapized and theorized into existence:
[S]odomy was a category of forbidden acts; their perpetrator was nothing
more than the juridical subject of them. The nineteenth-century
homosexual became a personage, a past, a case history, and a childhood,
with an indiscreet anatomy and possibly a mysterious physiology…The
sodomite had been a temporary aberration; the homosexual was now a
species.27
Social constructivists argue that this process – what Gayle Rubin called erotic
speciation – produces all sorts of erotic individuals who are then aggregated “into
rudimentary communities”.28 The modern sexual system, Rubin suggests, “contains sets
of these sexual populations, stratified by the operation of an ideological and social
hierarchy”.29
Social constructivist theories of sexuality take many forms. Janet Halley,
borrowing from Carol Vance, highlights the different varieties of social constructivism.30
There are those who claim that sexual orientation is fixed and that the categories of
heterosexual and homosexual can be found across cultures and time periods. But the
26
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meanings attached to these categories and their attendant range of activities will differ
across culture and history.31 There are those who recognize that acultural sexual
orientation categories may exist but that they are not necessarily defined by gender-ofobject choice – that “some other form or forms of human variance are primary”.32 Some
claim that the capacity for erotic pleasure is constitutive of the individual but that the
manifestation of that into a coherent sexual subject is culturally determined.33 In other
words, sexual object choice, behavioral repertoire, social meaning, emotional meaning are
all socially determined.34
The most radical social constructivists (this would include Foucault) assert that
“culture supplies the very terms for understanding bodily sex”.35 In other words, that
sexuality is prior to sex. Included in this group of most radical social constructivists are
those who argue that culture also supplies the terms for understanding bodily (genital) sex
as in male/female.
The emblematic text proposing this theory is the work of Judith Butler. Drawing
on the notion of regulatory bio-power developed by Foucault, Judith Butler argued that
the category of sex (as in male/female) itself was “part of a regulatory practice that
produces the bodies it governs, that is whose regulatory force is made clear as a kind of
productive power, the power to produce – demarcate, circulate, differentiate – the bodies
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it controls”.36 In other words, she theorized that the category of sex is itself, from the
start, “indissociable from discursive demarcations”.37 The category of sex (which is to
say, the notion of sexual differences), she suggested, is normative. Sex is not a “simple
fact or static condition of a body, but a process whereby regulatory norms materialize
“sex” and achieve this materialization through a forcible reiteration of those norms”.38
Noting historical and anthropological work that understands gender “as a relation
among socially constituted subjects in specifiable contexts” (this would include work
such as Rubin’s) Judith Butler observed that “what gender “is”, is always relative to the
constructed relations in which it is determined”.39 Butler however went further,
suggesting that not only is there “a radical discontinuity between sexed bodies and
culturally constructed genders” but moreover, gender designates “the very apparatus of
production whereby the sexes themselves are established”.40 As a result, she argued,
“gender is not to culture as sex is to nature; gender is also the discursive/cultural means
by which “sexed nature” or a “natural sex” is produced and established as
“prediscursive”…”.41 One of Butler’s central claims, then, was that sex is as culturally
constructed as gender, and that as such “the distinction between sex and gender turns out
to be no distinction at all”.42 What does all of this mean?
36
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The feminist account of the relationship between sex and gender is that sex is
biological and gender is the cultural reflection of sex. In other words sex is to female as
feminine is to gender.43 Under this account sex is a fixed biological fact; sex is part of the
“presocial ontology of persons”44, while gender is the cultural inscription upon this pregiven, and foundational biological fact. As discussed above, this understanding of the
relationship between sex and gender arose as a result of feminist challenges in the 1970’s
to the assumption that biological sex determined (caused) all of the (hierarchical) social
differences between men and women.45 The categories ‘man’ and ‘woman’, they argued,
were socially constructed. Gender, in other words, is a social construct.
Butler’s theory of gender performativity challenged this account of the
relationship between sex and gender. She argued that the concept of pre-social, or
ontological, is itself a social concept. She suggested that it is impossible to imagine a
realm outside of culture without reasoning within the realm of culture. In other words, it
is impossible to think about or understand sex outside of a cultural framework; how we
think about sex is always through a cultural lens. We haven’t the conceptual framework
to think about sex (or anything else) outside of culture. In fact, she argued, the concept of
thinking of culture outside the context of culture is itself a cultural concept. By all of this
she meant to suggest that it is culture, not biology, which is first, prior or ontological.46
As such, gender (a cultural construct) “is actually constituting the thing [sex] whose effect
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it appears to be”.47 In other words, the cultural signifiers that appear to describe someone
can actually create them (at least in part). It is the idea that a subject is formed through
acts and social context rather than by some pre-discursive (natural) foundation.
To suggest that this very radical claim met with a great deal of skepticism would
be to understate the response to Gender Trouble.48 Arguably, her theory was also greatly
misunderstood, which Butler suggested was the impetus for her second book on the issue
– Bodies That Matter – published only three years later.49 Butler’s theory of gender
performativity was taken by many to suggest that gender was some sort of freely chosen
drag performance in which each of us go to the closet each day and garb ourselves in our
chosen gender. This misunderstanding likely stems in part from a confusion between the
concept of performance and the concept of performativity which may be in part due to a
failure to understand what she means by performative.50 Butler’s idea was that gender is
created through a set of infinite and infinitesimal acts over time, on the part of the
individual and those around her both present and past. Butler did not suggest that any
given performance of gender thereby constituted gender for the performer or in general.
As she clarified in her 1999 preface to the second edition of Gender Trouble,
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“performativity is not a singular act, but a repetition and a ritual, which achieves its
effects through its naturalization in the context of a body, understood, in part, as a
culturally sustained temporal duration”.51
Butler was also criticized by some for what appeared to be her willingness to
disregard the materiality of the body, to ignore biological realities such as chromosomal
and gonadal distinctions between people. While Butler suggests that Bodies That Matter
was an effort in clarification, in it she actually softens the claim made in Gender Trouble
in a manner that suggests that its response was not simply to the misconceptions about her
theory but also to the skepticism it received. In Gender Trouble Butler suggested that
gender is actually constituting sex rather than reflecting its effect: that is, that the
materiality of sex is constructed through a ritualized repetition of gender norms. In
Bodies That Matter, she argued that in ascertaining what constitutes sex it is impossible to
know where biology ends (or begins) and the discourse constructing and regulating our
understanding of sex begins (or ends). In other words, we can not really know what the
biological component to sex is because we can only apprehend it through culture: “to
claim that discourse is formative is not to claim that it originates, causes, or exhaustively
composes that which it concedes; rather it is to claim that there is no reference to a pure
body which is not at the same time a further formation of that body.”52 Butler, at least in
Bodies That Matter, is not denying that biological differences exist. I think that, at its
most basic, what she is suggesting is that there are cultural forces at work which preclude
us from ever being able to disaggregate culture from concept. In other words, there is no
Archimedean seating at the local drag show.
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Gender, created through culture, gives meaning to bodies and in doing so
reinforces and reiterates normative understandings about sex (and gender) (and sexuality)
– thus the assertion that sex as a category constitutes the sort of regulatory ideal suggested
by Foucault. Sex, Butler suggested, is part of a regulatory practice that regulates the
bodies that it creates. The regulatory norms of sex materialize the body’s sex; they
materialize sex differences, so as, she suggested, to maintain hetero-normativity (which is
itself a cultural construct). In other words, sex difference is never simply a function of
material differences that are not in some way marked and formed by discursive practices.
Drawing upon Foucault’s suggestion that discourse is productive, that it is through
discourse that the webs of ‘force relations’ are weaved, Butler argued that regulatory
ideals of sex are perpetuated in the service of consolidating the heterosexual imperative.53
One non-theoretical example that may help to demonstrate what Butler and other
social constructivists of this genre meant to suggest is the medical community’s
traditional response to the birth of an intersex infant. In Transsexual Warriors, Leslie
Fineberg provides a caricature of the hospital room scene after an intersex baby is born:
When an intersex infant is born, the parents are confronted with a shocking
fact that violates their understanding of the world. Physicians treat the
birth of such an infant as a medical emergency. A medical team, generally
including a surgeon and an endocrinologist, is roused from bed, if need be,
and assembled to manage the situation. Intersexual bodies are rarely sick
ones; the emergency here is culturally constructed. The team analyzes the
genetic makeup, anatomy, and endocrine status of the infant, “assigns” it
male or female, and informs the parents of their child’s “true” sex. They
then proceed to enforce this sex with surgical and hormonal intervention.54
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That the conditions causing these medical emergencies are often not harmful and that the
physical abnormalities often do not give rise to functional difficulties55 suggests that the
eagerness to surgically intervene stems more from a concern over securing a certain and
stable status at the beginning of a life than from a concern about ambiguous genitalia. In
other words, it suggests that there is some cultural imperative at play.56 In other medical
circumstances doctors often wait until children are older to surgically correct congenital
abnormalities.
The medical community’s decision of which sex and gender to assign to intersex
infants is often premised on stereotypical and essentialist gender/sexuality roles which
assume that ‘to be a man’ is to possess a penis capable of penetrating a vagina and ‘to be
a woman’ is to possess a vagina with the capacity to be penetrated by a penis.57 Thus,
traditionally if an XY baby is born with a penis that is less than 2.5 centimeters when
fully stretched, the child will be surgically and hormonally altered to create female
genitalia and the parents will be told they have a girl.58 This procedure may be performed
regardless of the fact that such intervention could preclude the individual’s reproductive
abilities. If an XX infant is born with a phallus that resembles a penis rather than a
clitoris the doctors will surgically reduce the baby’s phallus even if such a procedure
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destroys the child’s future ability to experience genital sexual response.59 “In other
words, men are defined based upon their ability to penetrate females and females are
defined based upon their ability to procreate.”60 This, Butler would argue, is an example
of gender norms and regulatory ideals regarding sexuality (masculine is to penetrate,
feminine is to be penetrated) constituting male and female in service of ‘the heterosexual
imperative’. In this respect, Butler’s theory is reminiscent of MacKinnon’s assertion that
to be male is to dominate sexually (penetrate) and to be female is to be dominated
sexually (penetrated).61
In addition to theoretical arguments that claim that male/female and
feminine/masculine are socially constructed, there are also arguments asserting that
sexual orientation and sexual identity are socially constructed. Such arguments have been
the focus of queer theorists.
II.

An Introduction To Queer Theory
One particular aspect of discursive power, and its contribution to the social

construction of sexuality, is diacritically constituted knowledge. Diacritically constituted
knowledge and its implications for sexual identity and subject formation is the focus of
queer theory. Foucault alludes to it through his discussions of the tactical polyvalence of
discourses in which reverse discourses (such as gay identity) arise (and produce power).62
Butler more directly acknowledges the concept where she argues that what is considered
as normal is only cognizable because of what is identified as abnormal.
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The characteristics hailed as normal (and that enforce heterosexuality)
change over time. Therefore, one's "sex" is recognizable only to the extent
that one assumes the current socially approved characteristics.
Paradoxically, these standards--which rule everyone--enable people to
defy and/or refuse to follow the norms. The standard is defined as
"normal" only because groups of people (those who defy) are chosen to
represent what is "abnormal". 63
Queer theory has been particularly occupied with examining and challenging the
heterosexual biases implicated or manifested through binary understandings of sex and
gender. While the focus of queer theory has typically been on sexual orientation this
work is significant in any discussion regarding distinctions, legal or otherwise, between
natural and unnatural.
One of the early contributions to queer theory, and a contribution which focused
significant attention on this aspect of discursive formation, was made by Eve Kosofsky
Sedgwick in Epistemology of the Closet.64 Sedgewick suggested that heterosexuality is
an incoherent identity category that relies completely on the presence of a homosexual
identity category for its existence.65 To put it simply, the existence of homosexuality is
indispensable to those who define themselves as against it. She noted that “erotic
identity, of all things, is never to be circumscribed simply as itself, can never not be
relational, is never to be perceived or known by anyone outside of a structure of
transference and counter-transference”.66
The implications arising from Sedgwick’s insights regarding the “diacritical
frontiers between genders”67 as they relate to sexual identity formation are noteworthy. I
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have suggested elsewhere that knowing one’s place in the social order, whether that place
is one of relative privilege or not, serves two psychologically ameliorative functions.68 It
relieves one from the “anxiety of identity interrogation”69 and it helps to inform one as to
the socially agreed upon, acceptable conduct for interpersonal exchanges – the episteme
of social interaction. I argued that gender identity is produced through relational,
contextually influenced, interpretative processes. I suggested that because gender is
produced in this manner, in societies which strongly embrace static, binary conceptions of
gender, and in which social, familial, occupational, and sexual interactions are heavily
influenced by gendered social scripts, gender expressions which are ambiguous, or which
have changed since a prior interaction, or which are strongly incongruent with normative
understandings of the correlation between gender and biology, are often experienced by
others as uncomfortable, if not disruptive.
Examples of the manner in which this operates today may be found in the social,
political and legal response to bi-sexual identity claims and transgender expressions or
claims. In identifying what he described as bisexual erasure by both heterosexuals and
gays and lesbians, Kenji Yoshino offered as one motivating factor for this erasure their
shared investment in stabilizing group identities by eradicating the threat to these
identities that he suggested is posed by bisexuality.70 “In a world that denies bisexual
existence, cross-sex desire and same-sex desire are mutually exclusive. This means that
the presence of cross-sex desire ipso facto negates the presence of same-sex desire, and
68

Elaine Craig, “Trans-phobia and the Relational Production of Gender” (2006) 18(2) Hastings Women’s
Law Journal 101. I suggested that in order to reduce the disruption experienced as a result of this
uncertainty static, binary understandings of gender must be re-conceptualized.
69
This phrase is borrowed from Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, (2000) 52
Stan. L. Rev. 353 at 362.
70
Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, supra note 69. Yoshino argued that bisexuals
pose an identity threat both to heterosexuals and gays and lesbians and that this serves as one of the factors
motivating both groups to render bisexuality invisible.

36

vice versa.”71 He argued that the existence of bisexuality, however, calls into question
the sexual orientation of the self. It does so, he suggested, by disrupting the ‘bifurcated
identification strategies’ deployed by gays and straights to understand their sexualities;
bisexuality disrupts their identity categories thus depriving them of the comfort members
of all groups take “in knowing their place in the social order”.72
With respect to the implications of binary thinking on identity formation and
identity maintenance one earlier theorist ought to be discussed. While much of queer
theory literature attributes its beginnings to Michel Foucault, Judith Butler and Eve
Kosofsky Sedgwick, the exclusionary result of binary identity models was also noted in
the 1960s by sociologist Mary McIntosh.73 McIntosh, in a 1968 examination of the social
construction of sexuality, suggested that both heterosexuals and homosexuals are invested
in conceptualizing homosexuality as a condition “[f]or just as rigid categorization deters
people from drifting into deviancy, so it appears to foreclose on the possibility of drifting
back into normality and thus removes the element of anxious choice (emphasis added)”.74
This analysis can also be applied in examining responses to gender transgression.
Judith Halberstam suggests that “[t]ransgender may indeed be considered a term of
relationality; it describes not simply an identity but a relation between people, within a
community, or within intimate bonds”.75 She notes that transgender is an important term
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not just for those “who want to reside outside of categories all together but to people who
want to place themselves in the way of particular forms of recognition”.76
Not unlike the perceived threat to sexual identity posed by the bisexual, the
existence of transgenderism challenges dyadic and biological, genitally determined
understandings of gender and sexuality. In a world in which each of us is supposed to be
either a man or woman, identifying to which of ‘the two gender categories’ another
individual belongs affirms one’s understanding of within which category one’s own
gender may be located.77 Under a binary understanding of gender, and because gender is
produced relationally, the very fact that one cannot easily or instantly determine whether
another individual is ‘the same’ as them or ‘the opposite’ of them disrupts affirmation of
one’s own gender categorization.78 This internal disruption is ultimately reflected in
one’s negative outward response. In this way, gender conformity is subtly, and
constantly, socially rewarded. Gender transgression is subtly (and often not so subtly)
and constantly socially discouraged. This is an example of the way in which diacritical
models of knowing, or discursive formations founded on ‘diacritical frontiers’, socially
construct, and then proceed to regulate, the very dyads they describe.
Conclusion
Sexual essentialism understands sexuality as unchanging, ahistorical and asocial
or pre-social. Essentialists maintain that sexuality is a property of individuals, and is
without social determinants. If sexuality is pre-social what is its origin or source? For an
essentialist the source of sexuality must be nature. Indeed, the assumption “that our
sexuality is the most natural thing about us” is deeply embedded in the social
76
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consciousness, at least in the modern western world. Whether founded on Christian
doctrine79 or sexual science,80 an essentialist approach understands sexuality as
spontaneous and as natural.
The chapter to follow will demonstrate the problem when law adopts this
naturalistic fallacy as the story of human sexuality. If sexuality is rooted in nature then it
will always and forever be understood, measured and evaluated through one specific
dyadic episteme: natural versus unnatural.
As will be discussed, there are a number of problems with legal conceptions of
sexuality that understand it as pre-social. First, it is a problem because “we learn very
early on from many sources that ‘natural’ sex is what takes place with members of the
‘opposite sex’. ‘Sex’ between people of the ‘same sex’ is therefore, by definition,
‘unnatural’.”81 In other words, as Jeffrey Weeks argues, every sexual act, desire or
identity is understood through and measured against a heterosexual paradigm.
Underpinning an essentialist conception of sexuality is a heterosexist conception of
sexuality. This is a conception in which same sex desire is and will always be not simply
abnormal but unnatural.
Not only does a conceptual framework which at its core understands sexuality
through a heterosexual paradigm entrench same sex desire and identity as unnatural, it
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also entrenches the notion of sexual difference thus polarizing the distinction between
men and women:
[T]here is a continuing assumption of a sharp distinction and polarization
between ‘the sexes’, a dichotomy of interests, even an antagonism (‘the
battle of the sexes’) which can only be precariously bridged. Men are men
and women are women – and this is truth embodied in the dominant
structures of heterosexuality, from which everything else falls away.82

Jeffrey Weeks notes that a naturalistic understanding of sexuality also leads to the
conception that “‘sex’ is an overpowering natural force, a biological imperative
mysteriously located in the genitals”.83 He argues that this too gives rise to a
“pyramidical model of sex, to a sexual hierarchy stretching downwards from the
apparently Nature-endowed correctness of heterosexual genital intercourse to the bizarre
manifestations of ‘the perverse’.”84
A third difficulty with a legal understanding of sexuality as pre-social or naturally
occurring is that it, to some extent, obfuscates the ability to perceive the relational,
contextual and institutional factors which contribute to the regulation of sexuality by
overemphasizing biology, heterosexual arousal, romance, and sexual morality (rather than
political morality). Legal conceptions of sexuality founded on essentialism tend to focus
the law’s moral compass on sexual acts rather than sexual interactions.85
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A final difficulty with an essentialist understanding of sexuality is that it evinces
an air of inevitability – if not an abdication of power then at least a concession that
changes to gendered and sexualized hierarchies are and will always be to some extent
bounded by parameters beyond or external to the choices, practices, beliefs and epistemes
that presently operate in this society.
The alternative, or one alternative, is the view of sexuality put forth by
constructivist theorists. It is an understanding of sexuality not simply as a biological fact
or naturally occurring phenomenon that can be repressed or suppressed but rather a
complex series of interactions and relationships, a “historically shaped series of
possibilities, actions, behaviors, desires, risks, identities norms and values that can be
reconfigured and recombined but not simply unleashed”.86
This is not to suggest that sexuality does not exist. Nor is it to suggest that
biological and mental factors, or the materiality of the body do not contribute to the
concept of sexuality. “All the constituent elements of sexuality have their source either in
the body or the mind…But the capacities of the body and the psyche are given meaning
only in social relations.”87 Rather it is to suggest that sexuality is as much a social
product as is food, language or familial structure.
This is not a particularly radical claim. Sexual behavior, sexual identity, and
sexual norms will logically vary across culture, religion, climate, class, economic
conditions and time. For example, sexual practices might vary somewhat in warm
climates from what they will be in cold ones, just as they may vary in cultures where
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large amounts of alcohol are consumed from cultures that tend to imbibe less. Changes in
economic and political structure will bring changes to sexual practices and sexual
identities.88 Sexual practices may be different in societies whose norm it is for couples to
live with one’s extended family than in those where single-family households are the
norm. They may vary depending upon availability and knowledge of birth control,
prevalence of sexually transmitted infections, or male to female ratio. They could be
different in twenty-first century western society, where personal hygiene involves daily
cleansing, than they were in the 16th century tenements of Europe.
In fact, less intuitive is the assertion in light of all of this, that sexuality is
something more than the product of social patterns, normative distinctions and the
development of meaning though choices and practices. So it is not a particularly radical
claim to assert that sexuality is particularized…that it is socially contingent. What is
perhaps a more significant claim is the assertion made in the chapter to follow that the
law ought to conceptualize, and correspondingly treat, sexuality as a socially contingent
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social good. This approach, I will argue, better enables the law to remain open to the
infinite re-articulation of sex, gender and sexuality norms while at any given moment
draw distinctions and make judgments about how best to protect individual sexual
integrity.
Queer theorists claim that the categories of sexual orientation, and the
categorization of sexual acts as natural or unnatural are socially constructed. A queer, or
constructivist, approach to sexuality understands sexuality as “a social fact deeply
embedded in the cultural and linguistic forms of many, many decades”.89 In other words,
a complex social phenomena produced through a combination of factors including,
depending on the degree of constructivism embraced, aspects of particular subjectivities,
social relationships, cultural practices and institutional structures. Gayle Rubin’s
distinction between sex and gender, Catharine MacKinnon’s power feminist assertion that
sexuality is prior to gender, Judith Butler’s theory of gender performativity, Eve KofskySedgwick’s assertion that the diacritical frontiers upon which understandings of sexuality
currently rely are socially contingent, Michel Foucault’s genealogy of sexuality and
Jeffrey Weeks’ histography of sexuality are all part of the same project. It is a project
oriented towards examining what sexual norms have become dominant and regulative,
and understanding how these social and cultural understandings of sexuality constitute the
relationship between sexuality and power, and the systemic or institutional forces which
regulate and further shape what sexuality is today and what it will be tomorrow.
In examining the intersection of law and sexuality the question becomes how the
law understands sexuality? Do courts tend to approach sexuality as an innate, unchanging
and essential element of who we are as individuals – the ‘truth of the self’ - or as a
89
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historically and culturally contingent social phenomena? More importantly, what are the
legal implications of the ways in which the law conceptualizes sexuality? How do
conceptions of sexuality inform, influence and impact the law?
A review of Supreme Court of Canada cases in different legal contexts – the
section 15 equality claims of sexual minorities, sexual harassment cases, admission of
similar fact evidence in sexual assault trials, and the criminalization of child pornography
– demonstrate that the Court often understands sexuality through an essentialist
perspective.
The cases discussed in the next chapter reveal that the Court considers sexual
object choice to be both unchanging and an element of one’s true self. Many of the cases
also reveal a tendency on the part of the Court to categorize sexual acts as either ‘natural’
or ‘unnatural’. But the cases show something more. They show that when the Court
operates under an essentialist understanding of any aspect of sexuality – including but
also beyond the issue of sexual object choice – the legal ‘space’ in which to identify the
social forces, and contextual factors contributing to or producing many aspects of human
sexuality is significantly constricted. An essentialist understanding of sex and sexuality
conceals the sexual harassment of boys and men by heterosexual men; it precludes rights
recognition for those sexual minorities that cannot or will not assimilate to the dominate
norm of ‘monogamy and immutable sexual object choice’; it precludes a re-valuing of
same sex desire; it obscures the relationship between poverty, alcoholism, lack of
education and child sexual abuse.
As discussed in the next chapter, when adopted by the law, essentialist
conceptions of sexuality justify the hierarchical distribution of legal rights and privileges
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based on sexual object choice, render some victims (and perpetrators) invisible, and reify
problematic distinctions between men and women. This focus on the biological, on
genitals, on sex as a force of nature to be contained or liberated (depending on one’s
perspective) also drives the law’s traditional concern with, and moral focus on, sexual
acts rather than sexual actors. A moral focus on sexual acts rather than sexual actors, as
will argued throughout the remaining chapters, is less capable of promoting and
protecting sexual integrity as a common good.
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Chapter 3 – Natural Categories and Non-Categorical Approaches To Sexuality

Having discussed in the previous chapter the distinction between essentialist and
constructivist conceptions of sexuality, this chapter will examine legal contexts in which
the Supreme Court of Canada’s reasoning reveals an essentialist approach towards
sexuality. The objective is to demonstrate that across legal contexts an essentialist
conception of sexuality contributes to legal reasoning which fails to account for the social
contingency of sexuality. A failure to account for the social contingency of sexuality is
problematic for different reasons across different legal contexts. The chapter will begin
with an examination of similar fact evidence in sexual assault trials. These cases
demonstrate that courts often (problematically) rely on an essentialist conception of those
who sexually assault children. Following this will be a brief discussion of the criminal
regulation of child pornography and the way in which, here too, the Court’s essentialist
conception of ‘the pedophile’ is revealed. This section will argue that such a conceptual
approach fails to develop a legal discourse or promote legal strategies to address the
social factors that perpetuate the sexual victimization of children. Next will be discussed
the way in which equality rights for gays and lesbians have been achieved through a
categorical approach to equality which emphasizes sexual identity as an innate and
essential aspect of one’s self. This is an achievement that has benefited some sexual
minorities. It is also an approach to equality that has been criticized for not being
transformative enough. Finally the chapter will examine the issue of sexual harassment,
demonstrating how an essentialist conception of sexuality identifies male heterosexual
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arousal as the cause of sexual harassment; such a conceptual approach fails to adequately
emphasize the contextual and relational factors associated with sexual hostility and
obscures the sexual harassment of boys and men by other boys and men.
I. ‘The Rapist’ And ‘The Pedophile’ – Natural Deformities Or Human Products?
How does the Court approach concepts such as rape, sexual assault, child sexual
abuse, ‘the pedophile’, and ‘the rapist’? What does it mean to suggest that the Court
adopts reasoning that tends towards an essentialist conception of those who sexually
violate children – a conception in which those who sexually offend against children are
understood to have an innate, pre-social disposition oriented towards this type of sexual
violence and in which the problem of child sexual abuse itself is understood as pre-social,
acontextual?
Foucault’s discussion of the 19th century France village idiot who molests one of
the village girls, and is then arrested for his simple, ‘bucolic pleasures’ and forced to
spend the rest of his life speaking about them to the police, the courts, the doctors… is
one of the central images in The History of Sexuality: An Introduction. Foucault writes of
this incident:
[w]hat is the significant thing about this story? The pettiness of it all; the
fact that this everyday occurrence in the life of village sexuality, these
inconsequential bucolic pleasures, could become from a certain time, the
object not only of a collective intolerance but of judicial action, a medical
intervention, a careful clinical examination, and an entire theoretical
elaboration… So it was that our society … assembled around these
timeless gestures, these barely furtive pleasures between simple minded
adults and alert children, a whole machinery for speechifying, analyzing
and investigating.1
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Foucault’s claim was that the intervention of the many and sundry officials and
less simple-minded adults changed what was a harmless and ‘barely furtive pleasure’ into
a discourse which then socially constructed this behavior as a particular understanding of
sexual deviance. That is to say, the interaction between the child and the half-wit
becomes understood as a sexual one – a sexually deviant one – because of the ‘truths’
spoken about it. Foucault’s description/theorization of their interaction makes two
interrelated constructivist claims. The first suggests the social construction of ‘the
victim’. The second suggests the social construction of ‘the offender’.
i) Foucault’s Precocious Child
Robin West critiques Foucault’s discussion of this interaction, noting that in all
the attention given to the ensuing discourses swirling around the village idiot “neither the
French officials, nor Foucault himself, nor the vast majority of social and legal critics he
has influenced, have yet heard scarcely a word from the child who was molested in that
eerie scene…”.2 She asks whether it is actually pleasures that are transformed into
discourse. “Is it as true of the “alert child” as it is of the half-wit? Or is this Foucauldian
“truth” about how “natural-pleasure-is-transformed-into-socially-constructed-sexuality”
only maintainable because of the alert child’s silence?”3 This question is a good one.
Whose truth are we to believe? The Village Officials’ or Foucault’s? It reveals the way
in which Foucault’s work is at once both a description and manifestation of that which he
proposes to describe. It would be impossible for it not to be such. Foucault’s anecdote
and West’s critique of the analysis drawn from it reveal both the use and limitations of
queer theory – an issue to be discussed at greater length in Chapter Seven.

2
3

Robin West, Caring For Justice, (New York University Press: New York, 1997) at 272.
Ibid. at 273.
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Foucault’s observation that both what we understand to be sexual interactions and
how we understand those sexual interactions are socially constructed through discourse is
noteworthy.4 It is an important observation because it provides a theoretical framework
from which to challenge dominant conceptions about sexuality. It is a framework that
readily allows one to argue, for example, that neither homosexuality nor female
promiscuity are inherently harmful nor self-destructively perverted. It is a framework
that has much to contribute to claims of sexual liberty, and perhaps even substantive
sexual equality. Methodologically, as will be discussed in Chapter Eight, it provides
important insight into the account of sexual integrity that I develop throughout this work.
As referenced in the section below regarding sexual harassment, his discursive theory
offers insight into the ways in which sex, gender and sexuality norms act as (and
constitute themselves through) regulatory mechanisms in institutional settings. It is an
analytical framework which allows Robin West to point out that his analysis is not quite
right –that it leaves out a very large and important piece of ‘the truth’ – the (lack of)
discursive contribution of the young girl.5 It is noteworthy because its description permits

4

Certainly the concept of child, at its fringes, is in this context socially determined. A thirteen year old
Canadian may experience sexual interactions with an adult very differently now than in 1870. See for
example Carol Smart, “A History of Ambivalence and Conflict in the Discursive Construction of the “Child
Victim” of “Sexual Abuse” (1999) Social & Legal Studies 391 at 393:
Sociologically speaking, it would seem that we can now easily accept the idea that the extension
of schooling to children in this century changed childhood. However, the idea that extending the
age of consent for girls from 13 to 16 years old in 1885 also changed the nature of childhood is
less easily grasped. We tend to think that it was self-evident that a 13-year-old could not consent
and was too immature for sex. In fact this was not then self-evident at all. Rather we ought to
understand the extent to which the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 1885 was part of a new
construction of modern childhood. It created and extended a particular, historically and culturally
specific type of childhood to the age of 16 in much the same way as the Education Acts did
subsequently.
This point is interesting. It reveals not only the fact that ‘childhood’ is a social construct but also the very
significant role that law specifically plays in socially constructing it.
5
While West is certainly not writing from a post modern perspective, but rather a cultural feminist one, the
structure of Foucault’s argument does create the space in which to observe those social actors not
contributing to the discursive formation of sexuality.
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one to examine, as will be done in the discussion to follow, how the law contributes to the
conception of the village half-wit.
But it is only an account of social meaning (formation).6 It describes a process one aspect of how societies come to be organized, understood and regulated. However,
whether or not the ‘subject is dead’ so to speak,7 does not change the fact that one cannot
be extracted from one’s context and so in the context in which the discussion to follow is
situated, whether sex with children only causes harm because society has constructed it as
harmful or whether it causes harm for some innate and pre-social reason which was
subsequently labeled harmful is normatively irrelevant.
There are two counter points to this assertion that should be noted. First, while it
may not be normatively relevant in this discussion of sexual assault law generally – where
harm is presumed and where the primary inquiry is into the social construction of the
offender– is it not relevant to, for example, a NAMBLA argument about lowering the age
of consent?8
No, not necessarily. At least not in the example I have just given. NAMBLA’s
argument is not that sex between adult men and pubescent boys is only harmful because

6

Of course, according to its own precepts it is at once a description and a contribution to the discourse (and
discursive meaning formation) that it describes. This point isn’t intended as a critique but merely an
observation. It is this observation that explains both why Foucault’s work is at once both a description and
if one accepts the description, a manifestation of that which he supposedly describes and why it would be
impossible for it not to be such.
7
This is the notion that there is no doer behind the deed – all there is, is the deed. Judith Butler, borrowing
from Nietzsche, makes this suggestion in Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, 2nd ed
(Routledge: New York, 1990) at 33. She quotes Nietzsche’s assertion in On the Genealogy of Morals that
“there is no ‘being’ behind the doing, effecting, becoming; ‘the doer’ is merely a fiction added to the deed –
the deed is everything.” Applying this in the context of gender, Butler suggests we might state as a
corollary that “[t]here is no gender identity behind the expressions of gender; that identity is performatively
constituted by the very “expressions” that are said to be its results”. (See Chapter 2 for a discussion of
Butler’s theory of gender performativity)
8
NAMBLA is the North American Man/Boy Love Association. They advocate for an end to "the
oppression of men and boys who have freely chosen mutually consenting relationships". See
www.nambla.org.
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society has socially constructed it as such. NAMBLA’s argument is that it is not harmful
to boys but rather beneficial for them. The issue in the NAMBLA example turns on
whose account/argument regarding the fact of, or potential for, harm is more persuasive.9
This is an argument that should be had. It is particularly an argument that should be had
regarding issues of sexual conduct that exist in the currently potentially grey areas at the
ends of social/sexual regulatory spectrums such as age, degree of consanguinity, or nature
of commodification. While the law can and should question, critique and challenge
assumptions about sexual harm and the criteria by which it assesses harm, and while what
is harmful now might not always be harmful and an approach to sexuality should
accommodate this ‘truth’, my point at this stage is that it does not matter for my argument
whether sex with children is inherently harmful or harmful because of social context. I
can presume it harmful without relying on essentialist reasoning.
In Canada, the law presumes that a young girl who, under coercion, bribery or
even just encouragement, manually ejaculates a grown man, is sexually violated – that
she suffers harm.10 Whether that harm is the manifestation of a socially constructed
victim discourse, or rather some innate and instinctively felt loss of dignity, and bodily
and personal autonomy, Foucault might have agreed that in the here and now the young
girl’s sexual integrity was compromised. The process by which the harm came to ‘be’
9

Now this raises the question, but isn’t scope of harm (beyond perhaps pure physical harm) itself socially
constructed? As demonstrated in Chapter Seven, queer theory, with its infinite regression, does not have a
good response to this counterargument. My response to this counterargument is found in chapter 8. It is
not a perfect response – but then thrust of it is that it does not need to be a perfect response – it need only be
open to perfection.
10
While the Court has established that Parliament may criminalize conduct for purposes other than the
prevention of harm (see R. v. Malmo-Levine [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571) it would be a stretch to suggest that the
justification underpinning most sexual offences is not some version of the harm principle. The most
obvious justification for the offence of sexual assault is the presumption that nonconsensual sex is harmful
– whether that harm is theorized as a violation of autonomy, equality or property interest (for a modern day
argument regarding the latter as justification see Donald Dripps, “Beyond Rape: An Essay On the
Difference Between The Presence of Force and The Absence of Consent” (1992) 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1780.)
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may very well be socially constructed. However, the harm is real. Given that social
constructivists do not necessarily assume that a social concept is more readily changed
than is an inherent one, it is not theoretically inconsistent to stake this claim and still
pursue a constructivist project of inquiry and theorization.
The second counterargument would be that this claim suggests a very problematic
approach in terms of sexual liberty and non-majoritarian sexual interests. For example,
doesn’t my argument suggest then that whatever society labels harmful is, in the context
of that society, harmful? Again the answer is no. This counterargument misconstrues
constructivist claims; it miscalculates both the lengthy process through which conduct
may come to be understood as – and therefore be - harmful and the degree of
entrenchment, stability and permanency this process creates and sustains. It is a
misapprehension analogous to the one discussed in Chapter Two regarding the
assumption that if sexual object preference – i.e. sexual orientation – is socially
constructed this means that it is easily and readily changed.11 A legislative, adjudicative,
religious, political or pedagogical statement or declaration that behavior X is harmful
does not socially construct harm anymore than a drag show, fashion show or wedding
socially constructs gender. If harm is socially constructed it is constructed, as Butler
would likely say, through the infinite and reiterative citation of norms and social
practices… of which legislative, adjudicative, religious, political or pedagogical
11

One might follow this point by saying, well if this is true of sexual assault victims and ‘homosexuals’ is it
not equally true of those who sexually assault children? This may well be true of individual sexual actors
who sexually assault children (or adults). This does not change the argument. It only raises the following
question: if one accepts that harm and pedophiles are contextually produced and socially contingent and
one acknowledges that there should nonetheless be efforts at changing this circumstance – since the harm is
real - the choice becomes to start talking differently about one or the other (or both). My argument
regarding the discursive production of ‘the pedophile’ is that to change the discourse regarding sexual
offenders would first entail recognizing that there are social and contextual factors that perpetuate this
behavior rather than innate biological deviations. Recognizing these factors- starting with a legal discourse
that acknowledges them –seems to me a good idea.
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statements would be a part. Sexual liberty and non-majoritarian interests, as will be
discussed in Chapter Eight, can be protected – at least to some degree - by critical, open
ended engagement with the criteria by which the law assesses harm.
ii) Foucault’s Village Idiot
It is the second constructivist claim found in Foucault’s passage regarding the
village idiot, and throughout Volume I, which is the main focus of this section of Chapter
Three. The second claim is that just as the homosexual was speechified into existence so
too were other types of ‘perverts’ - namely the sex offender. The suggestion that the
child molester as a species is socially constructed is not a conceptual perspective that has
revealed itself in the law’s approach to those who sexually offend against children.
Rather, an examination of two different areas of law –similar fact evidence in sexual
assault cases and the Court’s approach to the criminal regulation of child pornography –
suggest an essentialist conception of those who commit sexual offences – in particular
those who sexually abuse children. Such a conception understands those who sexually
abuse children as having an innate sexual orientation or sexual predisposition towards
children. In this way child sexual abuse is often considered a function of the innate
perverted arousal of a discrete minority. While the ‘pedophile’ has been, and continues to
be, treated by law as a member of a discrete and identifiable sexual minority, the ‘rapist’
does not. As discussed in Chapter Four, the case law concerning the definition of sexual
assault and the definition of consent in the last fifteen years suggests that the Court has
shifted, perhaps in part due to particular feminist interventions, towards a more
constructivist approach with respect to the perpetrators of sexual assault against adults. In
fact, even when an essentialist understanding of sexual violence against adults was more
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typical, the essentialist assumption tended to be that the sexual assault was a function of
an unnatural or uncontrollable sexual arousal rather than an unnatural or uncontrollable
sexual pervert.12 It may be that the natural/unnatural distinction is more pronounced in
the context of intergenerational sex thus making essentialist thinking more entrenched in
this context.
The next section will review cases dealing with similar fact evidence in sexual
assault cases. The section to follow will examine the Court’s approach to the criminal
regulation of child pornography.
II.

Similar Fact Evidence
The law surrounding the introduction of similar fact evidence has developed in

large measure in the context of sexual assault cases.13 While earlier cases involved wives
in bathtubs14 and babies in the backyard15 for several decades now, both in the United
Kingdom16 and in Canada17, the leading precedents concerning this evidentiary issue have
involved cases of sexual assault.18 It is an evidentiary issue that arises in criminal trials

12

See for example R. v. Dick, Penner and Finnigan, 1965] 1 CCC 171 at para. 39 where the court refers to
the accused’s animal lust in describing his rape of an adult woman.
13
This was true even before many of the more recent Supreme Court of Canada cases were released. Lynn
Hanson made the observation in 1993. Lynn Hanson, “Sexual Assault and The Similar Fact Rule” (1993)
27 U. Brit. Colum. L. Rev. 51.
14
R. v. Smith (1915), 84 L.J. K.B. 2153.
15
Makin v. Attorney-General for New South Whales (1893), [1894] A.C. 57.
16
R. v. Horwood, [1970] 1 Q.B. 133; D.P.P. v. Boardman, [1975] A.C. 421 (C.A.)
17
R. v. D.(L.E.). (1989), 71 C.R. (3d) (S.C.C.); R. v. B.(C.R.)., infra note 38; R. v. C.(M.H.)., infra note 47;
R. v. B.(F.F.), infra note 56; R. v. Handy, supra note 21.
18
This is not coincidental. Developments in the laws surrounding sexual assault, such as the fact that
consent is now determined based on the subjective perspective of the complainant thus making lack of
consent part of the actus reus, as well as the factual circumstances in which sexual assaults typically occur
(i.e. in private), mean that in many sexual assault trials assessments of credibility will often determine the
outcome: ‘he said – she said’ or ‘he said- he said’ has become the face of sexual assault prosecution in
Canada. Given the burden of proof in criminal cases and given the frequency with which the complainants
involved are children or other less than optimal witnesses it is unsurprising that similar fact evidence has
come to play such an important part in the prosecution of sexual assault offences. For an explanation
premised less on doctrinal changes to sexual assault law and more on feminist analysis of sexual assault law
generally see Hanson, “Sexual Assault and The Similar Fact Rule”, supra note 13. She argues that what
she describes as an overrepresentation of similar fact issues in sexual assault cases is due to factors
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regarding any type of offence; nevertheless case law determining its admissibility has
been, at least in recent times, developed almost exclusively in the context of sexual
assault cases.
What is similar fact evidence and why is it pertinent to a discussion regarding how
law conceptualizes sexual deviancy? To properly explore the ways in which the Court’s
treatment of propensity based reasoning reflects the Court’s conceptions of sexuality in
the context of sexual violation, it is necessary to review in brief this complex area of
evidentiary law – both in terms of its jurisprudential history and as it stands today.
Similar fact evidence is factual evidence of the past misconduct of an accused (or
opposing party) proffered for the purpose of inferring that the accused committed the
misconduct at issue in the trial.19 The issue of similar fact evidence typically arises in the
criminal law context when the Crown seeks to introduce prior bad acts as circumstantial
evidence to establish the following inference: if the accused committed the prior bad acts
suggested by the similar fact evidence then by inference he is also likely to have
committed the act with which he is currently charged. It is presumptively not admissible
under the “general exclusionary rule of evidence which prohibits the Crown or a party
from adducing evidence of bad character of the accused…”.20 The principle behind this
rule is that individuals accused of a crime are to be convicted based on evidence showing
that they committed the crime and not evidence showing that they are a bad person.21

including “the historical tendency of the courts to doubt sexual complainants and to search for corroborative
evidence; the perceived lack of credibility of some complainants; the law’s tendency to confine analysis to a
restricted set of facts and to view incidents as discrete events in isolation from their context…”.
19
John Sopinka, Sidney Lederman & Alan Bryant, The Law of Evidence in Canada, 2nd ed. (Toronto:
Butterworths, 1999) at 523.
20
Ibid.
21
In R. v. Handy [2002] 2 SCR 908. Justice Binnie suggests that behind the presumptive inadmissibility of
similar fact evidence is a recognition of “the difficulty of containing the effects of such information which,
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However, in what the Court has described as exceptional circumstances, similar fact
evidence is admissible if it is relevant to an issue in the case and its probative value
outweighs its prejudicial effect.22
Establishing what these exceptional circumstances will be, and what the actual
probative value of similar fact evidence is, has been a matter of considerable academic
discussion and judicial consideration. The main point of contestation and confusion, and
the point that is of significance to this discussion, concerns the issue of propensity
reasoning. The issue of evidence adduced to show that the accused has a propensity to
act in the very same manner with which he is now accused of acting has been difficult for
courts to address; the issue of reasoning based on propensity is of particular relevance to a
discussion concerning legal notions about innate, essential human (sexual) nature.
i) Evolution Of The Similar Fact Rule
once dropped like poison in the juror's ear, 'swift as quicksilver it courses through the natural gates and
alleys of the body.'" Justice Binnie’s quote is taken from the following passage of Shakespeare’s Hamlet:
Upon my secure hour thy uncle stole,
With juice of cursed hebenon in a vial,
And in the porches of my ears did pour
The leperous distilment; whose effect
Holds such an enmity with blood of man
That swift as quicksilver it courses through
The natural gates and alleys of the body,
And with a sudden vigour doth posset
And curd, like eager droppings into milk,
The thin and wholesome blood: so did it mine;
And a most instant tetter bark'd about,
Most lazar-like, with vile and loathsome crust,
All my smooth body.
The lines are those of King Hamlet’s Ghost, who is describing his own death at the hands of “that
incestuous, that adulterate beast…” his brother Claudius. Hamlet, in this passage and throughout the play
as a whole, is laden with incestuous overtones, corporeal metaphors involving bodily invasion, and
allusions to sex as diseased and infectious. Given the factual circumstance in Handy (accusations of sexual
assault) and more significantly in the law of similar fact evidence generally (i.e. the great preponderance of
which involves cases concerning sexual assault and child sexual abuse) in conjunction with the analysis to
follow regarding the Court’s essentialist conception of certain forms of sexual assault (in particular those
involving children who have a familial relationship with the accused) this particular quote was a rather
poignant selection on the part of Justice Binnie.
22
See for example R. v. Arp, [1998] 3 SCR 339.
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To understand what the Court’s approach to propensity based reasoning reveals
about their conceptions regarding the perpetrators of sexual offences, it is necessary to
understand the conundrum historically presented by the similar fact rule. In an effort to
ensure that people are tried for what they have done, not for who they are, courts for
nearly a century cited the Privy Council decision in Makin v New South Whales (Attorney
General).23

Lord Herschell in Makin held that:

It is undoubtedly not competent for the prosecution to adduce evidence
tending to shew that the accused has been guilty of criminal acts other than
those covered by the indictment, for the purpose of leading to the
conclusion that the accused is a person likely from his criminal conduct or
character to have committed the offence for which he is being tried. On
the other hand, the mere fact that the evidence adduced tends to shew the
commission of other crimes does not render it inadmissible if it be relevant
to an issue before the jury, and it may be so relevant if it bears upon the
question whether the acts alleged to constitute the crime charged in the
indictment were designed or accidental, or to rebut a defence which would
otherwise be open to the accused.24

This quote was interpreted by courts to mean that similar fact evidence was permissible in
certain circumstances but only where its use came within one of a number of
predetermined categories. The categorical approach softened over time25 and eventually
the courts came to view the rule as stipulating that “evidence which tends to show bad
character or a criminal disposition on the part of the accused is admissible if (1) relevant
to some other issue beyond disposition or character, and (2) the probative value
outweighs the prejudicial effect”.26 However as Justice Rosenberg points out, this

23

Supra note 15.
Ibid. at 65
25
Guay v. The Queen, [1979] 1 SCR 18; D.P.P. v. Boardman, supra note 16.
26
See Marc Rosenberg, “Similar Fact Evidence” in Special Lectures 2003: The Law of Evidence (Irwin:
Toronto, 2003) 391.
24
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articulation of the rule created a conundrum.27 Hamish Stewart summarizes well the
conundrum presented by the application of the Privy Council’s articulation of the similar
fact rule in Makin:
…evidence of the accused’s prior discreditable conduct is not admissible if
it is relevant only to show that he is more likely to have committed a crime
because he is a bad person; to be admissible the evidence must have
probative value on another issue which outweighs the danger that it will
be used for the improper purpose of inferring guilt from bad character. As
has often been pointed out, the rule in this form creates something of a
conundrum: if evidence of the accused’s prior bad acts is ever relevant, it
would seem that its relevance would derive from showing his bad
character; yet the evidence is said not to be admissible on that ground.28

The Supreme Court of Canada is said to have resolved this conundrum in its 2002
decision in R. v. Handy by acknowledging that it is propensity based reasoning which
constitutes the probative value of similar fact evidence.29
The next statement by the Court regarding similar fact evidence came in 2002 in
Handy. Handy remains the leading precedent on the similar fact evidence rule in Canada.
The accused in Handy was charged with sexual assault causing bodily harm. The
complainant alleged that while she had consented to vaginal intercourse with the accused
she had not consented to painful, aggressive sex or to anal intercourse. The accused and
the complainant had met at a bar the night of the incident. The two drove to a motel with
the intention of having sex. While engaged in vaginal intercourse the complainant
alleged that she became upset and asked the accused to stop because he was hurting her
by forcing himself into her. She testified that he refused to stop and then brusquely

27

Rosenberg, supra note 26.
Hamish Stewart, “Rationalizing Similar Facts: A Comment on R v Handy”(2003) 8 Can. Crim. L. Rev.
113 at 114.
29
Handy, supra note 21. See Rosenberg, “Similar Fact Evidence”, supra note 26; Stewart, “Rationalizing
Similar Facts”, ibid.
28
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switched to anal intercourse. She said she tried to fight him off and that he punched and
choked her. The accused’s defence was that the sex was consensual. “The issue thus
came down to credibility on the consent issue.”30
The Crown sought to introduce similar fact evidence from the accused’s ex-wife
to establish that he had a “propensity to inflict painful sex and when aroused will not take
no for an answer.”31 His ex-wife testified to a number of incidents of violence in which
the accused forced her to have painful vaginal intercourse or anal intercourse. She also
testified as to incidents of choking and other violence.
Justice Binnie determined that the similar fact evidence should not have been
admitted based primarily on the issue of possible collusion but also based on Justice
Charron’s finding (in the Ontario Court of Appeal) that “[w]hile the acts alleged by the
ex-wife took place during a conjugal, long-term relationship, the acts alleged by the
complainant took place during a short casual affair that began with her consent.”32 With
respect to the issue of collusion, several months before the alleged incident the ex-wife
had told the complainant about compensation she had received from the Criminal Injuries
Compensation Board for abuse she alleged that Handy had inflicted. She told the
complainant that “[a]ll you had to do [to get the money] was say that you were abused.”33
In Handy Justice Binnie established an analytical framework for assessing the
admissibility of similar fact evidence. He noted that evidence of other (presumptively
inadmissible) discreditable conduct may be admitted where the prosecution establishes
"that in the context of a particular case the probative value of the evidence in relation to a
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Handy, supra note 21 at para. 4.
Ibid. at para.6
32
Handy, supra note 21 at para. 21.
33
Ibid. at para. 15.
31
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particular issue outweighs its potential prejudice and thereby justifies its reception".34 He
stated that probative value may be assessed by considering the strength of the similar fact
evidence, including the extent to which the evidence can be proven and any allegations of
collusion. He established that a trial judge must identify the issue in question (that is the
issue at trial to which the proposed similar fact evidence is said to be relevant) narrowly.
After doing so, the trial judge should then examine the factors that connect or distinguish
the similar fact evidence to or from the facts alleged in the charge. These "connecting
factors" may include proximity in time for similar acts, extent to which the other acts are
similar in detail to the charged conduct, number of occurrences of the similar acts,
circumstances surrounding or relating to the similar acts, any distinctive feature or
features unifying the incidents, intervening events and any other factor which would tend
to support or rebut the underlying unity of the similar acts.35
Finally, under Justice Binnie’s framework, the trial judge must assess the potential
prejudice to the accused. A trial judge must consider the potential for moral prejudice
against the accused, meaning the risk of convicting the accused because he is a bad
person, and the potential for reasoning prejudice against the accused, meaning the risk of
distracting or confusing the jury.
Leading up to Handy the Supreme Court of Canada decided a number of similar
fact cases in the early 1990s in which the accused were charged with sexual offences and
the Crown sought to lead evidence regarding prior sexual misconduct.36 Critics have
34

Ibid. at para. 55.
Supra note 21 at para. 82.
36
The distinction should be noted between cases involving sexual assault charges in which the Crown seeks
to introduce the similar fact evidence to establish identity and those in which it is offered to establish that
either the sexual act occurred or that it was non-consensual. A great deal turns on the purpose for which
similar fact evidence is offered – in other words the fact in issue for which similar fact evidence is being
adduced to prove. While there are no longer discrete categories of purpose which similar fact evidence is
35
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suggested that prior to the Court’s ruling in Handy the law on similar fact evidence was
unclear and that the Court’s rulings regarding it were inconsistent.37 It may be true that
the law was unclear doctrinally. However, the Court’s rulings were, in terms of certain
factors, quite consistent with each other and with how these issues tend to be addressed in
lower courts post-Handy. For this reason, it makes sense to review the Court’s decisions
leading up to Handy, despite the fact that Handy is now the seminal case on similar fact
evidence. These factors include their degree of reliance on the accused’s propensity to
relate in a particular manner with the complainants (depending on whether the
complainant was an adult or a child at the time of the offence) and whether, in the case of
adult complainants, the sexual acts alleged to have occurred are outside the range of those
considered ‘natural’ or usual by the Court.
The paragraphs to follow will discuss the Court’s reasoning in cases leading up to
Handy. The section to follow will demonstrate how lower court decisions post-Handy
continue to rely on these same factors and continue to adopt reasoning that suggests
different conceptualizations regarding the sexuality of ‘the pedophile’ and ‘the rapist’.
The first of this series of similar fact cases decided by the Supreme Court of
Canada in the 1990’s was R. v. B.(C.R.).38 In B.(C.R.), Justice McLachlin (as she then
was) upheld the trial judge’s decision to admit similar fact evidence regarding prior acts
required to fall into in order for it to be admissible, analytically the ‘identity’ cases are somewhat distinct
from the actus reus cases. As noted above, Justice Binnie determined in Handy that while it is not the case
that “the degree of similarity in such a case must be higher or lower than in an identification case…the issue
is different, and the drivers of cogency in relation to the desired inferences will therefore not be the same”
(at para. 78). The cases that are of particular significance for this discussion are those in which the factual
issue in dispute essentially comes down to credibility as to the actus reus. These cases can and should be
distinguished from cases in which the factual issue in dispute concerns the identity of the perpetrator. The
analysis in identity cases understandably focuses almost exclusively on the similarity in modus operandi,
and evidence of signature type behavior.
37
See Lee Stuesser, “Similar Fact Evidence in Sexual Offence Cases” (1996) 39 C.L.Q. 160; Stewart,
“Rationalizing Similar Facts Evidence”, supra note 28.
38
[1990] SCJ No. 31.
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of sexual misconduct on the part of the accused. The accused was charged with sexual
offences against his biological (or in the Court’s words “natural”39) daughter, who was
aged 11 to 13 at the time of the assaults. His daughter alleged that the sexual acts had
occurred “two or three times a week, progressing from fondling to fellatio, cunnilingus,
sexual intercourse and buggery”.40 She testified that on occasion they had also urinated
on each other. The Crown led similar fact evidence that, several years earlier, the accused
had had sexual relations with the fifteen-year old daughter of his common law wife – a
girl with whom he had “enjoyed a father-daughter relationship”.41 His stepdaughter
testified that within a year of living with the accused he had made sexual advances
towards her – starting with fondling and culminating in five or six acts of sexual
intercourse. The Crown introduced the similar fact evidence in order to support the
complainant’s testimony that the acts occurred. In other words, it was led to bolster the
complainant’s credibility.42
There are two interrelated points arising from Justice McLachlin’s decision in
B.(C.R.) that should be noted. The first is with respect to her general comments regarding
the use of propensity based reasoning. The second concerns her application of the law of
similar fact evidence, as she states it in B.(C.R.), to the facts of B.(C.R.) itself.

39

Ibid. at para. 33. She uses the phrase throughout her decision. She also uses the term natural father as in:
“For a time…he acted as one would expect of a natural father”.
40
Ibid. at para. 33.
41
Ibid. at para. 2.
42
The trial judge confused the issue somewhat by stating that the admissibility of the step-daughter’s
evidence turned on “whether the similarities are sufficient to show that the accused had common
characteristics in the methods he used in the sexual acts…and that it is likely that they are one and the same
man”( at para. 35 of the Supreme Court’s decision, ibid.). His reference to identity as the fact at issue
helped form one of the grounds of appeal. Justice McLachlin was satisfied that despite this reference to
identity the trial judge’s reasons demonstrate that he considered the central issue of the case to be whether
to believe the complainant’s allegations.
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It was actually B.(C.R.), not Handy, in which the Court first acknowledged that in
fact the probative value of similar fact evidence does turn on propensity based reasoning.
Justice McLachlin stated that:
[i]t is no longer necessary to hang the evidence tendered on the peg of
some issue other than disposition .... [E]vidence of propensity, while
generally inadmissible, may exceptionally be admitted where the probative
value of the evidence in relation to an issue in question is so high that it
displaces the heavy prejudice which will inevitably inure to the accused
where evidence of prior immoral or illegal acts is presented to the jury.43

Justice McLachlin went on to note in B.(C.R.) that “in cases such as the present, which pit
the word of the child alleged to have been sexually assaulted against the word of the
accused, similar fact evidence may be useful on the central issue of credibility.”44 She
found that the probative value of the stepdaughter’s evidence stemmed from its
demonstration of the accused’s propensity to engage in the sort of sexual misconduct with
which he was charged. She found that the main similarity in each case was that “the
accused shortly after establishing a father-daughter relationship with the victim is alleged
to have engaged her in a sexual relationship”.45 She also noted dissimilarities the trial
judge had observed relating to the place and manner in which the acts occurred. She
identified the differences as follows:
[t]he age of the girls was different; one was sexually mature, the other only
a child when the acts began. One girl was a blood relation, the other was
not. While many of the acts were the same, there is no suggestion of
urination with M.H.S. [the step daughter] And there is a considerable lapse
of time between the two alleged relationships.46 (text added)
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Supra note 38 at para. 24. Justice Binnie noted this in his decision in Handy, supra note 21.
Ibid. at para. 41.
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Ibid. at para. 42
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Ibid. at para. 42.
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In light of these differences, to what propensity was Justice McLachlin referring?
Given that one victim was a child and the other a post-pubescent teenager, it was not a
pedophilic propensity per se. Nor was it a propensity to engage in the ‘unnatural’ act of
incestuous sexual contact, nor a propensity for the ‘unnatural’ practice of incorporating
bodily wastes into one’s sexual repertoire. She was referring to a propensity to take
sexual advantage of a father-daughter relationship. The Court’s analysis was directly tied
to what it determined to be the similarity in nature of the relationship between each of the
two victims and the accused. As discussed below, this particular factor - how the accused
relates to the complainants – appears to be the single most significant factor in the great
majority of cases involving the admission of similar fact evidence in trials concerning the
alleged sexual assault of a child.
Almost exactly one year after B.(C.R.) the Supreme Court of Canada, with Justice
McLachlin (as she then was) again writing for the majority, released R. v. C.(M.H.).47 In
C.(M.H.) the accused was charged with indecent assault against his ex-wife and sexual
assault against the daughter of a subsequent common law wife. The issue regarding
similar fact evidence related to the charge of indecent assault against his ex-wife. She
alleged that the accused forced her to have sexual intercourse with a dog. The Crown led
evidence from the accused’s subsequent common law wife that he had: (1) requested she
submit to sexual intercourse with a dog; (2) made a remark suggesting that she should
have sexual intercourse with a bull; and (3) requested that she engage in sexual conduct
involving a cucumber and body oils and foams.48 Like in B.(C.R.), the accused denied
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[1991] 1 SCR 763.
Ibid. at para. 20.
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that he had committed the behavior he was accused of and therefore the fact in issue
concerned whether the sexual acts had occurred.49
As noted above, a year earlier in B.(C.R.) Justice McLachlin determined that “[i]t
is no longer necessary to hang the evidence tendered on the peg of some issue other than
disposition”.50 She also stated that “[c]atchwords have gone the same way as categories.
Just as English courts have expressed doubts about the necessity of showing “striking
similarity” …so in Robertson Wilson J rejected the validity of this phrase as a legal
test”.51 However, in C.(M.H.) she held that:
Evidence as to disposition, which shows only that the accused is the type
of person likely to have committed the offence in question, is generally
inadmissible. Such evidence is likely to have a severe prejudicial effect by
inducing the jury to think of the accused as a “bad” person. At the same
time it possesses little relevance to the real issue, namely, whether the
accused committed the particular offence with which he stands charged.
There will be occasions, however, where the similar fact evidence will go
to more than disposition, and will be considered to have real probative
value. That probative value arises from the fact that the acts compared are
so unusual and strikingly similar that their similarities cannot be attributed
to coincidence. Only where the probative force clearly outweighs the
prejudice, or the danger that the jury may convict for non-logical reasons,
should such evidence be received.52 (emphasis added)

The Court in C.(M.H.) found that the evidence regarding the cucumber and body foam
had no probative value and should not have been admitted. Justice McLachlin
distinguished the ‘cucumber and oil’ requests from those involving requests to engage in
sex with dogs and bulls. She determined that the cucumber and oil requests had no
probative value because, at best, they demonstrated the appellant’s “particular sexual
49

Like in B.(C.R.) although for different reasons, the credibility of the complainant was perhaps not as solid
as the Crown would have liked. This is typical in cases involving child complainants. In C.(M.H.) the
credibility issue stemmed not from the age of the victim – she was an adult – but from her confusion
regarding the dates on which the acts allegedly occurred.
50
B.(C.R.), supra note 38 at para. 24.
51
Ibid. at para. 27.
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C.(M.H.), supra note 47 at para. 22.
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tastes or fantasies”.53 Invoking with respect to the allegations concerning bestiality, the
concept of, and a distinction between, natural and unnatural sexual acts she stated that “it
can be argued that the suggestion that one’s spouse should participate in such unnatural
acts is so remarkable that the separate incidents might be viewed as highly similar, giving
the evidence sufficient probative force to take it out of the category of mere evidence of
disposition”.54
Categorizing sexual acts as ‘natural’ and ‘unnatural’, and determining
admissibility based on this distinction, clearly reveals essentialist assumptions about
sexuality. To categorize in this way also has normative implications regarding the
potential for judicial bias against those whose sexual practices deviate from whatever the
sexual norms may be in a given community at a given time. While a distinction between
usual and highly unusual sexual acts may often be relevant in a determination regarding
the admissibility of similar fact evidence it is not necessary to make this distinction by
identifying which sexual practices are natural and which are unnatural. Moreover, courts
should be very cautious when employing an analytical approach based on their own
assumptions about what sexual practices are usual. While it may be obvious and
therefore highly cogent in regards to sexual practices at the far end of the usual-unusual
spectrum – such as perhaps bestiality? - it is likely more often the case that situating
sexual practice “X” on the usual-unusual spectrum requires a fairly subjective and nonquantifiable assumption on the part of the judge.
While she did determine that the evidence regarding bestiality could be admissible
because it was unnatural, Justice McLachlin also referenced the usual/unusual distinction
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in C.(M.H.). As such, it is impossible to say whether she deemed the evidence regarding
bestiality potentially admissible solely because she considered such acts to be unnatural
or because in addition she also considered them unusual. Certainly the decision suggests
that the distinction between natural and unnatural figured prominently in her analysis.
She did more than simply suggest that the acts were unusual. She determined that it
would be highly unusual for a spouse to ask their partner to perform acts as unnatural as
the ones the appellant was accused of suggesting.
There are two additional noteworthy analytical points regarding the distinctions
between B.(C.R.) and C.(M.H.). The first is the significant difference in terms of what
factors in each seem to determine the similarity or lack of similarity between the
allegations and the similar fact evidence. The second point concerns the seemingly
contradictory statements Justice McLachlin made regarding the use of propensity
evidence to demonstrate disposition rather than to establish some other fact in issue.
In B.(C.R.) Justice McLachlin determined that in certain circumstances evidence
may be admitted to demonstrate propensity and she admitted the similar fact evidence
despite distinctions regarding factors such as age of the victims, type of sexual acts, and
presence or absence of blood ties. A year later, she stated that similar fact evidence will
typically only be admitted where it goes to something more than disposition and she
employed the very ‘catchwords’ she had rejected in B.(C.R.). The similar fact evidence
was admitted in B.(C.R.) despite not sharing what Justice McLachlin would surely
characterize as the unusual character of the sexual acts alleged by the complainant
(incestuous pedophiliac relations and acts of urinating on one another). The focus in
B.(C.R.) was on similarity in relationship dynamics. In C.(M.H.) the ‘peg on which to
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hang’ the similar fact evidence offered by Justice McLachlin was the unusualness and
unnaturalness of the alleged sexual misconduct. She found that upon re-trial the evidence
regarding bestiality (but not that regarding cucumbers and oil) could be admissible on the
basis that it was “strikingly similar”55 to the allegations because of the unusualness of
suggesting one’s spouse engage in such unnatural acts. She did not discuss relationship
dynamics - the accused’s propensity to relate in a specific manner to his spouses.
The next similar fact evidence case released by the Court was R. v. B.(F.F.).56 In
B.(F.F.) the accused, B., was charged with numerous sexual offences against his niece
P.L. The accused was the brother of the complainant’s mother; he lived with her family
and was responsible for the care of her children for a number of years. P.L. alleged that
the sexual abuse, including the first instance of sexual intercourse, began when she was
aged 10. The abuse continued for a number of years, stopping only when one of P.L.’s
brothers caught the accused sexually assaulting P.L. The accused denied all of the
allegations. At trial, two of P.L.’s siblings gave evidence of repeated and brutal, although
not sexual, attacks against them by the accused. Justice Iacobucci’s ruling regarding the
siblings’ similar fact evidence received the unanimous support of the Court. He held that
it was admissible to show the accused’s pattern of domination over P.A.L. and her
siblings - his “system of violent control” - and thus it explained why it took P.L. so long
to come forward57 and why the abuse was allowed to continue for so many years.
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It is interesting to contrast Justice Iacobucci’s insight on this point with Justice Binnie’s puzzling
suggestion in Handy, supra note 21 at para. 23, that the fact that the accused’s ex-wife had not come
forward to reveal his abusive conduct until after he was incarcerated threatened her credibility. Isn’t there a
very obvious explanation as to why a woman allegedly raped and beaten for years by her husband would
wait until he was safely behind bars before coming forward to report his abuse? At the very least wouldn’t
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It has been suggested that Justice Iacobucci’s reasoning, like Justice McLachlin’s
reasoning in C.(M.H.) was inconsistent with B.(C.R.). That is to say, critics have argued
that B.(F.F.) was also a retreat from B.(C.R.).58 On its face this observation seems
accurate. Justice Iacobucci did refer to the old categorical approach, suggesting the
evidence could be admitted to rebut the accused’s defence of innocent association. He
did cite prior Supreme Court case law stating that similar fact evidence was not to be
admitted to show disposition.59 However, a closer examination of his reasoning in
B.(F.F.)- particularly when analyzed in relation to B.(C.R.) and C.(M.H.)- suggests a
more nuanced conclusion. Unlike the reasoning in C.(M.H.), Justice Iacobucci did not
compare the similarity of the acts against the different victims. He did not look for
striking similarity between the acts. Indeed, the similar fact evidence did not even relate
to sexual behavior. The evidence was admitted to show a pattern of relating – to
demonstrate the accused’s system of violent control. In B.(F.F.) similar fact evidence of
other misconduct on the part of the accused was admitted not because it shared with the
allegations an unusualness, an unnaturalness or a striking similarity. It was admitted in
order to establish the accused’s propensity to develop a certain type of relationship with
the children in his care: a relationship of domination, power imbalance and violence.60
Despite Justice Iacobuuci’s reference to the categorical approach, despite the fact
that he linked the similar fact evidence to an explanation regarding the complainant’s
not be the subject of an adverse inference based upon rejected stereotypical assumptions of how persons
react to sexual abuse.”
58
R.J. Delisle, Annotation, R. v. B.(F.F.) (1993), 18 C.R. (4th) 261; Hanson, supra note 13.
59
B.(F.F.), supra note 58 at para. 23.
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After B.(F.F.) the next similar fact evidence case from the Supreme Court of Canada was their 1998
decision in R. v. Arp, supra note 22. In Arp the similar fact evidence that the Crown sought to adduce was
offered to establish identity. In other words, the factual issue in dispute was identity not credibility. In
‘identity cases’ similarity is going to be the sine qua non of admissibility. Arp is a difficult case to
reconcile given the fact that it is an identification case, yet the Court allowed similar fact evidence for two
murders that did not actually share a high degree of similarity.
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delayed disclosure, the inferential reasoning underpinning B.(F.F.) is much more akin to
B.(C.R.) than to C.(M.H.). As Professor Delisle notes:
[w]hat premise, unarticulated in B.(F.F.) makes this similar fact evidence,
the physical mistreatment of L.L., relevant to rebut the defence of innocent
association with P.L.? What generalization concerning human conduct
makes this evidence meaningful in that regard? The only generalization
that comes to my mind is: People who would physically abuse a male child
in their care are the sort of person who would sexually abuse a female
child in their care since both types of conduct are examples of the exercise
of power.61

It would be possible to characterize the inconsistent reasoning in these cases as evidence
that pre-Handy the Court was all over the map in terms of its doctrinal approach to similar
fact evidence. I want to suggest an alternative interpretation - based on certain trends
evident in these cases and which are more pronounced in the post-Handy lower court
cases discussed below. The alternative interpretation is as follows: there is actually a
consistency in how the Court approached similar fact evidence cases in the early 1990s;
the seeming inconsistency stems from a distinction in how the Court treats similar fact
evidence in adult complainant cases and child complainant cases – a distinction that stems
from a difference in how the ‘pedophile’ and the ‘rapist’ are conceptualized by the Court.
ii) The Significance Of Similar Fact Evidence In Lower Court Cases
Wigmore defines propensity as a trait or group of traits, or the sum of her or his
traits - the person’s actual moral or psychical disposition.62 Regarding issues of sexuality,
the law’s treatment of and approach to ‘disposition’ is illuminating. Do courts treat
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Delisle, supra note 58; see also Stewart, supra note 28 at 119 where he states that “…while the evidence
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similar fact evidence in sexual assault cases as suggesting a propensity to act a certain
way or to be a certain way?
As Justice Binnie stated in Handy “[w]hen similar facts are attributed to an
accused acting “in character” it is the inferred continuity of character and nothing else
that displaces what might otherwise be explained innocently as mere coincidence”.63 All
similar fact evidence cases involve a double inference; the probative value of similar fact
evidence relies on the inference that the accused’s propensity for X makes it extremely
unlikely that it is merely a coincidence that both complainants are lying or mistaken in
their allegations of X(ish).64 The first inference is that the similar fact evidence
establishes a specific propensity. The second inference is that this propensity makes it
highly unlikely that it is a mere coincidence that both or all of the complainants are
making similar allegations.65 (This is why evidence of collusion requires that similar fact
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Supra note 21 at para. 63.
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The factual issue in dispute for which similar fact evidence is offered is an important factor in
determining its admissibility. Indeed, the analysis developed by the Court in Handy emphasized the need to
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116, that “identification of credibility as the “issue in question” may, unless circumscribed, risk the
admission of evidence of nothing more than general disposition (“bad personhood”)”. Instead he suggested,
at para. 120, the issue in dispute was “the consent component of the actus reus and in relation to that issue
the respondent’s alleged propensity to refuse to take no for an answer”. With respect, in sexual assault
cases where the accused denies that the acts occurred or denies that the acts were non-consensual,
identifying the issue as ‘proving an element of the actus reus’ rather than ‘bolstering the credibility of the
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evidence be excluded. It destroys the second inference. If there is evidence of collusion
there is little if any probative value left to the similar fact evidence.)
To avoid convicting someone for being a ‘bad person’ rather than for doing the
‘bad act’ with which they have been charged, it is critical that the similar fact evidence
raise both inferences. This means sufficient focus in the court’s reasoning not only on
how the evidence demonstrates a specific propensity but also on the likelihood of
coincidence that both complainants are lying or mistaken given this propensity.
This takes on a particular flavor in the context of sexual assault cases. Propensity
based reasoning may differ depending on whether one understands sexuality as an innate
and pre-social disposition or a contextually dependent social variable. The distinction
might be thought of as a distinction between reasoning based on the propensity to act a
certain way and reasoning based on the propensity to be a certain way (which suggests
one acted a certain way).
The lower court decisions applying the Handy ruling reveal that the focus of
propensity based reasoning seems to differ somewhat in some cases involving child
complainants from that found in cases involving adult complainants. In cases involving
child complainants the focus often tends to be more on the disposition of the accused (the
first inference). The reasoning is focused more on whether the similar fact evidence
demonstrates a particular propensity. In cases involving adult complainants the courts
tend to focus more on the likelihood of coincidence that both complainants are making
similar allegations (the second inference). The focus is centered more on the similarities
between the allegations. It is not that the reasoning in similar fact evidence cases
involving child complainants is unrelated to the unlikelihood of coincidence and it is not
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that the adult complainant cases lack reasoning through propensity. The distinction
between the two types of cases is actually much like the distinction between cases in
which the fact in issue is identity and cases in which the fact in issue is an element of the
actus reus. As Justice Binnie noted in Handy, in comparing cases in which actus reus
rather than identification is the issue, “the point is not that the degree of similarity in such
a case must be higher or lower than in an identification case. The point is that the issue is
different and the drivers of cogency in relation to the desired inferences will therefore not
be the same”.66 Similarly, the post Handy cases discussed here seem to suggest that the
drivers of cogency in adult complainant cases are not always the same as in child
complainant cases.
In many cases involving child complainants the courts tend to use a form of
propensity based reasoning which relies more on assumptions about an offender’s ‘true
sexual nature’ – there is more interest in an accused’s sexual arousal patterns and
proclivities. That said, courts in child complainant cases also focus heavily on the
accused’s method or manner of relating to children. Indeed, unlike in cases involving
adult complainants, in child complainant cases the single most important factor very often
appears to be the nature of the relationship between the accused and the complainants. In
this way the analysis in many child complainant cases reveals an unusual integration of
both essentialist and constructivist reasoning. Promisingly, courts identify similarity
between certain important contextual factors (not even necessarily related to sexual
conduct) such as relationship dynamics, patterns of control, and positions of power within
a family, as the drivers of cogency. Less promisingly, in many lower court decisions this
analysis of the accused’s relationship propensity is then integrated back into an
66
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essentialist approach which focuses on an offender’s ‘true nature’ or innate disposition.
This approach leads to at least two problems with these lower court decisions.
The first is its potential to result in the type of unjust reasoning that cases from
Makin to Handy have attempted to avoid: Mr. X is a pedophile therefore he did what this
child says he did. The concern is that once the similar fact evidence establishes that the
accused has a particular sexual disposition, moral prejudice or reasoning prejudice kicks
in and the accused is convicted based on who he is rather than what he has done. Similar
fact evidence should only be admitted where its ability to establish the second inference –
‘given his propensity towards interacting/relating in this way with children it is highly
unlikely that these similar allegations are a mere coincidence’- is as heavily scrutinized as
is its ability to establish the first inference – all of this evidence shows he has a propensity
to groom, manipulate and interact sexually with children with whom he has a particular
type of relationship. Essentialist conceptions of those who sexually offend against
children may be more likely to overly emphasize the first inference (or sometimes even to
misstate it as ‘a sexual orientation towards children’ rather than ‘a propensity to groom,
manipulate and interact sexually with children’) .
The second problem with this reasoning is discussed at greater length below in the
section addressing child pornography. Briefly and simply put, the problem is that this
reasoning further promotes a legal discourse that conceptualizes those who sexually
assault children as a discrete minority of sexual deviants with an innate sexual orientation
towards children. This is undesirable because an essentialist approach to child sexual
abuse limits recognition of the social factors that produce this problem. A more
constructivist conception of sexual offenders would encourage a legal discourse that
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acknowledges the social conditions and context in which child sexual abuse most
frequently arises. A legal discourse that recognizes this will help to promote legal
reasoning and legal approaches oriented more towards alleviating these conditions rather
than only attempting to identify and contain the ‘disordered other’.67
Unlike in child complainant cases, in cases involving adult complainants courts
seem less inclined to adopt propensity based reasoning that relies on essentialist
assumptions about an accused’s ‘true sexual nature’. Justice Binnie notes in Handy that
“not only can people change their ways but they are not robotic”.68 It seems much less
likely that one would read such an assertion in reference to an individual accused of
having sex with multiple children. In adult complainant cases courts are less likely to
look for, make references suggesting, or rely on assumptions about, an offender’s innate
sexual preference and more likely to focus their propensity based reasoning on the
likelihood of coincidence.
Adult complainant cases do not reflect the same sorts of assumptions about an
offender’s true nature. Instead, essentialist assumptions are revealed by the courts’
greater emphasis on the second inference – the likelihood of coincidence. More focus on
the second inference typically means greater weight is given to the degree of similarity
between allegations. For a judiciary tending to conceptualize sexuality from an
essentialist perspective this means more focus on and comparison of the specific sexual
acts at issue and less focus on the relationship dynamics, the interactional aspect of the
allegations. It may also mean resort to reasoning that assesses probative value based on
67
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characterizing sexual acts as natural or unnatural. For example, in C.(M.H.) discussed
above, the Court drew distinctions between natural and unnatural sexual acts and relied
upon these distinctions analytically.69
In adult complainant cases courts fail to do what they achieve in the child
complainant cases; they fail to properly consider the cogency of similar fact evidence that
demonstrates how the accused relates to women with whom the accused is sexually
intimate. In other words, they focus too much on the specifics of the sexual act alleged
and not enough on the relationship dynamics involved. As will be discussed below, in
child complainant cases courts appear able and willing to examine similarity in
relationship dynamics. In adult complainant cases, the courts do not seem to consider the
accused’s relationships – or manner of relating – in the same way.
An examination of the lower court decisions on similar fact evidence released
since Handy brings into better focus the different emphasis in cases involving child
complainants as compared to those involving adult complainants.70 A review of these
cases reveals certain trends: a pattern of relying on degree of similarity in modus operandi
with an emphasis on likelihood of coincidence type reasoning in adult complainant cases
where similar fact evidence is adduced to help prove an element of the actus reus; a
pattern in child complainant cases of emphasizing the presence of a propensity to sexually
abuse children in the context of a particular type of relationship; an emphasis on the
accused’s relationship dynamics in child complainant cases that is not as evident in adult
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cases.71 The paragraphs to follow will demonstrate how similar fact evidence is treated
differently depending on the age of the complainant. The cases discussed reveal
essentialist assumptions in both adult and child complainant cases as well as how these
essentialist assumptions are different in adult and child complainant cases. In child
complainant cases the essentialism is evidenced by the courts’ focus on an accused’s ‘true
nature’. In adult complainant cases the essentialism is revealed by the heavy emphasis
placed on similarity between the specific sexual acts alleged. The cases also show that,
perhaps oddly enough, in child complainant cases there is also a constructivist aspect of
the reasoning focused on context, particularly on relationship dynamics, that is not
evident in the adult complainant cases.
iii) A Propensity To ‘Relate’
In many lower court child complainant cases it would appear that the factor that is
most significant is the nature of the accused’s relationship to the alleged victims. This
seems to matter more than similarity in the types of sexual acts engaged in, gender of the
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There is one specific context in which the reasoning in adult complainant cases, in lower courts at least,
closely resembles the reasoning in child complainant cases. That is where the relationship between the
accused and the complainants is an institutionally recognized relationship of care – such as between a
doctor and patient. See for example R v Stewart, [2004] B.C.J. No. 195 where the British Columbia Court
of Appeal affirmed the trial judge’s decision to admit similar fact evidence against a doctor charged with
sexually assaulting nine adult female patients. The focus of the decision to admit the similar fact evidence
was on the way the defendant sexualized the doctor –patient relationship. The sexual acts alleged, the
pattern of grooming, and the type of relationship he had with the various women differed. The court
dismissed these differences on the basis that what was more significant was the similar way in which he
abused his relationship of trust with these women. See R. v. Gavrilko [2007] B.C.J. 2154 where the British
Columbia Supreme Court admitted similar fact evidence on the basis that the“underlying unity of the
evidence was sexual touching in a dentist and patient relationship” (at para. 31). See G. (J.R.I.) v. Tyhurst
[2003] 6 W.W.R. 402 where similar fact evidence against a psychiatrist being sued for breach of fiduciary
duty arising from his sexual conduct with the plaintiff was admitted. The court conceded that there were
numerous points of dissimilarity in the evidence of the three women but admitted it because it was, at para.
24, “strikingly similar, distinct and unique on the central question of whether a master/slave relationship
played a part in their therapy, the demeaning and submissive nature of that relationship and the fact of
whipping by the defendant in the course of therapy.” The courts do not focus on relationship dynamics in
adult complainant cases that do not involve professional relationships such as these. So in adult cases
where the power imbalance is assumed (due to the nature of the relationship), relationship dynamics play a
similar analytical role to the role they play in child complainant cases.
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victims and any other element of the accused’s modus operandi. Promisingly, in these
cases context is the single most important analytical factor.
For example, in R. v. R.B. the Court of Appeal for Ontario found that the required
level of connectedness between four different complainants had been met, despite the fact
that two of the cases involved fondling and masturbation while the other two escalated to
anal intercourse, on the basis that the relationship of trust was the same in each case.72
R.B. had acted as a foster parent for each of the four adolescent boys. He denied
engaging in any sexual interactions with any of the complainants. The court found that
despite the significant discrepancies in terms of the offending behaviors, the evidence in
each case could be used in the others to demonstrate “a specific propensity to engage in
sexual misconduct with boys in his care who came to him in a vulnerable condition”.73
The court further found that despite the lack of similarity in sexual acts a sufficient degree
of connectedness existed. The similarities highlighted included the fact that “the
appellant first engaged in sexually abusive conduct when the complainant was especially
vulnerable” because of injury, illness or inebriation and that “in each case the
complainant came to view the appellant as a father figure”.74
In R. v. Finelli the Crown was permitted to lead similar fact evidence of prior
sexual assaults against young girls in order to “demonstrate a specific propensity on the
part of Mr. Finelli to exploit his status as a family friend and overnight guest in order to
sexually assault prepubescent girls in their own homes by fondling” [first inference].75
The court went on to note that “while propensity underlies the probative value of true
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similar fact evidence, the breaking point between general propensity and specific
propensity is most easily understood as depending upon the objective improbability of
coincidence”.76 In other words, “is it against all probability that, in light of what the
Crown can show that Mr. Finelli did to the three similar fact witnesses on other
occasions, it is a mere coincidence that the complainant is not telling the truth when she
describes what she alleges Mr. Finelli did to her on this occasion?” [second inference].77
The same observation regarding the significant weight given to relationship
dynamics in child complainant cases can be observed in the Supreme Court of Canada’s
decision in R. v. Shearing (released the same year as Handy).78 In Shearing, the accused
was a cult leader accused of sexually assaulting a number of complainants - all but two of
which were members of his cult. The other two complaiants, sisters, lived with him; their
mother was a member of the cult and his housekeeper. The Court found that he had a
situation specific propensity to groom adolescent girls for sexual gratification by
exploiting the cult’s beliefs and that he proceeded that way with each complainant. The
evidence of each of the believer complainants was also admitted with respect to the nonbelieving sisters because the abuse of power and modus operandi were similar and
because, with them as well, he exploited his status as leader of the cult. The cogency of
the similar fact evidence stemmed from his “gross abuse of power”.79
In cases like these, courts rely on, as the cogent factor for establishing the
objective improbability of coincidence (and therefore demonstrating the probative value
of the similar fact evidence), a specific propensity on the part of the accused to sexually
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exploit a specific type of relationship with children.80 This reasoning seems sound. The
courts in these cases draw the first inference regarding his propensity and then base the
second inference on an assessment of the degree of similarity in how the accused interacts
with the different complainants – there is a recognition that an accused’s propensity to
relate in a particular manner is a critical aspect of his modus operandi. There is nothing
in these cases to suggest that the courts folded this evidence of propensity back into
assumptions about the accused’s essence as a pedophile, pervert or sexual predator.
In child complainant cases with this type of reasoning but where the relationship
between the accused and the complainants differ, the similar fact evidence is less likely to
be admitted, even where the sexual acts were quite similar. For example, in R. v. J.M.H.
the Ontario Superior Court of Justice refused to admit as similar fact evidence the
accused’s conviction of sexual assault against his nine year old step-daughter.81 J.M.H.
was charged with sexually assaulting a ten year-old girl whom he had invited into his
apartment after speaking with her on the street. The sexual acts alleged were similar to
those that he had been convicted of doing against his stepdaughter and other aspects of
the accused’s modus operandi were similar. However, the court found that the similar
fact evidence was not sufficiently similar stating that “[t]he accused, in the similar fact
evidence, was in a relationship of trust…a stepdaughter he had known for years in a home
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they shared. In the case at bar, it was a random encounter (sic) neither of them know the
other.”82
In R. v. Blake the Ontario Court of Appeal set aside the appellant’s conviction and
ordered a new trial on the basis that similar fact evidence regarding two prior convictions
for sexual assault against children was wrongly admitted by the trial judge.83 While the
sexual acts alleged in all three cases were similar there was no similarity in terms of his
relationship to the complainants. The Ontario Court of Appeal found that the prior
assaults “lacked the degree of connection necessary to make the discreditable conduct
evidence admissible”.84 They held that “the identified similarities in the appellant’s past
conduct amounts to little more than that he has engaged in genital touching of children
aged ten or under in the past, in circumstances involving privacy, and that following the
sexual abuse he may apologize to the child”.85
Again, in these cases the reasoning seems sound and does not resort to essentialist
conceptions that risk overemphasizing the first inference and underemphasizing the
second inference. Indeed the focus on manner of relating as a key aspect of the accused’s
modus operandi could be characterized as taking a constructivist approach (a recognition
that it is the interactions rather than the acts that is most significant in these cases).
However some lower court decisions incorporate this analysis of the accused’s relational
propensity into an overall approach that reveals assumptions about the accused’s innate
sexual disposition rather than relying on degree of similarity such that the chance of
coincidence is highly unlikely.
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iv) Folding Propensity To Relate Into Propensity To ‘Be’
An analytical approach that relies on underpinning assumptions that essentialize
those who sexually offend against children can result in reasoning that places too much
emphasis on propensity (the first inference) and not enough on coincidence (the second
inference).
In R. v. R.W.D. the accused was charged with sexual assault and sexual
interference against his two daughters.86 One of the daughters was pre-pubescent at the
time of the assaults; the other daughter had reached puberty when she was assaulted. The
defence moved to have the counts severed; this motion was denied. Justice Whitten of
the Ontario Superior Court of Justice found that the allegations of each would be
admissible against the other under the similar fact rule and that given this it would not be
in the interests of justice to have two trials. The sexual offences against his younger
daughter were alleged to have occurred between the ages of eight and ten. After the
sexual abuse against her stopped, (because he was forced to leave the house) he began
sexually assaulting her older half-sister. These offences were alleged to have occurred
when she was fourteen.
With A.P. he was accused of starting with innocuous touching and eventually
graduating to fondling of her breasts and vagina. With S.W. he started with genital
fondling and progressed to vaginal intercourse. According to the court, the factor
supporting the probative value of the similar fact evidence was his sexual disposition
towards his daughters.
This evidence if accepted as such by the jury, may demonstrate a context in
which the assaultive behavior took place and or a sexual attraction or proclivity
86
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that Mr. R.W.D. has towards his daughters. Both phenomena, may be of
assistance in the evaluation of the veracity of the assertions of A.P. and S.W.87

The cogent factor for Justice Whitten was that the accused’s behavior displayed a certain
sexual disposition. “That disposition would be described as an active interest in touching
his prepubescent daughter in a sexual manner. In other words he has a sexual interest in
his young daughter.” Justice Whitten found that “this overall interest is a distinct
deviation from the norm of a father-daughter relationship”.88 He went on to state that the
accused’s manner of relating to these girls was a manifestation of this sexual interest.
Only then did he compare whether the manifestation of this sexual interest was similar in
both cases. By reasoning in this manner his analysis was driven almost in whole by his
finding regarding the accused’s propensity. Compare his reasoning with the court’s
reasoning in R. v. R.B. In R. v. R.B. the court identifies an accused’s propensity to act a
certain way. In R. v. R.W.D. the court identifies an accused’s propensity to be a certain
way that makes him act a certain way. Justice Whitten may very well have arrived at the
same outcome without over emphasizing the accused’s sexual propensity. The point is
that courts should not rely on reasoning that risks convicting an accused for ‘being’ a
pedophile.
In R. v. M.B. the Ontario Superior Court of Justice admitted similar fact evidence of
prior sexual misconduct despite the fact that the sex of the complainants alleging the
similar fact evidence were different than the complainant in the charge being tried.89 In
R. v. M.B. the accused was charged with sexual assault, sexual interference, and sexual
exploitation against his nephew, C.B. The Crown sought to introduce evidence regarding
87
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his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference against his two nieces – K.B.
and J.B. (C.B.’s younger sisters). The accused denied sexual contact with any of the
children. C.B. testified that his uncle forced him to have anal intercourse with him over
eighty times starting when he was seven or eight years old. K.B. testified to one act of
vaginal intercourse occurring when she was eight or nine. J.B. alleged approximately
seven incidents of vaginal intercourse. The children also had another brother, L.B.,
around the same age who denied being assaulted by their uncle.
Justice Spies admitted the evidence of the nieces on the basis that “the similar fact
evidence demonstrates a specific propensity on the part of Mr. B. to engage in sexual
contact with young children within the family home and with whom he stands in a close
familial relationship, as uncle”.90 She found that the fact that the accused was the
children’s uncle was a significant connecting factor.91 “The evidence of the relationship
between Mr. B and the family, and in particular C.B., is stronger than I anticipated. Mr.
B was clearly a trusted member of the family.”92
Justice Spies’ treatment of the fact that the similar fact evidence concerned sexual
assaults against girls yet the complainant in the case before her was a boy, suggests an
underpinning assumption about innate sexual orientation and its relevance to the
admission of this evidence. She identified the most significant difference in the evidence
as the fact that the prior complainants were girls while the current complainant was a boy.
She suggested this was particularly significant given that there was no evidence that the
fourth child – who was also a boy – was sexually assaulted. In admitting the similar facts
she addressed this distinction as follows:
90
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The major difference that remains, of course, is the fact that C.B. is a boy
and the similar fact witnesses are both girls. This is significant not only
because of the difference in gender but also because L.B. does not allege
that his uncle sexually assaulted him…Given the young age of the children
when the assaults are alleged to have occurred, or in the case of C.B.
started, gender may well not have been a factor. In both the case of the
girls and C.B., intercourse is alleged. As for why L.B. does not allege any
sexual impropriety, there could be many reasons. One, of course, may be
that because he is a boy, his uncle did not want to engage in sexual acts
with him. However, it is also possible that Mr. B made a call on how
complicit he might be or for some other reason chose not to assault L.B.
For these reasons, I have decided that the pattern established by the
allegations of the two girls is relevant and more significant than the fact
that L.B. does not allege that he was sexually assaulted.93

Justice Spies’ reasoning is awkward. She seems to struggle with reconciling an
assumption that gender of object preference is fixed and immutable (and presumptively
heterosexual - despite the fact that the vast majority of the sexual abuse was against the
boy) with the fact that M.B.’s victims were both male and female. She offers a number of
possible explanations as to why L.B. did not allege sexual abuse and why this need not
impact the probative value of the girls’ allegations. One in particular - the fact that the
children’s secondary sexual characteristics had not yet developed - reveals the essentialist
assumptions underpinning her reasoning. She determined that, given their age, “gender
may not have been a factor”. Presumably she is assuming that gender was not a factor
because M.B. is sexually oriented towards prepubescent bodies; M.B. is a pedophile. (It
also resolves any hetero/homo confusion for her – ‘oh, this is why he assaulted the boy –
his genitals hadn’t developed yet’). M.B. may very well be sexually oriented towards
children but the reasoning justifying the admission of prior bad acts should not be based
on the fact that M.B. is sexually oriented towards children.

93

R. v. M.B., supra note 89 at para. 107, 108 (emphasis added).

85

In R. v. F.L. the accused was charged with sexually assaulting his next-door
neighbor’s daughter when she was between the ages of ten and fourteen.94 The
complainant alleged that he had sexually touched her on six different occasions. The
allegations included assertions that he had put his hands inside her panties and that he had
performed oral sex on her. The Ontario Superior Court of Justice admitted the evidence
of the accused’s ex-wife. She testified that during the latter part of their marriage he was
impotent. She claimed that the only way he could orgasm was to fantasize and
masturbate in her presence about having oral sex with young girls in the neighborhood.
She testified that he had asked her to arrange for him to see S., a nine year old girl in the
neighborhood that he fantasized about, naked. She refused. She testified that he began
fantasizing about S. when she was 9 and that he lost interest in her by the time she
reached 11 and had grown tall. She testified that he asked her to purchase a pair of young
girl's panties. She did this. She said that “he held them in his hand when he fantasized
about having sexual relations with young girls and masturbated. It assisted him in
achieving sexual arousal”.95 She testified that she discovered her husband “accessing
internet sites which showed girls in school uniform” and that he “called her into the
computer room… where he showed her child pornography on the computer”.96
She said that on one occasion while fantasizing about having sex with young girls
he told his wife that he had committed a sexual assault on the complainant. “Specifically
he said that when he was in the playroom he lifted her nightgown, touched her breasts and
sucked on her titties. The next morning she asked him if what he said about A.F. was
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really true. He said that she should not even think about it.”97 The court admitted this
last piece of evidence as a prior statement by the accused against interest. The evidence
regarding internet pornography was not admitted. However, the ex-wife’s evidence
regarding his sexual fantasies, his masturbatory patterns, his requests to see other girls in
the neighborhood naked, his use of girl’s underwear for purposes of arousal, the age range
of girls about whom he fantasized and his sexual practices with his wife (describing his
sexual fantasies to her about young girls and having her recount them back to him while
masturbating) was admitted. The court was careful to note that this evidence was not
being admitted with respect to propensity but instead to establish the context and
narrative for his ex-wife’s testimony regarding his confession:
If the trier of fact accepts the evidence of D.L. that she and her husband engaged
in the sexual practices that she describes, this will support her evidence that F.L.
made the confession. If her evidence that she and her husband engaged in these
sexual practices is disbelieved, it is unlikely that the confession will be
believed.98

It is difficult not to suggest that underpinning the court’s decision, particularly given its
bizarre reasoning regarding the narrative exception, were essentialist assumptions about
‘pedophiles’ and this ‘pedophile’ specifically. This is particularly the case in light of the
court’s decision to include evidence of the age at which the accused’s sexual interest in S.
(another child in the neighborhood) allegedly waxed and the age at which it, according to
the ex-wife, waned; as well as her evidence regarding his use of girl’s underwear to
masturbate. Was the age range of those he fantasized about, or his use of girl’s
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underwear to masturbate really relevant to establishing the context of the confession or
was it really about establishing that he was a ‘pedophile’?99
In R. v. T.B. the evidence of each of the step nieces’ allegations against the
accused was admitted regarding the other charges because it was highly probative in that
the similarities made it unlikely that the complainants were lying or mistaken.100 The
Ontario Court of Appeal found that “the force of similar circumstances in this case refutes
coincidence or other innocent explanation. This evidence is sufficiently compelling to
safely draw the inference of many sexual assaults on the facts charged.” 101 However,
they went on, unnecessarily, to say “in short, toward his step-nieces the respondent was a
sexual predator”. The concept ‘sexual predator’ has been used in other child complainant
cases.102
Consider the following two cases where the concept ‘sexual predator’ was at play.
While not directly tied to the courts’ similar fact evidence analysis in these cases, their
use of the term ‘sexual predator’ and the role in their analysis that the term plays is
nonetheless revealing. In R. v. D.I. the Crown sought to admit the evidence of each
complainant as similar fact evidence for the counts relating to each of the other
complainants. 103 The Crown argued that the evidence was relevant to show among other
things “the relationship the accused established with the daughters of his girlfriends” and
99
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“to show a distinct pattern of conduct by the accused that involves dominance over
vulnerable victims”.104 The defence argued that the “true issue to which the similar fact
evidence is directed is that of identification, thus requiring a higher standard to be applied
on admissibility, namely that of "striking similarity".105 The court accepted the defence
position that the real reason for the evidence was to establish identity. This was based in
part on evidence that there were other men in the house at times. Regardless, the court
denied the Crown’s application, in part on the basis that there was the potential for
innocent collusion. What is interesting about this case is the court’s ruling in the trial
itself. The court found that the evidence of each of T.M. and S.M. was unreliable because
of the possibilities of innocent collusion, false memory, and the identification of the
wrong perpetrator. While the Crown argued that there was no evidentiary foundation to
believe that a perpetrator other than the accused was involved, the court determined that
there was some support for the proposition. The support was based on the court’s
assumptions about ‘sexual predators’. The court stated that:
Tiffany M. states only one assault occurred and Sasha M. states there were two. If
true, the assaults would be consistent with a perpetrator who had limited access to
the girls. Assuming (Mr.) Daniel I. was a sexual predator, one would assume that
numerous assaults would have occurred over the four year period that he lived
with the girls. While this is speculation, it nonetheless gives me a disquieting
feeling about the reliability of Tiffany M. and Sasha M.'s evidence in relation to
their identification of (Mr.) Daniel I. as being the perpetrator of the assaults upon
them.106
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Similar reasoning about sexual predators was relied on in R. v. Wadel to assess
similar fact evidence.107 In Wadel the accused was alleged to have sexually assaulted the
five complainants while they were residents of the juvenile detention facility where he
worked. The judge admitted each of the complainants’ testimony as similar fact evidence
on each of the other charges. However, he gave it very little weight. This was a very
tragic case in which all of the complainants had gone on to have numerous problems
including addictions issues and significant criminal records. The court found them to be
less than credible witnesses. The accused was acquitted. There was an additional
witness, D.M., who was also a resident at the institution; he had not endured the same
sorts of personal struggles the other complainants had experienced. He said he had a very
close and personal relationship with the accused but did not have sex with him. He
testified that Wadel would visit him at bedtime and have long intimate talks with him.
D.M. stated that he was confused about his sexual identity at the time. Significant is the
court’s treatment of his evidence:
It would seem to be a reasonable conclusion that given D.M.'s homosexual
orientation and his significant fondness for Dwight Wadel, had Dwight Wadel
wished to involve D.M. in homosexual acts, either at White Oaks or at his
residence, there would have been no resistance on D.M.'s part. The fact that there
was no such intimacy between D.M. and Wadel is urged upon me as a significant
piece of evidence from which the Court can infer that the events involving Wadel
and the other five named complainants did not take place. It is the Crown's theory
that Wadel engaged in such misconduct with the five named complainants and
that he was a sexual predator who was exploiting the wards under his care for his
own sexual gratification. If this were true then one might wonder why D.M.
would be an exception from this group? Why would he not have been a victim of
explicit sexual contact with Dwight Wadel during his stay at White Oaks?
Dwight Wadel had the opportunity and it would appear from D.M.'s evidence that
he would have been a willing participant, had Wadel so wished.108
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The court concluded that D.M.’s evidence could be seen as helpful to the defence in
several respects. In particular, the court noted that the fact that Wadel could have
sexually assaulted D.M. – given the child’s homosexuality? – but did not, favoured the
defence.109 The assumption underpinning this reasoning was that either Wadel is a sexual
predator or he is not. Sexual predators indiscriminately sexually abuse every boy to
whom they have access. The fact that Wadel did not sexually abuse this boy suggests he
is not a sexual predator. That he is not a sexual predator supports the defence’s assertion
that Wadel did not sexually assault these other five boys. This reasoning is based almost
exclusively on essentialist assumptions about who an accused is or is not rather than
reasoning based on what he has or has not done.
v) Adult Complainant Cases
In adult complainant cases where the Crown seeks to introduce similar fact
evidence to establish an element of the actus reus, outside of those involving doctorpatient type relationships, the courts do not tend to look for and rely on a propensity to
engage in a particular type of sexual behavior tied to a specific relationship dynamic. In
adult cases the focus appears to be more on the sexual acts and not on the sexual
interactions.110
Take for example the case of R. v. G.G.111 In R. v. G.G. the accused’s adult
daughter alleged that she awoke one night to find her father’s hands inside her panties.
Her father had come into her house without her knowledge while she was asleep on the
109
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couch. The Crown sought to have admitted similar fact evidence of a prior conviction of
sexual assault against the accused’s other adult daughter – G.L. G.L. had also awoken to
find her father’s hand inside her panties fondling her genitals. The trial judge refused to
admit the similar fact evidence. One of the issues was that the complainant was aware of
the prior conviction. The trial judge found that there was a possibility of collusion –
which would of course destroy the probative value of the similar fact evidence. However,
the trial judge determined that the similar fact evidence would not have been very
probative even had there not been a possibility of collusion because
the circumstances surrounding the sexual assault of G.L. i.e. the placing of the
accused's hand inside the panties and touching the genital area of an
unconscious, vulnerable woman, who is an acquaintance or relative of the
accused, cannot reasonably be described as peculiar or highly distinctive, but
rather as a generic act, which is sadly far too common or present in sexual
assault cases brought before the Court in this jurisdiction.112

The relationship status between the accused and the complainants was the same,
and his modus operandi was the same. The similar fact evidence was not admitted
because from the judge’s perspective the sexual misconduct – the sexual act alleged – was
too common, not unusual enough. This reasoning much more closely resembles the type
of reasoning used in identity cases than the reasoning in actus reus child complainant
cases. Had this case involved allegations by these daughters as children it is most likely
that the court’s examination of similarity in circumstances surrounding the allegations
would have differed; the reasoning most likely would have focused much more on the
relationships between the accused and his daughters rather than on the specific sexual act
alleged and how common or unusual it might be.
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In adult complainant cases where the accused’s propensity to relate to his alleged
victims in a particular manner is examined it may be less likely that courts will give it the
kind of weight it is given in the child complainant cases.
In R. v. C.P.K. for example, the Ontario Court of Appeal overturned the trial
judge’s decision to admit similar fact evidence concerning the accused’s conduct towards
his previous domestic partner.113 The accused was charged with unlawful confinement,
sexual assault, anal intercourse, and uttering a death threat against the complainant; she
was his common law spouse at the time of the alleged offences. The complainant
testified that the accused had become increasingly jealous and possessive, that he had
started acting strangely and had accused her of having sex with other people (including
her mother, the neighbor and the dog). If she denied his accusations he became
physically aggressive. The events from which the charges stemmed involved a period of
two or three days during which he kept her at a motel and forced vaginal and anal
intercourse on her at knife point. He threatened to kill her.
The similar fact evidence was from a previous domestic partner. She alleged that
shortly after moving in with him the accused began acting paranoid. He accused her of
sleeping with other people and if she denied it he became aggressive. He physically
assaulted her on numerous occasions. He threatened to kill her at knifepoint while
straddling her on the bed. He held her down and kissed her against her will. He choked
her. The Crown acknowledged that the allegations of sexual assault differed between the
two but argued that, “in the context of abusive domestic relationships in which the
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appellant used fear as a means of control, the sexual assaults described by the
complainant were simply another method of asserting control.”114
The Ontario Court of Appeal excluded the evidence. They determined that the
trial judge had erred in identifying the complainant’s credibility as the fact in issue. The
fact in issue should have been identified as whether the sexual assault, the threatening and
the confinement occurred. (The accused pled guilty to the charge of assault causing
bodily harm). The court also determined that the similar fact evidence lacked cogency. It
was not similar enough given that it did not relate to the same sort of sexual misconduct –
as such it amounted to general bad character evidence according to the court. Contrast
this reasoning with the Supreme Court of Canada’s reasoning in B.F.F. where the
accused’s non-sexual but violent conduct towards the complainant’s siblings was
admitted to demonstrate a propensity for relating in a controlling and violent manner to
the children in his care.115
vi) What Ought The Court To Do?
Approaching the issue of similar fact evidence with a recognition that method or
manner of relating is an important part of the modus operandi for those who sexually
assault children (and therefore ought to be given significant consideration) seems both
advisable and promisingly constructivist. Where, however, this analysis is folded back
into assumptions about true nature and innate sexual proclivities its social constructivism
is lost. In adult complainant cases, the problem is not that the court’s inquiry is focused
on discovering the accused’s true nature to relate – the problem is the lack of focus on the
accused’s relational propensities.
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There are constructivist and essentialist elements to both of these approaches. What
courts ought to do is apply an analysis that relies on likelihood of coincidence based
reasoning (so as to eliminate the true nature – innate sexual deviant assumptions
underpinning child complainant cases) but which recognizes the significant cogency of
similar fact evidence regarding an accused’s propensity to relate to …children or women
or men … in a particular manner (so as to examine and compare relationships rather than
relationship status and so as to focus more on relationship dynamics than on comparisons
between specific sexual acts). In other words for all cases regardless of age of the
complainant, maintain the more sophisticated understanding of the role of power
currently evident in many child sexual abuse cases but lose the essentialist elements
evident in both approaches by rejecting reasoning based on assumptions about innate
disposition and natural versus unnatural sexual acts, and focusing on similarity in method
or manner of relating as a significant element of modus operandi.
III. The Criminal Regulation Of Child Pornography
The suggestion made in the previous section that courts often conceptualize ‘the
pedophile’ as a pre-social category or type of person is also raised by the Supreme Court
of Canada’s differing approach to the criminal regulation of child pornography and adult
pornography.
The Court’s approach to child pornography reveals an assumption that those who
sexually offend against children are of a discrete class of individuals with an innate,
sexual pre-disposition constitutive of their essence. Conversely, in the context of adult
pornography, the Court’s approach reveals a conception of sexuality, an orientation
towards coercive or violent sex with other adults, as socially produced. Comparing the
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Court’s reasoning in cases addressing adult pornography with its analysis in cases
concerning child pornography illustrates that while the Court identifies pedophiles as a
discrete category of individuals with an innate and pre-social sexual orientation they do
not conceptualize those who sexually assault adults in the same way. As will be
discussed in Chapter Four, conceptualizing sexual violence as socially contingent both
requires and promotes legal reasoning that acknowledges the contextual factors that
contribute to the perpetuation of these harms; it also better accommodates the
perspectives of all sexual actors involved in an interaction (not simply the perspectives of
the accused and the justice system). In contrast, understanding sexual violence as a
function of the perverted arousal of a discrete minority (a conceptual approach evident in
the Court’s treatment of child pornography) produces a legal discourse that obscures the
social factors that perpetuate the sexual violation of children.
Chapter Four will include an in depth discussion of how the Court conceptualizes
sexual assault against adults. The criminal regulation of adult pornography will be
addressed at length in Chapter Five. Chapter Five will demonstrate how the Court’s
approach to the definition of obscenity began to change in the early 1990’s. The Court
began to adopt a more constructivist understanding of sexual violence. They began to
focus on adult pornography’s potentially detrimental attitudinal impact towards women –
what is sometimes described as the potential for ‘attitudinal bias’. The harm of obscenity
identified by the Court turned on its potential to perpetuate inequitable perceptions about,
and treatment of, women by men. They gave recognition to the argument that depictions
of rape could normalize and perpetuate more rape.116
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Does the Court justify criminalizing child pornography in the same way - on the
grounds that to do otherwise might harm society by corrupting the way in which people
treat children? In other words is it justified by the concern that the proliferation of child
pornography might cause more people to sexually abuse children – that it might create
more pedophiles? This is certainly one of the justifications that the Crown argued in R. v.
Sharpe – the Court’s leading precedent on the criminal regulation of child
pornography.117 In fact, the Court did not justify the prohibition against possession of
child pornography on the basis of attitudinal bias; the prohibition was not justified on the
basis that child pornography risked creating attitudinal changes in society such that more
people would begin sexually assaulting children.
R. v. Sharpe involved a constitutional challenge to section 163.1(4) of the Criminal
Code.118 Section 163.1(4) prohibits the possession of child pornography – that is any
visual representations that show a person who is, or is depicted as, under the age of 18
years and is engaged in, or is depicted as engaged in, explicit sexual activity and visual
representations the dominant characteristic of which is the depiction for a sexual purpose
of a sexual organ or the anal region of a person who is under the age of 18 years.119 The
defence argued that the provision, because it prohibited not just the production, sale or
distribution but also the possession of child pornography, was an unjustifiable violation of
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sections 2(b) and 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.120 But for two exceptions –
what might be described as the ‘private diaries’121 and the ‘teenage experimentation’122
exceptions – the Court found that while section 163.1(4) does violate section 2(b) it was
saved under section 1. The two exceptions were overly broad and not saved under section
1. For purposes of this discussion what is of most significance are Chief Justice
McLachlin’s reasons for finding that the prohibition on possession of child pornography
bears a rational connection to the pressing and substantial objective of the law – the
pressing and substantial objective being the prevention of harm to children.123
The Crown argued, and the Court adopted versions of, five different harms caused by
child pornography. It is the first harm alleged by the Crown - that child pornography
promotes cognitive distortions – that reveals the Court’s essentialist conception of those
who sexually offend against children. The Crown argued that, “pornography may change
possessors’ attitudes in ways that make them more likely to sexually abuse children”.124
They argued that people may come to see sexual relations with children as normal and
have their moral inhibitions weakened. The Crown argued that people who would not
otherwise abuse children might consequently do so. This argument tracks precisely the
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argument made by the Crown and accepted by the Court in Butler and Little Sisters –
cases dealing with the criminal regulation of adult pornography.125
However, the Court in Sharpe did not accept this justification. Instead they adopted a
modified version of the Crown’s argument. The Court accepted that, while the scientific
evidence linking cognitive distortions to increased rates of offending was limited,126 there
was a reasonable apprehension of harm. They accepted that “child pornography may
reduce pedophiles’ defences and inhibitions against sexual abuse of children”.127 The
nuance of their modification to the Crown’s argument is significant.128
In Butler and Little Sisters the Court justified the prohibition on the production and
distribution of certain types of pornography based on the concern that such materials and
depictions could induce individuals to change their sexual behavior and would influence
and reinforce negative perceptions about women.129 In Sharpe the Court justified the
prohibition on the possession of child pornography based, in part, on the concern that
such materials and depictions would incite pedophiles making them more likely to
offend.130
This distinction raises a number of questions. Why is ‘the pedophile’ a discrete and
identifiable sexual orientation whereas ‘the rapist’ is not? Those with a propensity for
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sexual interactions with children are ascribed an innate sexual orientation. But sexually
violent behavior directed towards adults is socially contingent and could, through
exposure, be induced in an individual.
Why is it problematic for courts to understand child sexual abuse through an
essentialist lens – to perceive pedophilia as an innate sexual orientation? It is problematic
because it obfuscates many of the dynamics and larger social issues involved in both the
perpetuation of and social response to child sexual abuse; an essentialist conception of
child sexual abuse conceals the larger social context - the social determinants - that
produce sexual violence against children. Constructing ‘the pedophile’ as a discrete
category of people, making him the archetypical child sexual abuser is a dangerous
misapprehension of the social problem of child sexual abuse. It portrays the child abuser
as atypical (and child sexual abuse as “aberrational rather than systemic and
ubiquitous”).131 Under an essentialist framework the pedophile is defined as ‘different in
kind’ from most of us, who are ‘normal’. The pedophile is not one of us but rather a
disordered ‘other’. The problem with this conception is that it “suggests that the solution
to sexual violence is to identify, and then excise and banish the problem. Systemic
approaches to sexual violence are not necessary. We need not change anything
fundamental in our society. We need only find the “predators and banish them.”132
More sexual abuse against children is perpetuated by their own family members than
by anyone else known or unknown to the child.133 Less frequently are child sexual abuse
victims violated by ‘the pedophile’ - that aberrational ‘other’ lurking around playgrounds
131
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or trolling on the internet. Children are in much greater numbers violated by their fathers
and grandfathers, stepfathers, uncles, cousins and brothers.
Understanding the issue as the ‘problem of the pedophile’ encourages discussion,
policy and legal approaches for keeping children safe from that ‘other’ - it does nothing to
keep children safe from their own families.134 It does nothing to recognize that child
sexual abuse is often a threat that comes from within the family and not external to it.
The focus of those criminal law approaches aimed at preventing child sexual abuse
which are proactive (as opposed to reactive) are typically oriented towards keeping
children safe from the sexual predator who stalks them in the playground, toy store or on
the internet. Section 161 of the Criminal Code provides one such example.135 It permits a
court to make an order prohibiting anyone convicted of a sexual offence against a person
under 16 from attending a park, playground, school ground, swimming pool or
community centre where children are likely to be present. Section 161 was enacted
following a British Columbia Court of Appeal decision striking down as unconstitutional
a similar provision which automatically prohibited anyone convicted of a sexual offence
from loitering in or near a park, playground or bathing area.136 It is not that laws such as
section 161 are themselves problematic. It is that these legal approaches target only one
specific subset of child sexual abuse and there do not seem to be parallel proactive or
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preventative legal initiatives aimed at preventing the larger category of sexual abuse that
occurs within families.137
The federal government’s recent Tackling Violent Crime Act further exemplifies this
point.138 The Act, which purports to address the issue of child sexual abuse, raises the
age of capacity to consent to sexual interactions from 14 to 16. Its legislative objective,
as articulated in the preamble to the Act is to ensure that “families should be able to raise
their children without fear of sexual predators”.139 According to legislators, raising the
age of consent from 14 to 16 will make the streets safer for our children and protect
communities from sexual predators and human trafficking. Discussion about the
proposed Act in the House of Commons reveals the degree to which legislators seek to
distance ‘us’ from ‘them’:
If the hon. member would have followed what has happened, he would
know that, for example, our bill to raise the age of consent. We know that
child welfare advocates and child sexual exploitation experts have told us
that Canada has become, in some instances, a destination for those adult
sexual predators, who have come from jurisdictions where their age of
consent is higher. We do not want Canada to become a destination for
adult sexual predators.140

The government’s impetus for addressing the problem of sexual abuse against
children in Canada was the influx of sexual predators from foreign lands, the threat that
Canada will become a hotbed of child sex tourism?141 Enacting proactive provisions to
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protect children from those who lure and exploit them through the use of the internet is
desirable. Taking measures to ensure that Canada does not become the next Phuket, as
ridiculous as that proposition is, is not the problem. (Although the efficacy even of
meeting the articulated objective of these measures is questionable in this instance.)
Again, what is problematic is that these sorts of measures and the articulated
justifications for pursuing them distort the issue. The law is, of course, much more
willing and able to intervene in the regulation and surveillance of public spaces. It is
more comfortable for judges and lawmakers to speak of and think of those who sexually
abuse children as aliens, outsiders, ‘others’, than it is to acknowledge that it is our social
structures, our educational deficits, our systemic poverty, our social dysfunction, and our
families that are hurting our children. Given that the vast majority of children who are
sexually abused are violated by family members and acquaintances, drawing a circle
around the family, reifying the public/private distinction and identifying the threat as
from without rather than within is dangerously obtuse. Jurisprudence that conceptualizes
‘the pedophile’ in this way contributes to this problematic discourse.
This is not to suggest that the criminal law ought not to be concerned with taking
measures to prevent the sexual exploitation of children by strangers. Rather the point is
that legal conceptions which promote the notion that child sexual abuse is perpetuated by

where the accused is married to the complainant (and the complainant is 14 or older). Section 150.1(2.2)
creates a transitional exception for those accused where the complainant is 14 or older and is the accused’s
common law partner or has a child or is expecting a child with the accused, at the time the act comes into
force. In other words, but for those common law couples who are grandfathered in, accused who marry 14
or 15 year olds can have consensual sex with them, while those who merely shack up with them cannot.
The traditional family values suggested by such a legislative scheme include a moral distinction between
married and common law couples, and a disapproval of premarital sex (and a privileging of marital sex).
The exception also implicitly endorses marriages between young girls and adult men, a practice which
religious right and ultra conservative sectors might continue to embrace but which most feminists reject as a
practice which perpetuates the treatment of women as the (sexual) property of men – first their father’s and
then their husbands.
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the anomalous and disordered ‘other’ are likely to encourage legal approaches to
prevention which focus on identifying and containing those ‘others’ rather than truthful if
uncomfortable acknowledgment that the behavior is prolific, that it is more often uncles,
grandfathers, coaches and teachers than it is three eyed, candy peddling, sex tourists and
that like other criminal offences, it is strongly correlated with the typical social
determinants of crime. Focusing on the child pornography consuming sociopathic
pedophile trolling the playgrounds, rather than the dangerous and violent landscape of so
many children’s family lives is much like the way that courts and legislatures traditionally
focused on stranger rape while ignoring the much more common rape of women by their
spouses, co-workers, neighbors and friends.142 It does nothing to encourage an
examination of the social structures that perpetuate this violence against children. It fails
to make the connection between child sexual abuse and other types of child abuse,
including mental and physical abuse as well as neglect. An essentialist understanding of
child sexual abuse, in which ‘the pedophile’ is constructed as the archetypical offender is
unlikely to examine the possible correlation between child sexual abuse, other forms of
child abuse, alcoholism, poverty, drug addiction and lack of education.143 It is unlikely to
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recognize the generational, systemic way in which this social problem, once it has
infected a family, is very likely to reproduce itself over and over again.
The Court in R. v. Sharpe did not need to rely on (and in doing so reinforce) an
essentialist understanding of those who sexually abuse children in order to uphold the
constitutionality of section 163.1(4) of the Criminal Code.144 They could have come to
the same conclusion by relying on the same reasoning they endorsed in adult pornography
cases. There was no analytical need in terms of their reasoning, to modify the Crown’s
argument that child pornography may reduce people’s defences and inhibitions against
sexual abuse of children. If the Court is willing to accept, as they did in Butler, that
exposure to sexual violence against women could influence one’s sexual behavior in a
social context where women are systematically disempowered, why couldn’t they accept
the same argument with respect to exposure to sexual images involving children, also a
disempowered demographic?145 The unlikelihood that elected officials will pursue legal
reforms which force their voters to see child sexual abuse as a problem produced by, and
typically contained within, their own families makes it all the more important for courts
to adopt conceptual frameworks which promote such a legal discourse.
This section demonstrated the essentialist conceptions of sexuality underpinning legal
approaches to sexual violence perpetuated against children, and examined the

versus the degree which should be attributed to generational sexual abuse instigated by teachers and clergy
in residential schools and now working its way through the generations. Regardless of exactly what the
proportions of each might be, both are socially contingent factors. Essentialist understandings of the
pedophile as an alien ‘other’ fail to recognize and address these social realities.
144
Supra note 118.
145
This should not be taken as a wholehearted endorsement of the Court’s decisions in Butler, supra note
116. While the more constructivist approach to sexuality that they adopt seems correct there is another
element to the case that remains problematic. This is their failure to reject the “community standards of
tolerance” test to establish harm. For a discussion of this see Chapter Five.
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shortcomings of essentialism in this context. The section to follow will discuss the role of
essentialism in legal approaches to achieving equality for some sexual minorities.
IV. Conceptions Of Sexuality Under Section 15
There now exist in Canada a number of legal instruments, some constitutionally
entrenched, which provide protection against discrimination for some sexual minorities.
These include the provincial human rights codes, the Canadian Human Rights Act,146 and
the equality guarantee under section 15 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Each of
these legal instruments adopts a categorical approach to the prohibition of discrimination.
In other words, each prohibits discrimination that is based on certain categories of people
– each adopts a series of legislatively enumerated, or subsequently identified or
interpreted, grounds of discrimination.147 Sexual orientation is an analogous prohibited
ground of discrimination under section 15 of the Charter.
i) The Categorical Approach To Section 15 And Its Critics
The categorical approach to human rights and equality guarantees shared by each of
these legal instruments means that claims for freedom from discrimination based on
sexual orientation, behavior, identity and desire, and the legal reasoning which grants
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these claims, lend themselves well to an essentialist conception of sexuality. An
understanding that sexual orientation, behavior, or desire is dictated by an innate,
immutable, or not readily mutable sexual object preference and that this gender
preference constitutes an essential element of one’s self provides a strong justification
under section 15 jurisprudence, for arguing that the law not discriminate on the basis of
sexual preference.
While courts often assume sexual orientation to be immutable148 this is not always the
case; significantly, this was not the assumption in Egan v Canada - the Supreme Court of
Canada case in which sexual orientation was determined to be an analogous ground under
section 15.149 In Egan, Justice LaForest, writing for the majority, characterized sexual
orientation as “a deeply personal characteristic that is either unchangeable or changeable
only at unacceptable personal costs.”150 Recall that constructivists do not necessarily
suggest that an individual’s sexual object preference is mutable. For many
constructivists, the problem is the combination of the assumption of immutability with the
assumption that sexual object preference is a ‘natural’ way in which to draw distinctions,
identify social categories and structure social institutions. In other words, the problem is
not with the construction of sexual orientation as immutable or mutable only at great
personal cost, it is with the assumption that sexual object preference is an essential
element of the self, constitutive of who we are.
There is a rich scholarship of analysis and critique of section 15 jurisprudence
demonstrating both how the categorical approach essentializes sexual identity and why
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this is problematic.151 Scholars such as Carl Stychin, Didi Herman, Brenda Cossman,
Ruthann Robson, Bruce Ryder, Susan Boyd, Lise Gotell and many others have
demonstrated and critiqued the essentialist assumptions about sexuality evident in the
Court’s section 15 cases addressing sexual minority claims. Briefly, critiques of the
categorical approach to equality for sexual minorities include the following three
interrelated arguments: i) the assertion that because it relies on essentialist conceptions
regarding sexual identity this means that those sexual minorities who experience their
sexuality as fluid, as in transition or as impossible to categorize, will be excluded from
protection under current equality guarantees;152 ii) the claim that a categorical approach
means that dominant hetero-normativity will not be challenged, subverted, deconstructed.
That those sexual minorities able to conform or assimilate will receive equality
guarantees while those who deviate too far, those who are too ‘queer’, will not be
recognized by law;153 iii) the argument that the categorical approach to equality, in which
the claims of sexual minorities are framed under the category of ‘sexual orientation’,
means that other categories – prohibited grounds of discrimination - are
heterosexualized.154
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One of the difficulties with a categorical approach to anti-discrimination law is
that “[c]ategories can become naturalized and essentialized and a list of enumerated
categories – such as the grounds of prohibited discrimination – may appear historically
and socially fixed”.155 As both Nitya Iyer and Carl Stychin have argued, such an
approach does not recognize that “social identities are geographically and historically
contingent”.156 It does not conceptualize identity as socially constructed. They argue that
the existence of such categories obscures the “invisible background norm”.157 In other
words, while the law begins to protect certain categories of individuals who deviate from
the norm it does nothing to challenge the dominant norm against which these individuals
are being measured. In fact, it does nothing even to reveal that such measurement is
taking place. They argue that the norm remains in place, permanently fixed, immutable,
and ‘undeconstructed’. They also point out that this approach requires individuals
seeking equality to “fit themselves within one grouping that can be labeled
disadvantaged” thus obfuscating very real differences among ‘members’ of a particular
category.158
In “On Law’s Categories” Lise Gotell, borrowing from Foucault, engages in a
discursive analysis of Vriend v. Alberta,159 in order to conclude that “through a reliance
on fixed sexual identity categories[,] the liberal legal framing of sexual orientation” in
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Vriend works to reinforce the naturalness of heterosexuality.160 Her emphasis is on the
increasingly powerful role of law in constructing sexual subjectivity and the limits placed
upon the potential for transformative social and political change embedded in producing a
rigidly demarcated category of gay/lesbian.161 However, also to be drawn from her
analysis is the assertion that by relying on a rigid heterosexual/homosexual divide, claims
of discrimination based on sexual orientation serve to heterosexualize other important
human signifiers which have been identified under section 15 as prohibited grounds of
discrimination.162 She suggests that this process of heterosexualization was instigated
prior to the addition of explicit sexual orientation protections under anti-discrimination
provisions. Gotell contends that the initial exclusion of sexual orientation clauses from
human rights legislation has precluded the ability of “non-heterosexuals” to claim
protection against other prohibited types of discrimination. She notes, citing cases such
as Canada v. Mossop,163 that “prior to the addition of explicit sexual orientation
protections” unsuccessful complaints were made on the basis of existing categories,
including sex, marital status and family status.164 Cossman makes similar observations
about these same cases.165
Borrowing from Katherine Lahey’s conclusions in Are We Persons Yet? Law and
Sexuality in Canada,166 Gotell suggests that such decisions confirmed the exclusion of
‘non-heterosexuals’ from these categories. “Discrimination against gays and lesbians, in
other words, was not about sex, family status and so on; instead, it was discrimination on
160
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the basis of a missing pocket, -- sexual orientation.”167 In this way, she suggests, the
existing grounds were effectively heterosexualized and sexual identities, as constituted by
the law, further essentialized. For example in Mossop, the Court denied the appeal of a
gay man who claimed that he had been discriminated against on the basis of family status,
which was prohibited under the Canada Human Rights Act. Mossop’s employer had
denied him bereavement leave upon his partner’s father’s death. The Court found that the
employer’s discrimination was based on sexual orientation, not family status. Sexual
orientation was not covered under federal human rights legislation at that time.
Lahey suggests that the Court, “in concluding that this discrimination was not
‘really’ on the basis of marital status, but was ‘really’ on the basis of unprotected ‘sexual
orientation”’ extended heterosexual presumptions about family and essentialized Mr.
Mossop’s identity by assuming that the source of discrimination against him must relate
to his sexual orientation.168 This is similar to the manner in which the complainants and
human rights tribunals discussed in the next section used the category of discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation to conceptualize the sexual harassment of heterosexual
men by heterosexual men.
Brenda Cossman suggests that the Court’s treatment of gay and lesbian issues in
Canada over the past twenty years has left a legacy both of transgression and
normalization.169 She suggests that “the progress of formal equality in same-sex
relationship recognition…has brought a new lesbian and gay legal subject on stage. It is a
subject constituted in and through the discourses of formal equality – a radically different
subject than the lesbian and gay subject that was constituted in and through the
167
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conservative discourses of deviance, biology and exclusion.”170 She argues that while
this new legal subject does in some respects challenge and displace the heteronormativity
of legal subjectivity in the familial context, the process of inclusion through which this
occurs is at the same time a normalizing strategy in which “gays and lesbians are
reconstituted through discourses of sameness.”171 Discourses of sameness both promote
the conceptualization of sexual identity as innate and pre-social, and favour formal
equality over substantive equality. In other words, they expand the category of who is in,
but maintain an approach limited to making sure everyone who is in is treated the same
rather than changing the categories or rejecting the necessity of a particular category.
There are issues that should be noted in response to these arguments. The legal
advances made by certain sexual minorities since Egan and Vriend should not be
underestimated, nor should their future role in laying the groundwork for further social
change be underestimated. Indeed, it may be that until a certain degree of legal
recognition was achieved, legal arguments based on disruption or a queering of the law or
its subjects were likely to fail. Take for example, the right to legal recognition of same
sex relationships. Arguments based on recognizing diverse and alternative familial type
relationships and a queering of the family, in a legal era in which the disruption or
destruction of the family was precisely the argument put forth by opponents to same sex
marriage would have been certain to fail.172 Indeed, the Ontario Court of Appeal, in
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granting same sex marriage in Halpern v. Canada (Attorney-General),173 went to great
lengths to assure the Attorney General that same sex marriage would not lead to the
destruction of the family. Moreover, a premature argument focused too heavily on the
relational interest denied by the exclusion of gays and lesbians from the institution of
marriage, rather than a claim of identity based discrimination, would have played right
into the hands of those decision makers responsible for the formal type of equality so
parsimoniously handed out in the early same sex marriage decisions174 – ‘we aren’t
denying gays and lesbians the right to marital Bliss175 (pun intended): no one is saying
homosexuals can’t get married…they just can’t marry each other’. As Cossman notes,
arguments “driven by the discourse of sameness”, ones which represented a “less radical
shift”, in cases such as M. v. H., had greater resonance with the Court than did those in
the earlier days of Mossop and Egan “where at least some litigants were explicitly
concerned with resisting a politics of sameness”.176 It may be, however, that while
Cossman’s observation is accurate, it is only now, with the wisdom of hindsight and
experiential learning that the Canadian public and its legal system, having not witnessed
the collapse of life as we know it in an era of gay weddings, is ready to entertain
arguments about the value of disrupting the normative family model.177
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Foucault’s argument that power produces as much as it oppresses should also be
raised in this discussion. As noted in Chapter Two, Foucault suggested that power was
not simply a hierarchical system of domination but more a pervasive and continuous web
of relations between agents marked by continuous struggle or resistance. The legal and
social conception of sexual identity or preference as a category of folks (a ‘species’) also
produced an ‘it’s not a choice’ type reverse discourse – what Foucault called the “tactical
polyvalence of discourses”. This is a reverse discourse that was used very successfully
under section 15 to radically change the legal landscape of sexual minority rights in
Canada in a very short period of time.178
It seems reasonable to assume that, at least for now, the categorical approach to
equality, and the obstacles it presents for more transformative, perhaps ‘queer’ innovation
of social structures, is here to stay. This may mean that transformative approaches aimed
at creating yet more inclusive social structures ought to be directed towards queering or
disrupting these categories themselves.
While all have been addressed under the rubric of sexual orientation, there is an
important distinction between the form of social exclusion underlying the discrimination
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at issue in cases such as Vriend,179 Trinity Western University v. British Columbia
College of Teachers,180 Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada181 and cases
such as Halpern,182 M. v. H.,183 Egan184 or even more obviously Chamberlain v. Surrey
School District No. 36,185 Mossop,186 or Doe v. Canada.187 The former set of cases
constitute specific claims of direct discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, the
latter set of cases are about claims to societal recognition of queer relationships and
families. The significance of this distinction lies in its illumination of what I would
suggest, perhaps optimistically but I hope not naively, is the broader, underlying purpose
motivating the latter type of case: a desire for social or institutional affirmation and
recognition of a relationship, or a family which deviates from the norm … none of which
is necessarily about, or even directly involves, sexual object preference. To be sure, it
would be more than a little formalistic to suggest that a prohibition against same sex
marriage is not also about discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The fact is
that it is about both. However, one reason that gays and lesbians in Canada, relatively
speaking achieved so many rights so quickly may be because of the legal battles to
achieve recognition already fought and won by other non-traditional families in Canada.
This helped to produce a legal and social culture less reticent to at least consider the
possibility of a family model that might include monogamous gay and lesbian couples.
The subversive potential, the opportunity to queer the family, to ‘de-essentialize’ sexual
179
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identity, starts with a recognition of the ability to transpose and thus transcend, if not the
identities, then certainly the goals and motivations of various equality seeking or more
importantly equality needing groups.
An analysis and critique of the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in Doe v.
Canada,188 rejecting a constitutional challenge to the Processing and Distribution of
Semen for Assisted Conception Regulations189 demonstrates the promise of addressing
equality for sexual minorities by attempting to disrupt the categorical approach to equality
from within the categories themselves. The next section will argue that the claimants in
this case would have been better served by the jurisprudence of section 15 of the Charter
had they premised their argument on the assertion that they were discriminated against on
the basis of family status rather than sexual orientation. Such an approach would be
preferable both in terms of avoiding the pitfalls of the formal equality approach to section
15 adopted by both levels of court in this case, in addition to providing a more inclusive
and progressive litigation strategy for acquiring legal recognition of familial relationships
which deviate from the essentialist, hetero-normative paradigm assumed by the Semen
Regulations. It may be that such an approach would encourage a more constructivist,
contextual, socially contingent equality analysis in the context of sexuality, sexual
identity, and sexual preference.
ii) Family As Status Under Section 15

188

Susan Doe v. Canada (Attorney General), (2006) 79 O.R. (3d) 586 aff’d 276 D.L.R. (4th) 127 (C.A.).
The constitutional validity of the Semen Regulations was originally challenged in an earlier case Jane Doe
v. Canada (Attorney General), [2006] O.J. No. 191. Jane Doe v. Canada was dismissed after the claimant
successfully conceived through home insemination.
189
S.O.R./96-254 [hereinafter the “Semen Regulations” or alternatively the “Regulations”].

116

The Semen Regulations were enacted in 1996 under the Food and Drug Act.190
The impetus for the Regulations arose as a result of a concern expressed in the Report of
the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies in 1993 over the lack of
uniform national standards applicable to the several sperm banks (now called semen
establishments) across Canada responsible for the screening and collection of semen from
anonymous donors.191 The concern was that women who utilized semen from
anonymous donors who had deposited at sperm banks that did not screen for diseases
were at risk of contracting some form of communicable disease. The source of the Royal
Commission’s concern with the risk of infection from donor insemination was the use of
semen from anonymous donors, not the use of semen from known donors. In fact it is
unlikely that the Commission focused on known donors at all, given that the Report does
not actually distinguish between known and anonymous donors.
The Regulations prohibit the clinical use of semen in “assisted conception” unless and
until the following has occurred: the donor has tested negative for a number of
communicable diseases including HIV and Hepatitis B and C, the semen has been cryopreserved (frozen) and quarantined for six months and, the donor has then re-tested
negative for these diseases. The inequality created by the Semen Regulations relates
primarily to their application to known donors rather than to restrictions and prohibitions
on the use of anonymous semen donation in assisted conception practices.192 The
inequality stems from the Regulations’ definition of “assisted conception”.
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The Semen Regulations define “assisted conception” as a “reproductive technique
performed on a woman for the purpose of conception using semen from a donor who is
not her spouse or sexual partner”.193 In other words, women who are married to, living
together in common-law relationships with, or having sex with their chosen donor, can
access assisted conception procedures without being subject to the Regulations’
restrictions; they can be inseminated by their physicians without their donor first
undergoing the screening, and without being subjected to the wait period and the costs
(both pecuniary and otherwise) imposed as a result of the Semen Regulations. Women
who are not in a spousal or sexual relationship with their chosen donor do not have this
option. Individuals who are not in a spousal or sexual relationship with their chosen
donor, regardless of their relationship to the donor, will, in order to receive assisted
conception services, first have to incur the cost of having the semen screened, cryopreserved for six months and then re-screened194 – a cost which is measured in the
thousands. In the end, they will only have access to cryo-preserved semen rather than
fresh semen. The rate of successful assisted conception using frozen sperm is, however,
significantly lower than the rate of success when assisted conception is conducted with
fresh sperm.195 The Regulations impose an additional barrier to accessing assisted
conception procedures for those women who are not in a sexual or spousal relationship
with their known donor and whose known donor is gay or over 40.196
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Doe v. Canada involved a challenge to the Semen Regulations by ‘Susan Doe’ a
woman who sought assisted conception to conceive using semen from the same gay man
who had biologically fathered the claimant and her partner’s first child. The claimant’s
partner conceived and gave birth to the family’s first child and the couple wanted their
second child to be biologically fathered by the same man who had biologically fathered
their first child. However, because Susan Doe was not in a sexual or spousal relationship
with him, her donor and his semen were subject to the Regulations.197 While her donor
was willing to provide fresh semen for use in assisted conception he was not willing to
have his semen cyro-preserved and quarantined. As a result, Susan Doe was denied
access to assisted conception procedures using her chosen donor’s semen.
Susan Doe challenged the constitutional validity of the definition of “assisted
conception” under the Regulations, arguing that it violated section 15 of the Charter by
discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation.198 The Ontario Superior Court of Justice
held that the definition of “assisted conception” in the Semen Regulations did not violate
the claimant’s rights under section 15 of the Charter; this decision was upheld on appeal.
Susan Doe argued that this exemption from the Regulations for the semen of a
woman’s spouse or sexual intimate discriminates against lesbians who by definition will
not have a semen donor who is a spouse or sexual partner. Justice Dambrot, of the
Ontario Superior Court of Justice, and Justice Macpherson of the Ontario Court of Appeal
acquire that authorization a physician is required to provide the government with, among other things, a
rationale outlining “the reasons that justify the use of the requested semen” and the “reasons why the needs
of the patient cannot be met using semen” from a man who hasn’t had sex with another man, even once,
since 1977.
197
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(who on the whole adopted Justice Dambrot’s reasoning) disagreed.199 Justice Dambrot
found that the exemption from the Regulations was not, as Susan Doe had argued, a
recognition that “women are entitled to knowingly and voluntarily accept the risks to
themselves and to their unborn children associated with conceiving a child with the donor
of their choice.”200 His rejection of this claim was premised on the fact that heterosexual
women who are not in a sexual or spousal relationship with their donor are also subject to
the Regulations. As such he reasoned,
…simple logic tells me that the justification for the exemption of spouses
and sexual partners cannot be recognition that women are entitled to
knowingly and voluntarily accept the risks to themselves and to their
unborn children. It would be impossible to reconcile that purpose with the
fact that a heterosexual woman who wants to be inseminated by a known
donor is not exempt from the scheme.201

Instead he suggested, “it makes perfect sense to exclude from the scheme women seeking
assisted conception with the semen of their spouses or sexual partners, because there is no
point in imposing the Semen Regulations on such women having regard to the fact that
they have already been exposed to any risk that exists, and will likely continue to be
exposed.”202 As such, for Justice Dambrot the Regulations logically draw a distinction
between donors who are sexually intimate with, or married to, the women seeking
assisted conception and donors who are not.203 Having identified this as the purpose of
the exclusion, Justice Dambrot unsurprisingly came to the conclusion that while
concededly “lesbians do not ordinarily have spouses or sexual partners who can donate
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semen” and therefore the Regulations do impose differential treatment on them, sexual
orientation is not the basis for this differential treatment.204
Undeniably, one of the legislative objectives of the Semen Regulations is to
prevent the spread of communicable diseases. In keeping with this objective, it is simple,
and logical (to use Justice Drambot’s language205) to subject anonymous semen to the
regimen of testing prescribed in the Semen Regulations. It would also be consistent with
the legislative objective articulated by the Court, although perhaps not efficacious, to
subject the semen of all known donors to this regiment of testing. However, there does
not appear to be a well reasoned basis, consistent with the stated objective, to exclude
from the strictures of the Semen Regulations some known donors, but not others.206 I
would suggest that the exclusion from the Semen Regulations of known donors who are in
a spousal or sexual relationship with the women seeking assisted conception, is actually
204
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based on hetero-normative and essentialist assumptions or understandings about family
and interpersonal relationships in contemporary Canadian society. That is to say, the
exclusion from the Regulations is premised on a monogamous, heterosexual ideal of the
family that presumes that the semen of husbands ought not to be subjected to the same
testing and restrictions as that of any other known donor semen. If this is so then, the
constitutional difficulty with the definition of “assisted conception” under the Semen
Regulations is not only that its effects impose a differential burden to some as a result of
their sexual orientation but that, by relying on a hetero-normative, traditional conception
of the family its purpose imposes differential treatment based on family status. If this is
the case then even within an analytical framework which privileges purpose over effect –
such as Justice Dambrot’s - the definition of assisted conception under the Regulations
violates section 15 of the Charter.
Had Susan Doe argued that the definition of assisted conception treated certain
types of families differently and that this differential treatment was based on family
status, her claim at the very least would not have fallen prey to the formalistic bent with
which courts of late appear to be approaching section 15 challenges.207
Premising a constitutional challenge to the Semen Regulations on the basis of
family status discrimination rather than simply on the basis of sexual orientation
discrimination is both more inclusive now, and more likely to promote greater inclusivity
in the future. As a category family status may be more conducive to maintaining openended and constantly re-articulated boundaries as to who is in and who is out. It is by its
structure oriented towards litigation strategies intended to re-define it – to queer which
207
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relationships/ which interpersonal social dynamics constitute family– to change its social
meaning. Every piece of equality litigation successfully argued under family status – a
relational concept- rearticulates and in this process contributes to the social construction
of family.
Despite the semen, despite the importation of sexual intimacy into the definition
of assisted conception, and despite the litigants’ decision to argue discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation, Doe v. Canada is not solely about sex…or sexual orientation.
It is, in large measure, about relationships. Yet cases like this are consistently presented
to the public, and analyzed on the sole basis of whether or not there has been
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
The Court in Doe v. Canada was right to suggest that the category of individuals
disadvantaged by the Semen Regulations does not just include lesbian couples, it also
includes heterosexual women who wish to start, or who belong to, families with known
donors with whom they are not in a sexual relationship, such as single women or any
three or more parented family. The Semen Regulations discriminate against anyone,
regardless of their sexual orientation, who wants to start or expand a family that does not
conform to the traditional, stereotypical model of a monogamous, two biologically
parented, heterosexual family, upon which the exclusion was premised. In addition to the
possibility of success, the distinct advantage of premising a claim in this case on the basis
of family status rather than sexual orientation is that it pursues the same goal, recognition
of a different way of life, a different type of family, a different choice, without
capitulating to the essentializing effect of the rigid heterosexual/homosexual classification
of sexual identity. While still premised on the need to establish differential treatment, a
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pragmatic reality under the binding analytical framework established by the Court, this
approach is more in keeping with both the element of human dignity Justice L’HeureuxDube sought to have transcend notions of enumerated and analogous group identity208 and
with the desire to further social transformation through the disruption of loci of
institutional power, such as the family.
It is true that the categorical approach to equality does nothing to challenge the
fact that the law’s distributive role is being dictated by or in reference to certain norms. It
is true that it requires individuals to fit themselves into categories. It is true that with
respect to the category of sexual orientation this results in an essentialist conception of
sexuality. I do not, however, agree that the success of the sexual minority equality
movement has done nothing to challenge those norms upon which ‘individuals are
measured’ – or to put it otherwise, upon which the distribution of rights, privileges, and
legal benefits are based. I have argued elsewhere that the access to cultural paradigms
acquired by the successes of the sexual minority rights movement lends itself well to a
process of subversion (or what I would now describe as iconoclasm) from within.209 I
will argue in Chapter Eight that legal movements, such as the movement to acquire same
sex marriage, provide a good example of this.
The categorical approach to equality driving section 15 has ascribed to an
essentialist conception of sexuality. As noted above, legal scholars have argued that
while many sexual minorities have received the benefit of section 15 protection, these
legal successes have not resulted in transformative changes to the social and legal
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institutions that regulate sexual behavior or to the assumption that economic privileges be
distributed based on sexual relationship status. However, some of the power and access
to cultural and social institutions achieved under this approach have successfully
disrupted and replaced certain essentialist conceptions about family, sexuality and sexual
relationships. Given the legal reality – the categorical approach to section 15 is unlikely
to be rejected anytime soon – it is necessary to devise new equality seeking strategies to
promote more constructivist legal conceptions about sexuality, sexual relationships, and
sexual preference. Claims of discrimination based on sexual orientation may have had
their (very successful) day in court. This does not mean that the pursuit for equality for
those whose sexual identity, sexual preferences, and relationship choices do not conform
to the hetero-normative paradigm is over. It does not mean that the essentialist
conception of sexuality adopted and perpetuated under section 15 should be accepted. It
may mean, however, that efforts should now be directed towards queering the categories
themselves, making less claims based on identity and more based on status – on relational
and interactional concepts. The downside, of course, will be that these are not claims that
will benefit as significantly from those reverse discourses that achieved so much for some
sexual minorities.
This part has noted how the essentialism driving the categorical approach to
equality unavoidably excludes those unable or unwilling to ‘fit into the category’. It has
attempted to reconcile the power produced through an essentialist conception of sexual
orientation with its corresponding obstacles to more transformative approaches. The final
section of Chapter Three will examine how an essentialist conception of sexuality leads to
an approach to sexual harassment that fails to fully account for the social context that
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produces this type of sexual hostility. Part Three will also demonstrate how categorical
approaches to issues of sexuality can be problematic not only in the equality context but
also in the area of sexual harassment law.
V. The Sexual Hostility Of Sexual Harassment – A Non-Categorical Approach
The Supreme Court of Canada’s current approach to sexual harassment was
established in 1989 in Janzen v. Platy Enterprises.210 In Janzen v. Platy, the Supreme
Court of Canada recognized, as human rights violations, allegations of sexual harassment
perpetrated against the two waitress claimants by ‘Tommy the cook’ and his boss (the
owner of the company with which they were employed). The Manitoba Human Rights
Tribunal had found in favour of the complainants; however upon judicial review, the
Tribunal’s decision was quashed by the Manitoba Court of Appeal.211 Justice Hubbard
was of the view that to harass and to discriminate are two “entirely different concepts.”212
He argued that “[w]hen a schoolboy steals kisses from a female classmate, one might well
say that he is harassing her. He is troubling her; vexing her; harrying her -- but he surely
is not discriminating against her”.213 Justice Twaddle, in his concurring opinion, argued
that sexual harassment did not constitute sex discrimination because it was not a
distinction based on the category of sex but rather an action based on sexual attraction or
‘sex appeal’.214
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, Chief Justice Dickson overturned the
Manitoba Court of Appeal’s determination that sexual harassment did not constitute sex
discrimination. Chief Justice Dickson determined that a finding of discrimination does
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not require the uniform treatment of all members of that particular group. He found that
to argue that it is not discrimination because it is based on the sexual appeal of a
particular woman rather than women as a whole is analogous to suggesting that
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is not sex discrimination because it only
discriminates against pregnant women and not all women are pregnant.
This reasoning was rejected by Chief Justice Dickson in Brooks v. Safeway
Canada Safeway Ltd. on the basis that while it was true that Safeway had only
discriminated against pregnant women, it is only women who can be pregnant.215
Pregnancy he argued cannot be separated from gender. Correspondingly, he found in
Janzen v. Platy that “[o]nly a woman could be subject to sexual harassment by a
heterosexual male” and “sexual attractiveness cannot be separated from gender”.216
In terms of outcome, a feminist analysis of the Supreme Court of Canada’s
reasoning would consider Janzen v. Platy Enterprises a victory for women. The Court
held, in no uncertain terms, that sexual harassment – whether it be in the form of quid pro
quo or hostile work environment – was indeed a form of discrimination based on sex.
Moreover, the Court made steps towards adopting a constructivist notion of sexual
harassment as a systemic product of a sexist labour market.217 However, Chief Justice
Dickson’s reasoning in Janzen v Platy also relies significantly on an essentialist
conception of sexual harassment. This has led, in one particular legal context, to an
application of sexual harassment law that relies on the same type of problematic and
essentialist categorical reasoning discussed above regarding section 15 of the Charter.
Chief Justice Dickson focused a great deal of his analysis on sexual demands:
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Common to all of these descriptions of sexual harassment is the concept of using
a position of power to import sexual requirements into the workplace thereby
negatively altering the working conditions of employees who are forced to
contend with sexual demands.…sexual harassment may take a variety of forms.
Sexual harassment is not limited to demands for sexual favours made under
threats of adverse job consequences should the employee refuse to comply with
the demands…Sexual harassment also encompasses situations in which sexual
demands are foisted upon unwilling employees or in which employees must
endure sexual groping, propositions, and inappropriate comments, but where no
tangible economic rewards are attached to involvement in the behavior.218

Instead of rejecting the Manitoba Court of Appeal’s assumption that sexual harassment
was about sexual attraction not sex (and therefore was not sex discrimination) he found
that it was sex discrimination because “sexual attractiveness cannot be separated from
gender”,219 which he assumed to be synonymous with sex (as in male/female sex). From
here he drew the analogy to pregnancy and came to the conclusion that “only a woman
could be subject to sexual harassment by a heterosexual male”220 and that therefore sexual
harassment constitutes sex discrimination.
Why did the Court suggest that “only a woman could be subject to sexual
harassment by a heterosexual male”221 or that “sexual attractiveness cannot be separated
from gender”?222 Was this necessary in order to avoid the formalistic reasoning adopted
by the Manitoba Court of Appeal? Was it consistent with Chief Justice Dickson’s
(decidedly constructivist) recognition that sexual harassment is produced through social
context (i.e. a sexist labour market)?
In fact, it was neither necessary nor consistent and it is problematic to
conceptualize sexual harassment as ‘sourced’ in biology and arousal. As demonstrated in
218
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the paragraphs to follow, it leaves less analytical space to recognize claims of sexual
harassment by heterosexual men against other men (and by heterosexual women against
women). 223 It also leaves those sexually harassed because of or based on transgressive
gender expression less protected. It encourages a categorical approach to sexual
orientation in which claims of sexual harassment by men and boys that should be
understood as sexual harassment are framed as claims of discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation. An essentialist conception of sexual harassment cannot accommodate
a truly complex gender analysis of the issue – something that an understanding of
‘straight male’ on male sexual harassment, for example, may demand. Moreover, an
essentialist conception of sexual harassment is inconsistent with those aspects of Chief
Justice Dickson’s decision in which he recognized the role of social and contextual
factors -such as power and systemic inequity - in producing sexually harassing
behavior.224 It does not ask or answer the question as to why sexuality is the weapon of
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For a discussion on this point see Catherine A. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A
Case of Sex Discrimination, (Yale University Press: London, 1979). The Court in Janzen v. Platy cited
Catherine MacKinnon’s definition of sexual harassment: "the unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in
the context of a relationship of unequal power “. While the Court cited Mackinnon’s definition, among

129

choice in so many employment, educational and institutional settings. It does not inquire
into the other power dynamics at play – whether these are individual, institutional,
political, economic or social. It fails to fully explore why Tommy the Cook’s boss, who
presumably was not motivated by sexual arousal, chose to ignore his employees’
complaints.
A conception of sexual harassment focused on sexual attraction is less likely to
produce systemic remedies. A failure to account for the many social and institutional
factors and complex power dynamics that contribute to sexual harassment obscures
systemic labour hierarchies between men and women; it obscures the distinction between
sex and gender and the role that gender (in addition to or perhaps in some cases even
instead of sex or sexuality) plays in sexual harassment cases; it also makes it much more
difficult to identify the many sites where it occurs and the diversity of individuals who are
subjected to it.
i) Straight Eye For The Straight Guy, High School Pariahs And Social Solutions
Given the Court’s determination in Janzen v. Platy that either the perpetrators or
complainants of sexual harassment may be male or female, the assumption that only a
woman could be subject to sexual harassment by a heterosexual male is based not on the
belief that men cannot be sexually harassed, nor even that men cannot sexually harass
other men but rather on the assumption that straight men will not sexually harass other
men.
What underpins the claim that straight men will not sexually harass other men?
First, it is underpinned by an assumption that sexual harassment is motivated by sexual

others, it did not adopt MacKinnon’s analysis of power or MacKinnon’s constructivist account of sexuality
and gender.
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desire, sexual attraction and sexual arousal; while such an assumption is consistent with
Chief Justice Dickson’s focus on sexual demands, to characterize sexual harassment this
way was precisely the understanding of sexual harassment that feminists argued against.
Second, it assumes that sexual desire, sexual arousal and sexual attraction are fixed. In
other words, a heterosexual man will not sexually harass another man because sexual
harassment is about sexual attraction (and in addition an assumption that men who
identify as heterosexual are never sexually aroused by other men). Chief Justice
Dickson’s reasoning leaves little, if any, analytical opportunity to address cases of sexual
harassment by heterosexual men against other heterosexual men. The sexual harassment
by men or boys of other men or boys, completely irrespective of the sexual orientation of
either the victims or the perpetrators, is not uncommon.225 Indeed, one might find that the
more male dominated, the more butch, the work place or social context the more likely
this is to happen.226
The reasoning in North Vancouver School District No. 44 v. Jubran illustrates
exactly how an essentialist conception of sexual harassment can impede recognition of
other victims in a way that a constructivist understanding of sexual harassment does
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not.227 North Vancouver School District No. 44 v. Jubran involved a human rights
complaint against the school board by one of its former students.
For Azmi Jubran high school was a “living hell”.228 This was because in grade
eight, Azmi was selected as the class “pariah” and spent the next five years being
singled out and picked on by a group of fellow students. In particular, he was called a
“homo”, a “queer” and a “faggot”. He was kicked and he was spit on. His tormentors
drew sexually graphic pictures of him and attached the label homo to them. On a
number of occasions his entire class chanted “Azmi is gay” in unison.229 Azmi alleged
that he had been discriminated against on the grounds of sexual orientation. The school
board argued that a student who identified as heterosexual and was perceived to be
heterosexual could not claim that he had been discriminated against on the basis of
sexual orientation.230
The British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal found that Azmi was not a
homosexual, nor according to the Tribunal, were his tormentors. They also found that
the students did not perceive Azmi to be a homosexual. Regardless, the Tribunal held
that Azmi had been discriminated against on the ground of perceived sexual orientation
and that the school board had failed, without reasonable justification, to provide a
discrimination free learning environment.
The Tribunal’s award was quashed on judicial review to the British Columbia
Supreme Court.231 Justice Stewart stated that
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of overarching importance, the Tribunal proceeded on the basis that even if
it accepted as a fact that the students who attacked him did not believe
Jubran to be a homosexual their conduct fell within s. 8 of the Human
Rights Code, infra. For my purposes therefore the case must be
approached as one in which Jubran is not a homosexual and the students
did not believe him to be a homosexual.232

Based on this reasoning Justice Stewart held that, given that Azmi is not a homosexual,
and that the students did not believe him to be a homosexual he could not find that their
harassment was discrimination based on sexual orientation. He stated that the Tribunal
erred by equating “discrimination through harassment by the use of hurtful words of a
sexual nature with discrimination "because of the sex or sexual orientation OF THAT
PERSON OR CLASS OF PERSONS".233
If one understands sexual orientation as an essential part of self, constitutive of
who we are, and one determines that human rights legislation prohibiting discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation is confined to protecting those belonging to historically
disadvantaged or oppressed sexual minorities, then one must find that Azmi, who
identified as straight and was perceived as straight, was not discriminated against based
on sexual orientation. If one finds that sexual harassment is behavior motivated by sexual
arousal (as dictated by one’s pre-social and innate sexual object preference) then the use
of hurtful words and conduct of a sexual nature by these heterosexual students against
another heterosexual student was not discrimination based on sex. Justice Stewart’s
reasoning is consistent with the Supreme Court of Canada’s interpretation of sexual
harassment in Janzen v. Platy. It is reasoning which demonstrates how an essentialist
conception of both sexual orientation and sexual harassment precludes legal recognition
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of this human rights violation because of an overly simplistic interpretation of the
behavior at issue. Instead of recognizing the multilayered and immensely complex
intersection of power with sex, sexuality and gender and the relationship dynamics these
social practices and cultural understandings of sexuality and gender produce, Justice
Stewart chalked these sexualized attacks up to an unexplored, and frankly uncritical
assumption of teenage cruelty. Thus his explanation for the harassment: “His high school
years were a living hell. Why? Because a group of students singled him out for attack. For
reasons unknown - and probably capable of being understood only by the addled brains of
certain teenagers - Jubran was a pariah."234
Are they reasons unknown? Are they incapable of comprehension? Azmir’s
classmates testified that they did not perceive him to be homosexual. They claimed that
they were not targeting him because he was gay. The explanation provided by the school
board and supported by the testimony of the students was that they targeted him because
he was different and that the homophobic slurs were the form that their attacks took.
From an essentialist perspective it may be incomprehensible why a group of
heterosexual students would sexually harass another heterosexual student, who they
perceived to be heterosexual, by demonizing him as a ‘faggot’. It may not be possible
from this perspective to identify the behavior – which no one questioned was harassing as sexual. However, from a social constructivist account of sexual harassment which
understands it as a product of social and institutional practices - a multiplicity of force
relations manifested through webs of relationships in which sexual identity and the
categories of sex themselves are produced and regulated through the normative practices
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which are typically understood to reflect them, as Foucault might suggest235 - the conduct
becomes both comprehensible, as normative policing, and identifiable as sexual
harassment. Under this account, assuming the Supreme Court is correct that harassment
that is of a sexual nature constitutes discrimination based on sex then, the conduct
directed towards Azmi was certainly discrimination based on sex.236
The British Columbia Court of Appeal came to a different conclusion than that of
Justice Stewart of the British Columbia Supreme Court.237 They found that “the
consequences of the actions of Mr. Jubran's harassers was that he was discriminated
against because of his sexual orientation, whether or not he was or his harassers believed
or perceived him to be homosexual.”238
But does it really make sense to suggest that Azmi was discriminated against
because of his sexual orientation or even perceived sexual orientation? Certainly he was
discriminated against. Certainly it demeaned him in a way that interfered with his
participation in school life. But his sexual orientation, according to him, is heterosexual.
His harassers testified that they understood his sexual orientation to be heterosexual. They
further testified that they did not mean to imply by their taunts that he was homosexual.
Azmi was straight. His harassers knew him to be straight. His harassers were not trying
to suggest that he was other than straight.
In fact, Azmi was not discriminated against because of or based on his sexual
orientation. But was he discriminated against based on sexual orientation generally –
235
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based on the concept of sexual orientation? He was wrongly labeled homosexual.
However to identify someone as gay, regardless of whether or not they are sexually
attracted to members of the same sex, is not an act of discrimination - to suggest
otherwise carries with it heterosexist, if not homophobic, normative assumptions. The
issue is that he was persecuted and that the weapon of choice was reliance on social
attitudes of hatred and fear towards sexual minorities – Jubran was subjected to sexual
hostility not discrimination on the basis of his sexual orientation.
In Macdonald v. Brighter Mechanical Ltd. the complainant alleged that he was
discriminated against on the basis of sexual orientation.239 MacDonald was not gay.
There was no evidence to suggest that his alleged harassers (fellow heterosexual
employees) thought that he was gay. However, like in Jubran the complainant’s claim
was nonetheless framed as discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
Macdonald alleged that among other things he was called a fag, asked how he
liked sucking cock, and on a regular basis had sexually explicit material placed in his
toolbox suggesting he try pussy for a change.240 The Tribunal found that he had not
proven these allegations on a balance of probabilities. However the Tribunal went on to
discuss what their outcome would have been had he proven the allegations. The Tribunal
determined that “even if Mr. MacDonald was occasionally called gay or a fag, or did
receive a few ads or pictures in his toolbox, I would not find that he had been
discriminated against in the course of his employment on the basis of sexual
orientation.”241 This finding was based on five points: i) this, unlike the Jubran case,
was an employment case - involving adults – and so MacDonald was not as vulnerable or
239
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as in need of protection as a student would be; ii) the conduct occurred over the course of
a relatively short period of time – one year not several years as in Jubran; iii) any
homosexual epithets directed at Mr. MacDonald and any sexually related material which
may have been placed in his toolbox were because his fellow employees disliked him –
the conduct was therefore unrelated to any ground protected under the Code; iv) it was
both “clear and relevant”242 that no one at Brighter Mechanical perceived Mr. MacDonald
to be gay or anything other than a heterosexual male”.243
Maintaining that Jubran or MacDonald were discriminated against based on their
sexual orientation is not the only or the best way to establish that the conduct they alleged
violates human rights legislation. Under a socially constructed understanding of
sexuality, in which sexuality is more than nature, more than biological drives, but also (or
instead, depending on the degree of constructivism) a product of social organization, a
description of relationships, social interactions, and regulative sex and gender norms, and
in which sexual harassment is not understood through innate sexual object choice
designations or sexual arousal, it makes much more sense to say that these allegations, if
proven, demonstrate sexual harassment (discrimination based on sex) rather than
discrimination based on sexual orientation.
The benefit of adopting the approach I am advocating is that claims will not turn
on whether the complainant was or was not gay or whether respondents thought that the
complainant was gay. This approach does not obscure the systemic way in which sex,
gender and sexuality are produced as categories of identity through social and
institutional practices that are then deployed to regulate the very categories they have
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produced.244 All of which ought to i) provide greater insight into how and why
homophobia still reigns over playgrounds and many job sites and ii) better reveal how
sexuality, through the policing of sex and gender norms, is so often the weapon of choice
in both the social demand for sex, gender and sexuality conformity and the mechanism of
power that both informs, and flows from, such demand.
One might respond to this approach by asking what then would distinguish sexual
harassment from other forms of harassment? In other words, what basis justifies the
law’s distinction between sexual harassment and plain old name-calling? The response to
this critique is two fold. First, simply put, the law often makes distinctions based on
choice of weapon. Second, the law also often makes distinctions based on the impact of
the conduct or social practice at issue. Much as is the case with respect to race, for
historical reasons as well as current social conditions, sexual hostility has a different
impact than plain old name-calling - on both an individual level and a societal one. One
of the, although not the only, reasons why sexual hostility is so often the weapon of
choice is because sexual hostility has often been and is so often the weapon of choice.
Indeed, in part, it is the very fact of this circumstance that makes sexual hostility such an
effective weapon. One of the policy objectives of human rights legislation is broad or
general social amelioration. In other words one of its objectives is to reduce the efficacy
of weapons like sexual hostility.
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Such as, for example, the way in which pubescent adolescents, by vigilantly policing gender norms in an
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In Mercier v. Dasilva the complainant identified as straight as did the supervisor
he accused of violating his human rights by among other things asking him repeatedly –
in front of co-workers - to ‘do him a fellatio’.245 The Tribunal noted that neither Mercier
nor Dasilva identified as gay. The Tribunal found that the evidence did not establish that
Dasilva actually wanted Mercier to perform oral sex on him. In light of this evidence the
Tribunal rejected Mercier’s claim of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation;
instead they found that he was sexually harassed. In doing so the Tribunal conceptualized
sexual harassment as an act of sexual hostility – as the use of sexuality as a weapon to
demean and humiliate. The Tribunal’s reasoning accommodates the group dynamics at
play (the fact that the requests for fellatio not coincidentally occurred in front of other coworkers). Under the Tribunal’s reasoning, the fact that Dasilva may have been motivated
by his dislike for Mercier would not be a basis on which to dismiss the claim (unlike the
reasoning in Macdonald v. Brighter Mechanical). It is reasoning that does not require the
Tribunal to assume that being, or being identified as, gay is presumptively demeaning.246
It is reasoning that recognizes sexual harassment as much more complex than simply the
sexualization of the workplace. It is reasoning that accommodates the fact that a straight
man may sexually harass another straight man.
In Janzen v. Platy Chief Justice Dickson makes reference to the issue of power.
He states that sexual harassment is “the concept of using a position of power to import
sexual requirements into the workplace thereby negatively altering the working
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conditions of employees who are forced to contend with sexual demands.”247 While he
gives recognition to the role of power he then ties this to the making of sexual demands –
the importation of sexual requirements. Contrast this with the reasoning of the Tribunal in
Mercier v. Dalsilva where an analysis of the power dynamics at play was incorporated
into the Tribunal’s conception of the actual behavior at issue.
As feminists have argued for decades,248 understanding sexual harassment as a
social practice - as a product of the context in which it is situated - will be more likely to
produce legal reasoning aimed at discerning whether sexuality is being deployed as a
weapon in a particular workplace or institutional setting. There is nothing to suggest that
a more constructivist approach could not be accommodated under the current definition of
sexual harassment. Janzen v. Platy defined sexual harassment as unwelcome conduct of a
sexual nature that detrimentally affects the work environment or leads to adverse jobrelated consequences for the victims of the harassment.249 While Chief Justice Dickson’s
essentialist reasoning should be rejected, the definition itself does not preclude the
possibility of a conception of sexual harassment that recognizes it as a social, institutional
and systemic problem in which sexuality is the weapon of choice.
Conclusion
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This chapter has demonstrated how the Court in different legal contexts - sexual
harassment suits, the equality claims of sexual minorities, similar fact evidence cases and
the criminal regulation of child pornography – tends to conceptualize sexuality as innate,
pre-social and biologically driven. The objective of this chapter was to develop (or in the
case of sexual minorities acknowledge and modify) arguments that reveal why
constructivist legal conceptions of sexuality are to be preferred over essentialist legal
conceptions of sexuality. The aim was to demonstrate that the Court’s essentialist
understanding of sexuality cuts across different legal contexts and that while the issues it
raises differ significantly depending on the legal context, in each, essentialist assumptions
give rise to problematic reasoning - reasoning that constricts the legal ‘space’ in which to
identify the social forces, and systemic factors contributing to or producing many aspects
of human sexuality.
Part I exposed legal reasoning which suggests that the Court conceptualizes those
who sexually abuse children as a discrete minority – an identifiable ‘other’ – and argued
that such an understanding perpetuates a legal discourse that obscures the relationship
between child sexual abuse and the social conditions that produce this problem – social
conditions such as poverty, alcoholism, lack of education and dysfunctional family
dynamics. Part II discussed how the Court’s approach to the equality claims of sexual
minorities relies on the assumption that sexual object choice is an unchanging and innate
element of one’s essential self. Many have argued that this justifies a hierarchical
distribution of legal rights and privileges that demands some degree of assimilation and
excludes those who cannot or will not assimilate. Part II also suggested that at this point
in time a more transformative approach might be to make equality claims based on those
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categories of prohibited discrimination that are relational in nature – such as family status.
Part III revealed how essentialist conceptions of sexual harassment render some victims
invisible while reifying those gender norms that help to constitute and regulate
problematic distinctions between men and women, and between sexual majorities and
sexual minorities.
The next chapter will examine a legal context – that of sexual violence against
adults - in which the Court has shifted from this essential conception. In doing so
Chapter Four will further demonstrate why the law ought to conceptualize sexuality as
socially constructed. Chapter Four will also begin to demonstrate how a legal conception
of sexuality as a social construct creates greater opportunity to orient law towards the
protection and promotion of sexual integrity.
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Chapter 4 – Queering Sexual Assault: Socially Constructed Conceptions Of Sexual
Violence

The previous chapter examined different legal contexts (sexual harassment cases,
sexual minority equality rights cases, and cases involving the sexual abuse of children) in
which the Supreme Court of Canada ascribes to an essentialist conception of sexuality.
Chapter Three also alluded to one area in which the Court’s reasoning indicates a shift
towards a more constructivist approach to issues of sexuality – that being the issue of
sexual violence among adults. This chapter and the next one will examine that area.
They will demonstrate how, influenced by feminist intervention, the Court has in the last
twenty years adopted a more constructivist understanding of sexual violence.
This newly adopted social constructivist understanding of sexual violence is reflected
in the Court’s approach to the regulation of obscenity and indecency, how the Court
defines consent to sexual touching and how the Court characterizes the harm of sexual
violence. It is a change that reflects a shift in the law’s moral focus - a shift from
protecting sexual propriety to promoting sexual integrity, a shift from moral concern over
sexual acts to moral concern over sexual interactions.
Until recently the law conceptualized sexual violence against women the same as, or
very similar to, the way it often continues to conceptualize the sexual violation of
children.1 Legal reasoning in cases involving sexual violence between adults revealed the

1

The issue of why the law has shifted towards a socially constructed conception of sexual violence
among adults but not as perpetuated against children is a topic unto itself. Perhaps this has occurred in
part because the ideas advanced by feminists regarding power and equality, if ascribed to, demand a
different conceptual approach to the rape of women by men but do not necessarily require a reconceptualization of ‘pedophilia’. In other words, power feminist theories cannot be universalized to
explain or theorize other types of sexual violence. Alternatively, as suggested in Chapter Three, it may
be that the natural/unnatural distinction is more pronounced in the context of intergenerational sex thus
making essentialist thinking more entrenched in that context.
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view that rape was perpetuated by men who were cursed with a natural sexual drive gone
awry, or an uncontrollable or abnormal lust.
In R. v. Dick, Penner and Finnigan, for example, the Manitoba Court of Appeal, in
upholding convictions against three defendants who brutally raped a young woman stated
that “they defiled the body of the complainant for no other purpose than of gratifying
their animal lusts; they robbed her of what a chaste woman considers her dearest
possession, her virginity.” 2 In R. v. Phelps, the trial judge noted that “I want to stress
that this was not a case where the assailant let his victim go after gratifying his perverted
lust. She escaped. There is no telling what further indignities she would have had to
undergo if she had not escaped.”3 Lest one think such sentiments are from a bygone era
consider Justice McLung’s 1998 characterization of a sexual assault as the defendant’s
“clumsy passes” and “sexual overtures” in his infamous decision in R. v. Ewanchuk.4
Under the old essentialist conception there was less space for the law to recognize and
give import to the role of hate, anger, misogyny, power or dehumanizing disrespect at
play in sexual violence. It was about lust and perverted urges – the greater the severity
and frequency of the offensive conduct the more perverted the offender. In other words,
in older cases essentialist thinking led courts to conclude that the sexual violation was
instigated either by a natural male sexual urge gone awry or a perverted sexual drive.
While the latter sentiment might arguably be revealed in contemporary cases regarding
dangerous or long term offender hearings, which feature a discourse of psycho-pathology,
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penile plethysmographs and personality disorder assessments, in a typical sexual assault
case, the perception of a natural sexual urge gone awry no longer plays the same
analytical role in sexual assault law.5
This chapter will demonstrate how feminists, in the context of sexual assault
cases, both explicitly advocated for the Court to conceptualize sexual violence as socially
contingent and, through their success in doing so, demonstrated how sexual violence is a
socially constructed concept. It is not only that the Court began to recognize instances of
sexual violence that they previously had not; it is that conceptualizing sexual violence as
socially contingent rather than the product of a natural sex drive gone dysfunctional
changed what does and does not constitute sexually violative behavior. In other words,
the very meaning of sexual violence, as conceptualized by the law of sexual assault,
changed.
Queer theory claims that the concepts of sex, gender and sexuality do not connote
or describe an innate, pre-social essence, but rather constitute themselves in and through
their categorization via the social ascription of normative meaning. The feminist
intervention on the issue of sexual violence between men and women both made, and in
its successes exemplified, a very similar claim.
I.

The Power Feminist Intervention
In the late 1980s and early 1990s Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence began

to reflect a perception that sex is about power and that sexual violence is an equality
5

An emphasis on uncontrollable urge or impulse may still be found in decisions addressing
applications to have an individual convicted of sexual assault declared a long term or dangerous
offender. This does not take away from the assertion that, in terms of the offence itself, the Court has
shifted away from a conceptualization of sexual violence as either an instance of, or orientation
towards, uncontrollable lusts or urges. To focus on this in order to determine whether an individual is
likely to re-offend is different from understanding the offence itself as defined by, or even caused by,
innate or natural sexual drive.
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issue.6 Within the span of just a few years the Court incorporated a power/dominance
analysis into its reasoning in the context of obscenity law,7 tort law,8 and sexual assault
law.9 While today it might seem axiomatic to suggest that coercive or forced sex between
men and women is, and ought to be, understood as an equality issue, this was not always
the case.
This change in the way that the law conceptualizes sexual violence was guided in
large measure by ideas advocated through legal activism (in both judicial and legislative
forums) on the part of what might be described as power feminists. What does the phrase
‘power feminism’ mean?10
This phrase refers to that branch of feminism, sometimes also referred to as
‘dominance feminism’, which argues that inequality between men and women is itself
sexualized. Beginning in the late 1970s and early 1980s power feminists began to
respond to issues such as rape, pornography, commercial sex, incest, public sex and
sexual harassment. These issues became the sites for legal and political activism, as well

6

Justice L’Heureux-Dube, the “great dissenter” as she was sometimes known, incorporated a power
analysis of sex into her dissenting and concurring opinions before the majority of the Court began to
adopt this position. See for example her reasoning in Seaboyer v. The Queen, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577.
7
R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 SCR 452.
8
Norberg v. Wynrib, [1992] 2 SCR 226; M.K. v. M.H., [1992] 3 SCR 6.
9
See for example R. v. Osolin, [1992] 2 SCR 313; R. v. Litchfield, [1993] 4 SCR 333; see R. v. R.A.
[2000] 1 SCR 163 where the Court relied on the power imbalance between employer and employee as
an aggravating factor in sentencing an accused convicted of sexually assaulting his employee.
10
The phrase is borrowed from Janet Halley but ought not to be taken as a complete endorsement of
the specific critique of feminism asserted by Halley. In Split Decisions: Taking a Break from
Feminism, (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 2006) Janet Halley uses the term to label Catharine
MacKinnon’s work. I intentionally employ the term to invoke a double entendre: the power in ‘power
feminism’ can be said to refer both to the theory of gender in which power is sexualized as well as to
characterize its theorists. It is neither coincidental nor insignificant that power feminism is/was
advanced by a segment of feminists (whether they be liberal, radical, etc) with a considerable degree of
power. They are its practitioners. They are legal advocates, legal scholars, successful writers and
politicians. They are women with institutional connections – women with (at least some degree of)
power.
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as the impetus for, and subsequent target of, feminist theories that identified male
sexuality as a primary source of female subordination and thus a major social problem.11
Power feminism (and the legal activism it engendered among Canadian feminists)
has been heavily influenced by the work of a number of feminist theorists. There are two
main conceptual frameworks for theorizing sexual violence that have advanced the many
and varied ideas and proposals of power feminists.
The first framework advanced arguments suggesting that rape be understood as
violence rather than sex. Susan Brown Miller was among the most prominent of those
who theorized that rape be understood as systemic violence perpetuated against women
by men.12 Some of these theorists demonstrated how the historical context for rape laws
was not the protection of women’s sexual integrity but rather the protection of a male
proprietary interest in female sexual property.13
The suggestion that rape is an act of violence was the conceptual framework
underpinning the significant legislative reforms to sexual assault law adopted in the mid
1980s. “One gains a very clear impression from reading the debates that there was
considerable consensus on this aspect of the reform.”14 However, as Professor Boyle
points out, while the ‘new’ sexual assault provisions emphasize violence, they tend to do
so as a means of classifying assaults as more or less serious; “the violence in question is

11

See for example in the context of sexual assault, Maria Bevacqua, Rape On The Public Agenda:
Feminism and The Politics of Sexual Assault, (Northeastern University Press: Boston, 2000) where she
traces the historical development of rape as part of the feminist agenda.
12
Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape (New York: Bantam, 1975). See also
Robin Morgan, Going Too Far: The Personal Chronicle of a Feminist, (New York: Vintage, 1978) and
Lorenne Clark and Debra Lewis, Rape: The Price of Coercive Sexuality (Toronto: Women’s Press, 1977).
13
Brownmiller, Against Our Will, ibid.; Clark & Lewis, Rape: The Price of Coercive Sexuality, ibid.
14
“During the debates on Bill C-127 the Honourable Flora MacDonald made the following statement:
This legislation makes a clear statement. It calls a spade a spade. It says that sexual assault is primarily
an act of violence, not of passion; an assault with sex as the weapon.” Taken from Christine Boyle,
Sexual Assault, (Carswell Company Limited: Toronto, 1984) at 53.
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other than the sexual touching itself…It seems inevitable that this will keep attention
focused on the “sexual” aspect of the attack.”15 There are three ‘degrees’ of sexual
assault: sexual assault, sexual assault with a weapon, and aggravated sexual assault. The
more force used the more serious the offence. Boyle’s point was that the violence
recognized by the provision is in relation to the degree of force used; it is not recognition
of the sexual aspect of the assault as itself violent. 16
While the issue of violence has certainly permeated Canadian sexual assault law,
the suggestion that rape be equated with (or reduced to) an act of violence – a ‘desexualized’ conception of sexual violence – has not been adopted in Canadian sexual
assault law.
The second conceptual framework for theorizing sexual violence advanced by
power feminists did not take a ‘de-sexualized’ approach. These perhaps more radical (in
terms of the essentialist/constructivist divide) theorists, the most prominent of which was
Catharine MacKinnon, argued that the sexual violation of women by men is itself the
process through which sexuality (and gender) is socially constructed.17
MacKinnon’s theory is both constructivist and structural. She argues that social
relations between the sexes are organized in a hierarchical manner such that men will

15

Ibid. at 53.
Boyle’s prediction in 1984 was that this would mean a definition of sexual assault that constituted an
assault with a sexual motivation. As discussed below, this prediction did not come to bear.
17
See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward A Feminist Theory of State,(Cambridge University Press: Harvard,
1989); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law, (Harvard University
Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1987) [hereinafter Feminism Unmodified ]; Catharine A. MacKinnon,
Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of Sex Discrimination, (Yale University Press: London,
1979); Catharine A. MacKinnon, “Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for Theory”,
Signs, Vol. 7, No. 3, Feminist Theory. (Spring, 1982), pp. 515-544; Catharine MacKinnon, “Feminism,
Marxism, Method and the State: Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence” (1983) 8 Signs 635 [hereinafter
“Towards A Feminist Jurisprudence”].
16
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dominate and women must submit.18 She suggests that the problem with much feminist
legal analysis is its failure to understand that “the mainspring of sex inequality is
misogyny and the mainspring of misogyny has been sexual sadism”.19 In other words,
sexual dominance causes a hatred of women that in turn causes inequality between men
and women. Intent on challenging the assumption that sex and violence are mutually
exclusive, she argues that:
[s]exuality, then, is a form of power. Gender, as socially constructed,
embodies it, not the reverse. Women and men are divided by gender,
made into sexes as we know them, by the social requirements of
heterosexuality, which institutionalizes male sexual dominance and
female sexual subordination. If this is true, sexuality is the linchpin of
gender inequality.20

MacKinnon’s claim is that once one takes into consideration the frequency with
which women are sexually violated by men it must be concluded that sexual violation is a
sexual practice– in fact a very common sexual practice - and that it therefore forms the
meaning and content of femininity (and masculinity).21 MacKinnon’s argument is that
"[p]erhaps the wrong of rape has proven so difficult to articulate because the
unquestionable starting point has been that rape is definable as distinct from intercourse,
when for women it is difficult to distinguish them under conditions of male dominance."22

18

Feminism Unmodified, supra note 17 at 4.
Ibid. at 5.
20
MacKinnon, “An Agenda for Theory”, supra note 17 at 544.
21
MacKinnon’s claim is that rape is sex. It should not be confused with Andrea Dworkin’s claim that sex is
rape. See Andrea Dworkin, Pornography: Men Possessing Women, (Penguin Group: New York, 1979,
1989). The distinction might be thought of as follows: for Dworkin all sex is rape, for MacKinnon some
sex is rape. That is to say rape is not distinct from sex – it is a type of – a common type – of sex.
22
MacKinnon, “Toward Feminist Jurisprudence”, supra note 17 at 187.
19
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What MacKinnon is suggesting is that “violence is sex when it is practiced as
sex”.23 In other words, “when acts of dominance and submission, up to and including
acts of violence, are experienced as sexually arousing, as sex itself, that is what they
are.”24 For MacKinnon, the way women are restricted and violated is often what sex is
for men and women and as such dominance will be experienced by men as sexual
pleasure and submission will be experienced by women as sexual pleasure.25 That is to
say, both men and women understand sexuality through the concept of male dominance.
She suggests that sexism is a political inequality that is enjoyed sexually and because the
inequality is socially defined as sexually pleasurable it will be considered consensual.
MacKinnon asserts that social hierarchy is prior to gender itself - the social
understanding of men and women is itself an effect of power. “Gender is an inequality
first constructed as a socially relevant differentiation in order to keep that inequality in
place.”26 Men’s gender is produced by using their sexuality to dominate women. Sexual
domination of women by men is men’s gender. Similarly, women’s gender is produced
through their subordination by men. Sexual subordination is women’s gender.27 The
inequality that exists between men and women is sexualized.
In less theoretical wording, of the sort that made its way into the Supreme Court
of Canada’s reasoning, sex is about power.28 More specifically, it is about the power
imbalances that exist (or can exist) in sexual relationships between men and women.

23

Catharine A. MacKinnon, “Feminist Approaches To Sexual Assault in Canada And The United
States: A Brief Retrospective” in Constance Backhouse and David Flaherty, eds., Challenging Times:
The Women’s Movement in Canada and The United States, (McGill Queens-University Press:
Montreal, 1992) 186 at 191.
24
MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified, supra note 17 at 6.
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid. at 42.
27
Ibid. at 46.
28
See for example R. v. Osolin, supra note 9.
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Both the suggestion that rape is violence and that sexual violence is itself constitutive of
(hetero)sexuality (and thus gender) provide theoretical groundings for the assertion that
sexual violence is an equality issue; both have had an impact on the way that the Court
conceptualizes sexual violence.
MacKinnon’s theory may be more radical (in terms of its degree of constructivism)
than those who argue that rape is about violence not sex. However, interestingly it is
MacKinnon who has been relied on by feminist interveners in Canadian sex equality,
sexual assault and obscenity cases29 and it is MacKinnon who among power feminist
theorists is most often cited by the Supreme Court of Canada.30 This is not to suggest that

29

While MacKinnon is considered by many to be on the ‘radical side’ of power feminism her contribution
to its theory and her impact on law reform in areas such as pornography and sexual harassment is
unquestionable. She is cited in numerous LEAF factums (including their submissions in Butler, supra note
7; Norberg v. Wynrib, supra note 8 and R v. Ewanchuck, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330. (LEAF has, since 1985
intervened in numerous Supreme Court of Canada cases involving issues such as sexual assault and
pornography and presumably their submissions contributed to the eventual adoption of power feminist
analysis by the Court. For a discussion of their interventions and support for this presumption see
Christopher Manfredi, feminist activism in the supreme court: Legal Mobilization and the Women’s Legal
Education and Action Fund, (UBC Press: Vancouver, 2004); see also Christopher Manfredi “Judicial
Discretion and Fundamental Justice: Sexual Assault in the Supreme Court of Canada” 47 Am J of Comp L,
(1990) 489 at FN 4 where he cites further support for the assertion that LEAF has been influential in the
Supreme Court of Canada: Lori Hausegger & Rainer Knopff, "The Effectiveness of Interest Group Litigation: An Assessment of LEAF's Participation in Supreme Court Cases," paper presented to the Annual
Meeting, Canadian Political Science Association, June 12-14, 1994; F.L. Morton & Avril Allen, "Feminists
and the Courts in Canada: Measuring Interest Group Success," paper presented to the Annual Meeting,
American Political Science Association, Aug. 29-Sept. 1, 1996. Manfredi notes that “both of these studies
place LEAF's litigation success rate at approximately 60%, compared to an overall litigant success rate of
31%.” Manfredi’s research reveals that “LEAF participated in 28 Supreme Court cases from 1988 to 1997,
presenting arguments on 49 separate Charter issues in those cases. The Court adopted the position
advocated LEAF on 34 of those issues (69.4% agreement rate).” As of 1999 LEAF had “intervened in
almost one-third of the Court's sexual assault cases to support legislation and common law rules that favor
the interests of sexual assault complainants” (Mafredi, ibid. at 491). “LEAF's position has been adopted on
thirty-four of forty-nine issues in the twenty-eight Supreme Court cases in which it has participated since
1988” (Manfredi, ibid. at 499.) LEAF’s track record in sexual assault cases specifically is not on par with
these overall results. In cases such as Ewanchuk, where what is at issue is the substance or meaning of
sexual assault laws, LEAF has been relatively successful. In cases more directly related to issues of due
process (such as admission of prior sexual history evidence or third party records) LEAF has been less
successful.
30
She was cited approvingly by Justice Cory for the majority in R. v. Osolin, supra note 9, by Justice
L’Heureux-Dube in her concurring decision in R. v. Ewanchuk, ibid, her dissent in Symes v. R., [1993] 4
S.C.R. 695, and her partial dissent in R. v. Seaboyer, supra note 8. She was cited approvingly by Chief
Justice Dickson in Janzen v. Platy, [1989] 1 SCR 1252 for her definition of sexual harassment (see Chapter
2 for a discussion of how regardless of what theoretical framework the Court referenced they did not adopt
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the Court has not relied on the work of many feminist writers. The doctrinal work of
feminist legal scholars, such as Christine Boyle and Elizabeth Sheehy, has been cited by
the Supreme Court of Canada in several sexual assault cases.31 Rather it is to suggest that
in terms of conceptualizing sexual violation (and thus implicitly adopting a particular
conceptual account of sexuality), whether that be in the sexual assault, sexual harassment
or obscenity context, it is Catharine MacKinnon’s work which both activists and the
Court have referenced most frequently.
Nor should recognition of the influence of MacKinnon’s work be taken as a
suggestion that members of the Court never adopt the less radical but still constructivist
conception of ‘rape as violence’. They do. This is evidenced by Justice Wilson’s
concurrence in R. v. Bernard.32 The majority in Bernard, upholding the rule in R. v.
Leary33 found that where the accused admitted to the sexual assault but denied mens rea
based on his self-induced intoxication, the intention to get drunk could be substituted for
the intention to commit the physical act. Typically individuals are presumed to intend the
natural and probable consequences of their acts and mens rea can be inferred from their
actions. Justice Wilson (and Justice L’Heureux-Dube) concurred in the majority’s result
but did not substitute the fault of committing the sexual offence with the fault of getting
drunk. Justice Wilson held that in this case the necessary mens rea for sexual assault
could be inferred from the accused’s sexual behavior. She determined that in the very
rarest of circumstances intoxication would be extreme enough as to raise doubts as to the
a constructivist conception of sexual harassment in Janzen v. Platy).
31
See for example R v. Seaboyer, supra note 6; R v Ewanchuk, supra note 29 where Elizabeth Sheehy,
"Canadian Judges and the Law of Rape: Should the Charter Insulate Bias?" (1989), 21 Ottawa L. Rev.
741 was cited. Christine Boyle’s book , Sexual Assault, (Carswell Company Limited: Toronto, 1984)
has been cited repeatedly by the Supreme Court of Canada. These important works, however, have
been more doctrinal than theoretical.
32
[1988] 2 SCR 833.
33
(1977), 33 C.C.C. (2d).
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presumption that an individual intends the probable and natural consequences of their
volitional conduct. However, she argued, in most cases a guilty mind can be inferred
from the physical act of nonconsensual sexual touching itself. Underpinning her decision
was her assertion that
[s]exual assault is a crime of violence. There is no requirement of an intent or
purpose beyond the intentional application of force. It is first and foremost an
assault. It is sexual in nature only because, objectively viewed, it is related to sex
either on account of the area of the body to which the violence is applied or on
account of words accompanying the violence. Indeed, the whole purpose, as I
understand it, of the replacement of the offence of rape by the offence of sexual
assault was to emphasize the aspect of violence and put paid to the benign concept
that rape was simply the act of a man who was "carried away" by his emotions.34

Under her reasoning sexual violence is violence. Full stop. Her reasoning demonstrates
how the ‘rape is violence’ conception of sexual violence is a constructivist approach
intended to counter the ‘natural urge gone awry’ conception of sexual violence. It also
demonstrates how this account, unlike the yet more contextualized, more socially
constructed, more nuanced and more radical approach of MacKinnon leaves less
analytical space for a definition of sexual assault that incorporates the perspective of the
complainant. Justice Wilson’s account focuses exclusively on the actions, conduct of the
accused.35
While there are cases with references to sexual assault as violence for the most
part neither the legislature nor the Court has completely adopted the perspective that rape

34

R. v. Bernard, supra note 32 at para. 84.
A version of Justice Wilson’s concurring opinion in Bernard was ultimately adopted by the majority
in R. v. Daviault, [1994] 3 SCR 63. The defence of self-induced intoxication for general intent
offences was subsequently limited legislatively under section 33.1 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985,
c. C-46 so that it could not be applied against charges of sexual assault. The legislature limited it by
applying a reasonable standard of care element to the defence and stipulating that anyone who, while
drunk, commits an assault or other violent crime has departed from that standard of care. In other
words they adopted a version of the rule in Leary.
35
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is purely about violence not sex. There is, as discussed below, a sexual component to the
offence that limits the opportunity to conceptually reduce the offence simply to violence.
There are many implications of an equality type approach to conceptualizing sexual
violence.36 To understand sexual violence under the rubric of equality is to adopt an
analysis that will focus on relationships, on power, on the subjective perspective of all
sexual actors involved in the interaction. In other words, it is to adopt an approach that
understands sexual violence as socially contingent.
There are two legal contexts in which a power feminist (and constructivist)
conception of sexual violence has clearly been adopted by the Court. These include the
substantive meaning of sexual assault (that is the harm to be protected against, the
meaning of sexual assault, and the doctrine of consent) and the criminal regulation of
adult pornography. The remainder of this chapter will focus on sexual assault law
demonstrating how this constructivist conception of sexual violence promotes a shift in
the law’s focus away from sexual propriety and sexual acts and towards sexual integrity
and sexual interactions. The chapter to follow will examine the criminal law definition of
obscenity and indecency.
II.

The Meaning Of Sexual Violence
There are two major definitional issues concerning sexual assault law that indicate

that the Court has adopted the understanding that sexual violence is about power and
inequality. They include how the Court designates an assault as a sexual assault and how

36

For example, there have been legislative and judicial attempts to balance the due process interests of
an accused with the privacy interests of a complainant (such as with respect to issues like the
introduction of evidence regarding the complainant’s prior sexual history and defence counsel use of
third party records). The complainant’s privacy interest has been articulated as an equality interest.
See for example R. v. Seaboyer, supra note 6; see also section 276 of the Criminal Code, ibid.
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the Court has come to interpret the definition of consent.37 The constructivist perspective
adopted in both of these reforms share the same analytical shift. Both the definition of
sexual assault and the definition of consent arrived at by the Court in recent years
incorporate a new factor into the analysis of the offence. That factor is the subjective
experience of the complainant.
In defining sexual assault the subjective experience of the complainant is incorporated
into the newly adopted concept of “sexual integrity”.38 In defining consent it is
manifested through an explicit determination that consent is both a part of the actus reus
and the mens rea - a determination which understands consent as both attitudinal and
communicative depending on whose perspective is being considered. In determining the
actus reus for sexual assault whether there was consent for the sexual interaction turns
entirely on the state of mind of the complainant at the time the sexual interaction
occurred. Consent under the mens rea now refers to the accused’s perception of the
complainant’s positive expression of consent rather than communication of non-consent
or lack of any expression of consent.39
Why do these changes indicate a more constructivist understanding of the issue of
sexual violence? As will be demonstrated by examining the cases below, these changes

37

Several writers have observed the shift in how sexual assault is defined. Susan Estrich for example
suggests that there is no longer significant disagreement over what rape is and so now the only game in
town is credibility. Susan Estrich, “Sex at Work” (1991) 43 Stan. L. Rev. 813. Lise Gotell makes a similar
argument. Lise Gotell, “The Discursive Disappearance of Sexualized Violence” in Dorothy E. Chunn,
Susan B. Boyd, and Hester Lessard, Reaction and Resistance: Feminism, Law and Social Change, (UBC
Press: Vancouver, 2007). Before examining how sexual assault law addresses issues of credibility it is
important to do more than simply observe that the meaning of sexual assault has changed (and become
better defined). It is also important to understand how that change happened, and what that change suggests
in terms of the law’s conception of sexuality in the context of sexual violence. It is important both in terms
of its potential insight into issues of credibility in the sexual assault context as well as its implications for
issues of law and sexuality more broadly. Examining this change and its conceptual implications is the
objective of this section.
38
R. v. Chase, [1987] 2 SCR 293.
39
R. v. M. (M.L.). [1994] 2 SCR 3; R. v. Ewanchuk, supra note 29.
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reflect an approach that is concerned more with power, relationships, equality and sexual
actors than with sexual arousal and sexual acts.
i) Defining Sexual Assault – From Sexual Propriety To Sexual Integrity
There has been a shift in the meaning that the criminal law assigns to the harm of
sexual violence. It is a conceptual shift from defining sexual violence based on
deprivations of sexual propriety to identifying and defining sexual violence based on
violations of sexual integrity. This is a shift that now incorporates into its analysis an
objective assessment of the subjective experience of the victim in defining the harm of
sexual violence.40 It is a shift that rejects to some extent the former essentialist analysis
based on genitals, sexual arousal or community standards of sexual propriety.41 This shift
from focusing on sexual propriety to sexual integrity enables greater emphasis on
violations of trust, humiliation, objectification, exploitation, shame, and loss of selfesteem rather than simply, or only, on deprivation of honour, chastity or bodily integrity
as was more the case when the law’s concern had a greater focus on sexual propriety.
There have been a number of legislative reforms to the Criminal Code provisions
addressing sexual violence in the time since power feminism came to the fore.42 (Indeed,

40

It is true that the subjective experience of any particular complainant may involve a notion of
propriety. But this refers to the complainant’s own sense of propriety, not the community’s sense of
propriety. A violation of one’s sense of propriety relates to one’s sense of integrity. In other words,
the meaning of sexual assault needn’t be cleansed of any notion of propriety it just shouldn’t be
focused on the community’s sense of propriety. The definition of sexual assault still retains an
objective element so one needn’t worry that relying on an individual complainant’s sense of propriety
will result in inconsistency (or an injustice) in the law.
41
It should be noted that some feminist theorists, such as MacKinnon, have argued strongly not to
have a gender neutral definition of rape. This seems contrary to their overall constructivist account of
sexual assault; it seems difficult to imagine a gendered definition of sexual assault that doesn’t invoke
the penis. This seeming inconsistency in such an approach is resolved when one recalls that theories
such as MacKinnon’s are constructivist and structural. For further explanation of this point see
Chapter Six.
42
In 1975 the government passed the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1975, S.C. 1974-75-76, c.93. This Act
removed the requirement that judges warn juries that, for offences such as rape, incest and indecent assault
of a girl under 14 (note that indecent assault of a male complainant did not need to be corroborated) it was

156

the significant reforms to the criminal laws regulating sexual violence were a product of
not only of a shift in legal reasoning but also, to a large extent, parliamentary initiatives
spurred on by feminist advocacy.) Of particular significance to this discussion is the
1982 amendment to the Criminal Code; an amendment that, among other things, replaced
the offences of rape and indecent assault with sexual assault, established three tiers to the
offence and added a definition of consent (which was again amended in 1992).43
The offence of rape, as it stood prior to the 1982 amendment, stipulated that “a male
person commits rape when he has sexual intercourse with a female person who is not his
wife” without her consent.44 Under the rape provision, the offence could only be
perpetuated by a male against a female; it required penile-vaginal penetration. The
definition of rape turned on penises, biology and correspondingly (hetero)sexual
gratification rather than on power, relationships and context.45

unsafe to convict solely on the uncorroborated evidence of the complainant. Section 142 of the Act limited
the accused’s ability to ask questions concerning the complainant’s prior sexual history with people other
than the accused by requiring that such questions be pre-screened by the judge in camera). In 1982 the
government passed An Act to Amend the Criminal Code in relation to sexual offences and other offences
against the person, S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c. 125, s.19. The 1982 amendments repealed the corroboration
rule altogether. Not only were judges not required to warn the jury it was unsafe to convict on
uncorroborated testimony of the complainant, they were no longer permitted to do so. Section 246.6 of the
1982 Act also revised the prior sexual history rules, abrogated the doctrine of recent complaint, established
that sexual reputation could not be admitted to challenge the credibility of the complainant and redefined
rape as sexual assault. For a comprehensive discussion of the evolution of these early legislative reforms
see Christine Boyle, Sexual Assault, supra note 16. There were further reforms in 1987 (S.C. 1987, c.34,
ss. 1-8), 1992 (S.C. 1992, c.38, ss. 1-3) and 1997 (S.C. 1997, c.30, ss.1-3).
43
Ibid. Christine Boyle suggests that “the concept of sexual assault was introduced … in response to
concerns that the emotional and political baggage carried by the term rape was a serious impediment to
the reporting of, and conviction for, the crime of rape.” Boyle, ibid.
44
R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 143 [repealed 1980-81-82, c. 125, s.6]. A number of feminist writers have
argued that the offence of rape was historically a law intended to protect the proprietary interests of men
(fathers, and husbands) in women. See for example Boyle, ibid; Susan Estrich, Real Rape: How The Legal
System Victimizes Women Who Say No, (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 1987); Constance
Backhouse, “Nineteenth-Century Canadian Rape Law 1800-92” in D.H. Flaherty, ed. Essays in the History
of Canadian Law, Vol II (1983), 200; Lorenne Clark & Debra Lewis, Rape: The Price of Coercive
Sexuality, supra note 12.
45
One might argue that the fact that the offence of rape was one of general intent and not specific
intent suggests that sexual arousal, i.e. (hetero)sexual gratification, was not instrumental to its analysis.
This argument is not persuasive. Sexual arousal was likely an assumed aspect of the offence of rape
given that it required penile penetration of a female by a male. All of the rhetoric in the courts
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The replacement of the offences of rape and indecent assault with the sexual assault
provisions opened the door for the Court to adopt a new conception of sexual violence. It
is, as will be discussed, a conception that focuses more on power, relationships and
context than on sexual motives, genitals and sexual gratification.
As noted above, the offences of indecent assault against a female, and indecent assault
against a male were also removed and replaced by the offence of sexual assault in 1982.
Unlike rape, the definition given to these offences pre-reform did leave the analytical
opportunity to focus on power and relationships rather than an approach premised on
essentialist conceptions of sexual violence. However that opportunity was not realized.
The Supreme Court of Canada, in R v Swietlinski affirmed the definition of indecent
assault as
an assault that is committed in circumstances of indecency, or as
sometimes described, an assault with acts of indecency. What acts are
indecent and what circumstances will have that character are questions
of fact that will have to be decided in each case, but the determination
of those questions will depend on an objective view of the facts and
circumstances in relation to the actual assault, and not upon the mental
state of the accused.46

The offence did not require that the accused act with a specific intent (i.e. a sexual
purpose).47 However, whether a circumstance was indecent was gauged not by
violation of the sexual integrity of the complainant (which in post-Chase cases would

regarding uncontrollable lust, in conjunction with the fact that presumably given its definition the
offence required an erect penis (although that would perhaps not be the case for attempted rape),
suggests that although sexual arousal was not explicitly necessary to the offence it was likely
presumed. More plausibly, rape was a general intent offence for the purely instrumental reason that
that meant intoxication was presumptively not a defence.
46
[1980] S.C.J. No. 107. The Court relied on earlier cases that defined indecent assault in this way
(see R. v. Resener, [1968] 4 C.C.C. 129].
47
Although some courts did wrongly interpret it that way. See for example R. v. Collins, infra note 51.

158

mean an objective consideration of the complainant’s subjective experience48) but by
the adjudicator or jury’s perception of the moral standards of the community. The
analysis focused on immorality or impropriety rather than on power and the perspective
of the other sexual actor/s involved in the interaction.49 Sexual morality and propriety,
not context and relationships, determined what was indecent. Often, rather than
defining indecent assault it was assumed “self-explanatory” and left up to the common
sense of the jury.50 The focus was on sexual propriety not sexual integrity.
The ‘community standards’ of propriety type analysis resulted in an essentialist
approach to potentially offensive sexual behavior short of intercourse or attempted
intercourse (which would be covered under the offence of rape); factors such as
community morality, sexual gratification or motives of the accused, and heterosexist
assumptions, determined whether a particular sexual interaction constituted
‘circumstances of indecency’.
For example in R. v. Collins, the Ontario Court of Appeal affirmed that the
accused’s conduct amounted to an indecent assault not because repeatedly forcing his
tongue into the complainant’s mouth, despite her contestations, violated her sexual

48

This should not be taken to suggest that the subjective experience of the complainant – i.e. whether
the complainant experienced a violation of sexual integrity – is determinative. It is not. See R. v.
Robicheau, [2002] SCJ No. 50 overturning the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in [2001] N.S.J. No. 113.
Rather, what it is suggesting is that in objectively determining whether the assault occurred in ‘sexual
circumstances’ the most salient factor will be whether the complainant’s sexual integrity was violated
and determining whether the complainant’s sexual integrity was violated will of necessity require an
examination of the complainant’s perspective and experience (see R. v. Litchfield, supra note 9). This
makes it different than the analysis of indecent assault. Indecent assault based its objective
determination on the sexual propriety, morality, standards…of the community not the integrity of the
complainant. Of the only ten reported cases prior to the 1987 Chase decision that mentioned sexual
integrity all but one were for charges of sexual assault not indecent assault.
49
R. v. Louie Chong (1914), 23 C.C.C. 250, where the Court upheld the trial judge’s conviction on the
basis that the appellant seized hold of the complainant and offered her money for "an immoral
purpose". This case was cited with approval by the Court in both R. v. Swietlinski, supra note 46 and
in Leary v. The Queen, [1978] 1 SCR 29] at 57.
50
R. v. Hay, [1959] M.J. No. 4 para. 7.
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integrity or dignity as a human being, but because of it “ being morally offensive,
violating prevailing notions of decency, and being committed in circumstances which,
viewed objectively, involved the sexual gratification of the appellant.”51
The reasoning in R. v. Moore provides an example of how in 1955, based on 1950s
community standards of tolerance, a woman making a pass at another woman
constituted circumstances of indecency,52 where the same action by a man would not.53
As noted above, with the new sexual assault offences came a new legal approach.
The Court was clear that the new provisions did not simply re-word the offence of rape
(or indecent assault). Instead, the Court found that the reforms intended to create new
offences.54
The Supreme Court of Canada established the meaning of this new offence - sexual
assault - in R. v. Chase in 1987.55 The Court in Chase overturned a New Brunswick

51

[1985] O.J. No. 51. Where, in any of those factors might one find consideration of the perspective
of the ‘object’ upon whom this morally offensive behavior engaged in for purposes of the sexual
gratification of the accused was perpetuated?
52
[1955] A.J. No. 1, a conviction for indecent assault against a female was overturned not because the
defendant’s actions were not indecent (the Court did not dispute this) but because the act lacked
hostility. Prior to the lunch date, at which the defendant had tried to kiss the complainant, she had
written her a love letter. The trial judge found that the letter, revealing the defendant as a “sexual
invert” and constituting a clear “invitation to Lesbianism” established circumstances of indecency.
The letter, stated in part "I would never ask you to try to change. That would be very foolish. Any such
thought or desire would have to come from your side. I do ask, though, that you be a bit tolerant of
me…If you have no interest in me or my type of life, nothing I could do to you would phase you one
way or another and would certainly leave you unblemished. How many men can say that?” For a
description of this case and its historical background see Backhouse, Carnal Crimes, supra note 4.
53
For substantiation of the assertion that the same behavior by a male towards a female in 1955 would
likely not have been deemed indecent, much less have resulted in a conviction at trial see Backhouse,
Carnal Crimes, ibid.
54
Chase, supra note 38 at para. 4.
55
Ibid. In Chase the Court did suggest that in determining the meaning of sexual assault the law ought
to draw on the jurisprudence surrounding indecent assault. However, as discussed in the pages to
follow, the incorporation of the notion of sexual integrity into its definition and the particular notion of
sexual integrity adopted suggests that while certain similarities exist between the two lines of caselaw
– such as the need to make the test objective – there also exist fundamental and important distinctions
between them which challenge the assertion that the Court really has relied much on the indecent
assault jurisprudence. Certainly in the cases since Chase the old indecent assault case law does not
appear to be relied upon by courts. The Court, in Chase, did draw significantly on the Alberta Court of
Appeal’s decision in R. v. Taylor (1985), 44 C.R. 3d (263). The impact of the Taylor decision is
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Court of Appeal finding that the act of grabbing a girl’s breast and demanding that she
engage in sexual intercourse with the accused did not constitute a sexual assault on the
basis that sexual assault was limited to intentional and forced contact with the sexual
organs or genitalia of another person without that person's consent.56 In overturning the
Court of Appeal, Justice McIntyre writing for the Supreme Court of Canada found that
[s]exual assault is an assault within any one of the definitions of that
concept in s. 244(1) of the Criminal Code which is committed in
circumstances of a sexual nature, such that the sexual integrity of the
victim is violated. The test to be applied in determining whether the
impugned conduct has the requisite sexual nature is an objective
one…If the motive of the accused is sexual gratification, to the extent
noteworthy because the case involved the intersection of the new sexual assault provisions with section
43 of the Criminal Code – the use of corrective force defence. In an effort to limit section 43’s
application to the new sexual assault provisions (section 43 serves as a defence for parents, under
certain circumstances, to charges of assault) Chief Justice Laycraft stipulated a definition for sexual
assault that did not require sexual intent. Significantly, he did not however include in his definition a
consideration of the sexual integrity of the victim. In “The Corrective Force Defence (Section 43) and
Sexual Assault” (2001) 6 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 35, Professor Mark Carter somewhat overstates the
impact of Taylor and section 43 on the development of sexual assault doctrine in Canada. While it is
true that Taylor was relied on by the Court in Chase and it is also true that Taylor found that an interest
in or pursuit of sexual gratification was not an essential element of the definition, he fails to note that it
was the Supreme Court in Chase that added consideration of the sexual integrity of the complainant to
the definition. Those who doubt that the concept of sexual integrity is central to the harm to be
protected against by the sexual assault provisions need only consult the third of the three classes of
conduct exempt from the possible justification for unlawful activity of a law enforcement official
provided for under section 25.1 of the Criminal Code: “(a) the intentional or criminally negligent
causing of death or bodily harm to another person, (b) the willful attempt to obstruct, pervert or defeat
the course of justice, or (c) any conduct that would violate the sexual integrity of an individual.”
56
R. v. Chase, (1984), 13 C.C.C. (3d) 187. The New Brunswick Court of Appeal’s decision in Chase
is an excellent example of extremely essentialist reasoning; ironically it also brilliantly exemplifies the
manner in which law contributes to the social construction of sexuality. The New Brunswick Court of
Appeal determined that the grabbing of the fifteen year old girl’s breasts was not a ‘sexual’ assault
because her breasts are a ‘secondary sexual characteristic’ – like a man’s beard or a bird’s plumage (at
para. 10). Justice Angers held that “to include as sexual an assault to the parts of a person's body
considered as having secondary sexual characteristics may lead to absurd results if one considers a
man's beard. Nor am I prepared to include those parts of the human body considered erogenous zones
lest a person be liable to conviction for stealing a goodnight kiss. In any event, to involve secondary
sexual characteristics or erogenous zones or, for that matter, the sexual gratification intent of the
accused might well lead the court into the domain of sexology or at least require it to examine the
sexual behavior of the human species (at para. 14).” He concluded “it seems to me that the word
"sexual" as used in the section ought to be given its natural meaning as limited to the sexual organs or
genitalia.” It is odd that he selects a man’s beard rather than a man’s nipples as his analogue. His
reasoning invokes the notion of a natural meaning for sexual organs, genitalia, (and implicitly also
secondary sexual characteristics and erogenous zones) while simultaneously providing an example of
how the law constructs the meaning of sexual organs, genitalia, secondary sexual characteristics and
erogenous zones.
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that this may appear from the evidence, it may be a factor in
determining whether the conduct is sexual. It must be emphasized,
however, that the existence of such a motive is simply one of many
factors to be considered, the importance of which will vary depending
on the circumstances.57

An assault then, becomes a sexual assault where it violates the sexual integrity of the
complainant.
Prior to Chase, the phrase “sexual integrity” had never before been used in a reported
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada. Of the 551 reported decisions in which
Canadian courts have used the term “sexual integrity” only ten of them were prior to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Chase.58 Until 1980 the term had never been used in a
reported decision in Canada.59 Today the notion of sexual integrity is the governing
concept in the legal definition of sexual assault in Canada.
Not only was the adoption of this term to determine the wrong of sexual assault novel,
the manner in which the Court employed it signals a shift that has had significant impact.
It is a shift towards a substantive meaning for a sexual offence that at the definitional
stage flipped the analytical perspective from that of the accused (or the community) to
that of the complainant.60 It is, of course, not the use, per se, of the term ‘sexual

57

Chase, supra note 40 at para. 11.
Based on a quick law search of all Supreme Court of Canada decisions using the search term “sexual
integrity” (accessed December 12, 2008).
59
The term sexual dignity, which has been used in thirty reported decisions was not employed until
1985. It was only used seven times prior to Chase. (Quicklaw search of the term “sexual dignity” last
accessed January 21, 2009).
60
This is not a development that has necessarily occurred in other jurisdictions. In most U.S.
jurisdictions the focus at the definitional stage remains on the offender. Whether that be by
maintaining an offence which turns on penetration, or by adopting a definition of “sexual contact”
which requires a specific intent to “arouse or gratify the sexual desire of either party”. See State v.
Darby, 556 N.W. 2d 311, 318 (S.D. 1996); People v. Norman, 184 Mich. App. 255, 457 N.W. 2d 136
(1990); State v. Schmidt, 5 Neb. App. 653, 562 N.W. 2d 859. The closest the U.S. cases seem to come
to focusing less on the essential and biological and more on the social and the interactional is to define
the offence based on sexual intrusion. However even then the offence is still determined from the
perspective of the accused and typically tends to still involve a corporeal focus on bodily penetration.
58
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integrity’ that effected a significant impact, but rather the meaning that the Court attached
to the term sexual integrity.
The term could have been used simply to imply protection for some notion of chastity
or propriety, thus perpetuating the law’s interpretation of indecent assault and maintaining
an unfortunate tradition in sexual assault law’s approach to women’s sexuality.61 In those
ten cases prior to Chase which utilized the term, several used it to connote antiquated and
paternalistic notions of chastity or propriety in which the interest in prohibiting sexual
violation was still understood more as a proprietary interest held, in an individual sense,
by a woman’s husband (or father) or in a societal sense by ‘the community’. In other
words, the pre-Chase cases used the concept in the same way that ‘indecent’ assault had
been understood in Canadian jurisprudence.
ii) Pre-Chase Use Of The Concept Of Sexual Integrity

(See for example the Colorado Criminal Code, which includes under its sexual assault provisions
definitions for sexual contact, sexual intrusion and sexual penetration. Sexual intrusion, for example,
is defined as “(5) any intrusion, however slight, by any object or any part of a person's body, except the
mouth, tongue, or penis, into the genital or anal opening of another person's body if that sexual
intrusion can reasonably be construed as being for the purposes of sexual arousal, gratification, or
abuse.” Sexual contact is defined as “the knowing touching of the victim's intimate parts by the actor,
or of the actor's intimate parts by the victim, or the knowing touching of the clothing covering the
immediate area of the victim's or actor's intimate parts if that sexual contact is for the purposes of
sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse” and sexual penetration means sexual intercourse, cunnilingus,
fellatio, analingus, or anal intercourse. Emission need not be proved as an element of any sexual
penetration. Any penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete the crime” (6) C.R.S.A. § 18-3401). The focus is exclusively on genitals and biology. Sexual violations are defined and understood
more from the perspective of what the accused may or may not have inflicted upon the complainant
rather than what a complainant might objectively be expected to have experienced. (Heywood v
Wyoming, 170 P.3d 1227, 2007 WY 149 (2007).) Working from a definition based on sexual intrusion
is very different from relying upon one based on sexual integrity. In all of the reported American
criminal cases, the term “sexual integrity”, at the time of writing, had only been used nine times (as
compared to 551 times in Canada) and never in the sense it has been used in Canadian cases since
1987. This is all the more remarkable given that the number of Canadian cases each year is, due to
smaller population and fewer jurisdictions, vastly outnumbered by the number of American cases each
year.
61
That is, an approach concerned more with sexual propriety (and property) and sexual morality than
with integrity.
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The first reported use of the term by a Canadian court exemplifies this point. In R c.
Archontakis, the trial judge stated, “[m]y prime concern has to be the protection of
society. Our streets must be made safe, especially for those who are least able to protect
themselves. Our wives and our daughters must be able to walk about on the streets
without having their physical and sexual integrity trampled upon by such as you.”62 One
question arising, what of those individuals whose subjectivity does not reach the
acclaimed status of ‘wife’ or ‘daughter’?
In R v. G.B. the trial judge stated that “I must, however, look beyond this accused and
the circumstances of this particular offence and consider the extent to which the court
must sentence with a view to discouraging others, particularly where the sexual integrity
of women in the community is concerned.”63
The term sexual integrity could also have been understood by the Supreme Court as
synonymous with bodily integrity. In the New Brunswick Court of Appeal decision in
Chase, Justice Angers found that
the addition of the word "sexual" to the term assault, in my opinion,
suggests that it is now necessary to determine to which part of the body
the unlawful force was applied. Based on the meaning of sexual, the
concept of a sexual assault as being an intentional and forced contact
with the sexual organs or genitalia of another person without that
person's consent is rather easily understood. So would, for that matter,
the forced and intentional contact of one's sexual organs with any part
of another person. The problem in this case is that the contact was not
with the sexual organs of the victim but to the mammary gland, a
secondary sexual characteristic.64
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[1980] J.Q. No. 196 at para 9.
R. v. G.B., [1982] N.W.T.J. No. 40 at para. 6.
64
Supra note 56 at 190.
63
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While the New Brunswick Court of Appeal reasoning was not followed in other
attempts to determine the meaning of sexual assault prior to the Supreme Court’s decision
in Chase, the reasoning in these other cases was also problematic.
In R. v. Alderton the trial judge noted in her charge to the jury that sexual assault was
any assault that also included anything connected with reproduction or sexual
gratification or desire, especially if that desire was of the heterosexual variety. She stated
that “[t]he next question is whether the assault was sexual. The word "sexual" in this
context means involving anything connected with sexual gratification or reproduction, or
the urge for these, especially the attraction of those of one sex for those of the other. A
sexual assault is simply an assault of a sexual nature.”65
On appeal the Ontario Court of Appeal in Alderton found that “without in any way
attempting to give a comprehensive definition of a "sexual assault we are all satisfied that
it includes an assault with the intention of having sexual intercourse with the victim
without her consent, or an assault made upon a victim for the purpose of sexual
gratification.”66 While it is true that this definition does not exclude consideration of
65

[1985] O.J. No. 2419. The accused in Alderton had entered the complainant’s apartment. Wearing a
nylon over his head and rubber gloves he held her on the bed with one hand covering her nose and
mouth. While he was trying to unroll tape, with his teeth and other hand, the complainant struggled
and was able to escape. The accused appealed his conviction for sexual assault. One ground of his
appeal was that his actions did not equate to a sexual assault. He lost the appeal. The Court of Appeal
suggested that there was ample evidence for a jury to find that he had committed a sexual assault.
They argued that the evidence does not permit of any other interpretation. Under the Chase definition
it is no longer necessary to make assumptions about his sexual motives, and require a specific intent in
relation to those motives. The court post-Chase would be bound to determine the issue not based
solely on his sexual motives (or lack thereof) but rather on determining the following: objectively
speaking, would a woman who at 4:00 a.m. wakes to find a strange man in her bedroom wearing a
nylon over his face and pink rubber gloves, a man who then proceeds to push her onto the bed, force
her head onto the pillow and attempt to tie her up, have had her sexual integrity violated? Without
question she would if the notion of sexual integrity includes not only freedom from bodily invasion but
also the conditions necessary for a sexual actor to flourish (as discussed below, infra page 25). Such an
approach may arrive at the same outcome but without having to rely on potentially problematic
assumptions about specific sexual intent and without adopting an analysis that fails to incorporate the
perspective of (up to) one half of the sexual actors involved in the interaction.
66
Ibid. at para. 22.
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sexual integrity (given its refusal to comprehensively define the offence) it affirmed the
trial judge’s reasoning. It is reasoning which is problematic both because it would have
inadvertently created a specific intent offence for those sexual acts of violation short of
intercourse and because it is premised on heterosexist, phallocentric and essentialist
reasoning which focuses entirely on the perspective of the accused.
iii) Sexual Integrity As ‘Conditions For…’
Certainly the notion of bodily autonomy is included within the concept of sexual
integrity, but the concept should mean something more. It should advert to the
importance of the integrity of one’s sexuality itself. A legal focus on sexuality more
broadly, rather than bodily integrity specifically, is consistent with the constructivist
suggestion that the law ought to focus its moral concern on sexual actors rather than
sexual acts.
Bodily integrity constitutes one aspect of sexual integrity, but sexual integrity should
mean much more than simply ‘freedom from’ bodily violation. It should include, along
with ‘freedom from’, the ‘conditions for’… sexual fulfillment, sexual diversity, the safety
necessary for sexual exploration and sexual benefit.
To suggest that sexual integrity extends beyond the notion of bodily invasion invokes
the notion of protecting sexuality itself (not to be confused with protecting sex itself). To
suggest that sexual integrity is about one's sexuality and not simply 'freedom from' bodily
invasion is to suggest that sexual integrity also includes 'conditions for' - so for example
the conditions necessary to create the capacity for developing a sense of sexual self,
sexual self-esteem, opportunity for sexual exploration, and beneficial sexual interactions.
Some of these conditions will necessarily entail other people, as some of them will
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include sexual interactions or sexual relationships with others.67 This will require that
other members of one’s community also experience a lived sexuality in which the
conditions for sexual integrity are available. It suggests the need for a community of
sexual actors with intact sexual integrities, so that each of its members might have access
to the relational aspects of sexual integrity. In this way sexual integrity is in part
relational. That it is in part relational suggests that it could be understood as a social
good.68
In fact, sexual integrity ought to be thought of as one of those social goods, like
language perhaps, that individuals need in order to be autonomous. “Some of our most
essential characteristics, such as our capacity for language and the conceptual framework
through which we see the world, are not made by us, but given to us (or developed in us)
through our interactions with others…[T]here are no human beings in the absence of

67

It is important that the conception of sexuality advanced here be understood holistically. A failure to
do so leads to reasoning such as the Ontario Court of Justice’s decision in R. v. Spence, [1994] O.J.
981. In Spence, the complainant was physically abducted, off the street, by her former pimp and two
other men. She was placed in the back of their car, threatened with gang rape if she continued to
refuse to remit to them the proceeds of her sex work and ultimately forced to disrobe. They were
acquitted of sexual assault on the basis that while her personal integrity had been violated, and her
commercial integrity had been violated, the crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that her
sexual integrity was violated. One wonders whether the Court would have considered the sexual
integrity of a woman who was not already a sex worker, to be violated were she physically abducted,
forced to disrobe, and threatened with gang rape and other violence if she refused to prostitute herself
for the benefit of her abductors.
68
What about asexual and sexually abstinent individuals? The fact of sexually abstinent individuals
does not present a challenge to the assertion that sexual integrity is a social good shared by all. That
some people experience their sexuality unilaterally does not change the benefit they derive from a
sexually healthy community. They may be sexually active with themselves making it no less
important that they experience the conditions for sexual integrity than it is for those whose sexuality is
experienced in part though interactions with others. Sexually abstinent individuals live their sexuality
as much as those who are sexually active; they just live it differently. It may be similar to the way
people of differing abilities experience language. In terms of asexual individuals, a community with
the conditions for sexual integrity to flourish is in their interests for two reasons, the second of which
they share with those who sexually abstain. First, the possibility exists that they will not remain
asexual throughout the entire course of their lives. Second, protection of bodily integrity remains an
important part of sexual integrity and a value that is as important to the asexual and abstinent as it is to
others. It may be that for a small proportion of the population, those who are asexual, this aspect of
the social good of sexual integrity is all that is needed to maintain it.
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relations with others. We take our being in part from those relations.” 69 In other words
certain relations are necessary in order to ‘be’ a ‘being’ – to be autonomous. Like
language, it would seem sensible to suggest that one’s sexuality, and thus sexual integrity
in the broader sense of the term, would be heavily contingent on, and deeply dialogic
with, one’s sexual interactions with the rest of society. It would also seem sensible to
suggest that sexual relations (and sexuality) constitute one type of those relations from
which ‘we take our being’.70
To be autonomous, then, we need certain relational opportunities – relationships in
this sense are a social good. One of those relational social goods pertains to sexuality. If
it is the case that sexual relations constitute one of the social goods needed for autonomy
it seems logical to suggest that sexuality be protected. Correspondingly, it seems
necessary to propose a conception of sexual integrity that extends beyond ‘freedom from’
bodily invasion to also include protection for one’s sexuality itself. In other words, an
understanding of sexual integrity that includes the conditions for the production of a
community of sexual actors whose lived sexualities include the possibility of a sense of
sexual self, with an ability to sexually relate to others, a faculty for sexual exploration and

69
See Jennifer Nedelsky, “Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities” (1989) Yale J.L.
& Feminism 7 at 8. Nedelsky emphasizes in her work the need to conceptualize rights as relationships, with
equality being the right that dictates the types of interpersonal relationships that a society promotes.
Jennifer Nedelsky, “The Practical Possibilities of a Feminist Theory”, (1993) 87 Northwestern U.L. Rev.
1286. As will be discussed in Chapter Eight it may be that more can be achieved under the concept of
social goods than the concept of rights, even the non-traditional version put forth by Nedelsky. That sexual
integrity is necessary for autonomy does not mean that the concept need be reduced to traditional liberal
notions of autonomy. Under the conception of sexual integrity proposed here a concern with sexual actors
does not suggest such a privileging of the individual. As will be discussed in Chapter Eight, a Razian
conception of autonomy requires the provision of certain social goods. People, to be autonomous, require
certain relational components to their lives – access to language, for example, would be one such
component. Sexual integrity would be another. These are types of social goods. Under this Razian
conception of autonomy it is incumbent upon legislators and adjudicators to provide and promote these
social goods because without them individuals cannot be autonomous.
70
Obviously this is meant figuratively but it would be equally true in a literal sense.
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a capacity for sexual benefit (whether that be economic, emotional, psychological or
physical).
If this is the case it becomes incumbent upon law to interpret - so that it might protect
- sexual integrity as including not just 'freedom from' bodily invasion but also 'conditions
for' an integrated, coherent and functional sexuality.71 In the context of identifying and
defining the harm of sexual violence such an interpretation of sexual integrity lends itself
to consideration of factors such as sexual shame, humiliation, violations of trust, and
sexual self-esteem.72
Nicola Lacey argues that developing an approach to sexual violence that incorporates
affectivity is critical.73 She suggests that the criminal law, to expand beyond the concept
of freedom from bodily invasion, needs to re-conceptualize its assumption of body-mind
dualism and shift its focus from autonomy, as traditionally understood, to integrity. (She
is referring to bodily integrity rather than the notion of sexual integrity employed here.)
Drawing on the work of Jennifer Nedelsky and Drucilla Cornell, she suggests that
rape law perpetuates a mind-body dualism and in the process fails to adequately respond
to both the corporeal and affective elements of sexual violence.74 She suggests that the
law needs a different idea of the body. She argues that the criminal law currently
conceptualizes it as bounded – as self-contained not breached, penetrated, or invaded.
71

The suggestion that the law ought to be oriented towards protecting the ‘conditions for’ sexual
integrity (in conjunction with the relational concept of sexual integrity described here) might sound
problematically communitarian to some. There are many critiques and concerns raised by arguments
suggesting that the law (or a society) ought to conceive of (and correspondingly protect) sexuality as a
common good. These concerns are critical and have not been overlooked. My response to them (my
attempt to overcome them) will become evident as my argument continues to unfold in the remaining
chapters.
72
As will be discussed in Chapter Eight this interpretation ought to apply to other legal contexts as
well.
73
See “Unspeakable Subjects, Impossible Rights: Sexuality, Integrity, and Criminal Law”, (1998) 11 Can.
J.L. & Juris. 47.
74
Ibid. at 57.
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(She notes that under this conception, gay men, women and children are abnormal or
exceptional while heterosexual men constitute the norm or frame of reference). The
current conception, she suggests, is an image of the body as territory, or property,
divorced from reason and emotion. Under the current conception bodies are boundaries
that separate autonomous individuals. Instead, bodies ought to be understood as aspects of
lived subjectivity through which people relate to one another. In this way the criminal
law might begin to protect those relational values it currently marginalizes.75
Lacey argues that the concept of bodily integrity is better than the concept of
mentalist autonomy (which she states is the current focus of rape law) because it puts the
bodily and affective aspects of sexual life more directly in issue. Her objective is to
destabilize the artificial distinction between mind and body so that the law might
recognize that rape violates the victim’s capacity to integrate psychic and bodily
experiences - a capacity needed to achieve autonomy.
Her argument and those of the relational feminists she draws on, supports the
suggestion made here that sexual integrity be thought of as a social good. However the
argument made here also differs slightly from Lacey’s position. It shares with Lacey’s
argument the assertion that integrity ought to include elements of body, mind and heart
and that there is a relational aspect to each of these elements. However, Lacey advocates
for a conceptual shift from autonomy to bodily integrity – with the concept of bodily
integrity including not only the corporeal but also affect and reason.
The argument made here is for a shift from focus on the body and on propriety to a
focus on sexual integrity. Unlike Lacey’s argument, it does not risk collapsing the
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Lacey, “Unspeakable Subjects, Impossible Rights: Sexuality, Integrity, and Criminal Law”, supra
note 73.
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distinction between mind and body by incorporating into the notion of bodily integrity the
elements of the psyche. Lacey’s approach risks advancing the suggestion that the mental,
emotional and social elements of integrity diminished by sexual violence are a function of
bodily invasion – almost like a symptom.
Irrefutably the sexual violation of a person’s body is likely to cause an affective harm.
Lacey suggests that where criminal law does attempt to incorporate affect into its analysis
it is always at the sentencing stage not the definitional stage. My concern is that from an
analytical perspective, collapsing the heart and mind into the concept of the body might
be susceptible to the same shortcoming. Why do all of the definitional work under the
concept of bodily integrity?76 The concept of sexual integrity developed here includes the
body, affect and reason, (as does Lacey’s approach); it recognizes that these elements of
the self are fundamentally relational (as does Lacey’s approach). The distinction, and it
may be a modest one, is that it does so without relying on the notion of bodily integrity as
the foundational or pre-requisite concept.
Incorporating a constructivist understanding of sexual violence inevitably requires
consideration of issues of power, relationships, specificity and the subjective experience
76

Donald Dripps is another theorist who has attempted to identify the harm of sexual violation without
relying on a ‘thin’ notion of autonomy that, he argues, demands that rape be defined by the conjunction of
non-consent with violence- a definition which offers an impoverished foundation for the law of sexual
assault; (“Beyond Rape: An Essay On the Difference Between The Presence of Force and The Absence of
Consent” (1992) 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1780). Dripps argued that rape laws are premised on an historically
patriarchal foundation and ought to be outright rejected in favour of a new legal regime. The regime he
proposed draws a distinction between violent forced sex and coercive non-violent sex. To theorize the
harm of the former he suggests focusing exclusively on its violent characteristics and regulating it through
the law of assault. In terms of non-violent but coercive sex he suggests adopting a commodity theory of the
sexual harm caused and regulating it through the notion of sexual expropriation. Sex will be expropriated
where the defendant knowingly disregards the victim’s expression of non-consent. Unfortunately, the only
factor that is relevant under Dripps’ account is whether the accused ‘acquired’ the sex through wrongful
means. That is to say, there is nothing interactional about his approach. It does not conceptualize the
complainant as a sexual actor. Moreover, it offers less, if any, protection for certain categories of
complainants- such as wives (see for a discussion on this point Robin West, “Legitimating the Illegitimate”
(1993) 93 Colum. L. Rev. 1442). Finally due to its central tenet – body as property- sex as service
(regardless of context) – his theory is also too focused on bodily integrity.
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of any of the sexual actors involved. To understand the harm of sexual violence (as well
as the sexual goods that the criminal law is assumedly meant to protect77) the law cannot
focus only on unwanted penises, penetrations, and (hetero)sexual desires. It must also
take into account preservation of sexual self-esteem, sexual awareness, sense of sexual
self, and ability to achieve sexual pleasure or benefit. It must develop language and
concepts that accommodate the ‘conditions for’ sexual integrity (and ‘freedom from’ is
only one of those conditions). An understanding of sexual integrity that extends beyond
bodily integrity is a start.
In the criminal law context, which is only one of the legal arenas in which law and
sexual integrity intersect, the interference with sexual integrity at issue will often involve
a bodily component. This does not demand that the criminal law’s conception of sexual
integrity need be reduced to bodily integrity.
Promisingly, it would appear that as sexual assault jurisprudence has developed in the
Supreme Court of Canada since 1987, sexual integrity and bodily integrity have not
necessarily been considered synonymous78 and the adoption of a definition for sexual
assault which involves an objective assessment of the impact on the complainant’s sexual
integrity has shifted the law’s focus so that what counts is not simply the sexual motives,
arousal or body parts of the accused or the community’s standard of sexual propriety but
also the perception, experience and impact on the complainant. In other words, it is a
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See Lacey, “Unspeakable Subjects, Impossible Rights: Sexuality, Integrity, and Criminal Law”,
supra note 73 at 54 for a critique of the law’s impoverished account of the value of sexuality. “There
is little trace in criminal law, then, of those things which contemporary social discourses of sexuality
mark as its values and risks. Ideas of self-expression, connection, intimacy, relationship – those things
which surely underpin contemporary understandings of what is valuable about sexuality – are absent.”
78
This is not to suggest that bodily integrity is not still considered the premier interest at stake. Justice
Major’s states in Ewanchuk, supra note 29 at para. 28, that “every man's person being sacred, and no
other having the right to meddle with it in any the slightest manner.” Rather it is to note that physical
integrity is not the only interest recognized by the interpretation of “sexual assault” given by the Court.
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definition that is corporeal, and affective, relational and interactional; that is to say, it is a
definition that looks at the interaction, the relationships, the perspectives (both affective
and corporeal) of all of the sexual actors and the surrounding circumstances.79 A
definition, in other words, that operates from a social constructivist conception of sexual
violence.
iv) Chase And Its Impact
The doctrinal import of this shift is not to be underestimated. The very first reported
post-Chase case applying the Supreme Court’s definition exemplifies this point. In R. v.
Crowe, a former United Church Minister was charged with sexually assaulting two prepubescent boys (ages 11 and 12).80 The first complainant alleged that Crowe had on more
than one occasion sat him on his knee, hugged and kissed him on the lips, fondled his
penis both over top of and underneath the boy’s clothing, and attempted to have the boy
touch his penis. The defendant admitted to hugging and having kissed the boy on the lips
but denied, and claimed he found repugnant, the suggestion that he had fondled the boy’s
genitals or asked the boy to touch his penis.
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See for example the Supreme Court of Prince Edward Island’s affirmation of the trial judge conviction
for sexual assault in R. v. Howe, [2003] P.E.I.J. No. 21. The Court held that
“[i]n accordance with R. v. Chase, supra, we have to ask "was the sexual integrity of the victim
violated?" The test is an objective one. "Viewed in light of all the circumstances is the sexual or
carnal context of the assault visible to a reasonable observer?" Being prevented from pulling one's
pants up in public is clearly a violation of a person's sexual integrity to say nothing of the continued
contact of the appellant's bare penis against the exposed portion of the complainant's body. Even if
the appellant's stated motivation for the continued contact was accepted as being believable, or could
reasonably be true (as referred to in R. v. W.D ) it does not, on an objective standard, eliminate the
violation of the victim's sexual integrity and would not have led to an acquittal with respect to the
charge of sexual assault.”
The appellant’s stated motivation for continued contact (after the complainant had verbally withdrawn her
consent) was to ascertain what was wrong. He argued that at that point the contact changed from sexual to
non-sexual. The court found that any calming down could have been done by removing his penis from
contact with the complainant and giving her space.
80
[1987] O.J. No. 1671.
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Judge Carter determined that the touching had not been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt, in large measure because he found it difficult to convince himself that “a man
dedicated to God, whose good reputation throughout the years has been vouched for by
several witnesses, some of whom are outstanding men themselves, would do the
"touching" that is complained of here, and compound the matter by perjuring himself.”81
However, Judge Crowe convicted him of sexual assault regardless. He did so on the
basis that the kiss on the lips and the hugging had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt
– it had been admitted to by the accused. Basing his decision on the definition
established in Chase, and noting that while the accused denied any motive of sexual
gratification this did not preclude a conviction, he found that
a reasonable observer, seeing a 71 year old man alone with an 11 year
old boy who is sitting on his lap, pinch, hug and kiss the boy and then
kiss him on the lips, may well put the pinching down to horseplay, the
hugging and the kissing on the cheeks down to affection, but the kissing
on the lips he would not consider normal, but violating the sexual
integrity of the boy.82

A definition of sexual assault that turned on sexual motives or genital contact would not,
on the findings of fact made by the trial judge in this case, have resulted in a conviction.
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R. v. Litchfield provides a pronounced
example of the assertion that the shift from defining sexual violence based on sexual
propriety and biology to defining it based on sexual integrity promotes a constructivist
conception of sexual violence better able to account for the harm of sexual violation.83
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Ibid. (para. and page numbers not available).
Supra note 80.
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Supra note 9.
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In Litchfield, the accused was a doctor charged with fourteen counts of sexual assault
against seven of his female patients.84 Prior to trial a chambers judge granted an order
severing and dividing the counts such that there were to be three separate trials: one to
deal with alleged assaults involving the complainants’ breasts, one for those complaints
involving genitals and one for complaints of touching to other areas of the complainants’
bodies. The Crown proceeded first on the counts involving vaginal exams. The trial
judge refused to admit evidence of the complaints involving other body parts. At the
close of the Crown’s case, the accused’s motion for a non-suit was granted and an
acquittal entered. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada the order dividing and
severing the counts as well as the acquittals were set aside and a new trial ordered.
Justice Iacobucci writing for the majority found that the chambers judge did not have
jurisdiction to order the counts divided and severed. He went on to determine that even
had the jurisdictional error not been present the chambers judge’s order should be set
aside because it resulted in an injustice. The injustice stemmed from the impact that
severing and dividing the counts would have on the test to be applied in determining
whether an accused’s conduct had the requisite nature to constitute a sexual assault.
Justice Iacobucci found that
the arbitrary distinction based on the body parts of the complainants
amplified the difficulties in assessing the alleged sexual assaults in the
context of all of the circumstances surrounding the conduct by creating
an evidentiary problem which would not have existed but for the
order…[T]he order denied the reality of how the complainants
experienced the conduct which they alleged constituted sexual assaults,
and sent an inappropriate message that a complainant’s physical
attributes were more important than her experience as a whole person.85
(emphasis added)
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Supra note 9.
Litchfield, supra note 11 at HN.
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The difficulties in assessing the alleged sexual assaults in this case stemmed, in
part, from the fact that the complainants had consented to some touching for medical
purposes including touching of their breasts and genitals. In other words, in this case the
fact that the touching occurred, and the fact that it involved touching of breasts and
vaginal penetration revealed nothing to indicate whether or not the conduct was sexually
assaultive.
Justice Iacobucci noted that in light of the objective test established in Chase in
which all of the circumstances surrounding the conduct in question will be relevant to the
question of whether the touching was of a sexual nature such that it violated the
complainant’s sexual integrity, it is essential that “courts not create unnecessary barriers
to considering all the circumstances surrounding conduct which is alleged to constitute a
sexual assault.”86
Of significance are the factors that Justice Iacobucci focused on. Under a sexual
propriety approach the analysis would likely have turned on the perspective of the
accused; given that the touching occurred in a doctor’s office, under the cloak of doctorpatient relations, an assessment of whether or not the community would deem it improper
would likely turn on the accused’s motives. In other words it would have been necessary
to establish a sexual motive.87
The injustice that Justice Iacobucci’s reasoning identified is the injustice that would
occur if evidence regarding the nature of the relationship between the accused and the
complainant, the potential power imbalance at play and the experience of the
86

Litchfield, supra note 11 at para. 13.
It is not that sexual motive is not relevant under Justice Iacobucci’s reasoning. It is and given the
facts in this case it may be more significant than in other cases. It is that under the Chase approach the
sexual motive of the accused is not determinative nor is the perspective of the accused all that is
relevant in determining whether the conduct was sexual.
87
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complainants as whole persons were inadmissible. Referencing the Court’s decision in
Norberg v. Wynrib, he emphasized the importance of recognizing the imbalance of power
that can occur between a doctor and a patient where an alleged sexual assault is
concerned.88 He went on to note that not only did focusing on body parts rather than “the
larger context within which that complainant felt that the respondent’s actions were
inappropriate” deny coherent sexualities to the complainants, it sent an inappropriate
message about women in general.
Justice Iacobucci’s reasoning also led to the determination that among other errors
committed by the trial judge in rendering a directed verdict was his finding that the only
evidence going to show lack of consent was that of the two medical experts.89 Instead,
Justice Iacobucci held that the trial judge also ought to have considered “the testimony of
the complainants as to their feelings of specific distress and discomfort, as well as their
testimony that they had never had similar experiences with other doctors as evidence
going to lack of consent.”90
As previously noted, Nicola Lacey argues that one of the most significant
inadequacies of the criminal law’s treatment of sexual offences she has identified is the
virtual absence of affectivity from criminal law’s doctrinal scheme. 91 She is referring to
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Litchfield, supra note 11 at para. 14. Norberg v Wynrib, supra note 8 will be discussed at length in
the next chapter. It was one of the first decisions in which the influences of power feminism can be
seen to have taken hold in the Court’s reasoning. While Justice LaForest for the majority in Norberg
v. Wynrib does continue to focus on propriety rather than integrity, his decision does begin to
incorporate a constructivist perspective towards sexual violation. Justice McLachlin (as she then was)
writes a minority opinion that also invokes a power analysis but does so without relying on standards
of propriety.
89
“The medical experts had produced evidence on the necessity of and the proper procedures for the
types of medical examinations in question.” Litchfield, ibid. at 58.
90
Ibid.
91
“Unspeakable Subjects” supra note 73. While Lacey’s article was written after both Chase and Litchfield
it may be that she was focusing more on British jurisprudence. Britain, at the time she wrote the piece, still
had very antiquated and extremely essentialist laws regarding sexual offences (see Sexual Offences Act
1956, c. 69). While their criminal laws prohibiting sexual violence did undergo major reform in 2003
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the criminal law’s frequent failure to accommodate emotion. Justice Iacobucci’s
reasoning in Litchfield very much incorporates affectivity into its analysis.
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R. v. Cuerrier provides another example
of this trend towards greater concern with sexual interactions than with sexual acts.92 In
Cuerrier the Court determined that fraud that did not go to the “nature and quality of the
act” could still vitiate consent to sexual touching if it carries with it the risk of serious
harm.
Under the common law, fraud only vitiated consent where the fraud went to the nature
or quality of the act consented to by the complainant.93 In Bolduc v. The Queen, which
was a case applying the common law definition, a doctor was convicted of indecent
assault arising from a medical examination conducted on a patient in front of the doctor’s
friend.94 The complainant consented after being led to believe that the friend was an
intern and was observing for medical/educational purposes. The Court reversed the
conviction against the two on the basis that the complainant had consented to a medical
examine by the Doctor and the act completed was a medical exam by the Doctor:
Bolduc did exactly what the complainant understood he would do and intended
that he should do, namely, to examine the vaginal tract and to cauterize the
affected parts. Inserting the speculum was necessary for these purposes. There
was no fraud on his part as to what he was supposed to do and in what he actually
did. The complainant knew that Bird was present and consented to his presence.
The fraud that was practiced on her was not as to the nature and quality of what
(Sexual Offences Bill, 2003), today they still continue to maintain a hierarchical statutory distinction
between sexual offences involving penile penetration and all other sexual offences. Moreover, the concept
of sexual integrity has not been incorporated at a definitional level in English criminal law. (For a
discussion of sexual offences in UK criminal law see Nicola Lacey, Celia Wells & Oliver Quick,
Reconstructing Criminal Law, 3rd ed. (LexisNexis UK: London, 2003).
92
[1998] SCJ No. 64.
93
See R. v. Clarence (1988), 22 Q.B.D. 23 at 44 where the husband’s failure to disclose that he had
gonorrhea did not vitiate his wife’s consent because “the only sorts of consent which so far destroy the
effect of a woman’s consent…are frauds as to the nature of the act itself, or as to the identity of the
person who does the act.”
94
[1967] SCR 677.
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was to be done but was as to Bird's identity as a medical intern. His presence as
distinct from some overt act by him was not an assault.95

Returning to the case of Cuerrier, the issue was the definition of ‘fraud’ as it pertains to
consent under section 265(3)(c) of the Criminal Code.96 As noted, the common law
definition of consent as a defence to assault had stipulated that consent was vitiated by a
fraud related to the “nature and quality of the act” to which consent was granted. When
the Criminal Code amendments in 1982 were enacted the definition dropped these words;
the provision now states that consent is vitiated where it is given pursuant to a fraud.97
In Cuerrier the accused was charged with aggravated assault. He had knowingly and
repeatedly had unprotected sexual intercourse with two women without disclosing to
them that he was HIV positive. Both women testified that they would not have consented
to unprotected sex with Cuerrier had they known of his HIV status.
Justice Prowse of the British Columbia Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s
directed verdict of acquittal in Cuerrier.98 She did so on the basis that the legislature had
not intended to broaden the categories of fraud vitiated by consent. Justice Prowse
rejected the Crown’s alternative argument that the respondent’s acts exceeded the scope
of the complainants’ consent. Her reasoning, much like the Court’s reasoning in Bolduc,
focused on the sexual acts not the sexual actors. The complainants consented to a
particular sexual act – unprotected sexual intercourse with the respondent – and this was
the act that occurred. Given her narrow reading of what constitutes fraud under section
265 of the Criminal Code she upheld the directed verdict.

95

Bolduc, supra note 94.
Criminal Code, supra note 35, section 265(3)(c).
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(1996), 83 B.C.A.C. 295.
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Justice Cory, writing for the majority in Cuerrier disagreed. He found that
“Parliament had intended to move away from the rigidity of the common law requirement
that fraud must relate to the nature and quality of the act”.99 He determined that “it was
no longer necessary when examining whether consent in assault or sexual assault cases
was vitiated by fraud to consider whether the fraud related to the nature and quality of the
act”.100 He went on to find that in addition to fraud pertaining to the nature and quality
of the act or identity of the partner, the non-disclosure of important facts combined with
deprivation or risk of deprivation also vitiates consent. The deprivation must relate to a
serious harm or risk of serious harm.101 Rather than focus solely on the specific sexual
act, Justice Cory adopted an interpretation that takes into consideration the entire sexual
interaction, and the complainant’s perspective not just regarding the specific physical act
– penile/vaginal intercourse - but also regarding the context of the interaction as a
whole.102
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Cuerrier, supra note 92 at para. 105.
Ibid. at para. 108.
101
Justice L’Heureux-Dube in her concurring opinion, ibid., broadened the types of frauds capable of
vitiating consent. She found, at para. 16, that any fraud which is “designed to induce the complainant
to submit” to the act will vitiate consent and constitute assault. Justice Cory, understandably rejected
this approach on the basis that it would “trivialize the criminal process by leading to a proliferation of
petty prosecutions” (at para. 131). Justice McLachlin (as she then was) and Justice Gonthier found
that while Parliament had not intended to broaden the category of frauds capable of vitiating consent, a
failure to disclose HIV status did vitiate consent because it was a fraud going to the nature and quality
of the act.
102
There may be a strong policy oriented justification for this approach that also relies on recognition
of the social contingency of consent. There are those who argue that Cuerrier is wrongly decided from
a public health policy perspective. They suggest that the responsibility to practice safe sex should lie
with the individual, that each of us is responsible for either ensuring that we practice safe sex or
accepting the risk of choosing not to practice safe sex, and that decisions such as Cuerrier are
problematic because they will not send the message to individuals that they are responsible for
ensuring that their sexual partners wear a condom. This argument works better in some communities
of sexual actors – say for example a gay male community- than it does in others. It may not be as
persuasive in the context of heterosexual interactions where women, due to gendered, economic, social
and physical inequities, may not have the same sexual bargaining power. That is to say, gay men
might be better situated and socially equipped to refuse sex or negotiate safe sex than are many
women. For a discussion regarding the arguments for and against the use of criminal law to control
the failure to disclose HIV status to sexual partners see Isabel Grant, “The Boundaries of the Criminal
100
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Where the law maintains an essentialist focus on sexual acts as opposed to sexual
actors the reasoning in Bolduc makes sense, as does Justice Prowse’s reasoning in
Cuerrier. A legal conception of sexuality focused on sexual actors (and thus sexual
integrity) forces a different analysis. It requires the Court to ask much more than ‘did she
say he could insert a speculum into her vagina and if so is that what he did?’ It requires
the Court to inquire into the experience and perception of, as well as the potential impact
on,103 all sexual actors involved. The reasoning in Cuerrier suggests a concern with how
people treat each other sexually. The moral focus is on sexual relationships rather than
sexual acts. This is more likely to engender an emphasis on sexual integrity.
By focusing on sexual interactions the law is better able to consider the interests of
sexual actors themselves. A focus on the sexual act itself inevitably relies on essentialist
conceptions about sex that are more concerned with propriety than integrity.
It is not that anatomy is irrelevant. It is that its relevance is understood through a
constructivist lens in which power, inequality and the nature of the interaction is
determinative, not the body parts involved. The decision of the British Columbia Court of

Law: the Criminalization of the Non-disclosure of HIV”, (Spring, 2008) 31 Dalhousie L.J. 123. She
argues that it should only be used as a last resort in cases where other measures have failed and the
individual has had multiple sexual partners.
103
A response to the critique that the criminal law’s reliance on the impact of a sexual interaction in
ascertaining whether an offence has occurred constitutes impermissible or at least inadvisable
retrospective reasoning, will be discussed in Chapter 5 under the section addressing the post-Labaye
case law. With sexual assault, unlike for example aggravated assault, it is not only the consequences
(or potential consequences) of the sexual act that can vitiate consent thus making the conduct a sexual
assault. (See R. v. Williams, [2003] 2 SCR 134 where an accused continued to have unprotected sex
with his partner after becoming aware of his HIV positive status. At some unknown point his partner
became infected. He was convicted of attempted aggravated assault. He was not convicted of
aggravated assault simpliciter because the Crown could not establish that the complainant was still
HIV negative by the time the accused knew he was HIV positive. The actus reus for aggravated
assault requires endangering the life of another. It is based on the potential consequences of the
accused’s actions. (Cuerrier could be convicted despite not having actually infected either of the
complainants because his actions at the time he was aware of his sero-status did pose a significant risk
of serious bodily harm. The issue of lack of simultaneity that existed in Williams did not arise in
Cuerrier.) Justice Binnie noted in Williams that unlike with aggravated assault this is not the case
with sexual assault where the actus reus can be met regardless of the potential consequences.
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Appeal in R. v. Nicolaou provides a good example of this.104 The decision demonstrates
the way in which the corporeal can be incorporated into a social constructivist
understanding of the definition of sexual violence.
Nicolaou involved numerous charges against the defendant including assault, living
on the avails of prostitution, and sexual assault. The complainant alleged that Nicolaou,
who lived next door to her and supplied her with drugs, had beaten her and forced her to
prostitute herself in order to pay him money for drugs that he said she owed to him.
The accused also ordered another woman to search the complainant’s vagina against
her wishes. The sexual assault charge stemmed from this nonconsensual search. Relying
on Chase the trial judge found him guilty of sexual assault on the basis that a motive of
sexual gratification was not necessary and that assault for the purpose of power and
control can, where it violates the complainant’s sexual integrity, support a conviction.
The Court of Appeal quoted with approval the trial judge’s analysis of the gendered
power dynamics at play: “the evidence here clearly shows that [the appellant] was
demonstrating his power and control over not only the complainant but other women
present. I find him guilty of the sexual assault set out in Count 6.”105
The appellant argued that the trial judge erred because there "was no sexual or carnal
aspect whatsoever to the force employed".106 He argued that the trial judge “implicitly,
and incorrectly, focused on the anatomy involved in the assault”.107 The appellant
suggested that "[t]here is nothing in Chase or in the Criminal Code definition of assault
that suggests a sexual assault can simply involve the exercise of control and domination
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over another".108 The Court of Appeal rejected his arguments and affirmed the trial
judge’s reasoning in the case. They found that “a motive of sexual gratification is not
essential; the anatomy involved is relevant; [and] the exercise of power and control over
the victim and his or her humiliation or subservience can engage his or her sexual
integrity.”109 The involvement of sexual organs combined with the exercise of power and
control equaled, in this case, a violation of the complainant’s sexual integrity.110
In this analysis power becomes the salient factor. An examination of power
necessitates an examination of the corporeal and the affective. Humiliation,
subservience, and a contextual analysis of the gendered inequities at play (as evidenced
by the reference to the domination of other women present) all become not only relevant
but also a substantive element of what sexual assault means.
The Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in R. v. V. (K.B.) provides an example of
similar reasoning.111 In R. v. (K.B.) the appellant’s sexual assault conviction against his
three year old son was upheld. The appellant admitted to grabbing his son’s genitals in
order to discipline him. The child frequently complained of pain in the pelvic area and a
medical examination confirmed that the child’s injuries were not inflicted accidently.
The appellant admitted to assaulting his son in this manner. The issue on appeal was as to
whether the assault was a sexual assault. The Ontario Court of Appeal found that the
appellant's “misguided and primitive disciplinary exercise was an aggressive act of
domination which violated the sexual integrity of his son and constituted an assault which
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The accused’s conduct was found to be sexual assault because of a confluence of power, control,
gender (the court found he was exercising his control over not just the complainant but other women
present) and bodily integrity (through the court’s focus on sexual anatomy).
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can properly be viewed as a sexual assault.”112 Their decision was upheld by the
Supreme Court of Canada.113
Justice Osborne for the majority of the Ontario Court of Appeal found that the
presence or absence of sexual gratification was merely one of the factors to be considered
in determining whether a sexual assault has occurred. Sexual assault, Justice Osborne
stated, is “an act of power, aggression and control, [and] does not require sexual
gratification. In some cases, it is inimical to it…its absence in these circumstances does
not detract from the finding that the assault here was sexual in its overall context.”114
Again, power served as the most salient factor in the definition of sexual assault.
It might be argued that the reasoning in R. v .V.(K.B.), contrary to what is being
suggested here, is extremely essentialist – that it is all about anatomy- because but for the
fact that it was the child’s genitals, the assault would not have been characterized as a
sexual assault. It is true that if the father had flicked the child’s ears rather than the
child’s testicles he would not have been convicted of sexual assault. He also would not
have violated his son’s sexual integrity. It does not all come down to anatomy. In this
case, as in Nicolaou it is the combination of power and assault on sexual anatomy that
makes the offence a sexual assault. Not because it involved genitals but because it
involved an “an act of power, aggression and control” such that the child’s sexual
integrity was violated.115
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R. v. Larue provides the Court’s most recent interpretation of the meaning of sexual
assault.116 In Larue
the uncontested evidence at trial indicated that the highly intoxicated
victim awoke to find Larue on top of her, holding her down with a knife
to her throat and trying to force her legs apart. Her pants and underpants
had been removed, but she did not recall how. Larue slashed her throat
and she pushed him off and went for help.117

The “uncontested evidence at trial” established that the accused climbed on top of the
unconscious and naked from the waist down victim, and while holding a knife to her
throat tried to force her legs apart. The issue was whether this constituted aggravated
assault or sexual assault. A determination of such turned on whether the assault occurred
in circumstances that were sexual. The trial judge had a reasonable doubt as to whether
the assault was sexual. His reason was as follows:
[The complainant] agreed that her pants and panties may have been
removed before she realized that the accused was on top of her. On the
evidence, there may have been some romantic activity between [the
complainant] and the accused, before he attacked her with a knife, and
this may have been consensual. There may have been some sexual
activity between E.L. and [the complainant]. The fact that neither [of
the complainant's cousins] noticed such activity does not mean that it
could not have occurred. If it did, and [the complainant] was in a
blacked out state, such as was described in the evidence, it may have
been consensual between she and the accused, or between she and E.L.,
or E.L. may simply have removed her pants with some intentions of his
own. The probability is that the accused was in the process of sexually
assaulting the complainant. Her pants and panties are off, he is on top of
her, and he has a knife. The zipper on her pants is broken, which is
evidence consistent with forceful removal of that garment, but I cannot
decide this case on a balance of probabilities.118
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The Crown appealed this decision arguing that the trial judge erred in law by drawing
an artificial line between the potentially consensual sexual events that may have occurred
prior to the attack and the attack itself.119 The majority of the British Columbia Court of
Appeal rejected the Crown’s appeal, finding that if any error occurred – which they were
not convinced was the case – it was an error of fact not law.
The Court of Appeal determined that there were two compelling pieces of evidence
suggesting the attack was sexual. The first was the state of disarray of the complainant’s
clothing. They noted the evidence suggesting it may have been E.L. who removed her
clothing, arguing that
the disarray of clothing was one of the two most significant matters in
relation to the question whether the assault was sexual. If the accused
was responsible for that disarray, it was a most compelling circumstance
against him. But he may not have been responsible for it. To carry the
possibilities further, he may have come across the complainant in that
condition and that may have led him to lodge the vicious attack on the
complainant, an action for which the evidence seems to offer no clear
explanation.120

What was the court referring to in terms of “no clear explanation”?
They were referring to no clear evidence that the accused acted out of sexual interest,
was motivated in some way sexually, was pursuing sexual gratification. The point under
119
How any sexual interactions between the accused and the complainant could have been consensual
seems unclear, given the complainant’s level of intoxication. Justice Prowse, makes this point in her
dissent from the majority of the British Columbia Court of Appeal: “it is difficult to fathom how a
woman who has blacked out could be found to be consenting to any sexual activity, with either Mr.
N.E.L. or Mr. Larue.” (Supra note 118 at para. 12). Implied consent is not a legitimate defence in
Canadian sexual assault law (see R. v. Ewanchuk, supra note 29). Consent must be operative at the
time the sexual touching takes place. Nor is prior consent a defence. A state of unconsciousness
means an incapacity to withdraw consent. An incapacity to withdraw any previously granted consent
means the complainant was incapable of giving consent at the time the sexual touching occurred. See
R. v. Esua, [1997] 2 SCR 777 where Justice McLachlin (as she then was) states, at para. 73, that “the
hypothetical case of a complainant giving advance consent to sexual contact before becoming
unconscious does not constitute an exception. Consent can be revoked at any time. The person who
assaults an unconscious woman cannot know whether, were she conscious, she would revoke the
earlier consent. He therefore takes the risk that she may later claim she was assaulted without consent.”
120
Larue, supra note 117 at para. 35.
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Chase is that the court does not need an explanation of this sort to find that the attack was
a sexual assault. As noted above, the definition of sexual assault found in Chase does not
rely on an understanding of sexual assault as necessarily dictated by sexual arousal, or
sexual gratification. It is not that it denies that this may sometimes be the case (or that it
may sometimes be relevant to determining whether the assault was a sexual assault), it is
that this is not determinative of how the law defines sexually assaultive behavior.
The second compelling piece of evidence identified by the Court of Appeal in Larue,
on the issue of whether the assault was sexual, was “the complainant's statement that,
when she awoke to find him lying on top of her, he said, "If you don't let me fuck you, I'll
kill you.”121 Indeed, this does seem compelling. However there was a difficulty with this
evidence; the complainant retreated from it during cross- examination. The trial judge
found the complainant not to be a reliable witness.
The Court of Appeal went on to determine that even if the trial judge had made an
error it was an error of fact not law – it was open to the trial judge to conclude from the
evidence a reasonable doubt as to whether the attack was sexual. This is where the Court
of Appeal erred. They misinterpreted Chase. As the Supreme Court noted, under a
proper application of Chase it was not open to the trial judge, on the evidence (i.e. the
uncontested fact that the complainant woke to find the defendant lying on top of her
trying to pry her naked legs open), to find that this assault was not sexual in nature.
Larue demonstrates well the significance of conceptualizing sexual assault the way
the Court chose to do in Chase. Under an essentialist understanding of sexual assault the
actions of the accused will be interpreted through an understanding of sexual assault as
about arousal, and the inappropriate exercise of sexual desire. Uncontested evidence that
121

Larue, supra note 117 at para. 36.
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the complainant awoke to find the accused on top of her prying her naked legs open
would not necessarily be sufficient to establish that the assault ought to be characterized
as a sexual assault. Under such a conceptual framework the evidence in this case (that the
complainant’s pants may have been removed consensually by someone else) would be
enough to possibly raise a reasonable doubt as to the sexual nature of the attack.
Under a conception of sexual assault which examines the context in which the acts
occurred, the impact on the sexual integrity of the complainant, and which interprets the
accused’s actions based on these factors rather than on the presence or absence of arousal,
or sexual intentions, climbing on top of a partially disrobed and unconscious woman,
holding a knife to her throat and attempting to pry her naked legs open constitutes sexual
assault. It does not matter who took her pants off.
The definition of sexual assault in Chase does more than simply objectivize the actus
reus for this offence. It shifts the conception of what sexual violation is, what it means in
this society. It shifts it away from an understanding of sexual violation as (or as caused
by) the eruption of, or inability to control, a sexual drive. It shifts it away from an
understanding which relied on the conception of sexuality as a romanticized, heterosexualized and naturally occurring drive, away from a model which understood sexuality
as a turbulent sexual drive under which a healthy conscience is charged with guarding
against the sexual excesses of the sub conscience122 (excesses which can result in sexual
violation) away from the notion of a sexual sub conscience in need of civilizing control
both by the properly developed conscience of the adult mind and, for those not properly
developed, that great surrogate, the properly developed conscience of the law. Instead,
this substantive change to the legal concept of the harm caused by sexual violence reveals
122

Jeffrey Weeks, The World We Have Won, (Routledge: New York, 2007).
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an understanding of sexual violation as about interactions rather than acts – a context
dependent behavior in which the most salient factor is power not natural urge.123

III. Defining Consent: No Still Means No But What Matters Is Saying Yes
Part III. Reprinted from (2009) 13 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 247 by permission of Carswell, a division of
Thomson Reuters Canada Limited.

The definition of sexual assault adopted by the Court in Chase signals a shift towards
a less essentialist conception of sexual violence. The development of the Court’s doctrine
on the interpretation of non-consent as an element of the offence of sexual assault has
further advanced this shift. There have been significant changes to the way in which the
Court understands what the criminal law considers as consent to sexual interaction.
These changes, like with the changes to the definition of sexual assault, better incorporate
the complainant’s perspective of the sexual interaction thus requiring the analysis to focus
on the entirety of the sexual interaction rather than simply the experience/perspective of
only one of the sexual actors (the accused).
i) The Ewanchuk Decision

123

This is not to suggest that the law now fully conceptualizes sexual violence as socially constructed. Nor
is it to suggest that references to and reliance on notions about sexual drives (uncontrollable or otherwise)
are no longer to be found in cases about sexual violence. (Not only are sentencing decisions in sexual
assault cases, particularly those addressing dangerous offender and long term offender designations,
overflowing with references to arousal patterns an assessment of these factors is often heavily weighted in
sentencing decisions. Similarly, whether penetration occurred appears to be a significant factor in
determining severity of sentence. In addition, as demonstrated in Chapter Three, in assessing admissibility
of similar fact evidence in adult complainant cases, there is an element of essentialism revealed, not in
terms of sexual disposition, but with respect to the undue focus on specific sexual acts.) Rather, it is to
suggest that in this one important respect the law has adopted a conceptual approach to defining sexual
violence, to identifying the harm that sexual violence perpetuates, which is more constructivist. That is to
say, at this definitional stage, the law has come to understand that whether an act is sexually violative is
contingent on all of the social factors surrounding and contributing to the act and how it is experienced by
the sexual actors involved.
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The Court’s decision in R. v. Ewanchuk affirmed two significant conceptual changes
to the doctrine of consent in sexual assault law.124 The first was the elimination of any
notion of implied consent.125 This firmly entrenched consent as an element of the actus
reus the absence of which is a purely subjective determination based on the complainant’s
perspective at the time of the sexual interaction.126 As the law now stands, in any sexual
interaction either there was consent to the sexual touching or there was not consent to the
sexual touching and this will be determined based on direct and/or indirect evidence of
the complainant’s state of mind.127
The second was the characterization of knowledge of consent on the part of the
accused in the affirmative rather than the negative - the stipulation that consent means
indicating yes, rather than failing to indicate no.128 Prior to the Court’s decision in
Ewanchuk the consent element of the mens rea for sexual assault required that the
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Ewanchuk, supra note 29. The word affirmed is used here because many of the changes with
respect to the doctrine of consent recognized in Ewanchuk had already been adopted in earlier
concurrences or dissents and in lower court decisions. See for example R. v. Park, [1995] 2 SCR 836;
R. v. Esua, supra note 119; R. v. M.L.M., supra note 39.
125
Ewanchuk, ibid. at para. 31.
126
Ewanchuk, ibid. Both at common law (Ewanchuk, ibid. at para. 36) and under sections 265.(3) and
273.1 of the Criminal Code, supra note 35 consent must be freely given in order to be legally
effective. Fear, duress, incapacity, abuse of trust, and coercion all vitiate consent to sexual touching.
127
Among others, this change responds to the critique that “[a]lthough the law is framed around mens rea
and consent, the issue of mens rea only becomes relevant if consent/pleasure cannot be established. The
man’s intentions are therefore not a priority, the whole focus is on the woman, her intentions and her
pleasure…The law in seeking to find innocence or guilt cannot accommodate the supposed ambiguity of a
submission to a sexual assault. Either a woman does not consent or she consents. If the former cannot be
established the latter must have occurred. Hence, in law’s domain the more that non-consent can be made
to look like submission, the more it will be treated like consent.” Carol Smart, “Law’s Truth/Women’s
Experience” in Nicola Lacey, Celia Wells & Oliver Quick, Reconstructing Criminal Law, 3rd ed.
(LexisNexis UK: London, 2003) at 492.
128
Ewanchuk, ibid. Justice Major in Ewanchuk quotes from para. 39 of Justice L’Heureux-Dube’s
concurring opinion in R v Park, supra note 124: “the mens rea of sexual assault is not only satisfied
when it is shown that the accused knew that the complainant was essentially saying “no”, but is also
satisfied when it is shown that the accused knew that the complainant was essentially not saying
“yes”.”
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accused had believed that (or been reckless or willfully blind to the fact that129) the
complainant was not consenting.130 In other words a guilty mind was a mind that knew or
was reckless as to whether the complainant had withheld consent.131
The post-Ewanchuk conception of consent establishes that the accused, to be morally
innocent, must have believed (or been reckless or willfully blind to the fact that) the
complainant communicated consent. Ewanchuk established that for the purposes of mens
rea, consent is established based on the accused’s perception of the complainant’s words
or actions and not on the accused’s speculation as to the complainant’s desire for sexual
contact.132 This means that the accused’s belief that a complainant did not say no will not
exculpate the accused nor will his belief that she said no but meant yes. It also means
that a complainant’s passivity is not a defence.133 It is only a mistaken belief that the
complainant communicated consent that will raise a reasonable doubt as to mens rea- not
a mistaken belief that the complainant was consenting.134
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Prior to the 1992 amendment to the Criminal Code recklessness as to consent did not suffice to
establish mens rea (see An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (sexual assault) S.C. 1992, c.38, ss.1-3 for
the amendment; see R v Pappajohn, [1980] 2 SCR 120 and Sansregret v R, [1985] 1 SCR 570 for the
pre-1992 determination that recklessness as to consent did not constitute mens rea.)
130
See R v Pappajohn, ibid. at 140: “the essence of the crime consists in the commission of an act of
sexual intercourse where a woman's consent, or genuine consent, has been withheld”. See also
Sansregret,ibid; R v Robertson, [1987] 1 SCR 918.
131
This was supported by sections 265.(3) and 273.1 of the Criminal Code, supra note 35, both of
which are framed in the negative. Did the complainant submit or not resist? (section 265.(1)) Did the
complaiant express a lack of consent? (section 273.1)
132
Ewanchuk, supra note 29 at para. 46. “In order to cloak the accused’s actions in moral innocence,
the evidence must show that he believed that the complainant communicated consent to engage in the
sexual activity in question.”
133
The Court had earlier affirmed the rather significant point, that passivity or silence did not
constitute consent, in an unremarkable one paragraph decision overturning the Nova Scotia Court of
Appeal. (R. v M.L.M., supra note 39) In addition, section 265(3) of the Criminal Code, supra note 35,
defining consent as a defence to assault (including sexual assault) stipulates that no consent is obtained
where the complainant submits or does not resist by reason of the application of force, threats or fear
of the application of force, fraud or the exercise of authority. As noted by Justice L’Heureux-Dube in
Ewanchuk, supra note 29 at para. 86, this supports the finding that passivity or silence does not
constitute consent.
134
It is worth noting the way in which this significant shift in the Court’s approach was adopted. In
Ewanchuk the majority adopted this new approach with very little discussion – almost as if without
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In other words, it means that what is relevant in establishing mens rea is an
assessment of the actual interaction between the sexual actors involved and not an
assessment of the accused’s potentially distorted perspective regarding the complainant’s
sexual interest. It limits the accused’s (and the courts’) ability to rely on essentialist
understandings of what women are ‘like’, or what ‘certain’ women are ‘like’, or what
women, or ‘certain’ women ‘want’, in order to raise a reasonable doubt as to mens rea.
The result of these modifications is a conception of consent in which all parties to the
interaction must be sexual actors and in which the perspectives of all sexual actors
involved in the interaction must be taken into account, at the definitional stage, in order to
determine whether a sexual assault has occurred.
The criminal regulation of sexual assault faces exceptionally difficult challenges in
identifying sexually violative and morally blameworthy sexual interactions between
otherwise consenting adults. These challenges stem from the many social factors that
constitute how sexuality is expressed, how sexual interactions are gendered, what norms
of sexual conduct are created and how those norms are experienced by different sexual
actors. One of the main examples of this relates to the reality that sex involves socially
contingent power dynamics and in a society in which gendered power hierarchies are the
norm in familial, social, financial, psychological, physical and emotional contexts it is not
difficult to imagine that many women would acquiesce to sexual touching that they do not
desire.135 Distinguishing genuine consent from disingenuous consent is easier when there

recognizing the dramatic change that was occurring. The fleshing out – the discussion- of the
analytical approach adopted with very little fanfare in Ewanchuk is found in Justice L’Heureux-Dube’s
concurrence in Park, supra note 124 and Justice McLachlin’s dissent in Esua, supra note 119.
135
Desire is used here in a broad sense to suggest an act of consent that is consistent with the
preservation of sexual integrity. People consent to sex for all sorts of reasons beyond physical, sexual
or emotional desires. People consent to sex for money, out of boredom or curiosity or even pity.
People consent to sex because they are too tired to argue with their partner and they know that next
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is violence, threat of violence or some other form of overt coercion involved. It is more
difficult when none of these are present. However, if what the law deems important is
whether the consent was genuine (which it must if its interest is in preserving and
promoting sexual integrity) then it matters not whether the disingenuous consent arises
because of a knife to the throat or a context of systemic inequality and gendered sexual
violence in which many women have acculturated to what others might consider a
conservative sense of when it feels ‘safe’ to say no.136
A definition of consent that is in part based on acknowledgment of this context
reveals a conception of sexual violence that accounts for its social contingency. PostEwanchuk the concept of consent under the actus reus and mens rea is very different. In
identifying the actus reus the concept of consent is used in an attitudinal sense.137 It is
used to describe a state of mind – an unobservable feeling, sentiment or perspective about
the sexual interaction. In interpreting the mens rea for sexual assault, post-Ewanchuk, the
concept of consent is used in an expressive or communicative sense.138 The distinction in

time around it might be them initiating. While some of these circumstances might not be particularly
‘sexy’ they do not necessarily compromise sexual integrity. In all of them an interest is present and so
mutuality and thus sexual integrity is maintained. The need for mutuality to preserve sexual integrity
does not suggest that power imbalances necessarily vitiate consent. People with less (or different
kinds) of power can consent to people with more power and mutuality is still maintained. Mutuality is
destroyed where consent flows only as a result of power, whether perceived or real, whether exercised
or not. Nor should this be taken to suggest that mutuality is all that is needed to produce a community
of sexual actors capable of promoting the social good of sexuality. Mutuality will be needed in a
criminal law context in sexual interactions between two individuals. As will be demonstrated in
Chapter Eight, law’s role in promoting the social good of sexuality extends beyond simply recognizing
the need for mutuality.
136
Equally important is the principle that a just criminal legal system does not convict the morally
innocent. To be consistent with this principle, a sexual assault law concerned with sexual integrity and
therefore valuing genuine consent through a subjective definition of consent under the actus reus must
be certain to develop a mens rea requirement (i.e. an adequate mistaken belief in consent defence)
sufficient to ensure that the ‘morally innocent’ are not convicted. The assertion that Ewanchuk has not
threatened this principle will be addressed infra page 57.
137
Nathan Brett, “Sexual Offenses and Consent” (1998), 11 Can. J. Law. & Juris. 69 uses the term
“attitudinal consent” to characterize this understanding of the term.
138
This has also been described as a performative concept of consent (see Brett, “Sexual Offenses and
Consent”, ibid.). Brett advocates for the use of a performative concept of consent both in terms of
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how the term consent is understood in these two contexts reveals an attempt on the part of
the Court to recognize the contextual, socially contingent, gendered factors that constitute
consent to any sexual interaction. Employing an attitudinal concept of consent to define
the actus reus of the offence permits an analysis that acknowledges that (often gendered)
power dynamics short of overt (and therefore objectively ascertainable) coercion, are
nonetheless just as relevant to a determination of the authenticity of consent.139 By
rejecting the possibility of implied consent it also definitively draws the complainant’s
perspective into the legal definition of consent to sexual touching.140 Employing consent
as a communicative or expressive construct at the actus reus stage of analysis creates an
approach to sexual assault that recognizes these imbalances. A communicative
mens rea and actus reus. Justice Major rejects this suggestion outright in Ewanchuk stating that for the
purpose of establishing the actus reus of sexual assault the complainant’s state of mind is
determinative. The obvious critique of this suggestion arises in facts such as those found in Sansregret,
supra note 130 – circumstances in which the complainant did express consent – but did so under
duress or out of fear. Brett responds to this critique by arguing that coerced consent is not consent.
His response is lacking. In order to ascertain coerced consent one must rely on attitudinal consent. In
other words, to ascertain whether the performance was ‘real’ one must still assess the underlying state
of mind of the complainant. The less obvious the coercion the more salient attitudinal consent
becomes. Setting aside Brett’s suggestion for a performative concept of consent the only other option
that comes readily to mind would be an objective assessment of whether the complainant really did
agree to the sexual touching. It is difficult to see how this approach would avoid relying on
problematic assumptions about how people behave, or even worse ought to behave, in sexual
encounters.
139
Potential injustices to the accused that could arise from the approach adopted by the Court should
be safeguarded against by the subjective nature of the mens rea standard. (While section 273.2 of the
Criminal Code, supra note 35 does now incorporate an objective aspect into the defence of mistaken
belief in consent (which is in essence a denial of mens rea) it remains a subjective assessment – it
requires that an accused take reasonable steps, in the circumstances known to the accused at the time,
to ascertain consent. See the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in R. v. Darrach, (1998), 38 O.R.
(3d), aff’d (although not on this point) [2000] 2 SCR 443. While, as Justice L’Heureux-Dube notes in
Park, supra note 124, and Justice McLachlin notes in Esua, supra note 119, it is not often that a
genuine misunderstanding resulting in a sexual assault will occur, in those cases where it does it may
very well be that a complainant who articulated consent was sexually violated, but in a way which is
not criminally culpable.
140
See R. v. J.R. [2006] O.J. No. 2698 where the complainant had no recollection of the events and
could not say whether she had consented. She was able to testify that because she had, only a few days
earlier, had an abortion and the doctor had told her that she should not have sexual intercourse for a
certain period of time, and because she had no sexual interest in either of the two accused who had sex
with her while she was passed out on the bathroom floor of a Toronto hotel, she would not have
consented. Justice Ducharme found beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant did not consent.
His finding was based on her testimony regarding the abortion, doctor’s instructions and her lack of
sexual interest in either of the accused.
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understanding of consent at the actus reus stage acknowledges that consent to sex does
not mean the same thing to everyone, or even the same thing to anyone, in different
contexts; it shifts the salient interpretation to an interpretation of acts or words rather than
desires or natures. It ensures that all parties to the interaction are recognized by the law
as sexual actors.
Lise Gotell argues that in Ewanchuk, Justice Major’s reasoning was narrow, doctrinal
and decontextualized. 141 She suggest that his decision “located the importance of sexual
assault law on protection of individual autonomy and control over who touches one’s
body rather than equality based rationales”.142 She contrasts his reasoning with that of
Justice L’Heureux-Dube’s concurrence, suggesting Justice Major’s reasoning lacked the
contextualization and equality based rationales present in Justice L’Heureux-Dube’s
decision.
It is true that Justice L’Heureux-Dube’s concurrence in Ewanchuk is contextual in a
way that Justice Major’s is not. She begins by citing statistics revealing the gendered
nature of sexual violence and then continues by referencing the international Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.143 However, two
points should be made regarding Gotell’s critique.
First, Justice L’Heureux-Dube’s reasoning in Ewanchuk did not need to be as
“doctrinal” and “narrow”. She had already laid out her approach to the doctrine of
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Lise Gotell, “The Ideal Victim, the Hysterical Complainant, and the Disclosure of Confidential
Records: The Implications of the Charter for Sexual Assault Law” (2002) 40 Osgoode Hall L.J. 251.
For a similar critique see Hester Lessard, "Farce or Tragedy? Judicial Backlash and Justice McClung"
(1999) 10 Constitutional Forum 65.
142
Gotell, ibid.
143
Ewanchuk, supra note 29 at paras. 68-69. Indeed she says at para. 69 “[v]iolence is as much a
matter of equality as it is an offence against human dignity and a violation of human rights.”
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consent to sexual touching four years earlier in R. v. Park144 - an approach that the
majority in Ewanchuk adopted (as did Justice McLachlin, as she then was, in her
dissenting opinion two years earlier in R. v. Esau145).
Second, the doctrine developed by Justice L’Heureux-Dube in Park and adopted by
Justice Major in Ewanchuk, itself gives recognition to the gender based inequities present
in sexual violence and perhaps sexual interactions generally. Contextualization is
incorporated into the analytical framework of the doctrine itself. The doctrinal approach
developed by Justice L’Heureux Dube in Park (and adopted by Justice Major in
Ewanchuk) did not come from nowhere; it was informed by the contextualization - the
social factors – that she returns to in Ewanchuk.
In Park Justice L’Heureux-Dube gives recognition to the social factors that determine
how consent is understood in terms of defining both the actus reus and mens rea for
sexual assault. While her choice of language perhaps might be interpreted as suggesting
some ‘essential’ gendered element to the issue – she characterized the issue in part as a
gender gap in sexual communications – an examination of the theoretical source she
relied on in Park suggests that she did indeed adopted a constructivist conception of what
consent to sexual contact means; it is this conceptual framework that informs the
doctrinal analysis she developed and the Court as a whole ultimately adopted (in
Ewanchuk). Quoting R.D. Weiner she relied on the notion that:
Because both men and women are socialized to accept coercive sexuality as the
norm in sexual behavior, men often see extreme forms of this aggressive behavior
as seduction, rather than rape. A great many incidents women consider rape are,
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Supra note 124.
Supra note 119.
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in effect, considered “normal” by both male perpetrators and the male-dominated
legal system.146

It is a recognition of this social context which gives rise to the need for a purely
subjective standard of consent under the actus reus and a communicative notion of
consent under the mens rea.
Gotell also points out that post-Ewanchuk the analysis in sexual assault cases remains
at the level of the individuals involved in the case rather than at the systemic level in
which this social phenomena is produced.147 This is also true. However, it is difficult to
imagine how in the context of criminal law it could be otherwise. What is significant is
that the Court, in defining consent, in the context of individual cases – as they must do in
criminal law - did so based on a consideration of the social/contextual factors that help to
constitute what consent does and does not mean in a ‘system’ where sexual autonomy is
not distributed equally.
ii) The Response To Ewanchuk
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Park, supra note 125 at para. 40. To apply MacKinnon’s theory in its entirety would be to suggest
that women too (other than, of course, Catharine MacKinnon herself) also perceive many incidents of
rape as “normal”. Weiner’s quote is somewhat confusing on this point. In the first sentence she
suggests this is the case by stating that “both men and women are socialized to accept coercive
sexuality as the norm”. However she then contradicts this assertion in the next sentence by suggesting
that it is men and not men and women who experience this as normal. It may be possible to reconcile
these two sentences along with MacKinnon’s theory by understanding coercive sex in gradations. At
the lowest level of coercion it is only MacKinnon who sees that these acts are acts of sexual
dominance and aggression – her definition of rape. At the next level of coercion women but not men
understand certain acts of dominance or aggression as rape and it is only at the highest level of
coercion that men and the male dominated legal system understand and experience the acts as rape.
147
Gotell, supra note 141. One of Gotell’s main critiques of current sexual assault jurisprudence in
Canada is that it promotes an individualized, neo-liberal conception of sexual violence that tends to
obscure the systemic inequality that produces sexual violence and perpetuates the judicial system’s
mistreatment of rape victims. Her critique may be more accurate with respect to due process type legal
issues such as the use of prior sexual history and third party records, than it is with respect to the
substantive definitional elements of sexual assault law.
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Ewanchuk, which remains the leading precedent on the interpretation of consent in
the context of sexual assault, was a controversial decision148 and has been the subject of
some scholarly debate.149 Critics suggested that the Supreme Court of Canada had swung
the pendulum too far towards the ‘radical feminist agenda’ and away from the rights of
the accused. The sentiment underpinning this assertion is captured by the following
response to Justice L’Heureux-Dube’s Ewanchuk concurrence:
But just as he had no empirical evidence to support his view (if you discount all
of human history), she has no empirical evidence to say what she says (if you
discount Catharine MacKinnon's collected works) ... Madam Justice L'HeureuxDubé has shown an astounding insensitivity and an inability to conceive of any
concepts outside her own terms of reference and has thereby disgraced the
Supreme Court.150

This is a quote taken from lawyer Edward Greenspan’s letter to the National Post
reacting to Justice L’Heureux-Dube’s decision in Ewanchuk. Given his notation of
MacKinnon’s work presumably the ‘terms of reference’ to which he is referring relate to
MacKinnon’s power feminist conception of sexual violence. Certainly his nod to “all of
human history” demonstrates his own reliance on an essentialist conception of sexual
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Ewanchuk was controversial not simply for its doctrinal implications but also due to reactions stemming
from Justice L’Heureux-Dube’s concurring opinion responding to Justice McLung’s decision in the case at
the Alberta Court of Appeal (supra note 4). It is the former debate that will be the focus of this discussion.
For a discussion regarding the latter controversy surrounding Ewanchuk see Joanne Wright, “Consent and
Sexual Violence in Canadian Public Discourse : Reflections on Ewanchuk” (2001) 16 No. 2 Can J L&S
173; Constance Backhouse, “The Chilly Climate for Women Judges: Reflections on the Backlash from the
Ewanchuk Case” (2003) 15 Can. J. Women & L. 167; Hester Lessard, “Farce or Tragedy? Judicial
Backlash and Justice McClung" (1999) 10 Constitutional Forum 65; Edward L. Greenspan, "Judges Have
No Right to Be Bullies," National Post (2 March 1999) A18.
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See Christine Boyle, “Sexual Assault as Foreplay: Does Ewanchuk Apply to Spouses” (2004) 20 C.R.
(6th) 359; Lucinda Vandervort, “Honest Beliefs, Credible Lies, and Culpable Awareness: Rhetoric,
Inequality, and Mens Rea in Sexual Assault” (2004) 42 Osgoode Hall L.J. 625; Don Stuart, “Ewanchuk:
Asserting "No Means No" at the Expense of Fault and Proportionality Principles” (1999) 22 C.R. (5th) 39
[hereinafter “Ewanchuk: Asserting “No Means No”].
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Edward L. Greenspan, "Judges Have No Right to Be Bullies," National Post (2 March 1999) A18 as
cited in Constance Backhouse, “The Chilly Climate for Women Judges: Reflections on the
Backlash from the Ewanchuk Case” (2003) 15 Can. J. Women & L. 167.
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interactions (between men and women…). His concern seemed to be that Ewanchuk was
in tension, if not conflict, with the natural way of the (heterosexual) world.
Doctrinal critics of Ewanchuk articulated this same fear by suggesting that the
communicative definition of consent would lead to the criminalization of sexual
overtures151 – including between individuals in ongoing sexual relationships.152 One of
the central doctrinal issues raised by critics of Ewanchuk was a concern that it would not
sufficiently allow for the mistaken belief defence in cases involving ‘morally innocent’
accused engaged in typical sexual overtures153 or in cases where the accused and
complainant were in an ongoing sexual relationship at the time of the offence.
In order to ensure that the ‘morally innocent’ not be convicted of sexual assault,
the adoption of a subjective notion of consent under the actus reus analysis (in
conjunction with a communicative or performative notion of consent under the mens rea)
requires that there be a sufficiently robust defence of honest but mistaken belief in
consent.
However, a review of the reported decisions addressing the mistaken belief in
consent defence since Ewanchuk indicates that while sex may be complex,154 and while it
may well be difficult for courts to wade into the morass of ongoing sexual relationships,
judges do appear able to apply the more constructivist definition of consent adopted in
Ewanchuk in a manner which recognizes the complexity and diversity of sexual dynamics
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Stuart, “Ewanchuk: Asserting “No Means No”, supra note 149.
See for example Criminal Review.ca R v Ashlee (http://criminalreviewca/index.php/ 2006/08/24/ rv-ashlee accessed January 30, 2009); see also Justice Thomas’s decision in R. v. R.V., [2004] O.J. 849
(varied [2004] O.J. 5136 (C.A.) stating that in cases involving spouses the doctrine of implied consent
should still be considered; see R. v. Went, [2004] B.C.J. No. 190 where the British Columbia Supreme
Court also suggested this – but then went on to apply the principles of Ewanchuk regardless.
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Stuart, “Ewanchuk: Asserting “No Means No”, ibid.
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In “Ewanchuk: Asserting “No Means No”, ibid., Stuart cites several decisions recognizing the
“complex and diverse nature of consent” to sexual touching.
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without resulting in the sort of injustices to the accused that were once suggested by the
decision’s critics. The jurisprudence since Ewanchuk demonstrates that, despite fears to
the contrary, the art of seduction has not yet been criminalized in Canada. In fact, a
review of the post-Ewanchuk case law suggests that in cases involving allegations of
sexual assault by an accused against a long-term intimate partner, Ewanchuk has not
swung the pendulum far enough.
iii) Preserving The Art Of Seduction – A Kiss Is Still A Kiss
There were two main critiques regarding the doctrinal implications of the
Court’s decision in Ewanchuk. Both stemmed from the proposition that the Court’s
interpretation of consent would overly restrict the defence of mistaken belief in consent.
The first was the concern that Justice Major’s holding that assuming silence, or
ambiguous conduct means consent is a mistake of law, and therefore not a defence, would
result in the criminalization of harmless sexual overtures in ambiguous cases where “there
is a real issue of whether a sexual assault occurred”.155 This concern is well illustrated by
the hypothetical situations Professor Stuart suggested could problematically result in
conviction post-Ewanchuk:
Situation 1: Two teenagers, Jack and Jill, have their first date at the movies. After
the movies they go to Jack's apartment for coffee. They talk. Jill tells Jack that
she has a boyfriend but also that she is an open, friendly, and affectionate person;
and that she often likes to touch people. Jack tells her that he is an open, friendly,
and affectionate person; and that he often likes to touch people. They talk more.
They touch each other; they hug. At some point Jack kisses Jill. Jack thinks she
has responded positively to his sexual advance although nothing was said. Jill did
not welcome the kiss and felt she did nothing to encourage Jack. She was not
scared of him. She admits that at that point she opened two buttons of her blouse
but this was because she felt claustrophobic and nothing else. Jack felt he was
being encouraged by her action and touched her breasts. Jill slaps him.
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Situation 2: The same as situation 1, except that it was Jill who kissed Jack.156
The concern was that, in the first situation, post-Ewanchuk “since the complainant did not
communicate her consent to be kissed or for her breasts to be touched, it would appear
that the accused has no defence whatever he thought”.157 Additionally, “there could be no
defence of mistaken belief even in the second hypothetical since the opening of the blouse
was ambiguous conduct and belief that ambiguous conduct constitutes consent is a
mistake of law.”158 Critics suggested that if the Court’s proposition in Ewanchuk that the
presence of consent is determined solely on the subjective perspective of the complainant
and if mistaking silence, passivity or ambiguity for consent is a mistake of law and
therefore not a defence, an accused could be convicted of sexual assault simply for
pursuing a sexual encounter in a manner in which sexual encounters are quite commonly
pursued and innocently carried out. In other words, the Court will have criminalized
seduction in Canada.159
The decade worth of case law that has applied Ewanchuk in cases involving
claims of honest but mistaken belief in consent demonstrates that i) the types of
situations with which Ewanchuk’s critics were concerned have not actually been brought
before the courts; and ii) were a truly ambiguous situation of this nature to come before a
court a proper interpretation of Ewanchuk would not result in a conviction.160
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The following offers a hypothetical that much more aptly reflects the type of
ambiguous situations that have come before the courts in mistaken belief cases postEwanchuk:
Situation 1: Two teenagers, Jack and Jill, both attend a mutual friend’s house
party. Jill, an inexperienced drinker, consumes a great deal of alcohol. Jack also
consumes alcohol. As the party progresses, Jill becomes increasingly intoxicated
to the point where her friends take her upstairs and put her to bed in one of the
host’s bedrooms. Jill passes out. After the party has wound down, Jack heads
upstairs, finds Jill in bed and proceeds to roll her over, and remove her pants. As
Jack is pulling Jill’s pants down he notices Jill lift her hips slightly. Jack
interprets this as an indication of her willingness. Jack begins to fondle Jill’s
breasts and then her genitals. Jill fades in and out of consciousness as this is
occurring. At one point Jill moans. Jill awakens to find that Jack has inserted his
penis into Jill’s vagina. Jill immediately passes out again. Shortly thereafter Jack
ejaculates.
Situation 2: The same as situation 1 except, earlier in the evening before Jill
passes out, Jack and Jill flirt and Jill kisses Jack.

A remarkably high number of the post-Ewanchuk reported decisions involving
cases where a claim of mistaken belief in consent was denied closely resemble the factual
circumstances highlighted in the hypothetical situation just described.161 In fact, situations
quite similar to those I have just described constitute the most common factual
circumstances in all of the reported decisions where the mistaken belief defence is raised
and rejected.162 In these cases, the silence or passivity of the complainant stems from
unconsciousness not coyness or indecisiveness. ‘Ambiguity’ arises in these cases not
from a pubescent and gendered confusion over the complainant’s (lack of) sexual interest
161
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but rather from a sleeping or barely conscious complainant who moans163, rolls over164, or
lifts her hips slightly165 while the accused is disrobing, fondling or penetrating her. It is
not that critics of Ewanchuk suggested that denying the defence of mistaken belief in
consent in these types of cases posed a problem. However, the practical reality is that
these are the types of cases in which the principle in Ewanchuk that silence, passivity and
ambiguity do not connote consent has most commonly been applied.
The counter argument to this practical observation regarding the types of cases
that actually do come before the courts is that it does not matter whether the type of case
critics feared has yet come before the courts; the significance of the critique is established
simply by the possibility that an accused could be convicted without the degree of fault
required by fundamental criminal law principles. This counter argument raises the
second point demonstrated by the post-Ewanchuk cases. Under a proper interpretation of
Ewanchuk, were a truly ambiguous situation in which an accused relied on a
complainant’s conduct as an indication to proceed incrementally to come before the court,
it would not result in a conviction.
It may be that some of the concerns raised by critics of Ewanchuk involved a
misapprehension of the test established in Ewanchuk. As noted above, Professor Stuart
suggested that in his first hypothetical situation “since the complainant did not
communicate her consent to be kissed or for her breasts to be touched, it would appear
that the accused has no defence whatever he thought”.166 Ewanchuk does not require that
163
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the complainant communicated consent in order to allow the defence of honest but
mistaken belief in consent. To do so would remove entirely the subjective component of
the mens rea for sexual assault. Rather, Ewanchuk determined that in order to establish
the defence there must be evidence to lend an air of reality to the suggestion that the
accused believed that the complainant communicated consent.
The belief that consent was communicated can be based on the complainant’s
words or actions.167 Ewanchuk has not been taken to stand for the proposition that an
individual engaged in sexual activity with a genuinely consenting partner can never rely
on a kiss as evidence of an honest but mistaken belief that there had been an indication
for further, more involved kissing, or rely on further consensual kissing as evidence of a
belief that there was an indication of consent to intimate touching and so on.... In cases
where a complainant has consented to some sexual touching, courts have allowed the
accused to rely on this as evidence of a mistaken belief that consent to progress
(incrementally) was communicated. This is provided there was not some affirmative
indication that consent had been withdrawn or some other factor that the accused should
have reasonably known suggested the complainant was no longer consenting -which
would then require him to take further steps to ascertain consent. The concern that
Ewanchuk would result in the unjust conviction of an accused who has commenced
consensual sexual touching that unbeknownst to him at some point becomes unwanted
(but unexpressed) by the complainant has not been realized. In fact, in such
167
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circumstances courts have required evidence that the complainant indicated a withdrawal
of consent before rejecting the possibility of an honest but mistaken belief in consent.
Consider the case of R v Kuryluk, in which the Nova Scotia Supreme Court
acquitted the accused after finding that there was a reasonable doubt as to whether the
complainant had communicated her withdrawal of consent to further sexual activity.168 In
Kuryluk the complainant and the accused, former lovers, returned to the accused’s
apartment after having been re-acquainted at a bar. Once at the apartment the two
engaged in consensual kissing and fondling which then progressed to mutual oral sex and
then vaginal intercourse. After the oral sex, vaginal intercourse occurred. Kuryluk
testified that he believed the complainant consented to all activity short of ejaculation
during intercourse. The complainant testified that the mutual oral sex was not consensual
but that she had not indicated this to the accused and that she had said no to the vaginal
intercourse. The Court found that “[a]lthough his belief may have been mistaken, Mr.
Kuryluk's evidence that he believed the complainant consented to engage in the sexual
activity performed, albeit without ejaculation, supports the defence of honest but
mistaken belief”.169 The evidence raised “a reasonable doubt that lack of consent was
communicated to the accused with respect to any act other than accidental ejaculation,
which alone does not amount to a sexual assault”.170 There was conflicting evidence as to
whether the complainant said no to the intercourse. Justice Murphy found the accused
credible on this point.
Based on the consensual kissing, fondling and disrobing that preceded it, and her
testimony that she went along with it, Justice Murphy found that the evidence did not
168
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indicate that the oral sex was a sexual assault. In doing so he noted that the Crown had
acknowledged that the complainant did not communicate to the accused that she was not
consenting to oral sex.171
As noted above, the complainant’s evidence as to whether the oral sex was
consensual had been inconsistent. She initially told police it was consensual. On direct
examination she said she did not recall objecting to it, but then on cross-examination she
said it was not consensual. However, despite issues with her credibility it was the fact
that she had not communicated non-consent for the oral sex that Justice Murphy
highlighted.
In other words, Justice Murphy found that the consensual kissing, fondling, and
disrobing in conjunction with no indication by the complainant that she was no longer
consenting, could be relied upon by the accused as evidence to establish a mistaken belief
that the complainant had communicated consent to progress to oral sex.
In the Ontario Court of Justice decision in R v Anderson, the accused and the
complainant met in a bar where they hugged and kissed briefly. Justice Brophy found
that this was consensual hugging and kissing. 172 The accused and the complainant then
exited the bar and while outside continued kissing and touching. Justice Brophy found
that this too was consensual. The two then went around to the side of the building and
lowered themselves onto the ground where kissing and some fondling ensued. The Crown
conceded that the complainant consented to the initial kissing and hugging that occurred
171
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outside the bar. Justice Brophy acquitted on the basis that the Crown had not proven lack
of consent. He further held that even had the Crown established lack of consent beyond a
reasonable doubt the accused would have been entitled to rely on a mistaken belief in
consent. Justice Brophy stated that
if the complainant then changed her mind (which I find the Crown has not proven
beyond a reasonable doubt), there is obviously a transitional period where that
change of mind is going to have to be communicated in some fashion to the
accused. In that transitional period, it is quite possible for the accused to have
held an honest but mistaken belief that the complainant was still consenting to his
actions. I am of the view that the accused stopped his actions when it became
clear that the complainant wished to leave. At that point there was a message
being sent that she wished to stop and the accused did in fact end his sexual
advances.173

In the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia’s decision in R v MacIsaac the appellant’s
conviction for sexual assault was overturned on the basis that the trial judge had erred by
not considering the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent. 174 The appellant
testified at trial that he had visited the home of a woman with whom he was acquainted.
While there he hugged the complainant twice; the second time he followed the hug with a
brief kiss on the lips. The following day she made a complaint of sexual assault to the
police. The appellant testified that he did not ask permission to hug her or to kiss her.
Presumably given the trial verdict, the trial judge had made a finding of fact that the
complainant did not consent to the hug or kiss. On appeal Justice Edwards found that the
trial judge had failed to apply Ewanchuk and that the evidence clearly raised the defence
of honest but mistaken belief in consent. The evidence Justice Edwards was referring to
included the appellant’s testimony that after he put his arm around the complainant, as
they were walking to the door, she responded by putting her arms around him. It included
173
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the appellant’s evidence that when he hugged her she took her shoulders and titled them
forward, burying them into his chest. It included his evidence that the kiss on the lips
lasted approximately one second, that he did not use tongue and that when she broke off
the kiss and informed him she “didn’t want to go through with this” he did not engage in
any further overtures.175 Applying Ewanchuk, Justice Edwards found that the mistaken
belief in consent defence was available based on this evidence. A returned hug and a
tilting of the shoulders, regardless of what the complaint meant to communicate, was
sufficient evidence, if believed, to establish a mistaken belief that the complainant had
communicated consent for the kiss. That is to say, presuming his evidence was believed,
Mr. MacIsaac’s sexual overtures were not criminalized.
The key in cases of the type just discussed is the notion of incremental conduct
and the possibility of consent through words or conduct. Ewanchuk established that there
must be an affirmative unequivocal indication of consent to sexual touching. It
established that any adverse indication requires an accused to cease all sexual advances
until a clear and unequivocal affirmative indication is subsequently obtained. It also
established that “an unequivocal “yes” may be given by either the spoken word or by
conduct”.
In Anderson, provided the ‘transitional period’ was not unreasonable and
provided the accused did not escalate his sexual advances during the ‘transitional period’
(during which the complainant would have done nothing through words or actions to
indicate her consent for such escalation) it would seem that Justice Brophy’s reasoning
was consistent with Ewanchuk. Similarly in Kuryluk, setting aside the issue of
intercourse, and lack of consent to ejaculation and looking specifically at the Court’s
175
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analysis regarding the mistaken belief in consent defence as it would apply to the mutual
oral sex, it seems consistent with Ewanchuk to allow the accused (absent any indication
by the complainant to the contrary) to rely on the consensual mutual kissing as evidence
of a belief that the kissing communicated consent for fondling, on the consensual mutual
fondling as evidence of a belief that the fondling communicated consent for the disrobing,
and on the consensual mutual disrobing (in conjunction with all of the prior consensual
activity) as evidence of a mistaken belief that consent for the mutual oral sex had been
communicated.
In the great preponderance of cases dealing with claims of honest but mistaken
belief in consent between strangers and acquaintances the ‘ambiguities’ argued by the
defence stem from severely intoxicated complainants not crossed wires. Cases such as
Kuryluk, Anderson and MacIsaac demonstrate that where there is some legitimate
confusion stemming from the transition period between consensual sexual touching and
the lack of consent to incrementally progress to more involved sexual touching courts
have not applied Ewanchuk in a manner that unjustly denies the possibility of the defence.
iv) Mistaken Belief In Consent In Ongoing Sexual Relationships
Having dispensed with the apprehension that Ewanchuk would lead to the
criminalization of seduction, it is necessary to turn to the second main doctrinal concern
voiced by opponents of the decision. This was the suggestion that Ewanchuk, by
rejecting the doctrine of implied consent to sexual touching, would result in the unjust
conviction of accused who were involved in an on going sexual relationship with the
complainant at the time of the alleged offence. The concern was that the Ewanchuk
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reasoning would not give adequate recognition to the manner in which consent to sexual
interaction often occurs in the context of on going intimate relationships.
A review of the cases applying Ewanchuk in which an accused claims a mistaken
belief in consent in defence of sexual assault allegations made by a complainant with
whom he was involved in an on going sexual relationship demonstrate that this concern
also has not come to realization. In fact the post-Ewanchuk cases reveal that lower
courts are quite able to apply the communicative notion of consent adopted in Ewanchuk
in a manner that recognizes and accounts for both the fact that consent is often
communicated differently between long or longer term sexual partners than it is between
strangers or shorter term sexual partners as well as the diverse ways in which consent can
be communicated within the context of an ongoing sexual relationship. These cases
demonstrate that the communicative definition of consent can be properly applied in cases
involving intimate partners.
Unfortunately there are also lower cases indicating that if anything, the criminal
law, despite Ewanchuk, has failed to provide the same level of protection for sexual
autonomy inside intimate relationships as it does outside of them.176 As will be
discussed, the rejection of the doctrine of implied consent by the Supreme Court of
Canada has not been consistently applied by lower courts in cases involving spouses.
The paragraphs to follow will focus on three issues: i) the use of prior sexual
history in cases involving intimate partners; ii) cases where the couple had, or the accused
claims they had, a history of consensual sado-masochistic or ‘rough’ sex and; iii) cases
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where the sexual interaction arose in circumstances where the relationship was in
jeopardy.
a) Prior Sexual History In Cases of Sexual Assault Between Intimates
Many of the cases in which claims of mistaken belief in consent defences to
sexual assault charges in the context of on going relationships arise also involve
applications by the defence under section 276 of the Criminal Code to introduce the
couple’s prior sexual history. The first indication that those accused of sexually assaulting
an intimate partner will not be unjustly denied the mistaken belief in consent defence is
revealed by the courts’ liberal approach to the use of prior sexual history in these
circumstances.177
Justice McLachlin (as she then was) noted in R v Seaboyer that prior sexual history
between the complainant and the accused may be relevant to a claim of mistaken belief in
consent.178 To be admitted under section 276 of the Criminal Code the prior sexual
history must not be introduced as evidence that the complainant was more likely to
consent or as evidence of her credibility generally; in addition, it must have significant
probative value relevant to an issue at trial.179 In R v Darrach Justice Gonthier noted that
[t]o establish that the complainant's prior sexual activity is relevant to his
mistaken belief during the alleged assault, the accused must provide some
evidence of what he believed at the time of the alleged assault. This is necessary
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for the trial judge to be able to assess the relevance of the evidence in accordance
with the statute.180
In light of the definition of consent adopted in Ewanchuk, courts could have taken
a strict interpretive approach to the admission of prior sexual history in these cases by
finding that it will only have significant probative value where it is evidence of how
consent was communicated through words or conduct in the past. In fact some have
argued that such an approach may be a more appropriate interpretation of the interplay
between the requirements of section 276 and the mens rea definition of consent
established in Ewanchuk.181 However, courts have tended to interpret the relationship
between a mistaken belief in consent defence post-Ewanchuk and an application to
introduce evidence of a prior sexual history between the accused and the complainant
more liberally, such that the prior sexual history, provided it is recent,182 tends to be
admitted.183
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In R. v. Wilson for example the Court admitted evidence of prior sexual history
between the complainant and the accused as relevant to the defence of mistaken belief in
consent. It was admitted not to demonstrate his perception that consent had been
communicated prior to the alleged offence but simply to show that she had in the past
consented to ‘unusual sex’:
The sex alleged, as perceived by Mr. Wilson, involves the unusual feature of
bondage. Any consent to such sex would necessarily be an exceptional consent.
Whether Mr. Wilson had received such consent from Ms. C. previously would be
a factor in the consideration of evidence of such a perception. 184
Consider also the case of R. v. B.J.S.185 In B.J.S. the accused was charged with
sexually assaulting his wife.186 The accused testified that he believed his wife had given
him permission to touch her for the purpose of inspecting her fidelity based on a prior
incident that had occurred in 1987. The Alberta Provincial Court admitted the evidence
of the 1987 incident – presumably a prior inspection – on the basis that it was
significantly probative of his mistaken belief that he had permission nearly twenty years
later to again ‘inspect’ his wife. The evidence was as to the fact of the prior supposedly
consensual vaginal examination and not as to how consent for that examination was
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communicated nor as to why the fact of the prior sexual interaction evidenced his belief
that consent in the present circumstance was communicated.
b) Cases With A History of Consensual ‘Rough Sex’
In cases involving sexual assault charges between sexual intimates, the impact of
Ewanchuk does not seem to have resulted in a more restrictive approach to the admission
of prior sexual history between the accused and the complainant as evidence to establish
an honest but mistaken belief in consent. Moving forward then, has the ‘communicative’
definition of consent (and its corresponding rejection of the doctrine of implied consent)
adopted in Ewanchuk resulted in an approach to consent that fails to accommodate the
complexity and diversity of sexual communications between intimate partners? The
litmus test to answer this question might be found by examining how courts, postEwanchuk, have approached cases where the accused bases his mistaken belief in consent
on a prior sexual history between the accused and the complainant which featured
dominance and submission and in which sometimes ‘no’ genuinely did mean yes.
In fact, the communicative definition of consent found in Ewanchuk does not appear
to work any injustice to the accused in these types of cases. This is demonstrated by the
British Columbia Supreme Court’s appellate decision in R. v. Went.187
In Went the accused and the complainant had been in a healthy social and sexual
relationship for a number of years. The relationship frequently included “forceful sex”
and “insincere verbal exhortations” by the complainant to stop.188 Their sex play
included the accused “grabbing her hair during sex and gently pulling it, engaging in
activity which could be characterized as Mr. Went "taking" her, and the initiation of oral
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sex by one partner pushing the head of the other partner into the initiator's lap”.189 The
Court noted that:
…of some importance in this case and in their relationship, Ms. D. agreed that
she, from time to time, would say "no" or "don't" in relation to the initiation of
sexual contact by Mr. Went when she did not mean for him to stop. In this
context, she agreed that she enjoyed and was aroused by being "taken" in a sexual
way.190

The complainant testified that on all of these occasions “her use of the words "no", "stop"
or "don't" during sexual activity were preceded by a direct or subtle invitation to sexual
activity, such as hugs or flirtation”.191
The charges arose as a result of a sexual interaction that the accused conceded was
not consensual; his defence was that he mistakenly believed that she was consenting. On
the night of the incident the couple were watching a movie together on her couch. The
movie depicted a man having sex with a woman who had a plastic bag over her head.
The accused testified that the complainant said “see, she likes it”. The complainant
denied making this statement. The trial judge did not make a finding of fact as to whether
she made the statement. At some point the accused, as he had done in the past, put his
hand over the complainant’s mouth and nose to which she responded by saying
“don’t”.192 There was disagreement as to whether this was preceded by a hug. The trial
judge said he was unable to make a finding of fact on this point. The accused then
grabbed the back of her head and forced it into his lap to initiate oral sex – again as had
occurred in the past. Both parties agreed that she resisted all of this. The accused then
got on his knees in front of her and tried to remove her clothing. There was disagreement
189
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as to whether she assisted in the removal of her clothing by lifting her bottom. The trial
judge did not make a finding of fact on this point either. After this the accused attempted
to initiate sexual intercourse at which time, according to him, the complainant’s
protestations finally registered with him and he realized that she was actually not
consenting. There was as noted above, agreement that the complainant was not
consenting; thus the actus reus was established. The sole issue was as to the accused’s
claim of mistaken belief in consent. In other words, as to whether there was evidence he
could rely upon to establish a mistaken belief that she had communicated consent.
The British Columbia Supreme Court allowed the defence and overturned his
conviction because the trial judge had not made a finding of fact as to whether the
consensual hug, positive comment about the film or assistance with the removal of pants
had occurred. The benefit of the doubt of course goes to the accused. The accused then,
was permitted to rely on his evidence (of the hug, comment, and hip lifting) to allow the
mistaken belief in consent defence. Presumably given all of the other evidence, had the
trial judge made a finding of fact that the hug had not occurred, that complainant had not
made the comment about the film or lifted her hips the defence would not have been
allowed. There are two important points to be noted about this case. First, Justice
Koenigsberg based on his own reasons, despite his contestations to the contrary, did apply
the communicative definition of consent established in Ewanchuk. While Justice
Koenigsberg both misconstrued the definition of consent in Ewanchuk (by suggesting that
Ewanchuk precluded the possibility of relying upon ‘behavioral consent’193) and wrongly
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Ewanchuk did not, as was suggested in Went, hold that an accused could not rely on evidence of
‘behavioral consent’ to establish a mistaken belief in consent. The Court in Ewanchuk did not even
employ the term ‘behavioral consent’. They did, however, establish that it is evidence of a mistaken
belief that consent was communicated through words or actions that raises an air of reality to the
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suggested that Ewanchuk’s rejection of the doctrine of implied consent only applied in
cases involving strangers,194 he actually did go on to properly apply the analysis in
Ewanchuk and in doing so overturned the accused’s conviction.
Second, he did so in a manner that appeared to accommodate the very specific
sexual dynamics of the couple at issue in this case. Courts are able to make assessments
as to what constitutes ambiguity in a particular sexual context. It seems that both
common sense and the Ewanchuk analysis are able to distinguish between relying as an
indication of consent on the lifting of one’s hips by a barely conscious and severely
intoxicated acquaintance195 and the lifting of one’s hips by a sexual partner with whom
one has a history of ‘no means yes’ sex play.196
c) mistaken belief when intimate partners are ‘on the rocks’
The concern that Ewanchuk would unduly restrict an accused’s access to the
defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent in cases where the accused and the
complainant had been involved in an on going relationship has not been realized in postEwanchuk decisions. However, some post-Ewanchuk cases involving intimate partners
do indicate the possibility of a different problematic trend. This involves a failure on the
part of lower courts to consistently ascribe to the communicative notion of consent in

defence. Presumably, actions would cover whatever concept the court in Went intended by the term
‘behavioral consent’.
194
Supra note 187 at para. 22. In R. v. R.V. [2004] O.J. No. 5136 the Ontario Court of Appeal held
that the Ewanchuk analysis does apply in cases involving spouses. In doing so the Court in R.V.
explicitly overturned the trial judge’s holding that Ewanchuk did not apply to intimate partner cases.
195
See R. v. Cornejo, supra note 165.
196
Contrast the decision in Went with the outcome in R. v. J.A., [2008] O.J. No. 1583. In R. v. J.A the
accused was convicted of sexual assault after inserting a dildo into his partner’s anus while she was
unconscious. She had been rendered unconscious by the accused. The couple had on a number of
occasions engaged in ‘breath play’ where one partner chokes the other to the point of unconsciousness.
Anal penetration had not in the past been a part of their sexual activities. Justice Nicholas convicted on the
basis that there is no defence of implied consent and, because the anal penetration was initiated while the
complainant was unconscious, it was not possible for her to have communicated consent. There was thus
no evidence possible of establishing consent or a mistaken belief in consent.
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cases involving sexual assault allegations between long term intimate partners – more
specifically, in cases where the accused’s actions appear to be motivated by a desperate
attempt to ‘win back’ or ‘re-claim’ his partner.
In R. v. T.V. the accused and the complainant had been married for several
years.197 The complainant wanted to terminate the marriage. In addition to the charge of
sexual assault, for which he was acquitted, the accused was also charged with several
other offences including assault (for which he was convicted). The complainant had had
an affair that according to Justice Baldwin had left the accused “devastated”, “heart
broken” and “angry” but still wanting to continue the marriage.198
According to Justice Baldwin “[w]hat occurred between the parties during the
time period in question is a tale of betrayal and revenge”;199 according to the complainant
what occurred between the parties was a tale of violence, threats, sexual extortion and
sexual assault.
The incident from which the charge of sexual assault stemmed occurred on the
couple’s 16th engagement anniversary. The complainant testified that the sexual touching
was not consensual. She testified that she repeatedly said no, that she told the accused to
get off of her and that he ignored her protests. The accused did not testify. His defence
was that the sexual interaction was consensual or that he had a mistaken belief that it was
consensual. The judge did not advert to any evidence that the accused could rely on to
establish his belief that consent was communicated – in fact quite the opposite. However
despite this, he found that there was an air of reality to the defence and ultimately
acquitted on this basis. He argued that this case was nothing like Ewanchuk because the
197

[2006] O.J. No. 4089.
Ibid. at para. 17.
199
Ibid. at para. 19
198

218

couple here had been “sexually communicating” for years. Taking Justice L’HeureuxDube’s comment that there was nothing romantic about Ewanchuk’s actions out of
context, and distinguishing on the basis of it, Justice Baldwin noted that
the accused was desperately trying to save the marriage. It was their engagement
anniversary and he had sent his wife flowers at work which she gave away to the
cleaning lady. He E-mailed her to come home so that they could have a special
dinner. She did not come home for dinner. He was trying to engage his wife
romantically throughout the day.200

Despite his finding of fact that the complainant said she did not want to have
sex201, and despite there being no evidence that she communicated anything other than an
explicit lack of consent, Justice Baldwin acquitted on the basis that “the evidence here
established that the complainant submitted or did not resist to the sexual activity in
question because she was “tired” and “tiredness does not vitiate consent”. In doing so he
made an error of law. He put the cart before the horse. While tiredness may not vitiate
consent, submission and a failure to resist do not constitute consent.202
Finding that the accused just “wanted to show her how much he loved her” Justice
Baldwin noted that “although the complainant did not verbally agree to participate in the
sexual activity, her protestations to “let me go” [made while the accused "lightly pinned
her wrists to the side and slowly moved her PJ top up”203] can be understood to mean let
me go from this marriage.” To suggest that Justice Baldwin’s analysis stretches the
imagination is to understate the situation.
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In R. v. D.M., another case that involved an intimate couple, the Ontario Court of
Justice did acknowledge that Ewanchuk was binding authority on the issue of consent.204
However despite this, the Court’s reasoning suggests an implicit rejection of Ewanchuk –
an implied implied consent.
In R. v. D.M. the accused was acquitted of sexually assaulting his girlfriend of two
years. A few minutes prior to the sexual touching from which the charges stemmed, the
accused had been advised by the complainant that she had been having sex with his
roommate. The incident started when the complainant entered his bedroom and lay on
the bed. He was upset and almost crying and began to rub the complainant’s stomach.
He then proceeded to touch her vagina. At this point she grabbed his wrist and tried to
pull his hand away. She was unable to do so. He penetrated her digitally and although
she told him to stop, he continued. Next she yelled (or screamed) at him to stop. From
here their evidence differed. He said he stopped at this point. She said he did not stop and
that she continued to yell and scream and it was only after she pried his fingers out of her
and fell off the bed that he stopped. The yelling and screaming was sufficiently loud that
the next door neighbors called the police.
Justice Tetley cited Ewanchuk and noted that “speculation by the accused as to
what the complainant may be thinking does not provide the accused with a defence. The
accused must believe that the complainant effectively said, "Yes" through her words or a
combination of her words and her actions.”205 Despite acknowledging this point of law,
and despite that, even on the accused’s own testimony, he continued the sexual touching
at least until after the first time and up until the second time that the complainant had told
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him to stop, the accused was acquitted on the basis of an honest but mistaken belief in
consent. The evidence the Court relied on in order to establish an air of reality to the
accused’s belief that she had communicated consent was the fact that “on at least one
prior occasion during an act of sexual intercourse the complainant had uttered the word
"no", which had meant she was uncomfortable and was requesting a change of position.”
In terms of evidence capable of supporting the honesty and reasonableness of his
belief that her screams (screams loud enough to cause the neighbors to call the police)
during this incident were the same as her ‘uttering the word no’ so that the accused might
change position during a previous sexual encounter, the Court relied on the following: the
fact that the complainant proposed to sleep in his bed; the accused’s calm demeanor both
pre and post incident despite having just discovered that his girlfriend had slept with his
best friend; the fact that he calmly tried to kiss and hug the complainant after the incident;
and his lack of sophistication on the stand.
One cannot help noting that in both R. v. T.V. and R. v. D.M. the female
complainants had engaged in sex outside of the relationship and that in both cases the
judges made more than passing reference to these women’s infidelities and empathized
with how difficult this must be for the accused.
In R. v. C.M.M the Nova Scotia Provincial Court found an accused whom had
broken into his estranged wife’s house, found a gun and threatened her with it before
putting it away (after it had accidently been fired) and having intercourse with her had an
honest but mistaken belief she was consenting.206 The Court found that the accused
entered the house intending only to let his wife know how he felt, that he found the gun
after he arrived, and that he intended only to scare her with it. The gun went off
206
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accidentally and he laid it aside immediately. Despite finding that the accused intended
to scare his wife with the gun, the Court determined that in the accused’s mind, this was
not a factor in the sexual assault. He found that the accused’s wife had led him to believe,
by her words and conduct, that she was consenting to the sexual intercourse.
It may be that it is trial judges in particular who are less willing to recognize that
the doctrine of implied consent to sexual interactions no longer exists, even as between
spouses. In addition to the two cases just discussed – which were not appealed – trial
judges in R. v. MacFie and R. v. R.V. refused to, or failed to, apply Ewanchuk.
The trial judge in R. v. R.V., in acquitting the accused husband, ignored
Ewanchuk.207 He held that as between husbands and wives an implied doctrine of
consent to sexual touching exists and that even proof that the wife said no and the
husband knew she said no was not sufficient to establish guilt.208 “I am of the view that
were a viable marital relationship exists, then it is not enough for the Crown to simply
prove that the sexual conduct took place without the stated consent of the other party in
order to secure a conviction for sexual assault by one marital partner against the other.”209
The trial judge in R. v. MacFie also found that an ex-husband who violently
abducted his estranged wife and had sexual intercourse with her in the back of his van in
a deserted gravel pit had a mistaken belief that she was consenting.210 The acquittal was
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set-aside on appeal on the basis that there is no air of reality to a kidnapper’s claim to
have honestly believed his hostage was consenting to the sexual assault.
Recall that the trial judge in R. v. Went also stated that the Ewanchuk standard
should be applied only between strangers and not intimates (although he went on to apply
an analysis which did properly Ewanchuk).
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Ewanchuk engendered a great deal of
controversy, some of it stemming from the concern that the communicative notion of
consent adopted by the Court would unjustly deny the defence of honest but mistaken
belief in consent to certain accused. In particular there was concern for those whose
harmless sexual overtures were, unbeknownst to them, unrequited. There was also
concern that the Court’s explicit rejection of the doctrine of implied consent could not
justly be applied to husbands and boyfriends charged with sexual assault.
A review of the reported cases, since 1998, in which the mistaken belief in
consent defence arose demonstrates that cases with the types of ambiguity envisaged by
Ewanchuk’s critics have not come before the courts. The cases also demonstrate that the
Ewanchuk analysis, properly interpreted, does not unreasonably constrain the progression
of intimate behavior between genuinely consenting adults, and that where a legitimate
confusion exists courts appear able to apply a communicative concept of consent that can
accommodate the diversity and specificity with which sexual interactions tend to occur.
Less promisingly, decisions in cases such as R. v. T.V.,211 R. v. R.V.,212 R. v. D.M.,213 R. v.
C.M.M.214 and R. v. MacFie215 suggest that in cases involving intimate partners or
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spouses, trial judges may be more willing to resort to reasoning that wrongly relies on the
assertion that as between spouses the doctrine of implied consent still exists. In other
words they continue to rely on a problematic understanding of sexual assault that fails to
incorporate the perspectives of up to one half of the sexual actors involved in any given
interaction.
Ewanchuk, it seems, has done much to achieve better respect from the law for the
sexual integrity of the intoxicated party-goer.216 The trial decisions discussed in the last
section suggest Ewanchuk has been less able to achieve this with respect to the sexual
integrity of wives and girlfriends.
Conclusion
This chapter demonstrated how in the context of sexual assault, the Supreme Court of
Canada has adopted reasoning which reflects a more constructivist conception of sexual
violence. This is not to suggest that essentialist thinking has been eradicated from sexual
assault law. Nor is it to suggest that the Court has now adopted a conception of sex and
sexuality divorced from hetero normative and romanticized notions about sexuality.217
However, while the shift towards a more constructivist conception of consent and
mistaken belief in consent cannot be expected to (and has not) eradicated from the case
law all remnants of essentialist reasoning, it has certainly done a great deal to replace and
subvert many of the essentialist beliefs underpinning what the Court has elected to
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describe as the ‘myths and stereotypes’ underpinning legal (and social) conceptions
regarding sexual violence.218
One of MacKinnon’s claims was that “rape is a sex crime that is not a crime when it
looks like sex."219 This argument was based on the assertion that “what the law does not
recognize is that the injury of rape is in the meaning of the experience to the victim, yet
the crime is defined in the meaning of the act to the attacker.”220 The interpretation of the
definition of sexual assault under Chase suggests that, in Canada, the law now does
recognize that the injury of rape is in the meaning of the experience to the victim.221 In
addition, the doctrine of consent adopted in Ewanchuk establishes that where the
attacker’s perception is considered (as it must be under the mens rea analysis) it is not the
meaning of the act to the attacker, but rather the meaning of the complainant’s words or
actions to the attacker that is relevant.
Together these two doctrinal developments in the law of sexual assault, by
incorporating a conception of sexual violence which takes its meaning from the social
factors, circumstances and overall context in which it is situated, introduce a shift in the
law’s moral focus away from sexual propriety and towards sexual integrity. Notably the
Supreme Court of Canada’s more recent approach to the definition of obscenity and
indecency indicates this same move towards a constructivist conception of sexual
218
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violence and the corresponding shift in the law from a concern over sexual propriety and
sexual acts to a concern with sexual integrity and sexual actors. This will be the focus of
the next chapter.

226

Chapter 5 – A Moral Shift
“Of woman as a real human being, with sexual needs and sexual responsibilities, morality
has often known nothing.”1 Havelock Ellis

The previous chapters demonstrated that the Court’s predominant view of sexuality –
whether it be in sexual harassment cases, similar fact evidence cases, section 15 claims,
or the criminalization of child pornography – is an essentialist understanding of sexuality.
It is a conception of sexuality as a pre-social product more of mother nature than of
culture, knowledge, relationships and social institutions. However, Chapter Four also
revealed that with respect to one issue the Court (and lower courts) have begun to adopt a
more constructivist approach to sexuality. That is the issue of sexual violence. This
chapter will further explore the Court’s constructivist approach to sexual violence. It will
reveal how the Court, in defining obscenity and indecency has shifted towards a
conception of sexual violence as socially contingent. It will suggest that, as is the case
with aspects of sexual assault law, this new constructivist approach (again an approach
advanced by power feminist theories) precipitated a shift on the part of the Court from a
conception of sexuality that reflected a moral concern over sexual acts to one that reflects
a moral concern over sexual actors.
I.

The Intersection Of Law And Sexual Morality
For a very long time the law and ‘sexual morality’ consorted with one another

unabashedly. Their bond, pervasive throughout all areas of law that touch upon human
relationships, was particularly evident in legal contexts such as the regulation of
obscenity and indecency, the regulation of non-marital and non-procreative sexual
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Havelock Ellis, Little Essays of Love and Virtue, (A. & C. Black, LTD: Soho Square, London, 1922).
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activity and prohibitions on the commodification of sex. And when law and sexual
morality consort, naturalistic, essentialist understandings of sexuality are almost always
there, lurking under the bedcovers.2
But what does it mean to suggest that law and sexual morality have danced
together throughout the years? Does it means that the law will have embraced, and will
be invested in maintaining a status quo account of sexuality? This has likely been the
case in Canada and the discussion in Chapter Three demonstrates that the particular
account embraced by the law is an essentialist account. Does it mean that those who are
overly sexualized, under sexualized, restricted, violated or ignored within a given sexual
morality will be less likely to see their sexual integrity or sexual realities reflected back to
them in the laws that govern their sexual conduct? As described in Chapter Three and
Chapter Four, this too has been the case in Canada. Does it mean that laws will likely be
geared towards protecting sex itself (or more specifically a particular essentialist
understanding of sexual acts) rather than the individuals, relationships, rights, and duties
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The case law between 1958 and 1968 interpreting the offence of gross indecency (which was removed
from the Criminal Code in 1987 (see An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Canada Evidence Act,
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and natural. (See Regina v. J., [1957] A.J. No. 78 at para. 20).
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implicated in, and through which is produced, this aspect of ‘being’ human/human
‘being’? The discussion below will demonstrate that this has also been the case in
Canada.
The difficulty with much of the jurisprudence where the moral focus is on sex
itself – whether that be in the context of sexual assault or equality or obscenity and
indecency or sex work - is that it inhibits the law’s ability to accommodate in its analysis
the nuance, fluidity and complexity of human sexual interaction and sexual identity much
less recognize how these interactions produce sexual identities, norms and practices and
the institutions that regulate them. (This includes a failure to recognize the perspectives of
all of the sexual actors engaged, the diversity of sexual actors in a society, the manner in
which a society produces that sexual diversity and the manner in which that diversity in
turn impacts a society.) It is less apt to accommodate individual sexual narratives, likely
because sexual stories are so often very complicated and socially nuanced. Moralistic
legal approaches focused on sex itself do not incorporate this social nuance because they
do not conceptualize sexuality as socially constructed – instead sex is conceptualized as
this naturally occurring and asocial or pre-social ‘thing’ either to be feared or revered. It
is either dangerous and must be controlled or it is sacred and must be cherished or
released, but regardless it is something beyond, outside of or separate from the
individuals and social contexts in which it is experienced.
But are these the only stories that can be told about the relationship between law
and sexual morality?
Morality will always play a role in the legal regulation of sex. To make legal
distinctions about sex is to make judgments between good sex and bad sex. Making
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judgments about sex, unless they are arbitrary, is an exercise of morality. But there are as
many sexual moralities in a society as there are people and while the law cannot attempt
to reflect all of them, it can attempt to reflect the fact of all of them. In fact, recognition
of this plurality could itself constitute the founding principles of a morality. A morality
of this sort, unlike the one which has traditionally underpinned the legal regulation of sex
in Canada, would not be driven to perpetuate one particular account of sexuality – a (sex)
drive which has often led the law to protect sex itself rather than those subject to the law’s
sexual prohibitions and privileges. There is nothing to suggest that the legal regulation of
sex must be driven by a morality underpinned by essentialist thinking and based on the
preservation of sex itself.
But then what sort of morality ought the law to adopt? How can the law make
distinctions between good sex and bad sex without a static and universal account of what
sex is? One possibility is to develop an approach that is grounded in political morality.
This might be achieved by adopting a legal approach to sexuality that focuses on the
actors, relationships, and cultures that produce and are produced by sexuality rather than
on sex itself.
In fact, just such an approach is developing in the relationship between law,
sexuality and morality in Canada. This chapter will demonstrate how the Court’s social
constructivist understanding of sexual violence has precipitated a shift in the law’s moral
approach from one concerned primarily with protecting and regulating sex itself to one
concerned with sexual relationships and sexual actors – a development which creates
greater possibility for the protection of the sexual integrity (rather than sexual morality)
as a common interest.
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The remainder of this chapter will be divided into three sections. The first part
will briefly outline the more recent history of one aspect of the relationship of law and
sexual morality in Canada; it will examine the evolution of obscenity and indecency laws
in Canada. This will be followed by a discussion illustrating how the Court’s more
constructivist understanding of sexual violence developed in R. v. Butler3 has led in
recent cases to a shift in the law’s focus from a moral concern with sex itself to a moral
concern with sexual actors and relationships. This shift began with the incorporation of
power feminist ideals in the 1990s and culminated in the Court’s decision in R. v.
Labaye,4 where the definition of indecency was interpreted such that the law’s post-Butler
indirect reliance on sexual morality was replaced with a reliance on political morality.
The final section will examine what impact an emphasis on political morality rather than
sexual morality ought to have on the legal regulation of sex work in Canada.
II. The Social Construction Of Pornography In Canada
If one had to identify one of the single most hotly debated, politically charged and,
for power feminists such as MacKinnon, directly targeted sites of legal contestation for
feminists in the 1990s it would be the issue of pornography.5 “It was prostitution that
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Journal of Women’s History 17(1) 38.) The intersectionality of classism, racism, sexism and heterosexism
with moral majoritarianism is not a novel concept. If one considers the way in which classist and racist
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epitomized the problem of the dual standard of morality and the abuse of women…in the
last century. In the late twentieth century pornography has come to fill this role. For
many feminists pornography is regarded as the very essence of patriarchy, indeed it is
theorized as the mainstay of male power and female subjugation.”6 Carol Smart divides
anti-porn feminists of the 1980s and 1990s into two categories – those with the
‘pornography as violence’ perspective and those with ‘the pornography as representation’
perspective. She does so with the self-conscious admission that such a division does not
really encompass the complexity and diversity of feminist positions against pornography.7
The first category sees pornography as “a practice of male power over women”.8
Catharine MacKinnon’s work would be characterized as falling into this first category.9
In Only Words MacKinnon argues that pornography is not speech but rather an act of
sexual violence against women (and that as such it should not receive constitutional
protection under freedom of speech guarantees).10 In other words, pornography, she

attitudes tend to dehumanize and correspondingly animalize those that are ‘other’, it is unsurprising to
observe that such attitudes are also consistent with one particularly constricted view of sexuality. This
view, which Jeffrey Weeks suggests was the dominant model of sexuality in the 1960s for example,
understands sexuality as an essentialist (rather than socially constructed) force of nature, often
uncontrollable, which like a head of steam is either to be released or repressed depending upon which end
of the political spectrum one happens to reside. Jeffrey Weeks, The World We Have Won, (Routledge: New
York, 2007), Chpt. 2
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suggests, is itself a sex act; “pornography is no less an act than the rape and torture it
represents.”11 The extreme articulation of this position is summarized by Robin
Morgan’s quote “Pornography is the theory; rape is the practice”.12
The second category – pornography as representation – does not approach
pornography as itself an act of violence but rather as a “metaphor for a patriarchal
society”.13 Regardless, Smart tells us, both agree that “pornography eroticizes domination
and power differentiation” and that this is harmful to women.14
The first approach, the assertion that pornography is itself a practice of subordination
that constitutes sexuality (and correspondingly gender) is, in terms of constructivist
accounts, the more radical approach. Again, as is the case with sexual assault
jurisprudence, interestingly it is this more radical approach that seems to better
characterize the theoretical underpinnings of the Court’s approach to obscenity and
indecency in R v. Butler.
The Court’s decision in R v. Butler initiated a shift towards a constructivist conception
of pornography in which the law’s moral focus is on sexual integrity rather than sexual
propriety.15 In Butler the Court determined that material will be obscene where it

influenced by LEAF’s (and correspondingly MacKinnon’s) argument, it does not go so far as to determine
that pornography is violence and not expressive activity.
11
MacKinnon, Only Words, supra note 8 at 29
12
“Theory and Practice: Pornography and Rape” in Going Too Far: The Personal Chronicle of a Feminist
(Random House: New York, 1978) at 139.
13
Smart, Feminism and The Power of Law, supra note 5 at 117.
14
Ibid. at 117. It should be noted that there was/is another ‘camp’ of feminists on the pornography issue.
This other camp of feminists “resisted this characterization of pornography as exclusively a source of
danger and subordination” (see Bad Attitude/s. supra note 4 at 22). A well known advocate of this position
was Carol Vance, who argued that it is important not to ignore the presence and role of pleasure in women’s
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constitutes the ‘undue exploitation of sex’. The Court in Butler divided sexually explicit
material into three categories: i) material which depicts explicit sex with violence – this
material will almost always be characterized as the undue exploitation of sex; ii) material
which depicts explicit sex that is non-violent but which is degrading or dehumanizing –
this material will be characterized as the undue exploitation of sex if the material creates a
substantial risk of harm; and iii) material which depicts explicit sex without violence and
that isn’t degrading or dehumanizing – this material generally won’t be obscene unless it
employs children in its production.16 Under Butler, determining whether material
‘unduly’ exploits sex depended upon the degree of harm posed by the material as dictated
by the ‘community standards of tolerance’. Whether the community standards of
tolerance test is still applicable in obscenity cases is unclear. As will be discussed below,
the Court in Labaye rejected the community standard of tolerance test in favour of a harm
based approach premised on constitutional principles such as autonomy and equality.
However, Labaye involved the definition of indecency not obscenity. While obscenity
and indecency have traditionally been defined under the same test,17 whether the Supreme
Court’s definition in Labaye also applies in the context of obscenity is yet to be explicitly
confirmed.
The notion of harm has in one sense or another always been a part of the law
criminalizing obscene depictions.18 While in earlier cases this notion took different forms,
such as a general sense of the need to protect from harm the moral integrity of a society as
16
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a whole, in Butler the notion of harm assumed a new meaning and a new role in the
definition of obscenity. Butler established that the notion of harm was to be incorporated
directly into the community standard of tolerance.19 “The courts must determine as best
they can what the community would tolerate others being exposed to on the basis of the
degree of harm that may flow from such exposure.”20 In other words, what the
community would tolerate others doing or seeing was to be determined based on how
much harm an act or sexually explicit depiction posed.
However it was not simply that degree of harm (as tolerated by the community) was
to be the ultimate arbiter in defining obscenity. Butler also represented a shift in the
Court’s understanding of the type of harm that obscenity laws were, or ought to be,
concerned with. The Court in Butler found that the harms caused by pornography and the
harms that obscenity laws ought to be concerned with related not to issues of morality but
to real harm to women. This was not the first time that the Court recognized that moral
approbation regarding ‘dirt for dirt’s sake’ was not the proper impetus for the law. In
Towne Cinema, Chief Justice Dickson found that “it is harm to society from undue
exploitation that is aimed at by the section, not simply lapses in propriety or good taste.”21
However, there was something new in the way that Butler conceptualized this harm to
society. First, the Court recognized the potential harm as a systemic harm caused
primarily to women. Second, for the first time they began to conceptualize it as the
physical, sexual and arguably social harm caused to women as a result of the behavioral
and attitudinal changes induced in those individuals who viewed certain types of
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pornography. Butler might be pointed to in this sense as an indirect recognition of sexual
integrity as a common good.
The Court in Butler adopted a harm-based justification for the censorship of some
pornography by adopting the presumption that “exposure to images bears a casual
relationship to changes in attitudes and beliefs”.22 They found that it was not
unreasonable for Parliament to conclude that certain types of pornography will harm
society by altering the sexual attitudes and ultimately sexual behavior of those who view
it. Justice Sopinka in Butler quoted with approval from the Meese Commission Report
on pornography:
the available evidence strongly supports the hypothesis that substantial
exposure to sexually violent materials as described here bears a casual
relationship to antisocial acts of sexual violence and, for some subgroups,
possibly to unlawful acts of sexual violence…. The evidence says simply
that the images that people are exposed to bears a causal relationship to
their behavior (emphasis added).23

The harm based justification for the criminal law definition of obscenity adopted by the
Court in Butler reflects a conception of sexuality as socially constructed and mutable.24
The reasoning in Butler relies on the assumption that a desire for sexual violence, or an
orientation towards sexual violence is not innate and pre-social but rather is susceptible to
external influences – in other words, it is socially contingent.
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The shift in Butler in the Court’s approach to the harms caused by pornography was
clearly influenced by the power feminist analysis of pornography offered by the
intervener LEAF.25 LEAF argued that sexual violence, as depicted in pornography,
constitutes the practice of sex discrimination. Their argument was founded on
MacKinnon’s assertion, discussed in the previous chapter, that inequality between men
and women is eroticized - that the gender hierarchy between men is a consequence of the
eroticization of sexual violence. Pornography depicts sexual violence as enjoyable and as
the norm …as natural. It is depicted as what women want, what women do and
consequently what it is to be a woman.26
According to MacKinnon, pornography depicts sexual pleasure for women as the act
of submission; it depicts sexual pleasure for men as the act of domination. In turn, these
depictions socially construct conceptions of gender. Not only do women understand sex
as domination but these portrayals reinforce that what it is to be a woman is to be sexually
dominated and what it is to be a man is to sexually dominate. “In pornography the
violence is the sex. The inequality is the sex. Pornography does not work sexually
without hierarchy. If there is no inequality, no violation, no dominance, no force, there is
no sexual arousal.”27 MacKinnon argued that pornographic depictions institutionalize
this gender hierarchy. Pornography “institutionalizes the sexuality of male supremacy,
fusing the eroticization of dominance and submission with the social construction of male
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and female.”28 As such, to legalize pornography is to legalize the subordination of
women.29
MacKinnon’s theory is structural. There is nothing in her theory itself to suggest that
a man who views violent pornography will change his sexual attitudes (that was the
Court’s interpretation of LEAF’s submissions as influenced by MacKinnon’s theory).
However, that being said, one would assume that MacKinnon’s legal activism advocating
for the prohibition of pornography must have been motivated by some hope for at least
the possibility of change. She must have assumed the possibility that if male sexual
violence was no longer ‘naturalized’ through pornographic depictions then women would
at some future point stop experiencing sexual dominance as pleasurable and ultimately
conceptions of what it is to be a woman (and a man) would change. This must have been
the impetus behind MacKinnon’s legal advocacy in this area, as well as her invocation
that women begin consciousness raising.30
After Butler the Supreme Court of Canada’s next significant statement on adult
pornography came in 2001 in the case of Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada
(Minister of Justice).31 Little Sisters involved a constitutional challenge by a queer
bookstore that was discriminated against by Custom’s Officials who consistently detained
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materials that the bookstore tried to import.32 Little Sisters argued, among other things,
that due to the unique role that pornography plays in the gay and lesbian community the
Butler definition of obscenity as applied to gay and lesbian pornography violates section
15 of the Charter – that it discriminates on the grounds of sexual orientation. Justice
Binnie, in rejecting this argument stated that:
The potential of harm and a same-sex depiction are not necessarily
mutually exclusive. Portrayal of a dominatrix engaged in the nonviolent degradation of an ostensibly willing sex slave is no less
dehumanizing if the victim happens to be of the same sex, and no less
(and no more) harmful in its reassurance to the viewer that the victim
finds such conduct both normal and pleasurable. Parliament’s concern
was with behavioural (sic) changes in the voyeur that are potentially
harmful in ways or to an extent that the community is not prepared to
tolerate. There is no reason to restrict that concern to the heterosexual
community.33

It would seem then that while same sex object choice may be conceptualized by the Court
as a fixed and immutable sexual orientation,34 in the Court’s view a proclivity for coercive
or violent sex is as socially contingent among gay and lesbian individuals as it is with
respect to their straight counterparts.35
It is noteworthy to compare the way in which the obscenity and indecency cases
reveal the same shift from a concern over sexual propriety and sexual acts to a concern
with sexual integrity and sexual interactions as was revealed in the Court’s sexual assault
jurisprudence in the previous chapter. This is best accomplished by examining the
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Court’s application and eventual revision of the Butler test in the indecency cases that
came after Butler.
III.

Re-Defining Indecency – A Standard Of Tolerance For The Community

A different version of pages 239 to 255 was previously published in (2009) 54 McGill Law Journal 3.

In 2005, the Supreme Court of Canada revised the meaning of indecency (and
correspondingly, perhaps also obscenity) under the Criminal Code.36 They did so by
removing from its definition any reliance on community perceptions about sex, a
consideration that had, in a variety of manifestations, underpinned indecency and
obscenity laws in Canada for the better part of the last one hundred years. Removing the
community’s perceptions regarding what constitutes good sex and what constitutes bad
sex from the definition of indecency meant that harm had to be identified in some other
way.
In Labaye, Chief Justice McLachlin writing for the majority turned to
constitutional principles to do so; she reasoned that for sexual activity to be considered
indecent under the criminal law, the harm which it is alleged to have caused must be harm
which is actually proven, whether that be through expert evidence or otherwise.37 This is
a change in the law, a change with potentially significant implications regarding the role
that sexual morality is to play in the criminal regulation of certain types of sexual activity.
The Court’s reasoning in Labaye reinforces the notion that the focus of laws
regulating sexuality should not be on sexual morality and moral harm to society but rather
on political morality and real harm to individuals. In doing so it leaves more space for
considerations, under the law, of sexual agency, and allows for greater consideration of
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individual subjectivities. This, as will be discussed below, creates greater opportunity
within legal reasoning for more diverse sexual narratives, all of which contributes to a
more constructivist conception of sexuality that recognizes the shared interest in
protecting sexual integrity.
i) The Constitution As Custos Morum
In Labaye, the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal of
Jean-Paul Labaye’s common bawdy-house conviction on the ground that the acts
occurring at his establishment, Club L’Orage, did not constitute indecent ones under the
Criminal Code.38
Club L’Orage, was a private swingers club with an annual membership fee. It was
located on the top floor of a building that also housed a strip club owned by Mr. Labaye.
The club was open to members and their guests only. Essentially, it consisted of “a
number of mattress…scattered about the floor of the apartment” that served as a meeting
place for individuals interested in partner swapping and group sex. Labaye was charged
with keeping a common bawdy house after undercover detectives observed a group of
four or five men having sex with one woman while other members of the club observed.
All of the activity was, concededly on the part of the crown, consensual.
Under the Criminal Code, a bawdy house is an establishment kept for the purpose
of committing acts of prostitution or indecency.39 The issue in this case was whether the
activities occurring at Club L’Orage were indecent. In other words, the case turned on a
matter of statutory interpretation – the interpretation of the term indecent.
38
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The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada determined that only activities
which pose a significant risk of harm, of the type “grounded in norms which our society
has recognized in its Constitution or similar fundamental laws,” harm so serious as to be
incompatible with proper societal functioning, will be considered indecent.40 In the
majority’s opinion the type of group sex occurring at Club L’Orage did not constitute
harm of that nature.
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Labaye, courts used the community
standard of tolerance test to determine whether an act was indecent (or whether material
was obscene). The test was adopted in 1962 in an attempt to achieve a more objective
standard for obscenity and indecency than had been the case under the common law
definition of obscenity. The common law test for obscenity initially asked whether the
material at issue would tend to deprave and corrupt other members of society.41 As Chief
Justice McLachlin notes in Labaye, this test stood for almost a century before the
Supreme Court in Brodie v. R., emphasizing the need for more objective criteria, adopted
a test based on the community’s standard of tolerance for sexually explicit material.42
The community standard of tolerance test adopted in Brodie, still considered difficult to
apply in an objective fashion, was eventually revised to explicitly incorporate a notion of
harm.43 In its original form, the test did not include any reference to harm.44 In an effort
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to make it yet more objective and less susceptible to the subjective sexual morality of any
given adjudicator the test was revised in Towne Cinema to incorporate into it a notion of
harm.45
In Towne Cinema, the Court found that obscenity could be established either by
showing that the material violated the norm of what Canadians would tolerate other
Canadians viewing or doing or by showing that the material would have a harmful effect
on others in society. Then in Butler, as discussed earlier, the notion of harm was
incorporated directly into the standard of community tolerance.46 The community’s
standard of tolerance was to be determined based on based on how much harm an act or
sexually explicit depiction posed.
This distinction between the test in Towne Cinema and the test in Butler is
significant. In Towne Cinema it was still possible to find material obscene solely on the
basis of community sexual morality. As noted above, Butler ostensibly changed this;
Butler purported to resolve (and reject) the morality issue once and for all. However,
there have been those who have challenged this suggestion. Brenda Cossman, for
example, described the test in Butler as “sexual morality in drag”.47 Cossman’s
assessment of Butler seems apt. Butler did not rid the law of obscenity and indecency of
sexual morality; its continued reliance on the community standards of tolerance test
precluded this even had it been the Court’s intention. Had Butler actually resolved (and
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rejected) the sexual morality issue once and for all it is unlikely that Chief Justice
McLachlin would have thought it necessary, in Labaye to reject the community standard
of tolerance altogether.
What Butler (and to some extent Towne Cinema) did do was to encourage a shift
away from a moral concern over sex itself towards a moral concern over power. The
harm based approach to the definition of obscenity and indecency is a shift towards a
moral concern over power. At the heart of an approach centered on a moral concern with
power (a political morality driven approach rather than a sexual morality driven
approach) is power feminism’s social constructivist conception of sexual violence.
The focus on power in MacKinnon’s theory and in the Court’s approach in Butler is
underpinned by a social constructivist account of sexuality which does focus more, and as
discussed above, in a new way, on sexual integrity rather than sexual propriety. While
this itself did not produce a shift from sexual morality to political morality in the criminal
regulation of obscenity and indecency, it did lay the essential groundwork.
In Labaye, Chief Justice McLachlin suggests that the Towne Cinema decision
marked the beginning of a shift from a community standards test to a harm based test;48 a
shift which she suggests was completed by the Court’s decisions in Butler49and Little
Sisters Book & Art Emporium v Canada (Minister of Justice).50
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Building on the Butler description of the type of harm targeted by the concept of
indecent conduct under the Criminal Code (that being “conduct which society formally
recognizes as incompatible with its proper functioning”) in Labaye Chief Justice
McLachlin determined that the harm must be both grounded in norms which our society
has formally recognized in the Constitution or similar fundamental laws and it must be so
serious as to be incompatible with proper societal functioning:
The inquiry is not based on individual notions of harm, nor on the
teachings of a particular ideology, but on what society, through its
fundamental laws, has recognized as essential. Views about the harm that
the sexual conduct at issue may produce, however widely held, do not
suffice to ground a conviction. This is not to say that social values no
longer have a role to play. On the contrary, to ground a finding that acts
are indecent, the harm must be shown to be related to a fundamental value
reflected in our society’s Constitution or similar fundamental
laws…Unlike the community standard of tolerance test, the requirement of
formal recognition inspires confidence that the values upheld by judges
and jurors are truly those of Canadian society. Autonomy, liberty, equality
and human dignity are among these values. (emphasis added)51

What Chief Justice McLachlin suggests in Labaye is that the law, when
considering or upholding social values, ought to rely on those values that the whole
society agrees upon. This is why her theory of harm relies on those values that have been
formally recognized – those that are reflected in our society’s Constitution or other
fundamental laws. Which social values does she identify? She identifies autonomy,
liberty, equality and human dignity. Despite the fact that Labaye did not involve a
constitutional challenge but rather a matter of statutory interpretation, the theory of harm
(and definition of indecency) that Chief Justice McLachlin ultimately adopts turns on
the future than certainly in terms of what it suggests about the court’s philosophical approach to crimes of
public indecency. Indeed, the implications of such a move are precisely what the dissent takes issue with.
The Court also addressed the role of the harm principle in criminal law in Malmo-Levine, infra note 58.
See infra page 24 for a discussion of this case.
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constitutional law. In other words, instead of measuring harm based on what the
community will tolerate, she suggests it ought to be measured against the Constitution.
Instead of measuring it against the social sexual values of the community taken as a
whole, it ought to be measured against the fundamental values underpinning the
Constitution.
What Chief Justice McLachlin does in Labaye is dispose of the community
standard of tolerance test by relying instead on the political morals reflected in the
Constitution to inform the definition of indecency. In essence she invokes constitutional
principles in order to protect constitutional principles.
The structure of her reasoning is very consistent with Ronald Dworkin’s theory of
liberal equality. A judicial assessment of the sexual morals of a large number of
Canadians is legal reasoning based on what Dworkin describes as first person ethics.
Dworkin distinguishes between first person ethics and third person ethics. Third person
ethics reflect those commonly held beliefs that all or most members of a liberal
democracy ascribe to. He also articulates the distinction by differentiating between moral
principles (which define our responsibilities and obligations to others – third person
ethics) and ethical convictions (which define our beliefs about the good life – first person
ethics).
Dworkin acknowledges that it is impossible for people to engage in political
debate completely outside the realm of their deeply held personal convictions. He
suggests that, as a result, what we must do is identify those comprehensive ethical
principles about dignity and personal responsibility that the majority of us share and then
resolve our conflicting political principles by determining which policies or political
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structures are more securely grounded in those more fundamental ethical convictions that
are shared by all or most. He bases this on the suggestion that the tolerance and neutrality
demanded by liberalism arises not simply from the need to separate the right from the
good, but from a certain understanding of the good – a certain model of ethics. Dworkin’s
theory of liberal equality attempts to maintain a link between personal ethics (what he
describes as first person ethics) and political values (what he describes as third person
ethics) while honoring the overriding liberal principle of state neutrality between
conceptions of the good.
This, in a nutshell, is Dworkin’s theory of justice. He arrives at this account of
justice by privileging the notion of autonomy. Autonomy (more specifically the equal
distribution of autonomy) is both the foundation and structure of Dworkin’s theory of
liberal equality. His liberal ethics is premised on the overarching and assumed value not
of a particular type of life, but rather, of a particular way of living: the performance of
living autonomously. Dworkin appeals to ethical convictions of a more general nature in
an effort to garner broader appeal or greater consensus. Similarly, Chief Justice
McLachlin relies upon more general convictions to justify the majority’s decision. In the
same way that, for Dworkin, autonomy serves as both the foundation and the structure of
his theory of liberal equality, Chief Justice McLachlin relies upon, in order to protect, the
fundamental ethical and social considerations enshrined in the Constitution. 52
Responding to Chief Justice McLachlin’s reasoning, the dissent in Labaye
commented that “the existence of harm is not a prerequisite for exercising the state’s
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power to criminalize certain conduct. The existence of fundamental social and ethical
considerations is sufficient.”53 However, despite this statement by the dissent, the dispute
between the majority and the dissent in Labaye is not actually over whether social values
ought to play a role in making or enforcing indecency laws – both adopt reasoning which
turns on an application of social values. Their disagreement is over which social values to
rely upon, and what role they ought to play, in ascertaining what constitutes indecency.
While the majority reasoning turns on what sexual restrictions and standards a
society can legitimately impose on its members without compromising broader ethical
convictions as articulated by the Constitution, the dissent depends on their perception and
interpretation of what sexual mores the majority of Canadians have adopted. This is why
the dissent endorses a strikingly quantitative approach to sexual morality and the
definition of indecency in which “use can be made of factual evidence, such as surveys,
reports or research regarding Canadians’ sexual practices and preferences, and their
attitudes toward and levels of tolerance of sexual acts in various contexts”.54 It is also the
reason why the dissent suggests that, contrary to the majority’s opinion, the community’s
standard of tolerance remains a salient consideration in identifying acts of indecency and
that “serious harm is not the sole criterion for determining what the Canadian community
will tolerate”.55
The dissent makes this argument on two bases. Firstly, they suggest that morality
for the sake of morality –and here they are referring to majoritarian sexual mores- should
53
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be permitted to play a role in defining the state’s power to criminalize conduct, regardless
of whether there is an associated harm.56 Secondly, and perhaps alternatively, they
suggest that activity which is inconsistent with the community’s sexual morality, in and
of itself causes harm to the community’s political morality.57 In other words, they argue
that there is always a harm associated with transgressions of those sexual values held by
most Canadians. The former argument concerns issues of the criminal law’s legitimacy
and its theory of harm. The latter combines this with an argument about the significance
and role of community in the maintenance of a political morality.
In support of their argument that majoritarian sexual mores may serve as a basis
for the criminalization of conduct regardless of whether there is an associated harm,
the dissent cites examples such as “child pornography, incest, polygamy, and
bestiality.”58 Whether or not each of these sexual offences has an associated social harm
of the type contemplated by the majority is debatable.
The Court addressed this issue in R v Malmo-Levine.59 Malmo-Levine involved a
section 7 Charter challenge to the criminalization of marijuana. In Malmo-Levine, the
Court rejected the argument that the harm principle is a principle of fundamental justice.
They determined that while the presence of harm to others may justify legislative action
under the criminal law, the absence of proven harm does not create an unqualified section
7 barrier to criminalization. Two important points on this issue should be noted. First,
56
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the harm principle referred to in Malmo-Levine was more akin to the principle as it was
conceived by John Stuart Mill than the harm principle adopted by the Labaye majority. 60
Although the dissent in Labaye argues that the majority relies on John Stuart Mill’s harm
principle,61 Chief Justice McLachlin’s theory of harm in Labaye differs from Mill’s
original principle. Her theory of harm includes attitudinal harm to others and harm to the
participants. It is in this sense much more accommodating to the use of the criminal law
power. Second, the claim that the harm principle is a principle of fundamental justice and
therefore a precursor to the use of the criminal law which controls legislative action is
related but not identical to the assertion that some version of the harm principle is the
right principle of interpretation to establish the legal definition of a socially or culturally
constructed, and value laden, concept such as indecency. Indeed, the Supreme Court of
Canada recognized the validity of this assertion in Butler by incorporating the notion of
harm directly into the community standard of tolerance test.
The judicial debate over social harm in Malmo-Levine correlates to the considerable
debate in the academic literature over the legitimacy of ‘morality for the sake of morality’
as a foundation for the criminalization of particular sexual acts.62 The division of the
Court in Labaye is largely a continuation and evolution of the famous exchange between
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Lord Devlin and H.L.A. Hart over the role of morality in the criminal law. At first blush,
the disagreement between the majority and minority in Labaye might even be
characterized simply as a reiteration (or manifestation) of the Hart/Devlin debate. Closer
examination, however, reveals that while the dissenting opinion does mirror Devlin’s
position, the analogy is not as accurate when comparing Chief Justice McLachlin’s
reasoning with Hart’s position.
Lord Devlin argued that in the interests of self-preservation, a society must be allowed to coercively restrict sexual conduct if that conduct threatens valued social
institutions and is contrary to the personal sexual morality of most members of society.63
Society, he argued, has a right to enforce certain moral convictions so as to preserve the
particular social environment desired by the majority of its members. Devlin’s concern
(shared by the dissent in Labaye) was that without the ability to criminalize conduct that
transgresses the personal morals held by the majority of citizens, the moral fibre of a
society would crumble.64 This same rationale is the basis for the Labaye dissent’s
suggestion that if the criminal law fails to incorporate the community standard of
tolerance test, the values considered worthy of protection by the Canadian community as
a whole will be “stripped of any relevance”.65 Upholding personal morals in the criminal
law also grounds the connection the dissent makes between community views on
sexuality and “social order”.66
Hart responded to Devlin’s argument by suggesting that in the criminal law a line
between private and public conduct must be maintained and that without some associated
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and provable harm, it would be illiberal for the state to prohibit certain behavior simply on
the basis that the majority is against it.67 He argued that there is no empirical evidence to
suggest that the separation of law and morality in law would lead to social decay. There
is a distinction, he suggested, between morally driven decisions regarding the severity of
punishment for a certain act (which may be acceptable) and morally driven decisions to
punish that act in the first place (which are not acceptable). Ultimately, the enforcement
of morality for the sake of morality is illiberal. Moreover, he contended, morality cannot
be instantiated through law. According to Hart, legally-coerced morality, or legal
moralism, is of no value as a foundational principle of the criminal law.68
Chief Justice McLachlin’s approach differs from Hart’s approach in that she does
endeavor to instantiate morality—political morality—through law.69 Hart, relying on
utilitarian theory, distinguished between “positive morality” and “critical morality” to
question the role of morality in the law. Positive morality referred to “the morality
actually accepted and shared by a given social group.”70 Critical morality referred to
“the general moral principles used in the criticism of actual social institutions including
positive morality.”71 For Hart, therefore, the question “is one of the critical morality
about the legal enforcement of positive morality.”72
In Labaye, Chief Justice McLachlin instantiates political morality in the law by
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interpreting the bawdy house provision of the Criminal Code on the basis that principles
of critical morality are a positive morality. In other words, for Chief Justice
McLachlin, critical morality is a positive morality. The distinction may not be surprising
given the different constitutional traditions in which Hart’s work and Chief Justice
McLachlin’s jurisprudence are situated. The values Chief Justice McLachlin affirms are
tolerance and respect for autonomy. She rejects the community standard of
tolerance test and replaces it with a new standard of tolerance: a standard required by
the constitution (of the community). Chief Justice McLachlin does not jettison ‘morality
for morality’s sake’ from the criminal law. She acknowledges that harm to values can, in
and of itself, constitute the sort of harm that ought to be prohibited by the
criminal law, but she strictly limits the range of values which may be subject to harm.
In the end, she relies on values so cherished by Canadian society that they have been
constitutionally entrenched.
Again, the values she identifies are autonomy, liberty, equality and human dignity.
She identifies three types of harm sufficient to justify coercive prohibition on the basis
that acts perpetuating such harm would compromise these fundamental constitutional
values.
The first includes circumstances where members of the public would, or there is a
significant risk they could, be involuntarily confronted with conduct that significantly
interferes with their autonomy and liberty.73 She suggests that “[p]eople’s autonomy and
enjoyment of life can be deeply affected by being unavoidably confronted with debased
public sexual displays. Even when avoidance is possible, the result may be diminished
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freedom to go where they wish or take their children where they want”.74 This, she is
careful to point out, is not about aesthetics. This is about being confronted with
something seriously and deeply offensive such that it creates an inability to go certain
places. It is about not being able to take your kids to the park for fear that they will be
unwittingly exposed to people engaged in sexual activity. By definition it refers to sexual
activity occurring in public places. This branch of harm, alone, shouldn’t cover activity
occurring in adult theatres or clubs because these are not places that members of the
public unwittingly stumble upon.
The second type of harm involves conduct which would, or there is a significant
risk it could, predispose others to anti-social behavior. Chief Justice McLachlin notes
that “[a]s far back as Hicklin, Cockburn C.J. spoke of using the criminal law to prevent
material from depraving and corrupting susceptible people, into whose hands it may fall.”
This, she suggests, could extend to include attitudinal harm such as conduct which
undermines respect for, and the dignity of, targeted groups. She notes that this must be
harm which can actually be proven. She is also careful to again include some public
element in the analysis under this branch of harm. “This type of harm can only arise if
members of the public may be exposed to the conduct or material in question.”75
Interestingly, and as the dissent notes, this second source of harm identified by the
majority resorts back to a standard the Court had long ago rejected as potentially too open
to the imposition of subjective moral views on the part of judges.76
The third type of harm identified by Chief Justice McLachlin involves conduct
which would, or there is a significant risk it could, physically or psychologically harm the
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persons involved.77 “Sexual activity is a positive source of human expression, fulfillment
and pleasure. But some kinds of sexual activity may harm those involved.”78 She
includes here both physical and psychological harm. While analysis of this sort of harm
will generally be dictated by whether the participants consented (leaving considerable
space for sexual agency), she acknowledges that sometimes consent is more apparent than
real, and notes that in some cases harm may be established even where there is apparent
consent. Courts, she suggests, “must always be on the lookout for the reality of
victimization”.79 As would be expected, she notes that the public/private distinction is
not as significant under this branch of harm.
Chief Justice McLachlin then defines the degree of any of these three types of
harm necessary to find a sexual act indecent. Borrowing from the language in Butler, she
adopts the requirement that to be indecent, the harm caused by the sexual activity at issue
must be significant enough that it is incompatible with the proper functioning of society.
There remains an ambiguity, one which is likely inevitable, both in Chief Justice
McLachlin’s definition of indecency and in the argument to follow below regarding the
interpretation of the bawdy house provisions. It relates to the fact that it is still necessary
to measure harm. What is attitudinal harm and how will it be established? How will the
court assess harm to the participants? What is the line between sexual autonomy and the
law’s obligation to intervene in the face of obvious victimization? Won’t moralistic
reasoning reveal itself once again when it comes time to assess harm? The answer to this,
at least in part, is… yes. Attempts to argue for the complete disaggregation of law and
morality are both futile and outdated. The more important question is what type of
77
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morality ought the law to trade in? My argument is that inevitably morality will come
into play, and that what matters is what order of morality the law relies upon. What Chief
Justice McLachlin does in Labaye is shift the law’s focus from sexual morality to political
morality. It is not a perfect answer but, as argued below, when it comes to the legal
regulation of sex, it is much preferable that the law’s moral compass be governed by
attempts to balance constitutional values such as autonomy, liberty, equality and dignity
rather than by an assessment of what the sexual consensus at any given time in Canada
might be. I said the answer was “ in part” yes. The equivocation stems from an
evidentiary point of distinction between Labaye and the community standards of
tolerance test. In Labaye, Chief Justice McLachlin is explicit in her assertion that harm
must be proven. In other words there must be evidence of harm. This was not the case
under the community standards of tolerance test.
The ultimate rejection of the community standard of tolerance test in Labaye, was
a move initiated in 1992 in Butler. It represents a shift towards a legal morality
concerned more with sexual interactions than with the categorization, assessment and
judgment of specific sexual actions. Accordingly, power feminism’s significant
contribution to sexual jurisprudence in Canada should be recognized. By emphasizing
the social factors and overall social context which produce sexual violence, an emphasis
the Court endorsed, power feminism instigated a shift in the moral focus of the law from
sex itself to the power dynamics and social factors constituting those dynamics.
ii) The Limits Of Sexual Morality
As articulated by the Court, the language of the test for obscenity or indecency, as
it stood prior to Labaye, was as follows: “what would the community tolerate others
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being exposed to on the basis of the degree of harm that might flow from such
exposure”.80 As a matter of application the test went something more like this:
“indecency laws are about what Canadians would not abide other Canadians doing”81 and
as will be discussed below, deciding “what Canadians would not abide other Canadians
doing” was often determined based on quasi-quantitative assessments of the sexual
practices of most Canadians. The moral focus was on sexual action rather than sexual
interaction.
Assessing harm based on community tolerance allowed for the regulation of sex
based on dominant sexual morality (as reflected in community levels of tolerance) rather
than social or political morality (as reflected in instruments such as the Constitution).
Historically, women (and sexual minorities) have not fared well under regimes governed
by traditional sexual mores. Traditional sexual mores have been for the protection of men
and male sexual propriety. A standard which is about sexual propriety is not a standard
about women’s interests, neither their interests regarding sexual agency and autonomy,
nor their interests with respect to sexual harms. A standard that is about sexual propriety
is not a standard that is about sexual integrity.
As the pre-Labaye indecency cases discussed below demonstrate, a legal regime
for the regulation of sex which is dictated by sexual morality rather than political morality
is not one which deals adeptly with the complexity of sex, nor is it one which is
particularly proficient at protecting the interests that sexual actors have in both their
safety and their sexuality.
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Consider Justice Sopinka’s reasoning in R. v. Mara.82 Justice Sopinka, declaring
lap dances to be indecent under the community standard of tolerance test, stated that “it is
unacceptably degrading to women to permit such uses of their bodies in the context of a
public performance in a tavern. Insofar as the activities were consensual as the appellant
stressed, this does not alter their degrading character.”83
Justice Sopinka went on to find that indecency laws are not there to protect the lap
dancers, but rather to protect the spectators from harm. The risk of harm to the
performers, he suggested, is only relevant insofar as that risk exacerbates the social harm
resulting from the degradation and objectification of women. So neither the safety nor
sexual agency of the women participants is relevant to the definition of indecency. Note
however, that harm to the spectators is relevant.
Justice Sopinka found that, according to community standards of tolerance, lap
dances are indecent because they desensitize sexuality and objectify women. Using the
criminal law to protect the decency of sex itself, which is what it means to define acts as
indecent on the basis that they might ‘desensitize’ sexuality, is about sexual propriety. It
is unsurprising that an analysis underpinned by sexual morality is not an analysis which is
particularly interested in harm to the actual women involved in a particular activity.
His decision is problematic for a variety of reasons. First of all, it is done on
behalf of the decency of some monolithic notion of women as incapacitated victims of
sexual objectification. Conceptualizing women’s sexuality in this way is not progress for
women. More importantly, nor is it good for the interests of those women involved in the
sex trade, that is, those women who are directly affected by the legal and social
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implications of sex work. By finding that the issue of consent is not even a relevant
factor of consideration in defining what acts, in this ‘adults only’ establishment, constitute
indecent ones, Justice Sopinka directly rejects the interests in sexual agency of the women
involved. By finding that harm to these women is only relevant if harm to them results in
greater harm to others, he does not focus on their interest in sexual safety.
His reasoning is not premised on relationships, nor on the sexual interactions at
issue. It is premised on an assessment regarding the immorality of lap dances. It is
underpinned by a moral assessment regarding the commodification of sex. The argument
made throughout this thesis is that legal reasoning, legal assessments and legal definitions
should be based on the understanding that the meaning of a sexual act (such as the
exchange of money for a lap dance) is produced through the relationships, interactions
and context in which it occurs. Justice Sopinka’s reasoning in Mara does not reflect a
consideration of these contextual factors.84
Even when the Court determined that a particular sexual act was not beyond the
community’s standard of tolerance, the application of the community standard of
tolerance test often produced reasoning which maintained a moralistic, majoritarian and
essentialist approach to the regulation of sexuality. This is evident in the Supreme Court
of Canada’s 1993 decision in R. v. Tremblay.85 Tremblay concerned a charge of keeping
a common bawdy house against the owner of a bar where nude dancers would perform in
individual cubicles for clients who were permitted to masturbate while viewing the
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dancers, who were also masturbating or pretending to masturbate. In restoring the trial
judge’s acquittal, Justice Cory stated that:
…I am of the view that it was entirely appropriate for the trial judge to take
into account the expert testimony of Dr. Campbell in determining the
community standard of tolerance. That testimony was relevant and helpful in
arriving at an objective appreciation as to what types of sexual behavior
would be tolerated by the Canadian public. It was on the basis of the
statistics provided by Dr. Campbell, which indicated that most Canadians
engage in masturbation, that the trial judge concluded that the average
Canadian was more likely to tolerate activities which were similar to those in
which they engaged in themselves. Obviously, any perception of what
would be tolerated will very properly be influenced by what is perceived as
normal. What is normal will, in turn, depend upon the extent to which that
same activity is engaged in by others. If the act in question is one that is
performed by the majority in the community then it is impossible to say that
the act itself would not be tolerated by the community. Thus, once the act
itself is found to be tolerated THEN the inquiry must shift to focus on the
circumstances surrounding its performance.86 (emphasis added)

Now fortunately for Mr. Tremblay, the trial judge had made a finding of fact that, based
on the testimony of Dr. Campbell, the expert sexologist, 90% of Canadian men and 50%
of Canadian women do indeed masturbate – and so it is therefore ‘normal’. As a result,
provided that it was not occurring in a location that is overly public, it is an activity that
the community will tolerate. It isn’t indecent.
This sort of legal analysis is problematic because it is dictated by the
consideration of factors (such as sexual impropriety or what most Canadians are doing
sexually and what they think normal) that do not allow for the nuanced and diverse reality
of people’s sexuality. The community standard of tolerance approach – from a
conceptual perspective – is a status quo approach. When it comes to sex – conceptual or
otherwise – status quo approaches are often not good for women. Women (one in four of
whom, by some accounts, will experience forced sex at least once during the course of
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their lifetime87) should not want legal definitions of what is, and what is not, decent
dictated by what is, and what is not, prevalent.88
Reasoning founded on sexual morality is reasoning driven to constitute through
law (as well as other social mechanisms) a particular account of sex. In fact, this is what
is suggested by the notion of sexual morality. (As discussed above, the particular sexual
morality that has dominated law, at least in Canada, is an essentialist, naturalized, sex as
dangerous, account of sex). A close examination of the cases suggest that in order to
achieve this, the law’s preoccupation often tends to be with the protection of sex itself
rather than with the sexual actors, relationships and interactions at issue in a given
context.
The law often purports to act out of concern for the welfare of individuals or
relationships and on one level this is likely true; but, scratch below the surface of these
decisions and one can detect an underlying concern for the protection of sex itself which
may be influencing or perhaps sometimes even driving the analysis in many of these
cases. This was exemplified by the Court’s approach to the concept of sexual
exploitation. Obscene representations are representations that unduly exploit sex. This
definition, even on its face, suggests that it is about the protection of sex itself. Its
concern is directed towards ensuring that sex (not women, not children, not visible
minorities) is not exploited. But it goes much further. Whether or not a representation is
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considered to unduly exploit sex was to be determined based on community standards.89
As noted above, prior to Butler ‘community standards’ referred directly and explicitly to
dominant sexual morality.
Cossman and others have argued that, despite contestations to the contrary, Butler
did not actually reduce the degree to which conservative sexual morality dictates a
determination that a representation exploited sex.90 Reasoning based on conservative
sexual morality is reasoning directed towards protecting a particular account of, or
understanding about, sex. Given this, it is perhaps unsurprising that incorporating a
notion of harm into the community standard of tolerance did not result in reasoning sans
sexual morality. After all, doing such ensures that obscenity laws safeguard against harm
to sex. That is to say, against harm to a particular account of sex… a sexual morality.
(An alternative would be to define exploitation based on harm to people.91)
This same observation can be made about Justice LaForest’s reasoning in Norberg
v. Wynrib. In Norberg v. Wynrib, Justice LaForest determined that, for the purposes of
battery, consent would be vitiated where the sexual relationship concerned an imbalanced
and exploitative relationship between the parties. A relationship would be exploitative if
89
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it contravened community standards of conduct (which intuitively must refer to sexual
conduct). So instead of examining the individual and subjective perceptions and
circumstances of, and risk to the parties involved,92 courts are to determine whether the
relationship is exploitative based on the court’s assessment as to what the community
thinks - that is to say, as to whether this is the sort of sexual relationship the community
would approve of. It will be exploitative if it does not jive with community sexual
morality. In other words, it will be exploitative if it transgresses the dominant account of
sex – in this context an idealized and romanticized account of sex. The inquiry, then, is
focused not on exploitation to the perceived underdog but on safeguarding sex (as
romantic93, as about love not business etc…) itself. To define exploitation based on
92
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whether it transgresses dominant sexual morality is to demonstrate a concern for
protecting the integrity of whatever understanding of sexuality underpins that morality,
rather than a concern for harm caused by the exploitation of people – whether it is the
exploitation of people fucking, working, singing, dancing or dying.
What is needed is an approach that enables the law to accommodate the
complexity that people engage with in relation to sexuality. The principles of harm and
consent are not new concepts, and the reasoning in Labaye obviously will not serve as a
panacea for what is an enormously complex social issue. That said, Labaye, by removing
the community standards of tolerance test from the definition of indecency, shifted the
criminalization of sex (in terms of indecency) from a purely majoritarian democratic
approach to a constitutional democratic approach. Chief Justice McLachlin’s decision in
Labaye eliminates considerations of community tolerance (sexual morality) and instead,
relies on the values underpinning the Constitution (political morality) in order to
determine whether a particular sexual activity is harmful. A legal definition that turns on
political morality rather than sexual morality, will, where that political morality is
anchored in values such as autonomy and equality, lend itself well to a constructivist
approach in which power dynamics, the perspectives of all sexual actors involved, and
other social factors contributing to the character of the sexual interaction, are considered.
A review of the cases that have applied the reasoning in Labaye show that
focusing on harm more objectively (as dictated by the Constitution rather than a
quantitative assessment of the balance of a community’s personally held sexual values)
seems to create space for greater subjectivity in individual cases. The result appears to be
legal narratives which do not construct an essentialist concept of women and sex but
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rather demonstrate some recognition of the diversity of women’s experiences and
perspectives, and the social complexity (and production) of human sexuality. This may be
an inevitable outcome of shifting the law’s focus towards harm and away from morality.
IV.

A Moral Shift: The Application Of Labaye

A version of pages 264 to 285 were previously printed as (2008) 12 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 327 published by
Carswell, a division of Thomson Reuters Canada Limited.

One post-Labaye decision that exemplifies this possibility of accommodating
women’s sexual subjectivity is R v Ellison.94 Ellison was a high school teacher charged
with a number of counts of indecent assault and gross indecency, as a result of sexual
contact he admittedly had with a number of female students and former students between
1973 and 1981. (Indecent assault, no longer in the Criminal Code, was an assault
accompanied by circumstances of indecency.95 Gross indecency was loosely defined as a
marked departure from the decent conduct expected of the average Canadian in the
circumstances.96) The analysis regarding the charges of indecent assault for the most part
turned on the issue of consent. He was convicted, in whole or in part, on three of the four
charges of indecent assault. It is the analysis regarding the charges of gross indecency
that is of particular interest to this discussion.
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[2006] BCJ No. 3241 [hereinafter Ellison].
R v Sweitlinkski, [1980] SCJ No. 107.
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R v Quisnel, (1979) 51 CCC (2d) 270 (Ont. C.A.). Gross indecency is no longer an offence under the
Criminal Code. Under its replacement, section 153, every person who has sexual contact with a 16 to 18
year old young person with whom they are in a position of trust or authority is guilty of sexual exploitation.
The offence does not turn on the impact of the sexual contact on the young person, but rather on the status
of their relationship and whether it is one of trust or authority. If it is such a relationship, this element of the
offence is met. Whether such a relationship exists will be determined based on the age difference, the
evolution of the relationship and the status of the accused in relation to the young person. While the
analysis in Ellison isn’t relevant under this law, it is nonetheless demonstrative of the way in which this
harm based approach could be used in other sections of the Criminal Code which do continue to use the
term indecent (such as ss. 163, 167, 169, 173, 175). Similarly, it might also be used to interpret what
constitutes “abuse of trust power or authority” under provisions such as section 273.1(2)(c) defining
consent in the case of sexual assault.
95
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In Ellison the Crown urged Justice Takahashi to apply the reasoning in Labaye to
inform his determination with regard to the gross indecency charges. While Justice
Takahashi found that Labaye was not directly applicable on the basis that convictions of
gross indecency ought not to be based on the broader implications of the indecent conduct
on society, in the end result his analysis absolutely followed the harm based approach to
indecency adopted in Labaye.97 Moreover, he explicitly acknowledged that the Labaye
reasoning was helpful to an analysis regarding gross indecency given the complexity and
nuance involved in human sexual behavior:
The advantage of a harm based approach is that it establishes a method by
which the boundary between criminal and non-criminal sexual conduct can
be objectively ascertained. This benefits the individual in making his
choice of behavior and the court in assessing what he chose. Human
behavior is infinite in its variation. It is not easily quantifiable or
measurable for making comparisons. Labaye…is instructive in directing
the need for a principled approach to address criminal matters involving
indecency.98 (emphasis added)
What was the outcome of Justice Takahashi’s approach and why is it a good one?
Ellison was charged with 12 counts of gross indecency; he had sexual contact with 12
different young women – some of whom were students, some former students. Some
were teenagers, some were in their early twenties. Some were sexually inexperienced,
others less so. Some continued a platonic relationship with Ellison for years after the
sexual activity had occurred. Some did not. Some reported having enjoyed the sexual
interactions they had with Ellison and wishing there had been more, others felt
traumatized by what happened, still others reported little if any effect at all.
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Justice Takahashi’s analysis is somewhat odd. While he seems to have overlooked the third branch of
harm in Labaye – harm to the participants – by finding that Labaye is not directly applicable because it
concerns the broader implications of the indecent conduct on society, he then goes on to both state that
Labaye is informative in making determinations of indecency and to apply the Labaye harm based approach
to his analysis – focusing particularly on the third branch in Labaye.
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Ellison, supra note 93 at para. 72.
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How should a judge, twenty years after the fact, attempt to decipher, interpret, and
unravel the innumerable and diverse variables involved in every one of the sexual
encounters that occurred so as to determine whether what happened was or was not
decent? How can a judge do this without either relying on his or her own sexual morality,
or his or her assumptions about the sexual morality of the majority regarding sexual
relations between a teacher and high school student? A judge can do this by doing what
Justice Takahashi appears to have done. By hearing and accommodating into the analysis
the perspectives and sexual narratives of the young women involved. By considering
factors such as whether the sexual contact caused humiliation, forced secrecy, guilt or the
defilement of one’s first sexual experience. By acknowledging that the emotional risk at
stake for each depended on each young woman’s individual vulnerability and degree of
maturity, and taking into account each woman’s stated desire or lack of desire to engage
in sexual contact with Ellison, whether they remained friends, and who terminated the
relationship. In other words, some of what are the many complex, nuanced and
sometimes messy elements that make up human sexuality.
What was the result? Ellison was convicted on four counts of gross indecency and
acquitted on the others. Consensual sex which neither participant experienced as harmful
was not considered indecent. Consensual sex which a complainant experienced as
harmful in some regard was found to be grossly indecent. This reasoning is analogous to
that used in the context of assault law, where the Supreme Court of Canada has held that
consent is vitiated if adults intentionally apply force that causes serious hurt or non-trivial
harm in the course of a fist fight. 99 It is not that one cannot consent to a fist fight, or even
(in principle rather than effect, at least) consent to a fist fight causing bodily harm; nor
99

See R v Jobidon [1991] 2 SCR 714.
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does Jobidon require that one must intend to cause bodily harm for consent to be vitiated.
It is that, for policy reasons, an otherwise consensual but socially useless and potentially
dangerous activity such as fighting becomes non-consensual if, but only if, non-trivial
harm is sustained by one of the participants. A similar policy justification could be
offered to support the reasoning in Ellison. Where an individual knowingly engages in
what is objectively potentially harmful sexual behavior (for example having sex with
one’s teenaged student) they are considered to have assumed the consequences arising
from any harm caused.
One counterargument to this approach, based as it was on the third branch of harm
under Labaye – sexual activity that causes harm to the participants – is that it sacrifices
certainty under the law. One principle central to the criminal law is that it be knowable.
The counterargument to defining indecency based on the harm to the participants
involved in the sexual activity is that it makes the law uncertain because whether an
offence occurs is contingent upon whether harm is suffered. However, there is nothing to
suggest that the approach endorsed in Labaye and adopted in Ellison is any less certain
than the community standard of tolerance approach. As is well demonstrated in a case
such as Tremblay, ascertaining the community standard of tolerance entailed determining
the sexual proclivities of the “normal Canadian”. This meant the somewhat nonsensical
(and Alfred Kinsey-esque100) process of gathering empirical evidence about the sexual
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Alfred Kinsey was a mid 20th century biologist, renowned for conducting the first mass scale quantitative
research into the dominant (and not so dominant) sexual practices of men and women. He interviewed
thousands of American men and women, recording the types and frequency of sexual activity they had
experienced. The “Kinsey Reports” – Sexual Behavior in the Human Male and Sexual Behavior in the
Human Female – were published by Indiana University Press in 1948 and 1953 respectively. His sample
was exclusively white and middle class. It included zero African Americans. Despite its broad spectrum of
questions, his survey asked almost nothing about forced or coercive sex. For a critique of Kinesey’s work
see Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape (New York: Bantam, 1975).
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practices of “average Canadians” from “expert sexologists” and the like. There is nothing
more certain ex ante about such a definition of indecency.
What is more, the blurring of subjectivity and objectivity in laws regarding the
criminal regulation of sex is unavoidable due to the nature of sex. Sexuality, in its infinite
manifestations both in terms of acts and identities, is utterly subjective.

Despite its

corporeal element (which it typically entails), it is the antithesis of objectivity or pure
physical reality. Without understanding how each of the parties involved in a sexual act
(any sexual act short of one causing death or serious bodily harm) conceived of the act, it
is impossible to know whether what occurred was a crime or an act of passion and
pleasure.
But it goes further. It is not simply that it is impossible to know how to
characterize the act without revealing how the parties conceived of it; it is that the act is
itself, defined, by how the parties conceived of it.101 This is why the courts, in the context
of sexual assault law, eventually established that the issue of consent must be dictated by
the subjective perspective of the complainant at the time of the alleged offence. That is,
that consent, or rather lack thereof, is part of the actus reus not the mens rea. It is
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Sexuality might be the prototypical example of the sort of abstract human phenomenon that George
Lakoff suggests we can only comprehend through what he describes as ‘conceptual metaphor’. George
Lakoff & Mark Johnson, Metaphors We live By, 2nd ed. (University Of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1980).
Lakoff suggests that metaphors are not simply a linguistic construction but rather are a conceptual
construction integral to the development of thought. Only those things which are purely physical in nature
can be understood and expressed without metaphor. He suggests that the greater the level of abstraction,
the more layers of metaphor are needed to express it. For Lakoff, the development of thought has been the
process of developing better metaphors. He suggests that applying knowledge from one conceptual domain
to another domain of knowledge establishes new perceptions and understandings. What does this mean in
terms of the relationship between law and sexuality? It means context and framing is never more present
and relied upon than when the law attempts to deal with issues of sexuality.
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dictated by “the complainant’s subjective internal state of mind towards the touching, at
the time it occurred”.102
This is not to suggest that this approach is perfect. Indeed, one count of gross
indecency on which Ellison was acquitted involved sexual contact with a complainant
who was 15 years old and extremely vulnerable at the time of the incidents. Ellison was
acquitted because, while this young woman who had been raped as a child while in foster
care did suffer from chronic fatigue syndrome, there was, according to Justice Takahashi,
no evidence that she suffered psychological harm as a result of Ellison’s actions. So
while the harm based approach to the definition of indecency does appear to facilitate the
law’s ability to map onto the complexity of sex, it may still not be nearly nuanced
enough. That is to say, not yet capable of handling a complex theory of harm which can
account for and address the situation of a 15 year old such as this, in an organic way
which doesn’t attempt to dissect and disaggregate human conditions which cannot
possibly be dissected and disaggregated.
Another example of the manner in which the Labaye approach results in reasoning
and outcomes which are better able to both accommodate sexual diversity and avoid
regulating conduct based on dominant sexual morality is Latreille c. R.103 This case
involved an appeal to the Quebec Court of Appeal regarding a conviction against Latreille
under section 163(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, for producing obscene pictures. The
photographs, which Latreille had taken to his pharmacy for development included
102

R v Park, [1995] 2 SCR 836; R v Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 SCR 330. As discussed in the previous chapter,
consent is dictated by the subjective state of the complainant at the time the sexual activity occurred. While
this is different from an analysis like that in Ellison (or Labaye) where the issue is whether harm is suffered
as a result of the sexual activity, it is offered more as an example of the need for subjectivity in legal
matters of a sexual nature. In addition, it wouldn’t, relying upon on the reasoning in Jobidon, supra note
77, present a significant challenge to this argument anyway.
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pictures of himself and a woman engaged in oral sex, pictures of that same woman
performing fellatio on one other man and pictures of the woman, nude, and depicted in
what the Court described as a “sadomasochistic context”. It was this last category of
pictures for which he was charged with producing obscene materials. There was no
evidence that any of the activities photographed were non-consensual. The
“sadomasochistic pictures” portrayed the woman kneeling by a bed with clothespins on
her nipples and a bathrobe tie binding her hands behind her back.
The trial judge, whose decision was released prior to the Supreme Court of
Canada’s decision in Labaye, determined that the photographs depicted the undue
exploitation of sex on the basis that they exceeded the community standard of tolerance in
Canada. In addition to disagreeing that such photographs exceed the community standard
of tolerance, the Quebec Court of Appeal, applying Labaye, found that such photographs
do not create the type or degree of harm necessary to constitute a finding of obscenity.
The Court emphasized that while the fact that the pictures were consensually and
privately produced and for private use does not rule out the possibility that they are
harmful enough to be considered obscene, it must be a factor which is taken into account.
The final ‘post-Labaye’ case to be discussed in this section is the decision of
Justice Chisvin of the Ontario Court of Justice in R v Ponomarev.104 Valeri Ponomarev,
owner of a massage parlor in Vaughan, Ontario was charged under section 210 of the
Criminal Code after an undercover police operation determined that the female
employees of his establishment, in addition to providing full body massage, would also
provide manual ejaculation if the client so desired.105 For an additional twenty dollars the
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Ibid. at 10.
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masseuse would conduct the massage naked. The manual ejaculation was included in the
price of the massage.
Justice Chisvin, relying on the definition established in Labaye, found that the
activities occurring at Studio 176 were not indecent. This finding was based on the fact
that it was clear from the evidence that the sexual acts were not occurring in public but
rather in private rooms, that the fee was forty dollars whether manual ejaculation occurred
or not, that the women employed at Studio 176 were there of their own volition, had
accepted the position knowing what it entailed, and were not in anyway coerced into
accepting the job. Based on Justice Chisvin’s account of the evidence, it is clear that
these women were in control of the way in which the massage would proceed.106 In stark
contrast to the reasoning in either Mara or Tremblay the perspective of the women
involved in these activities was clearly represented in the decision. Justice Chisvin noted
that the more credible of the two employees testified that she knew what the job entailed
before she accepted it and that “she felt she was responsible for her own actions. No one
pushed her to do this. Rather, she indicated that she chose to undertake the job. She said
she accepted responsibility for her actions.” The representation of these sex workers,
their autonomy and agency and their own interest in being free from sexual harm is very
different from the one in Mara.
A common bawdy house is defined as an establishment kept for the purposes of
acts of indecency or prostitution.107 In addition to determining that the acts were not
indecent, Justice Chisvin also found that the activity occurring at Studio 176 did not
constitute prostitution. Several courts, including the Supreme Court of Canada, have
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Ponomarev, supra note 103 at 13.
Criminal Code, supra note 38, s. 197(1).
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defined prostitution as the exchange of money for the offering of one’s body for lewd
purposes.108 In order to conclude that there was no prostitution occurring, Justice Chisvin
relied on the community standard of tolerance test.109 In other words, what would the
community consider to be the offering of one’s body for lewd activity in exchange for
money? Justice Chisvin found that the community would not consider this to be the
exchange of money for sex on the basis that, because the “manual release” occurred in
private and voluntarily, and because it was included in the price of the massage, it did not
constitute prostitution.
It seems hard to believe that the community would conclude that simply because
manual ejaculation was included in the price of the massage this did not constitute the
exchange of sex for money. Had Justice Chisvin used the interpretive approach to the
bawdy house provisions suggested here she would have reached the same result without
having to suggest that two for one pricing somehow converts this exchange of money for
services that include a hand job from prostitution into something else.110
i) Interpreting The Common Bawdy House Laws Post-Labaye
The exchange of sex for money is not, and has never been, a criminal offence in
Canada. But curiously (as the Fraser Report noted111), the activities associated with it
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Prostitution Reference, [1990] 1 SCR 1123 at para. 45.
Justice Chisvin relied on the Ontario Court of Justice decision in R. v. DiGiuseppe, [2000] O.J. No. 3128
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have been criminalized. This has meant, in effect, that you are allowed to sell sex but that
you can’t sell it in private and you can’t communicate in any way about the sale of it in
public. What is the purpose behind indirectly criminalizing prostitution? Purportedly, the
rationale for the communication provision is to deal with the public nuisance assumed to
be associated with selling sex on the street.112 But what is the purpose of the bawdy
house provisions, which criminalize sex work in the private sphere? Given that a single
woman (or man) working as a sex worker out of their own home could be convicted of
keeping a common bawdy house under the pre-Labaye interpretation of the law, it can’t
be simply public nuisance.113 The options left, it seems, are the prevention of harm or the
protection of a particular sexual morality, a sexual morality that disapproves of
commercial sex. Labaye adopts the former and rejects outright, and finally, the latter.
The principle underpinning Chief Justice McLachlin’s approach in Labaye is that
the criminal regulation of sex will only be legitimate where it is in furtherance of the
political morality that we, as a society, have endorsed through the Constitution and not
where it is deployed to sustain, or further, any particular sexual morality. Labaye
establishes that an individual won’t be guilty under the common bawdy house provisions
unless the sexual activity occurring is of the sort that would cause the types of harm
protected against by the values underpinning the Constitution. While Labaye dealt with
the bawdy house laws within the context of indecency, there is nothing to suggest that this
principle should not also apply in terms of the exchange of sex for money in a bawdy
house.

112
113

The legitimacy of this rationale will be discussed in section ii) below.
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To suggest this reasoning, of course, is to suggest that the exchange of sex for
money is not in and of itself harmful. However, this is an assumption that the law has
already made. As noted, the exchange of sex for money has itself never been
criminalized. There are all sorts of examples, in addition to prostitution itself, where
individuals legally make money by having sex, or paying others to have sex. The actors
or producers of pornography come immediately to mind. The owner of a bath house, post
Labaye, provides another example. Under the reasoning in Labaye, it is now no longer a
criminal offence to own an establishment where patrons, for an entrance fee, can have sex
(provided it isn’t harmful) with one another. The only difference between this and an
establishment used for prostitution concerns how, and between whom, money is
exchanged. In the former, the participants engaged in sex have both (or all) paid money
to a third party. It is consideration in exchange for the provision of a particular sexual
opportunity and a location in which to carry it out. In the latter, the consideration is for
the sex itself. Again, paying for sex is not illegal. Unless one resorts to moralistic
assertions about the sanctity of sex, or the immorality of commercializing sexual acts
themselves, something the law has to date refused to do, then without some further
associated harm, there is nothing to distinguish these two circumstances.114 Protecting a
particular sexual morality simply for the sake of itself, for example a sexual morality
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As an aside, the approach to the bawdy house provisions adopted in Labaye is consistent with the
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which disapproves of commercial sex, is not, following Labaye, the type of harm to
which the bawdy house provisions can be directed.115
Following the interpretation and application of the bawdy house provisions
established in Labaye, what types of sex for money transactions conducted in an
establishment continue to contravene the bawdy house provisions?
The exchange of money for sex done in a way that deprives the liberty and
autonomy of others, predisposes others to anti-social conduct, or where the sex is harmful
to one or both of the participants would continue to violate the bawdy house provisions.
This would include the exchange of money for sex in an establishment with unsafe
working conditions, such as a lack of sufficient stage security or a refusal to provide
condoms, for example. In such a case the proprietor of such a business would be guilty
of violating section 210.
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The exchange of money for sex, where the consent is more apparent than real
(such as where it is due to coercion, or due to intoxication), would violate section 210.
Obviously, the exchange of money for sexual activity which is otherwise prohibited by
law would also violate the bawdy house provisions, such as, for example, where there is
no consent, where an animal is used, or where children might observe the sexual acts. In
other words, the exchange of money for sex which would cause one of the types of harm
identified in Labaye would be a violation of section 210; the exchange of money for
harmless sex would not.
ii) Interpreting The Communication Provisions Post-Labaye
In the Prostitution Reference, the Court agreed that the communication law
violates section 2 of the Charter.116 As is typically the case with freedom of expression
cases, the main issue was whether that violation could be upheld under section 1. Key to
this determination was whether the law’s objective was important enough to justify a
violation of the right to freedom of expression. The Court found that it was sufficiently
important. Post-Labaye, it is apparent that the objective identified and relied upon in the
Prostitution Reference is not, at least with respect to the general communication
provision, sufficient.
Chief Justice Dickson, writing for the majority in the Prostitution Reference,
adopted the reasoning of Justice Wilson’s dissent with respect to the legislative objective
of the communication provision.117 It is, they agreed, “meant to address solicitation in
public places and, to that end seeks to eradicate the various forms of social nuisance
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arising from the public display of the sale of sex”.118 Both he and Justice Wilson
concluded that the legislation does not attempt to address “the exploitation, degradation
and subordination of women that are part of the contemporary reality of prostitution”119
nor does it seek to prohibit prostitution itself. The purpose of the law, particularly the
general prohibition on any communication in any manner regardless of whether it causes
traffic congestions or obstruction of others, is to reduce the social nuisance caused by the
sale of sex in public. The legislation is aimed at taking prostitution “out of public
view”120. The Court (with the exception of Justice Lamer) accepted the AttorneyGeneral’s suggestion that “Parliament did not seek to suppress solicitation, but only to
remove it from the public areas where it was creating the obvious harm.”121
This is where the reasoning of Chief Justice McLachlin in Labaye becomes
relevant. Labaye modifies the way in which the law is to conceive of harm under
criminal laws that regulate sexuality. According to Labaye, concepts of harm in the
criminal law context which are premised on sexual propriety and the protection of a
particular sexual morality, rather than actual harm, are not consistent with the values
underpinning the Constitution. Labaye should change the approach to the general
communication provision (what is now section 213.1(c)) by modifying the notion of harm
or social nuisance that can legitimately be targeted by the provision. The social nuisance
or harm identified in the Prostitution Reference as the object of the general
communication provision relates to the “public sensitivities … offended by the sight of
prostitutes negotiating openly for the sale of their bodies and customers negotiating

118

Ibid.
Ibid.
120
Ibid.
121
Ibid. at para. 123.
119

278

perhaps somewhat less openly for their purchase….Neither prostitution nor solicitation is
made illegal. But the high visibility of these activities is offensive and has harmful
effects on those compelled to witness it, especially children.” The genre of harm referred
to here falls under the first branch identified in Labaye: “the harm of public confrontation
with unacceptable and inappropriate conduct.”122 However, as McLachlin notes in
Labaye in the context of the bawdy house provisions, to be consistent with the values
underpinning the Constitution, the degree of harm contemplated by this genre is not “the
aesthetic harm of a less attractive community, but the loss of autonomy and liberty that
public indecency may impose on individuals in society, as they seek to avoid
confrontation with acts they find offensive and unacceptable…to live within a zone that is
free from conduct that deeply offends them.”123 The disruption to ‘public sensitivities’ by
the mere sight of a sex worker soliciting money for sex, or a john offering money for sex,
does not constitute the type of harm contemplated in Labaye. Communicating in a
manner or location that would pose a deeply offensive affront to others, such as perhaps,
persistent and aggressive or overly graphic and sexualized communication or perhaps
communication in or near a church or playground, would constitute the type of harm
contemplated in Labaye.124
There are two counter-arguments in response to this suggestion which should be
addressed. The first argues that a distinction between public indecency laws and public
nuisance laws ought to be made because the standards established in relation to public
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Labaye, supra note 3 at para. 40.
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Just as “the place in which acts take place and the composition of the audience” will affect whether or
not such acts cause the type of harm necessary to be considered indecent” so too will location and audience
affect whether communication causes the type of harm necessary to violate section 213(1)(c).
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indecency are not appropriately applied to laws regarding public nuisance. The response
to this is as follows. In terms of offences whose purpose relates to the social nuisance of,
for instance, communicating in a manner which stops traffic or obstructs a pedestrian
(such as are found under section 213.1(a) and (b)) this counterargument is likely true.125
These offences are not directed towards protecting a particular sexual morality.126
However, in terms of an offence like section 213(1)(c), whose purpose is to protect
people from the social nuisance of seeing something which offends their own moral
sensitivities (such as “the sight of prostitutes negotiating openly for the sale of their
bodies”)127 the conception of harm established in Labaye is both valid and desirable.128
Where the purpose of an offence is to prevent a moral affront, especially one related to
matters of a sexual nature (given both its subjectivity and our tradition of intolerance in
this area), it is entirely appropriate to measure harm based on the standards established in
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An alternative response to this counter argument would be that the types of harm addressed in section
213(1)(a) and (b) – interfering with traffic, obstructing pedestrians – constitute the types of harm
incompatible with the proper functioning of society and would be covered under Labaye.
126
In the Prostitution Reference the Court makes a distinction between the legislative objective of these
provisions and that of the general prohibition against communication under section 213(1)(c).
127
Prostitution Reference, supra note 107 at para. 128. This quote is from Wilson’s dissent but the majority
adopts her reasoning on this point.
128
Even beyond the Court’s conclusions in the Prostitution Reference, there are other arguments that reveal
the sexual moralism underpinning the communication provision. Frances Shaver, in reviewing the
legislative and social history of prostitution in Canada and its relationship to both Victorian era, and modern
day moral crusaders, argues that underpinning the communication provision and the rhetoric of public
nuisance are moralistic concerns about decency and propriety (Frances M. Shaver, “The Regulation of
Prostitution: Avoiding the Morality Traps” 9 Can. J.L. & Soc. 123 (1994). She suggests that the gendered
nature in which they are enforced reveals the moral impetus behind the law. Pointing to the fact that
whether prostitution laws are tailored to be gender –specific and protectionist or adopt gender neutral
objectives, women continue to be disproportionately punished under them. Shaver argues that, the modern
day moral crusader, less overt than his or her Victorian antecedents, often hides behind the rhetoric of
nuisance and that it is not always nuisance but rather a rejection of the acknowledgement by prostitution
that “sex is recreation, that sex is entertainment and that it can be had commercially, anonymously and
promiscuously” at 135. The history of the criminal regulation of prostitution (it was originally a status
offence), the fact that noisome, harassing or disruptive public conduct is already criminally regulated
regardless of whether the perpetrator is soliciting sex, votes, drugs, believers or customers (for example
under section 175), the gendered manner in which the communication law is enforced, and the fact that,
while subsections (1)(a) and (b) of section 213 refer to stopping vehicles or impeding traffic, subsection (c)
prohibits any public communication in any manner, all evidence the sexual moralism underpinning the
general communication prohibition.
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Labaye. As Chief Justice McLachlin noted, “tolerance requires that only serious and
deeply offensive moral assaults can be kept from public view on pain of criminal
sanction.”129 Tolerance, after all, is a key ingredient to the healthy functioning of a liberal
democracy.
The second counter-argument is that to consider the general communication
provision as only prohibiting communication which confronts the public in a way which
threatens the loss of autonomy and liberty to others, that is to say harmful
communication, will not adequately address the harm that the provision was meant to
protect against – the social nuisance which arises when a number of sex workers tend to
all work in the same area. In other words, the social nuisance to be addressed is that
caused when a particular location becomes a stroll area. To some extent this objection is
correct. However, the reasoning in Labaye suggests that objecting to the fact of a stroll
area itself is not a legitimate criminal law purpose. Further, this approach will reduce
some of the social nuisance caused by stroll areas by continuing to criminalize the more
egregious conduct. The existence of a stroll area and the aesthetic affront experienced by
some, at the mere sight of a sex worker plying their trade, like the fact that a particular
neighborhood might contain one or more bawdy houses, is without some associated harm
of the sort contemplated in Labaye, not something that ought to be targeted by the
criminal law. Again, Labaye establishes that only “deeply offensive moral assaults can be
kept from public view on pain of criminal sanction.”130 It does so on the basis that, in a
liberal democracy the force of the criminal law ought not to be brought down upon any
one or group merely to protect some from the thought that other Canadians are having
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Labaye, supra note 3 at para. 41.
Labaye, supra note 3.
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group sex. In the same way, its force should not be deployed merely to sanitize and mask
for others the reality that some (perhaps for survival or perhaps due to the systemic,
entrenched and gendered disparity in economic opportunity existent in Canada), choose
or are forced to sell their bodies for sex.
Why would the reasoning in Labaye ultimately lead to a reduction in the harmful
impact on sex workers which has been perpetuated as a result of the common bawdy
house provisions and the communication provisions? Reflecting upon the implications of
Labaye for the common bawdy house laws and the communication law, it quickly
becomes evident that most of the activities that would continue to be criminalized involve
charges against johns and pimps and not against sex workers. Charges against sex
workers would be most likely to arise only where their conduct is actually causing a
disturbance.
It would mean that the bar owner who coerces women into doing live sex shows,
should still be guilty of keeping a common bawdy house; so might be the owner of a
‘brothel’ who fails to provide security or condoms.131 It would mean that the john who
solicits sex in exchange for money from an obviously intoxicated street worker whose
consent would be more apparent than real should be guilty of communicating for the
purposes of prostitution, as should be the seriously intoxicated street worker who is
aggressively propositioning passersby.
But it also means that the woman who runs a sex trade out of her home should no
longer be the target of the criminal law, nor should the boyfriend who lives with her. It
means that the street worker who takes the time to properly interview a john so as to
131

In Labaye, supra note 3 at para. 51 Chief Justice McLachlin found that the risk of spreading sexually
transmitted diseases was not a relevant factor in determining whether an act was harmful to the participants.
The risk of spreading infectious disease and the provision of condoms are analytically distinct.
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ensure her safety before climbing into a vehicle with him wouldn’t be committing a
criminal offence by doing so. It means that neither the “massage therapist” nor the owner
of Studio 176 in Ponomarev should be the target of the criminal law and nor should the
private dancers in adult clubs.
Conclusion
As noted, Chief Justice McLachlin’s approach in Labaye suggests that the
criminal regulation of sex will only be legitimate where it is in furtherance of the political
morality that we, as a society, have endorsed and not where it is deployed to sustain, or
further, any particular sexual morality. This distinction, borrowed as it is from Ronald
Dworkin’s theory of political liberalism,132 recognizes the significance of sexual
autonomy; in doing so it permits greater space for sexual narratives which have not
always been heard by the law. It is an approach which is consistent with Canada’s liberal
democracy and the values underpinning the Constitution. In this sense Chief Justice
McLachlin’s reasoning in Labaye relies upon, in order to protect, the fundamental ethical
and social considerations enshrined in the Constitution.
However, emphasizing the importance of autonomy is not enough. Criminal laws
regulating sexuality must acknowledge and accommodate the very significant sexual
harms, particularly against women and children, which occur every day in Canada. These
laws must account for harm in a very real way. But with this in mind, the challenge will
always lie with deciding how harm should be defined. This is why law will never be fully
disaggregated from morality. At some point there will always be a measure of judgment;
even criminal laws used to regulate sexuality which adopt a harm based approach will
always, at some point, demand some moral assessment of harm. Chief Justice
132

See Dworkin, supra note 52 at 190.
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McLachlin’s approach in Labaye does not avoid this quagmire. Moral assessments of
harm will continue, to some extent, to be subjectively determined by individual
adjudicators. What her approach does do is suggest that, when it come to that moment of
truth - that point of moral assessment - adjudicators should be guided by political morality
rather than sexual morality (their own or the community’s). Is this more objective?
Perhaps it is, perhaps it is not. But it is certainly less majoritarian and this is positive.
Those responsible for legislating and interpreting prostitution laws have explicitly
taken the position that the purposes of the common bawdy house provisions and the
communication for the purposes of prostitution provision are not to prevent the
exploitation, degradation and subordination of sex workers.133 In the case of the general
communication provision, the purpose has been to prevent affronts to public sensitivities
caused by the sight of the sale of sex, which is a thinly veiled sexual moralism that
disfavours the commodification of sex. In the case of the bawdy house provisions there is
no veil; the bride’s face - big nose, warts, and all that sexual moralism- is revealed for all
the church to see. Labaye rejects the legitimacy of including sexual moralism – whether
at the level of the individual or the community – in the interpretation of the criminal law.
In doing so, it offers hope for those whose perhaps already precarious life circumstances
have been further jeopardized by the historical interpretation and application of the bawdy
house provisions and the communication provision.
The Standing Committee on Justice recently found that “law enforcement officials
and prosecutors do not seem to use general application provisions of the Criminal Code,
133

In the Prostitution Reference, supra note 107 the majority and the dissent agreed that the communication
provision is not concerned with the protection of sex workers (only Justice Lamer suggested that harm to
sex workers might also be a legislative objective of the provision.) In Mara, supra note 16, Justice Sopinka
rejected the notion that the bawdy house provision, in the context of indecency, was at all directed towards
protecting the lap dancers themselves.
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like kidnapping, extortion, sexual exploitation and assault to address the violence in
prostitution”.134 Those concerned with the harm that the exchange of sex for money
causes women because of the messages it conveys should be more concerned about what
it says about women and gender on a societal level that basic criminal law protection
against rape, torture, assault and murder is not afforded to this category of sexualized
women in the same way as it is to other citizens, rather than the messages conveyed about
women and gender by the fact that some women choose to sell their bodies, and that some
men choose to pay for sex (or lap dances or manual ejaculation). They should be more
concerned with the latter rather than the former, if for no other reason than as a matter of
priority and triage. And those concerned with those criminal laws which are presently
enforced with respect to sex workers – that is laws which criminalize the activities
associated with prostitution - should advocate to ensure that the objectives underpinning
these provisions and the manner in which they are interpreted, at the very least, attempt
not to compound the risk of harms that sex workers already face. This, however, will
require relinquishing reliance on moralistic assumptions about commercial sex. So long
as sexual morality continues to inform the interpretation, application, and enforcement of
these provisions, the provisions will continue to perpetuate harm to those most affected
by them.
This chapter demonstrated the manner in which the Supreme Court has, in its
approach to the criminal regulation of obscenity and indecency shifted towards a more
constructivist conception of sexual violence. A conception, like as was the case with
changes to sexual assault law, that better accommodates the social factors through which
sexual violence is constituted. In the context of sexual assault this meant revisions to the
134

The Challenge of Change, supra note 91 at 88.

285

meaning of sexual assault and the meaning of consent that better incorporate the
perspective of all sexual actors involved. In the context of obscenity and indecency it has
meant a shift from sexual morality to political morality. In both contexts the result is a
greater focus on sexual actors, and their sexual integrity. The social constructivist theory
that seems to have been most influential in these cases is the power feminist assertion that
sexual violence is produced by power imbalances, systemic gendered inequities,
relationships, and context. It is the assertion that this aspect of sexuality – sexual
violence - is socially produced rather than naturally occurring. Sexual violence is a
product of social conditions not biological ones.
Thus far social constructivist theories have been employed uncritically. The
chapters to follow will demonstrate the theoretical difficulties, and their legal
implications, both with incomplete (as in the case of power feminism) and the complete
(as in the case of queer theory) adoption of constructivist approaches.
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Chapter 6 – The Trouble With Power Feminism

The previous chapter revealed the relationship between essentialist conceptions of
sexuality and a moral focus on sex itself rather than sexual relationships. It argued that
legal reasoning founded on sexual morality tends to articulate one specific set of sexual
morals – one specific (essentialist) idea about what sex is (or should be); it demonstrated
how the law traditionally perpetuated this approach by focusing on the protection of sex
itself rather than the people or relationships involved in sexual interactions. Chapter Five
also suggested that the invocation of a sexual morality concerned with sex itself – an
approach which stems from an essentialist conception of sexuality - is problematic,
particularly for women. Chapter Five concluded by demonstrating, using the example of
the criminal regulation of sex work, how this shift to a more constructivist approach to the
intersection of law and sexual morality if carried forward, could mean that those who, in
this society, are overly sexualized, under sexualized, restricted, violated or ignored will be
more likely to see respect for their sexual integrity and sexual realities reflected back to
them in the laws that govern their sexual conduct.
Both Chapter Four and Chapter Five also argued that this shift towards a more
constructivist conception of sexual violence – in which the law’s moral focus moved from
a concern over sexual acts to a concern over sexual actors and in which certain legal
definitions have been modified such that social factors including the perspectives of all
sexual actors, and the power dynamics at play, are taken into account – was influenced if
not precipitated by the theoretical perspectives of power feminism.1 Chapter Five also

1

LEAF in particular advanced this power feminist analysis regarding issues of sexual violence. For
scholarship substantiating this assertion see Christopher Manfredi, feminist activism in the supreme court:
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demonstrated that despite this influence, post-Butler, sexual moralism as manifested
through the community standards of tolerance, was still very much a part of the Court’s
analysis in cases involving the criminal regulation of sex work, indecency and obscenity.
This chapter seeks to further explore this continued reliance on sexual moralism,
in an effort to suggest why power feminism was unable to unhinge the problematic
linkage between law and sexual morality.

I. The Structural Pitfall of Power Feminism
“Remember, Ginger Rogers did everything Fred Astaire did, but backwards and in high
heels.”
Faith Whittlesey

What do power feminism, and the Court’s recognition in 1992 that sex is an
equality issue, have to do with the community standards of tolerance test and reasoning
from sexual morality? An examination of cases such as R. v. Tremblay, R. v. Mara,
Reference Re Prostitution, Little Sisters, and Norberg v. Wynrib demonstrates that,
despite the fact that during this era the Court’s opinions began to reflect aspects of the
conception of sexuality suggested by power feminism, their decisions, because they also
continued to rely upon the community standards of tolerance test, persisted in
perpetuating a construction of female sexuality which was unsophisticated, highly
moralistic and which failed to recognize women’s sexual integrity.2 In other words,

Legal Mobilization and the Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund, (UBC Press: Vancouver, 2004);
see also Christopher Manfredi “Judicial Discretion and Fundamental Justice: Sexual Assault in the Supreme
Court of Canada” 47 Am J of Comp L, (1990) 489. For specific doctrine supporting this assertion compare
for example their factums in cases such as R v Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 SCR 330, R v Butler,[1992] 1 SCR 452
and Norberg v Wynrib, infra note 12, to the Court’s decisions in these cases.
2
See the discussion of R v Mara [1997] 2 CSR 630 and R v Tremblay [1993] 2 SCR 932 and Reference Re
Prostitution, [1990] 1 SCR 1123 in Chapter 5. See the discussion below regarding Norberg v Wynrib, infra
note 12 at 8.
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despite finally incorporating feminist analysis regarding sexual power dynamics into their
reasoning these opinions continued to construct conceptions of consent, women’s
sexuality and sex itself that were moralistic, essentialist and oversimplified.
This is not to suggest that the lessons of inequity and discrimination which a
power feminist analysis of sex offers are not important for courts’ to grasp and
incorporate into their reasoning; nor is it to dispute the fact that much substantive law
reform has been achieved through this analysis. The objectives of Chapters Four and Five
were to demonstrate precisely the opposite. Instead, these cases suggest that an
application of power feminist analysis effected through a lens of sexual morality will
continue to perpetuate a legal construction of sexuality which is not consistent with the
promotion of sexual integrity as a social good and which will inevitably stunt the
potential for a more sophisticated legal approach to sexuality that a constructivist based
analysis might otherwise offer.
It may not be coincidental that the Court was able to incorporate power feminist
ideals about sex into these decisions without relinquishing a foundation for their analysis
that was premised on sexual morality. There is an epistemic structure which legal
reasoning reliant in some respect on first person ethics (such as individual sexual
morality)3 shares with the ideology advanced by power feminists in the 1980s and 1990s.
Discourse, ideas and theories, legal or otherwise, that advance or ascribe to the possibility
of an objective sexual morality rely heavily upon notions of universal truth4. The more
3

I am referring here to first person ethics in the sense described by Ronald Dworkin.(See Chapter Five at
page 20 for a discussion of his theory). See Ronald Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here? (Princeton
University Press: Princeton, 2006); Ronald Dworkin, “Foundations of Liberal Equality”, in S. Darwall, ed.,
Equal Freedom (Ann Arbour: University of Michigan Press, 1995) 190.
4
Note that a first person sexual ethics that adopts this sort of universalism is not in itself problematic
provided it remains a universe of one. It is only when such ethics are applied to a larger universe that
potential injustices begin to arise. Speaking in terms of sexuality, in a universe of one, finite meaning
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radical proponents of power feminism also rely heavily on notions of undisputed truths
and universally applicable claims (regarding power, dominance and sex).
In the United States movement power feminists “formed important alliances with
social and religious conservatives morally opposed to issues such as “pornography, public
sex, and commercial sex.5 While this did not occur in Canada – perhaps because the
Christian right was not politically active in Canada in the way it was/is in the United
States – critics of power feminism in Canada have nonetheless linked the movement with
conservative sexual morality.
In her analysis of the LEAF factum submitted to the Supreme Court in Butler,
Lise Gotell discusses these not so strange bedfellows.6 Gotell’s claim is somewhat
different from the suggestion made here that they share a similar epistemic structure.
Gotell suggests that their position, which she refers to as ‘feminist foundationalism’, like
that of the social puritans on the right, also stems from conservative sexual morality.7
Is Gotell correct to suggest that feminist foundationalism stems from conservative
sexual morality? In fact some of the arguments made by LEAF in their Butler factum
would suggest otherwise,8 as would their position in Little Sisters.9 Instead it may be that

formation ie closure, completeness, at any given moment should be possible. See the discussion of Ernesto
Laclau’s work on meaning formation and closure in Chapter Seven for a greater exposition of this point.
5
Janet Halley, Split decisions: Taking a Break from Feminism,(Princeton University Press: Princeton,
2006) at 29.
6
Brenda Cossman, Shannon Bell, Lise Gotell & Becki L. Ross, Bad Attitude/s on Trial: Pornography,
Feminism, and the Butler Decision, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997).
7
This is directly contradictory to what feminists, such as LEAF interveners, have claimed. Indeed, they
declared Butler a victory, in part, because of its purported rejection of sexual morality in favour of concerns
regarding women’s equality.
8
R v. Butler,[1992] 1 SCR 452 (Factum of the Intervener LEAF at para. 7).
9
Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120 (Factum of
the Intervener LEAF). Admittedly there may also have been intra group politics, stemming from tensions
between the lesbian faction and the straight faction of the group, motivating their position in Little Sisters or
even a response to the critique they received from ‘pro-sex’ feminist and queer positive theorists postButler. Nonetheless, LEAF’s position in Little Sisters, at least as it pertains to lesbian pornography, can
hardly be described as reflecting a conservative sexual morality.
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the foundationalism in ‘feminist foundationalism’ stems simply from the fact that power
feminism is a structural theory.
Power feminism is structural. The object of its critique is in every sense premised
on the assertion of the following claim; society is structured in the following manner:
Male
Female 10

The difficulty with a structural theory is that it tends to produce a totalizing metanarrative. The problem with meta-narratives is that they rely on universal claims.
Universal claims, in turn, are founded on the possibility of objectivity. Claims of
objectivity in the context of sexuality at some point in the analysis are underpinned by a
particular sexual morality. The power feminist meta-narrative inevitably excludes
perspectives and sexual realities not in keeping with its ideals or objective truths.
For example, a legal approach which starts from the premise that women, because
of social realities such as economic deprivation, or social conditioning and false
consciousness, can never truly consent to, for example, loveless sex, or involvement with
pornography or consensual sadomasochism or prostitution is dogmatic, paternalistic and
silencing for many women. It is a legal approach that refuses or fails to operate outside of
the structure that it has claimed as both universal and universally the target of its critique.
Power feminism identifies

M
as problematic. Its aim is to, if not invert this
F

dynamic, at least redistribute its power. It uses constructivist arguments to ‘deconstruct’
the essentialist assumptions about masculinity, femininity and (hetero)sexuality that
10

The articulation of power feminism’s structural foundation as MF is borrowed from Janet Halley, Split
Decisions, supra note 5 at 17. In Split Decisions Halley summarizes feminism in general as involving three
fundamental claims: “m/f, m>f and carrying the brief for f”. By MF she is referring to power feminism’s
critique of systemic male subordination of female.

291

perpetuate

M
. Its failure to disaggregate itself from sexual morality arises because it
F

relies for its foundation on universal claims – assertions of objective truth – about this
structure. In doing so is it unable to introvert its constructivist analysis (regarding the
social contingency of sexuality) to allow conceptual space to challenge those claims it
identifies as ‘truths’. The problem is that even if Ginger were to lead and Fred were to
wear the heels, it may not be enough to simply dance the steps in reverse.
As suggested in the introduction to Chapter Two, once a constructivist
understanding of sexuality has been adopted it becomes impossible to coherently defend
an objective perspective on any aspect of sexuality. Once one acknowledges that the
meaning of sexuality is socially constructed it becomes impossible to make objective
claims of truth about sexuality. It becomes harder, with this conceptual approach to make
legal distinctions about good sex and bad sex, and to create laws oriented towards
protecting sexual integrity if sexual integrity and good sex cannot be objectively
identified, or defined. This is because of what I describe in Chapter Seven as the paradox
of queer theory. Power feminism avoids this paradox by anchoring its constructivist claim
in a universal structural claim about inequality. However, in avoiding it, it creates its
own paradox; it creates an inability to coherently detach from first person ethics – in this
context, from sexual morality.11

11

It also unnecessarily confines power feminists to one type of argument - the equality argument See for
example LEAF’s factum in M.K. v. M.H., [1992] 3 SCR 6 where they frame their argument entirely based on a
section 15 equality analysis and only then go on to offer the Court a very insightful and useful argument – one
that was very contextual but not at all related to section 15 of the Charter – concerning the need to change
limitation periods for tortuous causes of action stemming from allegations of incest. The contextual arguments
upon which the Court in M.K. v. M.H. based their decision to approach limitation periods differently in cases
involving childhood sexual abuse directly mirrored the contextual arguments that LEAF made in their factum.
The majority, at para.15, concluded in one sentence that it was unnecessary to address LEAF’s constitutional
arguments regarding section 15.
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As will be discussed below, a legal approach which incorporates a social
constructivist understanding of sexual violence into a broader conceptual framework
which continues to conceptualize sexuality from an essentialist perspective imbued with
sexual morality creates problematic decisions such as the majority opinion in Norberg v.
Wynrib, or the decision in Little Sisters.
II. Norberg v. Wynrib – Desiring The Drug Not The Doc
Norberg v. Wynrib,12 a civil case involving a 33 year old claimant who sued her
80 year old male doctor for negligence, battery and breach of fiduciary duty, was
considered a victory by feminists. It was heralded as “a milestone in the legal history of
sexual abuse litigation”.13 Like in Butler, LEAF also intervened in this case, and like in
Butler the Court again approached the sexual interactions involved as issues of equality,
embracing concepts such as power imbalance, trust and unconscionability to characterize
the sexual relationship between the litigants. The majority opinion was written by
Justice LaForest, with concurring judgments by Justice McLachlin (with Justice
L'Heureux-Dubé) and Justice Sopinka. The decision touches upon issues of consent,
commercial sex, tort law, fiduciary duty, and sexual assault.
In her early twenties Laura Norberg became addicted to pain killers after
recovering from a dental problem. For a period of time she obtained the drugs she sought
from various doctors and from her sister; eventually she began seeing Dr. Wynrib, an elderly
medical practitioner. Using a variety of pretexts, she obtained prescriptions for painkillers
from him for some period of time until he confronted her about her drug usage and she
admitted that she was addicted to the drugs he had been prescribing. Upon this admission,
12

[1992] 2 S.C.R. 226.
Jan Cowie, “Difference, Dominance, Dilemma: A Critical Analysis of Norberg v Wynrib” (1994) 58
Sask. L. Rev. 357 at 358.
13
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he advised her that if she was “good to him he would be good to her” and pointed upstairs to
his apartment.14
Norberg refused his offer and sought drugs from other doctors. However, eventually
her other sources dried up and she returned to see Wynrib. On several occasions over the
course of the following year Norberg would allow Wynrib to fondle her and simulate
intercourse with her in exchange for prescriptions. After a time, she told him that she
needed help with her addiction but instead of helping her he advised her to "just quit".15
Norberg eventually, on her own initiative, attended a rehabilitation centre and was able to
resolve her addiction.
She later sued Wynrib for sexual assault, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty and
breach of contract. At trial, she admitted that she "played" on the fact that he liked her and
that she knew throughout the relationship that he was lonely.16 The action was dismissed at
trial and on appeal and Norberg appealed further to the Supreme Court of Canada. All
members of the Court found for Ms. Norberg, but on the basis of different causes of
action. Justice LaForest found liability on the grounds of battery. Justice McLachlin (as
she then was) based liability on breach of fiduciary duty.17
For Justice LaForest the issue was one of consent and whether it was vitiated. For
Justice McLachlin, that she consented was irrelevant – Dr. Wynrib breached his fiduciary
duty and was liable on that basis. Justice LaForest, for the majority, having found that
Wynrib’s conduct constituted sexual battery, determined that it was unnecessary to rule
with respect to the other causes of action.
14

Norberg v. Wynrib, supra note 12 at para. 4.
Ibid. at para. 8.
16
Ibid. at para. 6.
17
Justice Sopinka also wrote a concurring opinion. He found that Wynrib’s conduct was negligent and
established liability on that basis.
15
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The tort of battery refers to the intentional infliction of unlawful force on another
person; intentional touching will not be battery where the person touched has consented to
the touch. In other words, battery is the intentional touching of one person by another, if
that touch was not consensual. However, even if consent to the touch was explicitly or
implicitly provided, such consent will be vitiated if it was obtained through force, or the
threat of force, or through fraud or deceit or where it was given under the influence of
drugs.18
Norberg agreed to participate in the sexual acts in exchange for drugs. There was
no physical force perpetrated or threatened by Wynrib; nor was Norberg found to be
under the influence of the drugs to which she was addicted when her consent was
provided. However, Justice LaForest found that the factors vitiating the consent defence
were not limited to these:
In my view, this approach to consent in this kind of case is too limited. As
Heuston and Buckley, Salmond and Heuston on the Law of Torts (19th ed.
1987), at pp. 564-65, put it: "A man cannot be said to be `willing' unless he
is in a position to choose freely; and freedom of choice predicates the
absence from his mind of any feeling of constraint interfering with the
freedom of his will". A "feeling of constraint" so as to "interfere with the
freedom of a person's will" can arise in a number of situations not involving
force, threats of force, fraud or incapacity. The concept of consent as it
operates in tort law is based on a presumption of individual autonomy and
free will. It is presumed that the individual has freedom to consent or not to
consent. This presumption, however, is untenable in certain circumstances.
A position of relative weakness can, in some circumstances, interfere with
the freedom of a person's will. Our notion of consent must, therefore, be
modified to appreciate the power relationship between the parties.19
(emphasis added)

18
19

Norberg v. Wynrib, supra note 12 at 27.
Norberg v. Wynrib, supra note 12 at 27.
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This is a significant finding. It is also consistent with the power feminist analysis
submitted to the Court in this case by LEAF.20 It is recognition of the basic claim that sex
is about power and that as such, an inquiry into the power dynamics at play is required to
accurately assess the authenticity of consent given in a particular sexual encounter.
Where Justice LaForest’s reasoning becomes problematic is in how he structures this
inquiry into the power dynamics at issue.
Justice LaForest based his decision on principles of unconscionability and
inequality of bargaining position as borrowed from the law of contract. He determined
that in circumstances where two parties to a sexual encounter are not of equal bargaining
position (which he suggests will typically be the case in special power dependency
relationships21) and where the sexual relationship is exploitative, consent is vitiated.
Exploitation, he determined, will be established based on community standards. He noted
that contracts involving unequal parties will be considered exploitative where the
transaction is sufficiently divergent from community standards of commercial morality.22
Drawing a direct analogy to sexual battery in the next sentence, he suggested that
“if the type of sexual relationship at issue is one that is sufficiently divergent from
community standards of conduct, this may alert the court to the possibility of exploitation.”23
While he did not actually specify that it was community standards of sexual morality to
which he was referring, it is difficult to imagine that he was referring to anything else,
particularly given his direct analogy to commercial morality and his finding that the

20

The LEAF factum focused particular attention on the battery (sexual assault) claim; less consideration
was given, in their factum, to the breach of fiduciary duty and negligence claims.
21
By ‘special power dependency relationships’ he means doctor-patient, teacher-student, or lawyer-client
type relationships.
22
Norberg v. Wynrib, supra note 12 at 37.
23
Ibid. at para. 40.
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sexual relationship here was exploitive because the community would find it
“disgraceful” and “sordid”.24
In this case he found that Wynrib’s medical knowledge, combined with his
knowledge of Norberg’s drug addiction and his ability to prescribe drugs gave him power
over her. He also found, as noted, that because the community (and the medical profession)
would consider the sexual conduct ‘disgraceful’ and ‘sordid’, it had been established that the
relationship was exploitive. As such he determined that Dr. Wynrib had committed sexual
battery; that is to say, the sexual relationship between the parties was not consensual under
tort law.
Unfortunately, despite his acknowledgment of the power dynamics at play in a
sexual relationship of this sort, Justice LaForest’s decision gives with one hand and takes
away with the other. To be more precise, he recognizes the importance of protecting
women’s sexual integrity, while simultaneously undermining it. There are three significant
and interrelated difficulties with his reasoning: i) by analogizing the sexual relationship
between the parties to a contract and then using principles of contract law to develop his
reasoning he obscures the complexity of sex, and ignores the important element of
affectivity; ii) by concluding that the sexual relationship between the parties was nonconsensual he denies recognition of the very autonomy he attempted to recognize;25 iii) by
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Ibid. at para. 44.
Certainly Justice LaForest’s reliance on tort evidences his intention is to recognize the importance of
(women’s) autonomy. As he notes, at 27, “the concept of consent as it operates in tort law is based on a
presumption of individual autonomy and free will.” Indeed, the very premise of the tort of battery is one of
autonomy. See Non-Marine Underwriters, Lloyd's of London v. Scalera, [2000] 1 SCR 551 at para. 15:
“We should not lightly set aside the traditional rights-based approach to the law of battery that is now the
law of Canada. The tort of battery is aimed at protecting the personal autonomy of the individual. Its
purpose is to recognize the right of each person to control his or her body and who touches it, and to permit
damages where this right is violated. The compensation stems from violation of the right to autonomy.”
Another critique of his decision is to suggest that it protects a conception of autonomy which is inadequate.
It protects a conception of autonomy as ‘freedom from’ – a conception which were he to understand
25
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relying upon community standards of tolerance to determine whether or not a sexual
relationship is exploitative his reasoning is unduly moralistic.
Attempting to apply the principles of contract law and the reasoning underpinning
these principles to a sexual interaction results in an account of sex which is moralistic and
which is not reflective of many women’s sexual realities. As Justice McLachlin notes in her
concurrence, the doctrines of tort and contract do not “capture the essential nature of the
wrong done to the plaintiff. Unquestionably, they do catch aspects of that wrong. But to
look at the events which occurred over the course of the relationship between Dr. Wynrib
and Ms. Norberg from the perspective of tort or contract is to view that relationship through
lenses which distort more than they bring into focus.”26 Instead, Justice McLachlin based
her finding on breach of fiduciary duty.27
Justice LaForest’s analogy to contract law and relationships involving an
inequality of bargaining power obfuscates the complexity and nuance that sex often
entails. Contract law, Justice LaForest noted, has developed doctrine to ensure that where
autonomy in a Razian sense, or in the sense advocated by Drucilla Cornell in The Imaginary Domain, or
Nicola Lacey in “Unspeakable Subjects, Impossible Rights: Sexuality, Integrity, and Criminal Law” (1998)
11 Can. J.L. & Juris. 47” would appear impoverished.
26
Norberg v. Wynrib, supra note 12 at 50.
27
Doctrinally this move is significant. While there was at this point in the law of fiduciaries no question
that a doctor – patient relationship could give rise to fiduciary obligations (McInerney v. MacDonald, [1992]
2 S.C.R. 138) the law was still unsettled as to what the nature of such obligations would be. In LAC Minerals
Ltd. v. International Corona Resources Ltd., [1989] 2 S.C.R. 574, Justice Sopinka writing for the majority,
held that fiduciary obligations "must be reserved for situations that are truly in need of the special protection
that equity affords". He suggested that the duty ought to be reserved for matters akin to the duty of
confidentiality. Preferring instead Justice Wilson’s earlier opinion in Frame v. Smith, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 99,
Justice McLachlin held that the principles of fiduciary obligation should not be restricted to such narrow legal
and economic interests but rather should also be used to defend fundamental human and personal interests.
Justice McLachlin’s approach to fiduciary duty in the context of sexual contact was adopted by the majority less
than a year later in M.K. v. M.H., supra note 11 where the Court, with Justice LaForest writing for the majority,
found a father liable for breach of fiduciary duty based on incestuous sexual abuse he perpetuated against his
daughter. Justice LaForest quoted approvingly from Justice McLachlin’s decision in Norberg v. Wynrib
although he continued to rely on tort law in addition to finding liability under breach of fiduciary duty. Of
course, a finding of battery in M.K. v. M.H., a case involving the sexual assault of a child, is not problematic in
the way that such a finding is problematic in Norberg v. Wynrib. The issues that arise in Norberg v. Wynrib
regarding a finding that consent was vitiated would not arise in M.K. v. M.H., where the child lacked capacity to
consent to sexual contact with the father in the first place.
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contracting parties do not share equal bargaining authority the “weaker” party will be
protected. “The doctrines of duress, undue influence, and unconscionability have arisen to
protect the vulnerable when they are in a relationship of unequal power. For reasons of
public policy, the law will not always hold weaker parties to the bargains they make.” He
goes on to suggest that this same notion of unconscionability should be applied in the
context of sexual battery.
One problem with this approach is that the rules, the social mores, the types of
communication, the criteria for evaluation, the intent of the parties, the social attitudes,
the law, the interpersonal dynamics and the power imbalances involved in negotiating a
sexual encounter are not only different from those involved when negotiating for anything
else, but complex relationships involving not easily discernable, let alone dissected,
power imbalances are likely the norm and not the exception when it comes to sexual
interactions.
Think, for example, of a stay at home mother of three who is financially and
socially dependent on her husband, or think about an unpopular high school girl in the
back seat of the captain of the hockey team’s car. Nor is gender the only salient factor
implicated in these imbalances. Consider, for example, a young woman having sex with
another much more experienced woman for the first time, or a middle aged gay man
having sex with a much younger and more attractive twenty –five year old man, or think
about a desperately in love man who knows his girlfriend is having an affair; perhaps
think about a sex worker charging $1500 to spend the night with a lonely and sexually
disabled client, then think about the drug addicted sex worker charging $20.00 to give a
blow job to a drunk college student.
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While the ideal conditions for any contractual relationship may be rare, perhaps it
is possible to identify what those conditions would be and to, as a result, go about
defining finite rules to govern the human behavior of contracting generally. Not so in the
case of sexual negotiations.
There are problems with borrowing from contract law in a legal circumstance such
as this. First, it is disingenuous. Justice LaForest had at this point in his analysis already
indicated that ‘the community’ would find the exchange of sex for drugs ‘sordid’ and
‘disgusting’. One wonders what trades – outside of love, commitment or mutual orgasm
- the community he draws on would find not to be exploitative. Adopted in its entirety,
his position exposes a great number of sexual actors to tortuous liability for sexual
battery.
Second, while it may well be possible to identify a balanced contractual
relationship in other contexts and instantiate through doctrine a determinate set of rules to
govern those relationships, attempts to do so in the context of sexuality seem less
plausible. Sex, even when it is not dirty, is quite often messy.
This is not to suggest that the issue of power imbalances in sexual relationships is
not crucially important to the legal regulation of sex or the concept of consent, nor
obviously is it to suggest that there can not be legally enforced rules regulating sexual
conduct in a society, but rather to suggest that Justice LaForest’s analysis is not a
particularly helpful way to approach the issue. It is difficult to imagine a sexual
interaction in which the parties are in completely the same position with respect to one
another- that is to say, in which the exchange is purely an exchange of sexual ‘goods’.
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Donald Dripps argues that there is no possibility of true parallel mutuality of this
type in sexual interactions.28 There is nothing to suggest, he argues, that the experience
of sex for women is categorically similar to the experience of sex for men. Let alone the
experience of sex by any given woman or any given man.29 “Whether one cites feminist
theorists or the judgment of Tiresius, there is no reason to believe that the exchange of a
male orgasm for a female orgasm is any more symmetrical than the exchange of orgasms
for money, affection, or security.”30
The hypothetical sexual scenario that he suggests most closely approximates true
mutuality would be the situation of two men, unknown to each other, who have
anonymous sex, no strings attached, in a bathhouse. “Here is sex at its least
constrained.”31 It is not he suggests, “influenced by threat of force or by promise of gain;
their encounter has no history and no consequence. Their common gender spares us any
difficulty with whatever domination may inhere, as a result of social injustice, in gender
itself. They make love solely because they find each other sexually attractive.”32 But, he
goes on to point out that, “[e]ven the bathhouse encounter is not the product of justly
distributed erotic assets.”33 Even it, he argues, is constrained; “the participants may diet
or exercise but fundamental aspects of their bodies are unchangeable. One of them must
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See Donald Dripps, “Beyond Rape: An Essay On the Difference Between The Presence of Force and The
Absence of Consent” (1992) 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1780.
29
Ibid. at 1790.
30
Ibid. at 1790.
31
Ibid. at 1788.
32
Ibid. at 1788. (His choice to describe their encounter as ‘making love’ is curious. It seems in tension
with his overall argument. It also seems unlikely that very many men who have sex in bathhouses would
describe it as ‘making love’. Anecdotally, the sense I have from those I have spoken with, is that men who
frequent bathhouses do not typically go in search of love and those that do end up sorely disappointed.
Setting aside his odd choice of colloquialism, his hypothetical is nonetheless illuminating.)
33
Ibid. at 1791.
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be more attractive, or more eager for sex, or know more about the possibility of doing
better by waiting, than the other.”34
Justice LaForest’s approach, by attempting to vitiate the consent that Norberg
“undoubtedly gave”35 is an attempt to avoid the messy acknowledgment that sex is very
often, if not always, about more than the equal exchange of erotic experiences.
Unfortunately, to ignore this messiness is to embrace a conception of sexuality which is
simplistic and which ignores both the insights of Tiresius and the lived realities of many
sexual actors. While his approach is consistent with power feminist ideology MacKinnon argues that “consent in sex … is supposed to mean freedom of desire
expressed, not compensation for services rendered”36- he, like MacKinnon, relies on an
assumption that is at best questionable.
Why should we assume such a constricted conception of consent? Is consent
really always about desire?

Sometimes people trade sex for drugs…or for money… or

for a warm place to sleep. People tend to do that when they are hard up for drugs…or
money… or a warm place to sleep. Laura Norberg was hard up for drugs. She traded
some sex for drugs. As Justice McLachlin suggested, there is no doubt that she consented
to the sexual activity and to engage in reasoning which attempts to show otherwise really
just muddies what are already nasty waters.37

34

Ibid. at 1789.
This is taken from Justice McLachlin’s concurrence, acknowledging the finding of the trial judge (supra
note 12 at para. 57).
36
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law, (Harvard University
Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1987) at 11.
37
“Tort and contract can provide a remedy for a physician's failure to provide adequate treatment. But only
with considerable difficulty can they be bent to accommodate the wrong of a physician's abusing his or her
position to obtain sexual favours from his or her patient. The law has never recognized consensual sexual
relations as capable of giving rise to an obligation in tort or in contract. My colleagues, with respect, strain to
conclude the contrary.” Norberg v. Wynrib, supra note 12 at 73.
35

302

Justice LaForest’s conclusion that Norberg did not consent because her desire was
for the drug not the doc is directly correlated with an idealistic and moralistic account of
female sexuality and sexual innocence – an account that unfortunately dichotomizes
women into victims and whores, tending to protect the former and ignore the latter.38 In
order to address the sexual wrong which most certainly occurred in this case without
facing the, perhaps not so nice, fact that people sometimes trade sex for drugs Justice
LaForest constructed a woman without any sexual agency because of her less than ideal
circumstances. Sexual agency is an essential element of sexual integrity.
The moral implications of his reasoning are evidenced by what he identifies as the
“determining factor”39: the fact that Wynrib and not Norberg initiated the sexual
exchange. In other words, he establishes a legal remedy precariously contingent on
Norberg’s relative sexual innocence - somewhat of a house of (playboy?) cards. Under
Justice LaForest’s reasoning if Laura Norberg had been the one to suggest the sex for
drugs arrangement this same doctor who undoubtedly took gross advantage of his drug
addicted patient would have escaped liability.
Alternatively, Justice McLachlin was able to acknowledge the sexual wrong and
provide a remedy without denying Norberg’s capacity for sexual agency or perpetuating
the victim versus the whore dichotomy; under Justice McLachlin’s breach of fiduciary
duty finding, Norberg can be a woman who traded her doctor some sex for drugs and still
be entitled to compensation. However, in order to make this finding Justice McLachlin
38

It should be noted, MacKinnon’s assumption that consent is supposed to mean freedom of desire
expressed is not premised on an idealized and romantic account of sex – no one would accuse her of that.
See for example Leo Bersani, “Is the Rectum A Grave?” October, 43 AIDS: Cultural Analysis/Cultural
Activism (Winter, 1987) 197 where he discusses the very unromantic and idealized account of sex provided
by MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin.
39
Justice LaForest stated, at para 46, “it seems to me that the determining factor in this case is that he
instigated the relationship -- it was he, not the appellant, who used his power and knowledge to initiate the
arrangement and to exploit her vulnerability” (Norberg v. Wynrib, supra note 12).
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had to acknowledge the perhaps less than pleasant reality that Norberg chose to trade sex
for drugs. Justice McLachlin did not question the fact that Wynrib took advantage of
Norberg (and that because he did so in his capacity as a doctor he was liable40) but nor did
she question Norberg’s sexual autonomy by suggesting she did not have the capacity to
consent.
Under Justice LaForest’s reasoning it was still necessary to inquire into the
cleanliness of her hands – had he been unable to vitiate her own ‘sexual naughtiness’
under his consent analysis he would have had to bar recovery under the doctrine of ex
turpi causa. Justice McLachlin, rejects outright the relevance of moral assessments
regarding her sexual conduct:
The short answer to the arguments based on wrongful conduct of the plaintiff is that
she did nothing wrong in the context of this relationship. She was not a sinner, but a
sick person, suffering from an addiction which proved to be uncontrollable in the
absence of a professional drug rehabilitation program…. It matters not that she
walked into his office in an attempt to obtain drugs to which she was addicted. Even
if that purpose had not been merely symptomatic of her illness, but in some sense
immoral, Dr. Wynrib's conduct in exploiting her dependency for his own ends
would have in any event constituted a breach of that aspect of his fiduciary
obligation enshrined, thousands of years ago, in the words of the Hippocratic
Oath.41
The final difficulty with Justice LaForest’s reasoning is his reliance on community
standards to determine whether a relationship is exploitative. What does it mean to
suggest that whether a sexual encounter is considered exploitative will depend on
community standards of morality? Why would a determination of exploitation turn on
whether or not the community would consider the sexual conduct to be ‘sordid’ and
‘disgraceful’? Taking into consideration the need to protect the sexual integrity of all
40

“It is not disputed that Dr. Wynrib abused his duty to the plaintiff. He provided her with drugs he knew she
should not have. He failed to advise her to enrol in an anti-addiction program, thereby prolonging her addiction.
Instead, he took advantage of her addiction to obtain sexual favours from her over a period of more than two
years.” Norberg v. Wynrib, supra note 12 at 57.
41
Norberg v. Wynrib, supra note 12 at 90.
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sexual actors in a community and the desire to protect all sexual actors from sexual harm,
contrast his analysis with the harm based approach adopted by Chief Justice McLachlin in
R v Labaye.42
His reliance on community standards of tolerance to ascertain whether a sexual
encounter is exploitative creates the possibility for a moralistically driven inequality in
the treatment of claimants. Those whose sexual choices do not jive well with the sexual
mores of the majority (such as, perhaps, sex workers) and those whose relationships of
inequality are so entrenched in the social subconscious of dominant society that ‘the
community’ would not recognize the relationship as sexually exploitative (such as,
perhaps, women in traditionally gendered marriages), will be treated differently from
other claimants on the basis of sexual morality assessments regarding the nature of the
relationship. Legal determinations as to which sexual interactions are exploitative, and
which are not, should not be based on moral distinctions founded on majoritarian sexual
morality.
It is not that sexual relationships of the types just suggested necessarily should be
treated the same as doctor-patient – or other special dependency type – relationships. It is
that if they are to be considered different under the law the reason for the distinction
ought not to be based on sexual morality. There is something deeply troubling about a
legal standard for consent to sexual contact that is dependent upon a community standard
of tolerance approach rather than a harm based approach. It is the sort of reasoning which
engenders discriminatory laws such as a higher age of consent for anal intercourse than
for vaginal intercourse under the Criminal Code and a historical definition of rape that
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[2005] 3 SCR 728. See chapter 5 for a discussion of this decision.
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denied a wife the legal ability (under the criminal law) not to consent to sexual
intercourse with her husband.43
In the end then, the manner in which Justice LaForest incorporates the ideals of
power feminism into his reasoning results in an analysis that is disempowering for
women; the power feminist claim of objective and universally applicable truth regarding
consent lends itself to Justice LaForest’s reasoning.
Justice McLachlin’s reasoning does not deny women’s sexual autonomy. It does
not refute Norberg’s sexual agency. Under her breach of fiduciary duty analysis
Norberg’s capacity, as a drug addicted woman, to consent is affirmed. Justice McLachlin
acknowledges that she consented to the sexual contact. She also acknowledges that
Norberg consented to the doctor-patient relationship – she voluntarily gave power in the
context of this very specific relationship. The imbalance then stems from her status as a
patient, a status men also hold, and not her status as a woman (or a drug addict). In
fiduciary relationships, “the relation may expose the entrustor to risk even if he is
sophisticated, informed and able to bargain effectively. Rather, the entrustor's vulnerability
stems from the structure and nature of the fiduciary relation. (emphasis added).”44
The fact of inequality of bargaining positions in sex should be recognized by the
Court. It was prudent to recognize the power imbalance that exists between a patient and
a doctor. However, it is one thing to attach legal prohibitions or liability to a specific
social arrangement (such as doctor-patient relationships ) which is what Justice
McLachlin does in this case – it is quite another to liken sexual interactions to contracts
43

…or for that matter the disparate application of the mistaken belief in consent defence to sexual assault in
cases where the accused was the spouse of the complainant at the time of the offence – a discrepancy that
seems to reflect some of this traditional sentiment regarding the sexual accessibility of wives. See Chapter
Four for substantiation of, and a discussion on, this point.
44
Norberg v. Wynrib, supra note 12 at 60.
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and then attempt to regulate them through the legal principles developed to regulate
contracts. The latter, as discussed above, results in an idealized (and essentialist) notion
of sexuality and legal reasoning based on sexual morality – reasoning which does not
protect the interests of many women and which at an analytical level denies sexual
autonomy thus threatening rather than protecting the community’s interest in the
promotion of sexual integrity.
III. Little Sisters: You Can Take The Porn Out Of Context But You Shouldn’t Take
The Context Out of the Porn
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R. v. Butler was not well received among
gay and lesbian activists and theorists.45 Their fear was that the Butler decision’s
injection of the harm principle into the definition of indecency would do nothing to
prevent the discriminatory censorship of lesbian and gay erotic and pornographic
materials.46 They argued that in fact, maintaining any link to moral corruption in the
definition of obscenity – which the Court did by identifying moral corruption “of a certain
kind” as that which leads to the detriment of society- would result in the targeting of gay
and lesbian materials. After all they argued, “ [l]esbians and gay men have long
experience with what the authorities think about “moral corruption”47 as it pertains to
sexual minorities. It turned out to be a well founded fear.
Unfortunately, as the post-Butler experience of businesses such as Little Sisters Book
and Art Emporium in Vancouver and Glad Day Books in Toronto demonstrated, “lower
45

See Brenda Cossman, “Lesbians, Gay Men, and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.”40
Osgoode Hall L.J. 223 (2003); Bruce Macdougall, Queer Judgments: Homosexuality, Expression, and the
Courts in Canada, (University of Toronto Press: Toronto, 2000); Leslie Green, “Men in the Place of
Women, from Butler to Little Sisters” reviewing Gay Male Pornography: An Issue of Sex Discrimination
by Christopher Kendall, (2005) 43 Osgoode Hall L.J. 473.
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See Brenda Cossman, Shannon Bell, Lise Gotell & Becki L. Ross, Bad Attitude/s on Trial: Pornography,
Feminism, and the Butler Decision, supra note 6 for a discussion of the response to Butler among gay,
lesbian and queer scholars.
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Green, “Men in The place of Women”, supra note 45 at 475.
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courts had no difficulty in finding that even the mildest lesbian and gay pornography
involved the undue exploitation of sex” and “[c]ustoms inspectors continued their pattern
of homophobic seizures, nearly putting these [important community bookstores] out of
business.”48
LEAF’s argument in R v Butler49 was informed by MacKinnon’s theory that the
inequality between men and women is itself sexualized. LEAF was motivated by
individual and societal inequities between men and women and their argument constituted
a power feminist analysis of pornography in which pornography, by depicting sexual
violence against women, perpetuates sexual violence against women through its
reinforcement of the male-female gender hierarchy.50
In Butler, Justice Sopinka’s application of these ideas regarding the harm caused by
pornography clearly reflected the Court’s incorporation of this gender analysis:
[T]here is a substantial body of opinion that holds that the portrayal of
persons being subjected to degrading and dehumanizing sexual
treatment results in harm, particularly to women and therefore to society
as a whole… Harm in this context means that it predisposes persons to
act in an anti-social manner as, for example, the physical or mental
mistreatment of women by men, or what is perhaps debatable, the
reverse.51

In Little Sisters, Justice Binnie determined that the “portrayal of a dominatrix engaged
in the non-violent degradation of an ostensibly willing sex slave is no less dehumanizing
if the victim happens to be of the same sex, and no less (and no more) harmful in its

48

Ibid. at 476.
Supra note 1.
50
See Chapter 5 for a discussion on this point.
51
Butler, supra note 1 at paras. 52, 61.
49
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reassurance to the viewer that the victim finds such conduct both normal and
pleasurable.”52
Is Justice Binnie’s analysis in Little Sisters a gendered one? Does it invoke the same
power feminist influenced contextual factors at play in Justice Sopinka’s Butler decision?
All of which is to ask, what harm is the Court in Little Sisters concerned with preventing?
Is it the harm caused by the systemic hierarchical relationship between men and women
and the manner in which rape (and consequently depictions of rape) perpetuates this
hierarchy and thus a particular social construction of gender relations and identity (ias
MacKinnon would argue) or is it the potential increase in sexual violence in the gay and
lesbian community perpetuated by those gays and lesbians exposed to the “portrayal of a
dominatrix engaged in the non-violent degradation of an ostensibly willing [same sex] sex
slave”?
The former type of harm would suggest that Justice Binnie was engaged in the same
type of feminist analysis of pornography that the Court adopted in Butler. Here the
argument would be that while gay and lesbian pornography does not depict the sexual
subjugation of women, it does portray the sexual subjugation of the feminine subject and
that this too perpetuates attitudes of a sexualized inequality between men and women
which manifests as sexual violence.53 There are a number of essentialist assumptions
about sex underlying this argument. It assumes that there are feminine sexual acts and
masculine sexual acts. That is to say, that men penetrate and women are penetrated, or as

52

Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), supra note 9.
It was likely this perspective that motivated the feminist organization Equality Now to intervene on
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MacKinnon would say – man fucks woman – subject verb object.54 Here the assertion
would be masculine fucks feminine.
This reasoning is unavoidably heterosexist. As Bruce MacDougall notes,
“domination of one gender by another is not a principal concern of gay and lesbian
pornography… Gay men for instance who are getting fucked should not be thought of as
women or as representing another gender from the man who is fucking.”55 In other
words, it is not masculine fucks feminine. It is man fucks man – subject verb subject and it is heterosexist and essentialist to superimpose upon it, or interpret it through, a
male/female, heterosexual paradigm.
But was this Justice Binnie’s theoretical approach in Butler? In fact, it would seem
that this was not his approach.
Justice Binnie focused on the alleged harm to gays and lesbians posed by a potential
increase in sexual violence in the gay and lesbian community perpetuated by those gays
and lesbians exposed to sado-masochistic pornography. This is evidenced by his reliance
on empirical research suggesting that the incidence of sexual violence in gay and lesbian
communities equals that in heterosexual communities and by argument that gays and
lesbians are equally deserving of protection against sexual violence.56 Justice Binnie
gave the following response to LEAF’s argument that same sex sado-masochistic
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pornography is different from heterosexual sado-masochistic pornography and that Butler
failed to recognize this difference: “violence against women was only one of several
concerns, albeit an important one, that led to the formulation of the Butler harm-based
test, which itself is gender neutral.”57
This declaration that the Butler test is gender neutral is significant. Justice Binnie’s
definition of obscenity and application of the Butler test in Little Sisters assumes that gay
and lesbian individuals who view sado-masochistic pornography are at risk of developing
an orientation towards violent sex. Butler involved an equality analysis. It situated
heterosexual pornography in a specific social context – a context of systemic sex and
gender hierarchy. In Butler the Court adopted the feminist assertion that degrading and
dehumanizing depictions of women would perpetuate and sustain inequality between men
and women - that such depictions would encourage sexist and misogynistic attitudes by
men towards women and that they risked inducing some men to behave in a sexually
violent manner towards women.
Little Sisters adopts both the finding in Butler that pornography can induce violent
antisocial behavior and its underpinning assumption that a desire for sexual violence is
socially contingent. However, it leaves behind the contextual analysis in which the Butler
reasoning was situated. In other words, it leaves behind the equality analysis of the
overarching systemic gender hierarchy in which the constructivist assumption about
sexual violence was originally adopted by the Court.
To determine that viewing images of sexual violence perpetuated against women will,
in a society systemically structured through sexuality as a gender hierarchy, influence
sexual norms such that more men are oriented towards sexually aggressive behavior
57
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directed at women suggests a socially contingent conception of sexual violence. To
determine that viewing images of sexual violence will, regardless of the broader social
context, promote violent sexual tendencies fails to fully account for the social
contingency of sexual violence.
Contrary to Justice LaForest’s position or LEAF’s position the approach to obscenity
found in Butler should be considered neither gender neutral nor inherently gendered. The
depiction of sexual aggression, sexual dominance, even sexual coercion by one muscular,
hyper-masculine white man over another hyper-masculine white man, under a
constructivist conception of sexual violence should be treated differently by obscenity
laws than the depiction of sexual aggression between two men one of whom is disabled,
or one of whom is very obviously racialized, or one of who is a prisoner of war and the
other a U.S. Marine. In other words, it is not that gay or lesbian pornography should be
exempt from laws regulating obscenity. It is not that same sex depictions of dominance
or degradation never pose the type of harm power feminists and the Court in Butler
attributed to heterosexual depictions of male over female sexual aggression, and sexual
dominance58. It is that if the law defines obscenity through principles of harm, on the
basis that sexual conduct is socially contingent, then the law in determining that harm
must give recognition to the particularity of the social context from which it arises.
Take for example the power feminist argument that even pornographic depictions that
do not depict violence still result in the objectification of those filmed or photographed
and that this too is harmful. Unless the law assumes that sexual objectification in and of
itself is harmful – an argument that relies on sexual morality and an interest in protecting
58
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sex itself- then to assess potential harmful impact the law must consider who is being
objectified and by whom and in what social context is the sexual objectification
occurring.
Why is, as Justice Binnie suggests, the “portrayal of a dominatrix engaged in the nonviolent degradation of an ostensibly willing sex slave … no less dehumanizing if the
victim happens to be of the same sex”?59 It is only “no less dehumanizing” if the source
of the dehumanization is purely the sexual degradation itself. That is to say, if there is
some inherent harm, some essential aspect of consensual sexual degradation itself that
makes it dehumanizing.
The problem with the Court’s approach in Little Sisters is not their conception of
sexual violence as socially contingent. Nor is the problem their continued reliance on the
principle of harm established in Butler. The problem is their failure to fully appreciate
the concept of sexual violence as socially contingent. This is a failure that, in the context
of same-sex pornography, results in a definition, the moral focus of which, remains on
protecting a particular account of sex (an account that can never involve boots and whips
and leather bustiers let alone nipple clamps, orgasm denial and rape fantasy). This is a
circumstance that inevitably directs the law’s attention towards propriety and away from
integrity - an analysis that power feminism lends itself to, despite its attempts to do
otherwise. It is a circumstance that leaves the door wide open for discrimination on the
part of homophobic customs’ officials and heterosexist adjudicators. It is a legal analysis
that, like Justice LaForest’s decision in Norberg v Wynrib, demonstrates the consequence
of adopting a partial conception of sexuality as socially constructed within a conceptual
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Little Sisters, supra note 52 at para. 60.
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framework that continues to rely on sexual morality in order to maintain a particular
(moral) account of sex itself.
IV. Drawing Moral Distinctions
Just as the universal claim that the exchange of sex for money, affection or status does
not constitute consent fails to sufficiently contextualize sexual interactions so too does a
claim that sexual objectification, or sexual degradation is inherently harmful. A failure to
fully contextualize sexual interactions results in an incomplete or partial conception of
sexual violence as socially constructed. An incomplete or partial conception of sexual
violence as socially constructed must turn somewhere to fill in the gaps. It turns to
essentialist conceptions of sexuality. Essentialist assumptions about sex – being that they
are essentialist – have a certain interest in protecting a particular account of sexuality. A
particular account of sexuality suggests a particular sexual morality. Laws oriented
towards protecting a particular sexual morality tend to focus more on sexual acts than on
sexual actors – a tendency that does not promote further inquiry into the social factors,
relationships, and power dynamics that constitute sexual norms, orientations and
behaviors. It is circular. Essentialist conceptions promote essentialist conceptions.
Because power feminism relies on universal claims involving objective truths it does not
lend itself to breaking this cycle.
Recall that the notion of sexual integrity articulated in Chapter Four included not only
freedom from sexual violation – in other words the freedom to say no – but in addition
the ‘conditions for’ a community of sexual actors with the capacity for sexual integrity.
This would include a broad but not unrestrained freedom to say yes. Cases such as Little
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Sisters60 and Norberg v. Wynrib61 as well as cases like R. v. Mara,62 R. v. Tremblay63 and
Reference Re Prostitution64 discussed in the previous chapter, demonstrate how a
constructivist conception of sexual violence that remains rooted in sexual morality does
not sufficiently protect this particular aspect of sexual autonomy (and thus sexual
integrity as a whole).
Integrity suggests wholeness, integration, and cohesion. Just as the liberty interest in
the freedom to say no must be steadfastly protected, so too must legal conceptions of
sexuality recognize the important interest in the ability and freedom to say yes. However,
the ‘conditions for’ sexual integrity cannot be reduced only to notions of sexual liberty –
whether that be the freedom to say no or the freedom to say yes. There is something
more to the notion of integrity. Integrity also includes the quality of being principled. To
act with integrity is to be principled. To have sexual integrity requires sexual principles –
to have sexual principles is to make distinctions between good sex and bad sex. As has
been discussed, this can be done based on sexual morality (first person ethics) or political
morality (third person ethics).65
An Ontario Court of Appeal decision from 1999 demonstrates well how
jurisprudential reasoning can articulate limits on sexual autonomy and be conducive to
promoting the ‘conditions for’ sexual integrity - including the production of a community
of sexual actors with the capacity for lived sexualities that promote sexual integrity as a
60

Supra note 9.
Supra note 12
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Supra note 2.
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Ronald Dworkin discusses the distinction between first person ethics and third person ethics in Ronald
Dworkin, “Foundations of Liberal Equality”, in S. Darwall, ed., Equal Freedom (Ann Arbour: University of
Michigan Press, 1995) 190. Dworkin’s distinction is also referenced at FN 3. The discussion of R v Labaye
and suggestions for its future application in Chapter Five, reveal arguments in favour of political morality
as the foundation upon which to draw distinctions between good sex and bad sex.
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social good.66 R. v. B.E. dealt with charges against a father under section 172 of the
Criminal Code for “participating in sexual immorality thereby endangering the morals” of
his children.67 The appellant was convicted of endangering the morals of his two sons and
two step-daughters. The appellant’s wife was also charged under section 172. The Crown
relied on the following evidence to support the charge that the appellant had endangered
the morals of his children:
On one occasion, the appellant and his wife allegedly engaged in sexual
intercourse in the family swimming pool in the presence of the children. This
evidence came from neighbors. The children could not recall any such incident.
The appellant and his wife engaged in various group sexual activities in the home
and videotaped those activities. Copies of the videotapes were kept in the home.
The appellant's wife participated in lesbian sexual activity in the house. That
activity was videotaped and copies of the videotapes were kept in the home.
The appellant videotaped his wife masturbating with a vibrator. There was
evidence that M.W. saw that videotape.
The appellant videotaped himself masturbating and ejaculating on his wife. There
was evidence that one of the children, J.E., was present when the video was made
or that he saw the video at some point.
There were sexually suggestive photos of the appellant's wife in the home.
There were pornographic videos and books in the home.
There were vibrators and other sexual devices in the home.
66
R. v. B.E., [1999] O.J. 3869. The reasoning in R v B.E. in many respects foreshadowed the Supreme
Court of Canada’s reasoning in Labaye. While the Ontario Court of Appeal did not reject the community
standards of tolerance test, they did adopt reasoning which did not directly employ community standards of
tolerance but rather focused primarily, if not solely, on harm. They also, at para 42, implicitly distinguished
it from the test they were adopting:
As a first step, the trier of fact will have to decide whether the child was aware of the conduct and
was able to appreciate the conduct to the extent that it could influence the development of the
child's value system. I do not regard this inquiry as significantly different than that required by the
harm-based community standard of tolerance test. Like that test, this inquiry involves a
determination of the risk of harm flowing from the conduct in question. In the case of the s. 172
inquiry, that harm is encompassed by the phrase "endangers the morals of the child.
67
Ibid. at para. 1. Section 172 of the Criminal Code R.S.C. 1985 c. C-46 stipulates that “everyone who, in
the home of a child, participates in adultery or sexual immorality or indulges in habitual drunkenness or any
other form of vice, and thereby endangers the morals of the child or renders the home an unfit place for the
child to be in, is guilty of an indictable offence…”
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The appellant and his wife placed sexually explicit advertisements in
newspapers.68

Section 172 invokes the concept of morality twice: it references the alleged sexual
immorality of the accused and the potentially endangered morality of the child. The
analysis in this appeal turned on whether the conduct endangered the morals of the
child.69 Justice Doherty of the Ontario Court of Appeal based his determination as to
what type of conduct would endanger the morals of a child, not on considerations of
sexual morality but as measured against a sense of political morality. Based on his
reasoning the focus of the provision ought to be on conduct that could impede a child’s
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R. v. B.E., supra note 66 at para. 10.
As noted, the Crown argued that placing sexually explicit advertisements in newspapers, engaging in
group sex, possessing sexually suggestive photos, pornographic videos, vibrators and ‘other sexual
devices’, videotaping sexual acts with one’s spouse, and participating in ‘lesbian sexual activity’ constitutes
‘immoral sexual activity’ pursuant to section 172 of the Criminal Code, supra note 64. With the exception
of the evidence that one of the children was present when the appellant and his wife videotaped him
masturbating and ejaculating on his wife, there was no allegation that any of the sexual conduct occurred
with, or in front of, the children. Evidence of sexual activity performed with or in front of one of his
children should be approached and assessed separately from evidence that the couple owned sex toys, that
his wife engaged in ‘lesbian sexual activity’ or that the couple placed ads in the paper. While assuming that
the mere possession of a vibrator or participation in ‘lesbian sexual activity’ is so morally egregious such
that any home in which it occurs is a home unfit for a child would be consistent with the Catholic Pope’s
edict on what constitutes child abuse it is not consistent, nor was it consistent in 1999, with either the
substantive laws in Canada guaranteeing equality rights to gay and lesbian families nor to the principles of
liberal democracy underpinning the Canadian legal system generally. Note the distinction between
potentially labeling conduct sexually immoral such that it endangers the morals of a child where the child is
involved in some way in the conduct – i.e. the context in which the act occurs makes it immoral (which is
the manner in which indecency laws in Canada were, even prior to Labaye, intended to be interpreted) and
identifying certain acts as sexually immoral and then discerning whether they succeeded in endangering the
morals of a child. Accepting that these sexual behaviors are immoral, simply on their face and absent
evidence of a problematic context, is an example of making assessments about good sex and bad sex based
on assumptions about the moral essence of a particular sexual act. This is a problem perpetuated by the
two-step approach to the structure of the provision itself. The Crown identified and led evidence on that
behavior which it determined constitutes sexual immorality. The jury then made a finding of fact as to
whether the behavior constitutes sexual immorality. The analysis only at that point shifted to whether the
now determined to be sexually immoral conduct had resulted in an endangerment to the children’s morals.
Justice Doherty’s appellate decision addressed only the issue of morality at the second stage – how to
conceptualize the children’s moral interest. The opportunity to articulate a conception of morality in the
first instance of the provision – the sexual immorality of the parent- did not arise in this case. The jury had
made a finding of fact regarding the appellant’s sexual immorality and it was not open to Justice Doherty to
address this issue.
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ability to develop the values needed to operate a free and democratic society.70 Justice
Doherty defined the moral harm at issue under section 172 as a matter of political, and
not sexual, morality:
…the concept of morality for criminal law purposes must be restricted to those
core values which are integral to the existence of a free and democratic society - a
society in which personal autonomy has priority except where the exercise of that
autonomy poses a real risk of harm to others. In my view, conduct that endangers
the morals of a child is that which poses a real risk that the child will not develop
those values which are essential to the operation of a free and democratic society.
The morals of a child will be endangered by sexual immorality where sexual
conduct presents a real risk that the child will not develop an understanding that
exploitive or non-consensual sexual activity is wrong. Similarly, if the conduct
degrades or dehumanizes women, it endangers the morals of the child in that the
child will not develop an understanding that all persons are equal and worthy of
respect regardless of gender. Furthermore, to the extent that the conduct actively
involves the child, it may endanger the morals of that child by leaving that him or
her without a proper sense of his or her own self worth and autonomy. Finally, to
the extent that the conduct imperils the child's understanding of parents'
responsibilities to protect and nurture their children, it may also imperil the
morals of a child.71

This case is a good example of the different aspects of sexual integrity that laws
regulating sexual conduct must accommodate. The sexual conduct at issue, by the very
nature of the provision (which regulates conduct in the home of the child) involves a site
where sexual actors’ autonomy interests are thought to be at their highest – the home. It
also involves prohibitions aimed at protecting sexual actors whose sexual integrity is in
its most vulnerable, developmental and dependent state – children. Does Justice
Doherty’s approach meet the challenge posed by this very obvious tension between
privacy and protection? Does it do so in a manner that protects and promotes sexual
integrity?

70
71

R v B.E., supra note 66 at para. 40.
R v B.E., supra note 66 at para 41.
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The appeal in this case was resolved on the basis that the trial judge made an error of
law by not properly explaining to the jury that the morals of a child could only be
endangered by sexually immoral conduct of which the child was aware and capable of
appreciating. In this case that meant overturning the conviction with respect to the two
sons and upholding the convictions with respect to the two step-daughters. The
conviction with respect to the step-daughters was upheld because, despite the trial judge’s
error of law the determination that he had endangered their morals would have been the
same given that the father had also been convicted of sexually assaulting them.72
The presence of pornography, suggestive photographs of the children’s mother, and
sexual devices would very likely have a different impact on a child whose father is
sexually assaulting them than on one whose father has not engaged in or attempted to
engage in any sexual interactions with them. It is helpful to examine how Justice
Doherty’s analysis would function had the father not also had sexual interactions with his
step-daughters. Assume that the trial judge had properly charged the jury regarding the
requirement that the child be aware and capable of appreciating the ‘sexually immoral’
conduct. Assume also that this father had not already been convicted of sexually
assaulting his children nor had he intentionally exposed his children to his sexual conduct.
Given these assumptions, how does the articulation of the values identified by Justice
Doherty manifest when applied to the evidence of sexual immorality led by the Crown?
Under his approach, most of what was found by the jury to be immoral conduct would
likely, under the counterfactuals offered here, not be considered conduct that would
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Justice Doherty noted that “it was not argued that convictions for corrupting the morals of the daughters
based on the evidence of the sexual assaults would, given the convictions on the sexual assault charges,
infringe the rule against multiple convictions for the same delict. The trial judge recognized the very close
connection between the offences by imposing concurrent sentences.
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endanger his children’s morals. Certainly it is unlikely that a court would find that a
child’s knowledge that his mother had ‘engaged in lesbian activity’, or that his father had
ejaculated on his mother or that his parents owned a vibrator was likely to pose “a real
risk that the child will not develop those values which are essential to the operation of a
free and democratic society”. At the same time, under Justice Doherty’s approach,
evidence that his mother had had sex with another woman in front of the child, or that the
child was present when the father videotaped himself ejaculating on the child’s mother
likely would endanger the child’s belief in his own autonomous ability to choose which
sexual acts to engage in or be exposed to – his ability to make his own sexual choices.
Similarly a child who discovers videotapes of her parents engaged in consensual
sexual activity with the neighbors would likely not be considered, on the basis of this
experience alone, in jeopardy of failing to appreciate that non-consensual and exploitative
sexual activity is wrong. However, exposure to videotapes depicting non-consensual sex
between men and women in which women are degraded and demeaned very well might
endanger the morals of the child “in that the child will not develop an understanding that
all persons are equal and worthy of respect regardless of gender.”
Justice Doherty’s approach is oriented towards producing a community of sexual
actors whose values include “an appreciation that exploitive or non-consensual sexual
activity is wrong; an appreciation that conduct which dehumanizes or degrades women is
wrong; an appreciation by the children of their own self worth and personal autonomy;
and an appreciation of the responsibility of parents to protect and nurture their
children”.73
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R. v. B.E., supra note 66 at para. 80.
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Conclusion
Unavoidably principles such as those identified by Justice Doherty draw moral
distinctions between acceptable and unacceptable sexual conduct - they make distinctions
between good sex and bad sex - but the distinctions are not premised on essentialist
claims or first person sexual moralities. Nor are they premised on structural claims of
objective truth about sex and/or gender. There is no overarching or underpinning
assertion of truth about power in any of these principles. The principles Justice Doherty’s
approach identifies as those upon which the law ought to base the regulation of sexuality
include the protection of bodily integrity, and the promotion of equality, autonomy,
sexual liberty and positive duty. None of these principles are conceptually static or
require a static analysis, none of them draw on judicial perception of the first person
sexual moralities held by most members of the community and none of them need be
hegemonic.
Through its equality analysis, power feminism has achieved a great deal in terms of
furthering the law’s conceptualization of sexual violence. Great strides towards
understanding that sexual violence is a product of, rather than inherent to, society have
been achieved. However, power feminism has not only privileged the principle of
equality above all others, it has, based as it is on a structural claim, resulted in assertions
of objective truth. The consequence of this is a failure to disaggregate itself from sexual
morality. To disaggregate from sexual morality requires acknowledgement of the
assertion that there are no objective truths regarding sex, gender and sexuality. That is to
say, it requires an analysis that is not structural; it requires an analysis that can and will
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apply its constructivist insights to its own claims. In the context of issues regarding sex,
gender and sexuality that analysis has typically been referred to as queer theory.
One might respond to this by arguing yes but to say that non-consensual sex is
wrong or that children should be taught an appreciation of their own sexual worth is also
to state objective truths. This is accurate. However there are important distinctions that
respond to this critique and that will be the subject matter of chapter 8.
In brief, these claims of truth are based on third person ethics. Okay, but isn’t
equality – the claim overarching and underpinning power feminism’s approach to the
legal regulation of sexuality – also a principle of third person ethics not first person
ethics? This is true. However, the difference is that power feminism elevates equality
over other principles. Its claim regarding equality is structural. Assertion of a hegemonic
principle (equality) embedded in a structural claim - MF - is not conducive to a legal
approach compatible with open ended, fully contextual and infinitely re-articulated
conceptions of sex, gender, sexuality and sexual integrity. As will be argued in chapter 8
and 9, improving the law’s ability to protect and promote sexual integrity as a social good
depends upon the possibility of open ended, fully contextual and infinitely re-articulated
conceptions about each of: sex, gender and sexuality. The notion of sexual integrity as a
social good developed in this thesis is not structural; while objective truths are
unavoidable if one seeks to draw distinctions between good sex and bad sex, it should still
be possible to introvert the constructivist approach. In other words, it should be possible
to maintain an open ended, fully contextual and infinitely re-articulated conception of
what constitutes sexual integrity and how best it ought to be protected and promoted as a
social good. This is not to suggest that this approach will provide the answer; nor is it to
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suggest that the claims of power feminism (or queer theory) do not provide answers to
some questions. Instead it is to make the rather simple suggestion that there is not one
answer and that a legal conception of sexuality should attempt to accommodate this
plurality (just as it should acknowledge and continually grapple with the plurality of
sexual moralities that exist within an community of sexual actors at any given point in
time.)
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Chapter 7 – A Critique Of Queer Theory
“I prefer to utilize the writers I like. The only valid tribute to thought such as
Nietzsche’s is precisely to use it, to deform it, to make it groan and protest.”1

Chapter Two described the theoretical foundations and highlighted the main
principles of social constructivism and queer theory more specifically. Chapter Three
then examined the Supreme Court of Canada’s jurisprudence in several legal contexts –
sexual harassment, section 15 equality claims, similar fact evidence in sexual assault trials
and child pornography cases – demonstrating that the Court often ascribes to a conception
of sexuality in which individuals are categorized based on an innate sexual orientation
and in which sexuality is, with the exception of sexual violence between adults,
understood as a pre-social phenomenon rather than a product of social interaction, norms,
discourse, institutions, and practices. An examination of these cases and an analysis of
the Court’s conception of sexuality in these cases also demonstrated how an essentialist
understanding of sexual orientation is problematic in each of these legal contexts,
suggesting that a recognition of the socially constructed nature of ‘sexual nature’, so to
speak, would produce legal reasoning that better accommodates the complexity and social
contingency of sexuality.
Chapters Four and Five discussed the exception to the Court’s naturalized
approach to sexuality – that exception being its shift towards a conception of sexual
violence between adults as socially contingent. Chapter Four also articulated a notion of
sexual integrity as both a social good and as the interest that ought to motivate and inform
laws regulating sexuality. Chapter Five also examined the way in which power feminist
1

Michel Foucault, “Two Lectures”, in Michael Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other
Writings, 1972-1977, (Colin Gordon ed. & Colin Gordon et al. trans., 1980) at 53.
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ideals motivated a conceptual shift in the Court’s approach to sexuality - a shift from the
traditional concern over sexual acts (underpinned by a sexual morality) to a concern over
sexual interactions (underpinned by a political morality). This is a shift towards
understanding this one aspect of sexuality – sexual violence - as socially contingent.
Chapter Six argued that while the power feminist intervention has been integral to
the Court’s shift towards a constructivist conception of sexual violence, its failure to
introvert this analysis – to apply social constructivist approaches to the structure of power
feminism itself – leaves it inevitably inhered in objective claims of truth about sex,
gender, and sexuality. As was demonstrated in Chapters Five and Six, this circumstance
lends itself to legal analysis that invokes power feminist ideals without rejecting sexual
morality (first person ethics). Chapter Six ended by suggesting that what is needed is a
more holistic re-conceptualization that accounts for the many other social factors that
contribute to the construction of sexuality - a re-conceptualization that is not structural, a
re-conceptualization that adopts an open ended, fully contextual and infinitely rearticulated conception of what constitutes sexual integrity. There are significant
implications to, and at least one theoretical problem in the context of law with, this
suggestion. The objective of this chapter and the next is to acknowledge these
implications and attempt to address (although not resolve) this problem.
An invocation of the constructivist critique of essentialist conceptions regarding
sexuality (as was done in Chapter Two) in conjunction with the assertion that it ought to
be invoked without anchoring it in the foundation of a structural argument (as was made
in Chapter Six with the suggestion that the problem with the power feminist intervention
is that it did not turn its constructivist critique inward) begins to sound like a
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wholehearted embrace of queer theory. Such an assertion calls for a closer examination
of the implications of claiming that meaning is socially constructed; this chapter will
examine those implications.
Up to this point queer theory and social constructivism have been treated
relatively uncritically in this discussion. Social constructivism has been deployed
methodologically to examine, critique and at times describe how the Court conceptualizes
sexuality. Constructivist arguments provide a rich theoretical framework within which to
do this. Queer theory and social constructivism have provided critical legal thinkers with
novel ways to conceptualize sex, gender and sexuality. That said, as will be demonstrated
in the discussion to follow, there are both theoretical and practical difficulties with queer
theory which greatly circumscribe its contribution to the development of legal approaches
towards issues of law and sexuality that promote and protect sexual integrity as a
common good.
The assertion that sex and/or gender are socially constructed taken apart from
power feminism’s structural foundation, is a macro level application of the types of
claims and challenges suggested by postmodern theories. Underpinning the theoretical
claim that sexuality, sex and gender, as well as the structures in which and through which
we understand these concepts, are socially constructed is the postmodern assertion that
the formation of meaning occurs through an infinite process of exclusion in which
meaning is never complete. The building blocks of social constructivist theories – when
disentangled from structural claims - are found in the toy box of post modernism.
This chapter will demonstrate why a theoretical approach to the legal regulation of
sexuality premised on the post modern (and queer theory) assertion that all meaning is
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produced by and can be reduced to this infinite process of exclusion in which it is never
complete, is problematic. This will involve a critique of queer theory, revealing its
infinite regression and paradoxical approach to justice, while at the same time
acknowledging its methodological advantages.
The chapter to follow – Chapter Eight - will then turn around and once again
argue for the importance of incorporating into a legal theory of sexuality, the notion that
the meaning of sexual integrity (and of sex, gender and sexuality) is constituted through
its infinite cultural, social, relational re-articulations. It will suggest the critical role that
queer theory and postmodernism could play in theoretical approaches to the legal
regulation of sexuality. It will suggest that a theoretical approach to the intersection of
law and sexuality which borrows methodologically from the insights of queer theory, but
which is framed by the concept of iconoclasm, is better able to account for, reflect, and
contest the context in which the legal regulation of sexuality operates in Canada’s
constitutional democracy.
To put it as plainly as possible, there is a tension between the two claims made
throughout the preceding chapters. The first claim, remember, is the suggestion that
sexuality be conceptualized by the law as socially constructed (and not reliant on a
particular structural conception). The second claim is that the law ought to understand
sexual integrity as a common good and be oriented towards creating the conditions to
protect and promote this common interest. If the meaning of sexuality is solely a function
of social context then on what basis can the law adopt a conception of sexual integrity
that it is then justified in protecting and promoting? The objective of this chapter and
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Chapter Eight is to give recognition to and attempt (unsuccessfully)2 to respond to this
tension.
I.

Critiquing Queer Theory
As discussed in Chapter Two, queer theory is a conceptual framework, or perhaps

methodology, which contests gender, sex and sexuality categorizations. Queer theory has
three main themes. It seeks to re-conceptualize power, re-conceptualize knowledge and
its relationship to power and re-conceptualize identity and subject formation. Note that
these objectives, particularly the first two, are not dissimilar to the objectives of power
feminist theories.
So why is this approach problematic in terms of law? Why is it problematic to
suggest a conceptual approach to sexuality that is constructivist without being structural?
Why is queer theory a paradoxical theoretical approach to justice?
The ‘death of the subject’ is a key theme in queer theory. Its central premise is the
assertion that gender, sexuality and sexual identity are socially constructed categories
rather than naturally occurring phenomenon.3 The theoretical foundation for this premise
is drawn from the postmodern suggestion that, in fact, all meaning is socially constructed.
(The paradox of postmodernism is evidenced in the previous sentence alone – ‘in fact, all
meaning is socially constructed’).
While modern theorists developed a number of meta- theories that assumed that
the individual or subject is created independent of social context and history, postmodern

2

It will become evident in Chapter Eight why the attempt is, and must be, unsuccessful. Briefly, the value
is in the trying and failing to reconcile this tension despite recognizing that to succeed in reconciling it
would be to fail.
3
See Chapter Two for a discussion of those theorists (such as Judith Butler, Michel Foucault, Eve Kosofsky
Sedgwick) who have most prominently developed this theoretical approach. See Chapter Four for a partial
critique of categorical conceptions of identity in the context of equality rights.
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thought suggests that such universal and essentialist notions of, and about, the human
subject and the human condition are ill-founded and are themselves socially constructed.
Postmodern thought suggests that we are not outside the discourses and social contexts
that create us as subjects. That is to say, all meaning is constituted through discourse;
there is no pre-discursive or essential aspect to the subject (or any subject).
Queer theory’s central premise is drawn from this postmodern insight. While
analytically postmodernism functions at a micro level (the site of its analysis is text) its
theoretical implications, as demonstrated by the work of theorists such as Foucault and
Butler, extend to macro level concepts and discourses like gender and sexuality. In other
words, its critical method can be applied to deconstruct the meaning of a specific word or
that of a larger concept (like gender or sexual identity). It is this notion, taken at face
value, which provided the theoretical framework for the analysis of the cases examined in
Chapter Three. It is this postmodern insight which underpins the assertion that sexuality
is socially constructed, an assertion which allows one to ask what possibilities in terms of
law reform, in terms of legal reasoning, in terms of how we structure relationships and
families and the legal regulation of sex, are opened up when one thinks about sex as
socially contingent, as a product of society not biology. As power feminism’s impact on
the substantive meaning of sexual violence under the criminal law demonstrates, this
method of analysis is useful. It, for example, allows for legal definitions of sexual assault
that incorporate the perspectives of different sexual actors by conceptualizing sexuality as
an equality issue rather than a naturally occurring human drive. That said, it is also
important to ask what are the logical implications of relying on a theoretical framework
that claims that the meaning of sexuality is socially constructed?
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Unlike modern thought, which assumes the existence of, and therefore seeks to
discover, measure and characterize, universal meaning (or in the context of sexuality
inherent or natural meaning)4 postmodernism focuses on the particular, on différance; it
challenges the possibility of universal/pre-discursive meaning, asserting rather, that
meaning, because it is formed through a process of exclusion (a social process) and is
therefore permanently unstable, can never be complete or universal. Underpinning this
claim is the Derridean concept of différance: the claim that words can never fully
summon forth what they mean but rather can only be explained or defined by using more
words, and that words and concepts derive their meaning in part by what they are not (the
meaning of “house” is understood in part by the fact that it is not a “shed” or a “hotel” or
a “barn” etc). The discussion in Chapter Two regarding diacritical modes of knowing is
premised on this concept. Similarly the suggestion that gender identity is relational draws
in part on this same insight.
In terms of law and social justice movements, there are both theoretical and
practical difficulties with this suggestion. The predominant difficulty with queer theory is
that it is paradoxical. In fact, queer theory actually represents a double paradox. It shares
with all group identity politics that embrace a social constructivist approach to identity
what Ernesto Laclau describes as the paradox of pure particularity. It is this paradox of
particularity which creates the tension inherent to what Nancy Fraser has called the
dilemma between the politics of recognition and the politics of redistribution – the

4

There have been legal examples of this conceptual approach throughout this discussion. Recall for
example, Justice Cory’s reliance in R. v. Tremblay, [1993] 2 SCR 932, on Dr. Campbell the expert
sexologist in an effort to determine whether masturbation was common enough (and thus naturally
occurring behavior) not to be indecent.
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recognition/redistribution dilemma.5 This is the argument that groups subject to both
cultural and economic injustice seek both recognition (which requires declaring or
performatively creating their group difference) and redistribution (which requires calls to
abolish differential treatment) – a paradoxical need to both claim and deny their
specificity.6
But then queer theory adds to this paradox of particularity a second level of
paradox – due to its own conceptual framework as a relational concept. It is the
implications arising from this double paradoxical nature that make it particularly
problematic from a legal perspective. The next two sections will explain further how and
in what way queer theory represents a double paradox that is problematic in terms of the
legal regulation of sexuality. Following this will be an examination of postmodern
theories (by Laclau and Derrida) that attempt to address this paradox. A discussion of
these theories is included because the theoretical concepts provided in Laclau and
Derrida’s attempts to reconcile the tension between nonstructural constructivism (i.e.
queer theory or postmodernism) and law’s need, Justitia’s need, for criteria by which to
judge, are relied upon in Chapter Eight to develop my argument regarding the promise of
iconoclasm and the legal successes that occur in the space between failures.
i) The Paradox Of Pure Particularity
5

Nancy Fraser “From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a Postsocialist Age” in Justice
Interruptus (New York: Routledge, 1996).
6
Fraser identifies different collectivities that she suggests can be located at different places on a spectrum
between groups who seek only recognition and those interested primarily or only in redistribution. Those
that fall in the middle she describes as bivalent collectivities. She locates sexual minorities at the
recognition end of the spectrum although recognizes that no collectivity can be neatly categorized as either
a solely recognition seeking or a solely redistribution seeking group. Her proposed solution for remedying
this dilemma is transformative remedies. These are remedies that destabilize both social categorizations
and wealth distribution structures. It seems plausible as a solution for bivalent collectivities such as women
(were that actually one social category which of course it is not) but does not seem to actually resolve the
recognition end of the dilemma for other collectivities such as those sexual minorities who really do not
want to assimilate or first nations groups not interested in destabilizing group differentiation.
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Ernesto Laclau’s postmodern account of the manner in which deviation is
constituted (described as a ‘chain of equivalence’) provides a good example of the
paradox of particularity.7 Laclau explores this paradox through his discussion of identity.
However, the same theoretical claims can be made regardless of whether one is
examining queer theory’s claims regarding sex, sexual or gender identity or post(or non)structural constructivist claims regarding the ‘identity’ (meaning) of sex, sexuality or
gender itself.
For Laclau the paradox of identity is the ever-present conflict that arises as a result
of the process of constitutive exclusion through which meaning (including identity) is
formed. Laclau suggests that any identity (and by extension one could say any meaning)
is created through its relative location in an open system of differential relations.8 By
differential relations he means a relation of exclusion/and or antagonism. Meaning is
created by what it excludes, or perhaps, what it is excluded from – in other words, it is
what it is not.9 This is the same concept underpinning queer theory. Laclau argues that
an identity, because it is constituted through its difference from all other identities, is
never complete; there exists therefore a limitless field of differential identities.10
As Laclau notes, since all identities emerge from this constitutive exclusion or
antagonism they all share in common this necessarily incomplete determination; this is

7

Ernesto Laclau, Emancipations, (Verso: London, 1996); Ernest Laclau, Judith Butler & Slavov Zizek,
Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left (Verso: London, 2000)
8
Emancipations, supra note 5 at 28. The assertion made in Chapter Two that one’s own gender identity is
threatened when one cannot discern another’s gender because gender is understood relationally, through
binaries, through diacritical modes of knowing, draws on reasoning similar in way to this concept
9
This is similar to Derrida’s concept of différance. Derrida would describe this as the originary ‘violence’
at the root of all meaning. By violence he simply means the inevitable process of exclusion through which
meaning is constituted. His use of the term violence in this context is not intended to refer to violence in a
physical or material sense.
10
Emancipations, supra note 5 at 14-15.
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what he suggests creates a ‘chain of equivalence’.11 It is important to note that he
suggests this incompletion is inevitable.
The incompletion is thought necessary under Laclau’s theory because the
antagonistic process in which meaning is constituted through exclusion, through lack of
recognition, suggests that a fully achieved difference or a complete integration into a
particular eliminates this antagonistic dimension as constitutive of any identity.
Therefore, as a result of this ‘chain of equivalence’, an attempt by any one group to
universalize its own particularity, or make a claim of inherent meaning, is as
misconceived as is any assertion of pure difference.
An attempt by any one group to universalize its own particularity is ultimately
futile because it fails to realize that such an attempt is as much a threat to that group’s
own identity as it is to the identities of others. Any assertion of difference will
necessarily re-inscribe the very context from which it wishes to differ. Any claim of
inherent and universal meaning will affirm the legitimacy of others’ claims of inherent
and universal meaning. One cannot assert a differential identity or meaning without
distinguishing it from a context and by making this distinction one asserts the context at
the same time that one asserts the difference.
As noted, to assert its own identity a group must assert its difference from the
identity of others; this cannot be done outside of a context of social relations. Any
assertion of identity or meaning thus re-inscribes the identity, context and meaning it
seeks to distance, distinguish or disrupt. This process operates both in terms of those with
power and those without (or with less) power. In this respect it is expressed in the
“undecidability between internality and externality of the oppressor in relation to the
11

Ibid.
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oppressed: to be oppressed is part of my identity as a subject struggling for emancipation;
without the presence of the oppressor my identity would be different. The constitution of
the later requires and at the same time rejects the presence of the other.”12
In this sense an oppressed group, whose identity is constructed within and without
a given system of power is in a paradoxical circumstance with respect to that system –
“the system is responsible both for the constitution of its identity and at the same time the
system is a condition of its existence. Any victory against the system also destabilizes the
identity of the victorious force”.13
Not only is it self-defeating, according to Laclau, an assertion of pure difference is
also illogical. As Laclau suggests, to claim a differential identity requires a claim of
commonality with the identity one wishes to be different from. This is because the
assertion of a right to a different identity or to a claim of recognition for a particular
identity can only be made by appealing to some principle of sameness (some
universality). To claim a right to recognition of difference (indeed to claim a right to
anything) requires an acknowledgment of sameness because it is to claim I have the same
right to an identity as do you – some commonality which equally entitles me to my
claimed identity. From this it can be concluded that it is impossible to claim a right to, or
12

Emancipations, supra note 5 at 17.
Laclau, Emancipations supra note 5 at 27. This issue is one of the largest social challenges facing
heterogeneous societies today and is itself the topic of countless books, articles and dissertations. There is
an abundance of literature exploring this dilemma – annihilation through assimilation - from many different
perspectives and in many different contexts and it seems almost trite to footnote sources discussing the
issue. That said for a sampling, in the context of sexuality the work of Ruthann Robson provides a good
example of the arguments against assimilation for sexual minorities. Ruthann Robson, “Assimilation,
Marriage and Lesbian Liberation” 75 Temp. L. Rev. 709. In the context of ethnic minority and nationalism
see Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition” in Multiculturalism: Examining The Politics of
Recognition, ed. Amy Gutman (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton Press, 1994); Will Kymlicka,
Multicultural Citizenship, (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1995); Will Kymlicka, The Rights of Minority
Cultures, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995); Ayalet Shachar, Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural
Differences and Women’s Rights, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001). In the context of
religious minority see Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, (2001) 54 Stan. L. Rev. 495; Madhavi Sunder,
Piercing the Veil, (2003) 112 Yale L.J. 1399.
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seek recognition of, pure difference. A claim of particularity is at once a claim of
inclusion and exclusion. It is a claim of the right to be included in the right to be
excluded. The paradox, of course, is that within any given system, if total integration
does not take place it means the identity is not fully achieved – the antagonism - the
exclusion – the lack of recognition - still exists; without the antagonism and exclusion,
the identity ceases to exist but because of the antagonism and exclusion the identity is
never complete – there will always be ‘a lack’. This describes the first paradox of queer
theory – a paradox shared by identity politics generally.
ii) The ‘Double Bind’ Of Queer Theory
This paradox itself – this constitutive lack - is not the full extent of the theoretical
problem, as it pertains to law, with queer theory. As noted above, it is not a paradox
unique to queer politics or issues of sexuality. It is the paradox of group politics
generally – whether those be, for example, the politics of ‘women’, the politics of ‘sexual
minorities’, or the politics of ‘racialized minorities’.
The double paradox of queer theory stems from the fact that queer is a relational
concept; it is a positionality in relation to a norm.14 While there will always be queer,
there will never actually be queers in the true sense. This is because queer, conceptually
speaking, is not an identity, but rather a critique of identity the effect of which is to
contest or disrupt normative understandings of the subject by suggesting that identity is
not fixed. While its site of contestation is the categorization of sexuality and gender, its

14

My use of the word “positionality” to reflect the relational nature of queer is borrowed from Adam
Romero, “Methodological Descriptions: “Feminist” and “Queer” Legal Theories: Book Review of Janet
Halley’s Split Decisions: How and Why to Take a Break from Feminism, 19 Yale J. L. & Feminism 227
(2007) at 228.
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claim is directed more broadly, at identity in general. At its extreme, its methodology is
used to suggest that there can be no subject, no doer behind the deed.15
Its paradox is illustrated both by the theoretical implications it produces and by
the ironical results of its cooption as the basis of an identity category or movement. The
paradox of queer theory is that it is a method of analysis, of which the motivating factor
for its development is an objection to the oppression of sexual deviance, but whose
animating feature is a disavowal of the possibility of knowing what a lack of such
oppression would be. As such, its efforts cannot actually be directed towards attempting
to create such a condition.
Take the supposed ‘founding theorists’ of queer theory: writers such as Judith
Butler, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, and Michel Foucault.16 It is neither happenstance nor
coincidence that the intersection of power and sexuality is the site of their analyses;
rather, this reflects a deeply held, but unarticulated, concern for justice.17 However, none
of them offers a theory of justice.18 This also is not a coincidence.

15

See Chapter three, FN 132 for a brief discussion regarding the claim that ‘the subject is dead’.
While Theresa de Lauretis is credited with coining the term queer theory (see David Halperin. "The
Normalizing of Queer Theory." Journal of Homosexuality v.45, pp. 339-343). it is the early 1990s work of
theorists such as Judith Butler, and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, using the method of deconstruction developed
through Jacques Derrida’s concept of difference, and building on the discursive theory developed in the
work of Michel Foucault, (History of Sexuality, supra note 1), and the notion of disaggregating sexual or
erotic desire and gender introduced by Gayle Rubin in “Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the
Politics of Sexuality,” in (Pleasure and Danger: Exploring Female Sexuality, Vance, Carol S, ed London:
Pandora Press, 1989) which are generally considered the inaugural texts in this area of thought. (see Split
Decisions, supra note 12 where Janet Halley suggests that were it not for the concepts developed in History
of Sexuality, Volume One, and “Thinking Sex”, Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble: Feminism and The
Subversion of Identity (Routledge: New York, 1990) and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s Epistemology of the
Closet, (University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1990) would not have been possible.)
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I am unable to point to a precise reference to substantiate this assertion. However, my assertion is
premised on two factors, neither of which directly substantiates it. The first is the manner in which, and the
audience by whom, their work has been received and the way in which it has been applied by later queer
theorists. (For instance, as David Halperin notes in Saint= Foucault, Towards a Gay Hagiography (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1995) at 15, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1, is to queer political
activists such as the members of the contemporary AIDS activist organization ACT-UP, as The Communist
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Queer theory is a justice project that according to its own precepts cannot achieve
justice. For a more concrete demonstration of its paradox consider the emergence of
‘queer’ as a category of self-identification. The self-identified queer is a walking
paradox. When one identifies as a queer one is either declaring that one doesn’t identify
as anything (which is nonsensical) or is, at the moment of identification, simultaneously
adopting, and in doing so, negating ‘queer’. That is to say, any act of identification is an
act of exclusion, a closure that correspondingly precludes the possibility of queer. This is
because to identify is to identify with something, with some norm. Queer is a
positionality in particular relation to a norm; that relation being the deviation from. To
identify as queer is to identify with a norm of deviating from the norm. To do so is either
an act of negation or of infinite regression. Either way the closure necessitated by the act
of identification is impossible. Think of it in terms of discursive performativity.19 In the
same sense that the statement ‘I am out’ is performative (in, and by, its declaration it
constitutes that which it is), the statement ‘I am queer’ is a performative negation (in, and
by, its declaration it de-constitutes that which it declares to be). I am suggesting that, in
precisely the same, but structurally opposite, way in which Derrida suggests democracy is
self-cannibalizing, one cannot truly identify as queer or with other ‘queers’.20
The moment of this impossibility explains the ironical phenomena of queer youth.
The ‘queer youth’, that is the youth who identifies as one who deviates from the norm, is

three self-identified sexual minorities who have dedicated much of their tremendous intellectual energies to
theorizing about sexuality are no different. It is neither happenstance nor coincidence that the intersection
of power and sexuality is the site of their analyses; rather, this reflects a deeply held, but unarticulated,
concern for justice.
18
Foucault even went so far as to deny being motivated by politics (which is odd given his non-academic
and quite radical activism regarding gay politics.) Halperin, ibid.
19
See Chapter Two at FN 50 for a discussion of the notion of performativity.
20
See infra starting at page 22 for a discussion of Derrida’s ‘democracy to come’ and the analogy between
his theory of justice and the observation I am making here regarding performative negations..
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most likely to wear the same clothes, have the same facial piercings, espouse similar
sexual and identity politics and make the same cultural references as all of his or her
queer compatriots. A group of individuals who all declare the same identity and adopt
similar clothing, physical presentation, music, culture and politics is a group with norms.
Unavoidably, the act of identification necessitates the adoption of, perpetuation of and
association with some norm or norms.
It is the implications of this paradox that suggest the problem with queer theory
from a legal perspective. In order to be internally consistent with its own reasoning,
queer theory cannot endeavor to articulate what sexual justice means. Recall that queer
theory claims that gender, sex and sexuality are socially constructed and to make this
claim it relies on the postmodern notion that meaning is constituted through a process of
exclusion and therefore is never complete. Typically, from this follows the conclusion
that if there can be no complete meaning to anything, there is no universal - the reason
being that universal is a concept of totality, it is by definition all encompassing…its
meaning is completed, closed. Conversely, the concept of queer is relational; queer is a
positionality in reference to any hegemonic norm. Its meaning is never closed.
While the assertion that meaning is never complete, if accepted, resolves the
structural pitfall of power feminism, it has from a legal perspective, problematic
significance for the concepts of identity and the subject; it suggests that the subject, or an
identity, is contextually dependent, never complete, and therefore immutably unstable;
that is to say, that the only universal is that there is no universal. Judith Butler describes
this notion of the incomplete subject as follows:
I understand the ‘incompletion’ of the subject-position in the following
ways:

338

(1) as the failure of any particular articulation to describe the population it
represents; (2) that every subject is constituted differentially, and that what
is produced as the ‘constitutive outside’ of the subject can never become
fully inside or immanent.”21

Such a conviction, if accepted, has a significant impact on the role that law does or could
play in the pursuit of justice. The potential futility of queer theory, from a legal
perspective, stems from the fact that, by destabilizing all meaning including the identity
of all subjects, it fails to provide any criteria, or conceptual framework, or even ability, to
judge.
In this way, postmodernism presents a challenge in terms of law because law
needs judgment to be operationalized. Its reforming, preventative and distributive
functions all require judgment. And for law to be just, that judgment must not be
arbitrary. To avoid arbitrary judgment requires meaningful criteria and in terms of law’s
distributive functions (whether it be the distribution of material resources, rights,
privileges, or punishments) it also requires subjects.
As such, queer theory does not possess the analytical framework, or provide the
analytical tools, to coherently pursue justice. It is not the fact that it cannot articulate a
substantive meaning for a theory of justice (it cannot …but many theories cannot); it is
that it cannot defend an attempt even to try. Pure postmodernism (and correspondingly
queer theory) does not have much to say about justice.22 The problematic created for law,
particularly in a liberal democracy given law’s distributional function, by the suggestion
that there is no subject to which rights, for instance, might be distributed, substantiates
this assertion; as does the practical and theoretical impossibility of queering law that is
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Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left, supra note 6 at 12.
Derrida, in “Force of Law”, infra FN 30 denied that postmodern had nothing to say about justice.
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created by the paradox of pure particularity in conjunction with the paradox of a relational
(and infinitely regressive) concept founded on a performative negation.
This is not to suggest that queer theory is not important. Rather, it is to suggest
that its contribution to an account of the intersection between law and sexuality (which is
essential to any project of justice) is finite, purely methodological and only one piece of
the necessary analytical framework. Aspects of its methodology are important to any
theory of the legal regulation of human sexuality because as a theoretical approach it
helps us to understand how deviation is constituted, how power is produced through
meaning, how that power operates and how sexual actors are constituted and regulated as
a result of the manner in which deviation is formed and power operates. While queer
theory does not have much to say about justice it can offer a very useful way to talk about
justice.
Queer theory gives a convincing account of how those who are ‘others’ become or
remain othered;23 however it cannot provide the vehicle for those who are othered to
become other than othered, nor can it create the space for those others who prefer to
remain others.
In this sense its methodological utility is essentially descriptive. An examination
of Brenda Cossman’s recent book, Sexual Citizens: The Legal and Cultural Regulation of
Sex and Belonging demonstrates this point.24 Cossman frames her analysis through the
trope of citizenship; she spends the bulk of the book very proficiently demonstrating how
American jurisprudence continues to both create new sexual citizens (by examining legal
developments such as same sex relationship recognition) and construct and exile ‘bad’
23
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sexual citizens (through her insightful analysis of phenomena such as the “new politics of
adultery”).
For example, she discusses the Supreme Court of the United States’ finding in
Lawrence v. Texas that a Texas law criminalizing sodomy between members of the same
sex, was a violation of the due process clause of the American Bill of Rights. In doing so
she suggests that “[t]he sexual citizenship of Lawrence is articulated against the backdrop
of what it is not; it is always against an identifiable border”. She argues that the Court
grants a liberty interest in consensual sodomy for gays and lesbians by reaffirming what
sorts of sexual citizens remain exiled, done she suggests, through the Court’s anxious and
incessant border patrolling. “In other words, the sexual conduct in question does not
involve children, harmful sex, nonconsensual sex, public sex or commercial sex. The gay
sex that is being protected is not all gay sex, nor is it all sex. [emphasis added]”25
Of course sexual citizenship is articulated against a background of what it is not.
Why wouldn’t it be? Of course the gay sex that is being protected is not all gay sex, nor
is it all sex. It is not that Cossman’s analysis is lacking – it isn’t. It aptly describes the
process of exclusion through which the meaning of sexual citizenship at a given point in
time, in a given social context, is constituted. She goes on to make the same analytical
move with respect to a number of other legal issues including the legal regulation of
dildos, and the granting of legal recognition for same sex couples. Presumably, Cossman
is not advocating in favour of a sexual citizenship that includes all sex. For example, she
is presumably not suggesting a sexual citizenship that includes inter-generational sex.
The difficulty is that structuring the analysis in the way that she does – demonstrating, the
way she does, that there are borders - will inevitably lead to a debate about the
25

Ibid. at 29.
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advisability of having borders. This is the very conversation she indirectly acknowledges
is no longer fruitful. Instead, let us accept that there are borders – which most of us do –
accept that this is something we either need or want as a society– which most of us do26 and start focusing on how to patrol them in a way which continues to allow for the
greatest possibility of revising them.
Queer theory and social constructivism (at its core) are situated somewhere
between the nihilist’s claim that there is no meaning and the universalist’s or essentialist’s
claim that there is inherent meaning. Its claim is not that there is no meaning but rather
that meaning is socially contingent. Its claim is that meaning is in constant movement
through time and space. That it is constituted through infinite reiterations of, and
deviations from, norms. But it is precisely this claim that, when it is not anchored in a
structure such as is offered by feminist foundationalism, makes it recursive and therefore
ultimately of only limited utility for projects of justice. As one account of, or attempt to
understand, the relationship between hegemony and deviation it is useful. As a vehicle
for the advancement of justice it offers little. Subversion for the sake of subversion is
regressive (in fact infinitely so) not progressive. Borders and meaning are synonymous.
Without borders there is no meaning. Meaning requires a closure; it requires exclusion.
A theoretical approach to sexuality and its regulation with the capacity to handle
law and concepts of justice requires the possibility of a subject, an ability to judge (which
necessitates both the possibility of substantive meaning and the possibility of its
disruption) and recognition of the need and a space for deviation (or what might also be
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called dissent). Justice needs borders. Queer theory proficiently delivers the latter but is
unable to offer, in any theoretically consistent manner, the former. It isn’t by chance that
Lady Justitia tends to hang out in front of the House of Law and not the Theatre of the
Absurd.
Some postmodernists have recognized this difficulty. Postmodern theorists such as
Laclau, Butler and Derrida have all attempted to resolve the paradox of postmodernism.
However, they have all attempted to do so by reconciling this paradox from within
postmodernism.
If social constructivist theories inhered to structure perpetuate sexual moralism yet
divorcing constructivism from foundation or structure results in the paradox of queer
theory, how ought a constructivist legal method conceptualize sexuality? Is there a
theoretical approach that offers more hope? The challenge is to find a method that allows
for meaning, judgment and openness. The section to follow will discuss attempts, by
Laclau, Derrida and Butler, to meet this challenge. Laclau and Derrida’s attempts are
included in this discussion because the insights that they provide regarding versions of a
‘space between’ will be drawn on in Chapter Eight to develop my argument regarding
iconoclasm and the legal successes achieved in the space between failures. Both Laclau
and Derrida concede some space for normativity. Butler’s attempt is examined because
her failure to concede any space for normativity exemplifies why it is necessary to
concede this space, as Derrida and Laclau both do, if the possibility of a nonstructural
constructivist legal approach to sexuality is to exist. It is particularly apposite to include
Butler’s work given that she, more so than either Laclau or Derrida, has applied her
postmodern approach in the context of gender and sexuality.
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II. A Particular Universality?
Laclau acknowledges that, in its efforts to deconstruct the totalizing metanarratives of modernity – the particularity of whose rationality he suggests was revealed
through examples such as European imperialism and Stalinism – the postmodernists have
created a paradox.27 If everything is particular then there is neither structure nor
foundation from which to identify or establish a grounding and correspondingly there is
no way to reject the antisocial practices of others.28
[A]n appeal to pure particularisms is no solution to the problems that we
are facing in contemporary societies. In the first place, the assertion of
pure particularism, independently of any content and of the appeal to a
universality transcending it, is a self-defeating enterprise. For if it is the
only accepted normative principle, it confronts us with an unsolvable
paradox. I can defend the right of sexual, racial and national minorities in
the name of particularims; but if particularim is the only valid principle, I
have also to accept the rights to self-determination of all kinds of
reactionary groups involved in antisocial practices.29

Think of it in terms of legal impediments to sexual liberty, as touched on above.
Organizations such as NAMBLA30 provide the most obvious and well-trodden example.
It is difficult, likely impossible, to deploy post (or non) structural constructivist arguments
to distinguish between the claims of different sexual minorities. Coherent legal
distinctions between the constructivist claims of men oriented towards sexual interactions
with other men and those of men oriented towards sexual interactions with boys requires
resort to some principle/s beyond the principle of particularity. Similarly, think of the
example of sex work. Constructivist arguments based on principles of particularity work
27
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well to destabilize the moral distinctions that power feminism makes between the
exchange of sex for erotic pleasure and the exchange of sex for anything else. However,
legal arguments that distinguish between trading sex for survival and trading sex for
success do not tend to be based on principles of particularity.
Laclau suggests that if we are to meet the demands of, or at least regulate, groups
with conflicting interests, it is necessary to appeal to some more general principles.31
Both Derrida, as discussed in the following section, and Laclau, as discussed in the one
after that, attempt to do this.

i) The Space Between Derrida/s

Derrida’s work in both “The Force of Law” and Rogues asks basically the same question:
How are we to distinguish between the force of law of a legitimate power
and the supposedly originary violence that must have established this
authority and that could not itself have been authorized by any anterior
legitimacy, so that, in this initial moment, it is neither legal nor illegal – or,
others would quickly say, neither just nor unjust?32

How is this question, seemingly about democracy and sovereignty, related to an inquiry
into identity and legal theories of sexuality? It is related because his question identifies
for democracy the same analytical paradox that queer theory poses for ‘sexual justice’. In
this way, his attempts to wrestle with this question and its underlying paradox (or ‘aporia’
as he would characterize it) both exemplifies the same type of claim about meaning
formation that Laclau makes and offers one suggested approach to accommodating this
paradox.

31
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Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law” (1989) 11 Cardoza L. Rev. 919 at 927.

345

“The Force of Law” was published in 1990. In it Derrida describes his notion of
justice as “to come”. Rogues was published fifteen years later, just before his death.
“The Force of Law” is framed by a discussion of ‘justice’ whereas Rogues is framed by a
discussion of ‘democracy’. However, both are an attempt to theorize justice. In “The
Force of Law” Derrida tells us that justice “requires us to calculate with the
incalculable”33.
Derrida claimed that "for a decision to be just and responsible, it must, in its
proper moment if there is one, be both regulated and without regulation: it must conserve
the law and also destroy or suspend it enough to have to reinvent it in the reaffirmation
and the new and free confirmation of its principle."34 As a result, to experience the
paradox “in which the decision between just and unjust is never insured by a rule” is to
experience justice.35 For this reason
justice remains, is yet to come, à-venir, it has an, it is à-venir, the very
dimension of events irreducibly to come. It will always have it, this à venir, and always has. Perhaps it is for this reason that justice, insofar as it
is not a juridical or political concept, opens up for l'avenir, the
transformation, the recasting or refounding of law and politics. 'Perhaps',
one must always say perhaps for justice.36

What does it mean to suggest that justice is “the very dimension of events
irreducibly to come”? To answer this it is helpful to examine and compare with this
suggestion, Derrida’s notion of ‘democracy to come’. When Derrida speaks of a
'democracy to come', he is not referring to a future democracy, or a new regime, or new
organization of political systems or nation-states. ‘Democracy to come’ is distinct from
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any kind of regulating ideal or teleological horizon.37 By ‘democracy to come’ he is
suggesting that democracy has the structure of a promise. In fact, he is suggesting that
democracy is a promise. In a sense, he means that what democracy is… is the promise of
democracy. The ‘to come’ indicates the promise of an authentic democracy which will
never be embodied in any structure, institution, or system which we call democracy. He
does not mean that 'democracy to come' will be simply a future democracy correcting or
improving the actual conditions of present day democracies; he means that democracy as
we speak of it is linked in its concept to a futural promise. He suggests that the structure
of a promise is inscribed in the idea of democracy because, internal to the concept of
democracy, is the notion of an endless process of improvement and perfectibility. “The
expression ‘democracy to come’ takes into account the absolute and intrinsic historicity
of the only system that welcomes in itself, in its very concept, that expression of
autoimmunity called the right to self-critique and perfectibility.”38

Derrida suggests that democracy needs deconstruction and deconstruction needs
democracy. By this, it seems he means that democracy more than other forms of political
organization demands or requires an openness to the future, that it needs to be associated
with the deconstructive notion of an open future.39 He suggests that the idea of
democracy implies infinite perfectibility. By infinite he means unavoidably incomplete
and by perfectibility he must mean ‘just’. His argument is that no political system or
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principle or law (or meaning) can by itself be called just (in other words be universally
just) because any system or law – in other words all institutionalized power – arises out of
and is instituted by or through an ultimately unjustifiable violence. By violence he does
not mean physical violence. His assertion that no political system or principle or law can
by itself be called just, is premised on the notion that any rule formation, any attempt at a
closed meaning, and therefore any content to a system or principle or rule will inevitably
involve a process of exclusion – an ‘inhospitableness’… a violence. (This concept of
inevitable inhospitableness is similar, if not analogous, to Laclau’s chain of equivalence.)
Democracy as a concept has to remain open to perfection – to a reality in which there is
not the violence of excluding some (meaning) and favoring other/s (meaning).

Derrida is careful to point out in Rogues that by ‘democracy to come’ he is not
simply making the observation that a true and full democracy will always remain to
come, indefinitely deferred. He notes that had he meant only that, he would have been
reproducing, if not plagiarizing, the classical discourses of political philosophy as far
back as Rousseau.40 By ‘democracy to come’ Derrida means something more than just
that democracy is a work in progress. He is questioning the very idea that democracy as a
concept can be understood. For Rousseau, true democracy in the present is unachievable
because of inherent human fallibility. For Derrida, the embodiment of a true and living
democracy is impossible because it is unknowable. Indeed, he says “[d]emocracy has
always been suicidal, and if there is a to-come for it, it is only on the condition of thinking
life otherwise, life and the force of life”.41
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It is in relation to this ‘aporia’ that in Rogues he casts doubt upon the possibility
that one could even speak democratically about democracy:
To speak democratically of democracy, it would be necessary, through
some circular performativity and through the political violence of some
enforcing rhetoric, some force of law, to impose a meaning on the word
democratic and thus produce a consensus that one pretends, by fiction, to
be established and accepted – or at the very least possible and necessary:
on the horizon.42
Derrida suggests that this openness or futural promise creates a self-destructiveness
inherent to the concept of democracy. Derrida suggests that democracy carries within
itself the seeds of its own destruction. The auto-immunity of democracy, its suicidal
possibility, he suggests, is that through its openness it always exposes itself to the
possibility of being taken over by the ‘un’ or ‘anti’ democratic. “The great question of
modern parliamentary and representative democracy, perhaps of all democracy, in this
logic of the turn or round, of the other turn or round, of the other time and thus of the
other, of the alter in general, is that the alternative to democracy can always be
represented as a democratic alternation.” 43 This, he suggests, is the ipseity of
democracy.44 It is a notion not unlike the paradox of pure particularity as an identity that
Laclau describes. It is analytically analogous to the infinite regression, the performative
negation, of queer theory.
So does Derrida’s theory offer us any assistance in avoiding or resolving this
ipseity? Derrida’s ‘democracy to come’ names the structure of an event beyond
calculation and program.45 This is the sense in which it is unknowable and therefore
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unachievable. Derrida argues that “democracy will never exist, in the sense of a present
existence: not because it will be deferred but because it will always remain aporetic in its
structure”.46 It will always be a concept tending to doubt. Why? Because it will always
struggle with “force without force, incalculable singularity and calculable
equality…heteronomy and autonomy, indivisible sovereignty and divisible or shared
sovereignty…”.47
The difficulty with conceptualizing justice (or identity) in this manner is not that
it is nihilistic. It is not nihilistic. It is that it is a ceaseless and infinite struggle ending
always and only in exclusion. To harbor simultaneously meaning and its negation is
impossible.
Derrida’s deconstruction of democracy, the demonstration that it is unknowable, is
not aimed at suggesting futility or annihilation; that said nor is the futural promise of ‘to
come’ meant to connote the democracy of the future, or some coming event. So then how
can the theory of justice claimed by Derrida be understood as other than self-annihilating
and futile? Because tucked neatly inside the ‘space between Derrida/s’ is one little nugget
of normativity.
Derrida suggests that the deconstruction of democracy, or the questioning of
sovereignty is what is already happening. In Rogues he says “in any case, such a
questioning of sovereignty [which he at times uses interchangeably with democracy]… is
at work today; it is what’s coming, what’s happening. It is and it makes history through
the anxiety-provoking turmoil we are currently undergoing.”48 The ‘to come’ suggests
that a democracy “must have the structure of a promise, and thus the memory of that
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which carries the future, the to-come, here and now.”49 When asked in interview “why
discuss democracy”, Derrida responded:
I think that there is inequality and repression in the traditional concept of
friendship such as we inherit it. It is in the name of more democracy that I
think we have to unlock, to open, to displace this prevalent concept, and
this is not my initiative, not the initiative of someone operating in a
deconstructive manner; it is what is happening today. Today this model of
brotherhood, man, friendship is being deconstructed in the world. What I
say about the nation-state is what is happening today in the world. This
so-called deconstruction is simply what is happening in a more or less
visible way, in an unequal way with what is called the 'inequality of
development'.50

He suggests that in the name of more democracy we ought to deconstruct
friendship but then goes on to deny that this is what he is doing, suggesting rather, that he
is merely describing what is transpiring in the world today. But Derrida is deconstructing
something in this statement –he is actually deconstructing democracy in the name of more
democracy. There is an important connection for Derrida between friendship –
hospitality – and democracy. The normative posture with which he begins this
observation (“It is in the name of more democracy that I think we have to unlock, to open,
to displace this prevalent concept…”), and his references to inequality belie the purely
observational characterization he goes on to give this statement. There is both a
deconstructive aspect evident in his link between friendship and democracy and a very
obvious normative assertion evident in his invocation of the concept of equality, his use
of the phrase ‘more democracy’ and underlying the correlation he assumes exists between
friendship and democracy. If this is true, if what he is doing is deconstructing democracy
in the name of more democracy, then given his definition of justice – that being those
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“moments in which the decision between just and unjust is never insured by a rule”51 – it
seems that in his invocation to deconstruct friendship in the name of more democracy he
gives us his normative account of justice. Justice, for Derrida in 2005 in Rogues, is the
very same paradox it was for him in 1989 in “The Force of Law”.
If we do not and can not know what democracy means, how can Derrida make the
normative assertion that we ought to deconstruct friendship in the name of more
democracy? The answer may be that Derrida’s concept of democracy to come is an
observational assessment of what occurs; and that the normative component of his
analysis is that it is justice that is both a work in progress and always only a work in
progress. Certainly he would agree that democracy need not connote justice but perhaps
there is something more significant to be gleaned by understanding his work in light of
the disaggregation of these two concepts. It is true that at times in Rogues, such as in his
discussion of Algerian or Chilean politics or more generally when he describes the
murderous and suicidal inclinations inherent in the notion of democracy, he is not
equating “democracy to come” with “justice to come”. However, at other times, he
seems to use the term democracy to indicate concepts such as equality, and justice, such
as in one interview where he states “but if we dissociate democracy from the name of a
regime we can then give this name 'democracy' to any kind of experience in which there
is equality, justice, equity, respect for the singularity of the Other at work, so to speak”52,
or where he suggests that ‘democracy to come’ does call for a militant and immediate
injunction or critique of every political discourse and human rights rhetoric which
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remains little more than an obscene alibi so long as it tolerates the terrible
plight of so many millions of human beings suffering from malnutrition,
disease, and humiliation, grossly deprived not only of bread and water but
of equality or freedom, disposed of the rights of all, of everyone, of
anyone.53
The implications of his use of the term in the former context are different than in the
latter. It may be that in this latter context he is talking not about democracy but about
justice. It is under this latter understanding of democracy that it makes sense to
deconstruct democracy in the name of more democracy.
Derrida argues that because democracy is a promise and will remain a promise it
keeps the meaning of fundamental terms like freedom and equality open-ended. The
structure of a promise opens up a space between democracy’s actual condition and its
future space and it is in this space between present and the future to come – delineated by
the concept democracy to come – where the meaning of fundamental terms like freedom
and equality can remain open-ended. The normative shift in his argument, the point at
which he begins to speak of his notion of democracy as justice is at that point where this
space between present and the future to come enters his analysis.
What suggests this? Derrida gives us a sense of what ought to transpire in this
space. He suggests that “to come' means also not a future but that it [democracy/justice]
has 'to come' as a promise, as a duty, that is 'to come' immediately. We don't have to wait
for future democracy to happen, to appear, we have to do right here and now what has to
be done for it.”54 Derrida suggests that the promise of repetition and the open-endedness
of the future to come keeps social values and institutional structures open to different
interpretations of what democracy means thus allowing multiple voices to clash and
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negotiate with one another. It is in this ‘space’ that such clashes can and will occur.
Interestingly, his very articulation of this ‘space’ is simultaneously a performance within
it, a demonstration of its functioning.
The open-endedness of this space between the present and the future to come
applies to the identities of the subjects engaged in modern discussion as well as the topics
of modern discussion. Derrida argues that pre-modern forms of social organization relied
on extra-political factors such as caste and class to ground political order, whereas
modern ones do not and so, with no identity being ahistorical and with the democratic
political field being open, the sovereign’s identity is open.55 The identity of people is not
fixed; it can only be determined by the interpretations and continuous re-identifications of
the people themselves. This is why democratic unity and sovereignty are inherently
unstable, internally and infinitely differentiated and open to never-ending contestation. It
is also why Derrida focuses on notions of hospitality.
Matthias Fritsch suggests that Derrida’s polemical space of democratic decision
making is opposed to a notion of deliberative democracy that specifies normative criteria
in advance.56 Derrida’s concern, he suggests, is that this would impose a universal and
hegemonic model of language on the radically open forms of democratic discussion and
questioning which Derrida proposes. Matthias suggests Derrida’s understanding is a
democratic discourse governed by openness, infinity and the possibility of unsurpassable
dissension that requires compromise rather than by normative rules given as universal.
Derrida’s rejection of all normative criteria, a refusal to lay down even a basic set
of rules for what goes on in ‘the space’, or even for how to understand what happens
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within the space must stem from a belief that to do so would limit access to the space, that
it would lead to inhospitality. But it may be that in taking such a position, Derrida has
specified normative criteria in advance – he may have laid down at least one rule. His
rule? Access for everyone to the space, to the place, medium or forum where clash
occurs, where meaning is contested.57 His rule is meant to achieve his concept of
hospitality – unconditional openness to Other; a successful accommodation of singularity.
So his rule, which is that there be no rules, is consistent with his underlying reason for
having no rules, but it nonetheless results in just the sort of double bind in which he
seems to delight. Ultimately, however, it seems that in all of this there remains, by the
introduction of this space, a normative shift. Whether it be called democracy, or justice,
equality or hospitality, in the space created by this futural promise a teleological horizon
resides and that horizon means something.
It may be that for Derrida law is a performative negation of justice in the same
way that queer is a performative negation of identity. Justice, perhaps, is the infinite
repetition of these negations. What is Just about this? Where is the nugget of
normativity? It is in the open-endedness - the hospitality and friendship – found in that
space between now and the future to come. The concept of a space between now and the
future to come, and the possibility for hospitality in that space will be relied upon in the
next Chapter in the discussion regarding the promise of the space between failures.
ii) Laclau’s Constitutive Lack

57

This ought not to be confused with a rule or set of rules about deliberative democracy. Derrida’s space
isn’t merely the public arena of political discourse. It is a radical space of struggle, violence and clash
where there are no rules. The first (and only) rule of Derrida’s fight club is that there are no rules in fight
club. In this way everyone gets to join.

355

As noted above, Laclau explicitly acknowledged the paradox of postmodernism.
That is its failure, due to its claim that all meaning is socially constructed and therefore
there is no universal, to provide criteria from which to judge. Laclau rejected both the
logical possibility and the desirability of pure particularity. He suggested that we need
general principles to address the conflicting demands of different groups. He argued that
unless there exists some sort of pre-established harmony, which he argued is neither
realistic nor desirable, the demands of various groups will inevitably clash with one
another; as such, he suggested, general or transcendent principles to address these
conflicts are necessary.58
Despite his assertion of the exclusionary manner in which identity (or meaning) is
created (and its corresponding incompletion and therefore particularity), Laclau does not
suggest that universality itself is impossible. Instead, he attempts to conceive of a
universal without meaning – universal as an empty place or space. He attempts to
identify a general transcendent principle devoid of any particularity by conceptualizing a
universal process. The process he refers to is the ‘chain of equivalence’ discussed above
– the emergence of identity from a constitutive exclusion or antagonism which produces
one necessary commonality …incomplete determination. By suggesting that universality
is an empty but ineradicable place, he acknowledges its possibility but suggests it has no
58
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actual content (i.e. it includes no particular); Laclau proposes that it is actually the
absence of any such shared content that constitutes the promise of universality. In doing
so he may have arrived at two universals. What is universal is both the inability to ever
fully put content into the universal and the structural process underlying such inability. In
other words, what is universal, for Laclau , is both this constitutive lack and his process
based explanation for why this lack exists. His empty but ineradicable place is, in some
respects, similar to the promise theorized in Derrida’s democracy to come, discussed
above. As with the space Derrida creates between now and the future to come, the
concept of Laclau’s ineradicable place will be relied upon in Chapter Eight. Simply put,
my argument will be that one of the infinite processes of meaning formation that might
occur in Derrida’s space or Laclau’s ineradicable place is iconoclasm.
Having accepted the necessity, or at the very least utility, as well as the possibility
of a universal, Laclau considers some of the historical ways in which the relationship
between universality and particularity has been conceptualized. One understanding of
this relationship between the two envisions a spectrum with universality on one pole and
particularity on the other, with a distinct line dividing the universal and the particular.59
According to Laclau, under this conception, there is no mediation between the two
concepts – the particular can only corrupt the universal. Either the particular realizes in
itself the universal (and thus eliminates its particularity) or it negates the universal by
asserting its particularism. The reason for this relates to the frontier dividing the two
poles. Is the line separating the two poles a particular line or a universal line? If this
supposed line is universal then ultimately it will engulf all particular – the particular will
become universal and the dividing line will blur. If the line is particular then universality
59
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is really only a particularity that defines itself in terms of limitless exclusion. The line, in
a sense, becomes an infinite number of lines.60
A second account of the relationship between particularity and universality
identified by Laclau stems from a theological perspective. Under this account there is a
point of view of totality, but it is God’s view and is not accessible to human reason.
Here, only God can see the universal, and humans cannot reason their way into
discovering it – under this account “there is no timeless world of rational forms which we
can discover through reason”61. Instead, God has a master plan (which is the universal or
totality) which requires a temporal succession of essential events unknowable to the
human subjects who “incarnate” each of these universal moments.62 In other words,
God’s master plan is the universal and the bodies incarnating it are the particular – and
there is no rational connection between the two. Laclau calls this the logic of incarnation
and suggests that it is because of this logic that history received a privileged position. He
argues that it became a privileged agent – an agent whose body was the expression of a
universality transcending it. The reason being because it was capable of, at least
retrospectively, recounting God’s master plan - history wasn’t stuck in the particular of
any one of these “universal moments” in the way that every human incarnate was. (It is
interesting to think about this account of history in terms of Foucault’s genealogies).
Laclau suggests that with the Enlightenment, modern thought, with its emphasis on
reason, eventually replaced this logic of incarnation. God as the universal and absolute
source of understanding was replaced by reason. The Enlightenment ushered in an era in
which there had to be a rational ground for everything. Laclau suggests however, that
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rationality also has a logic, although it is not the same logic as that of the logic of
incarnation. Under the logic of rationality everything must be transparent to reason
including the connection between the universal and the body incarnating it –there must be
a common ground between the universal and the body incarnating it. Rationality needs a
body - this, Laclau would suggest, is where both the origin and site of modernity’s
‘universal subject’ is derived.
According to Laclau, however, while the universal had purportedly found its own
body, this body was still the body of a certain particularity – European culture of the 19th
century. Euro particularism and the universal functions this body was supposed to
incarnate couldn’t be separated – this model of understanding the world and its humanity
had universalized Euro particulars. Laclau suggests that as a result, European imperialist
expansion was presented in terms of a “universal civilizing function” and the resistances
of other cultures was presented not as struggles between cultures and identities but as a
struggle between universality and particularity. This is the dilemma Laclau refers to in
Emancipations when he states “in the case of a secular eschatology, however, as the
source of the universal is not external but internal to the world, the universal can only
manifest itself through the establishment of an essential inequality between the objective
positions of the social agents.”63 In his example, this would be the inequality manifested
between the colonizers and the colonized.
In view of each of these accounts of universality, Laclau is left considering the
possibility that the universal is no more than a particular that has become at some point
dominant or hegemonic. As a result of arriving at such a conclusion, Laclau’s question,
in both Emancipations and Contingency, Hegemony, Universality could be characterized
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as: is there a universal or is the universal simply a particular which has become
hegemonic?
Laclau’s answer is that there is a universal: it is what, as was discussed above, he
identifies as the ‘chain of equivalence’ through which all identity is constituted. Despite
his assertion of the exclusionary manner in which identity (or meaning) is created (and its
corresponding incompletion and therefore particularity), Laclau does not suggest that
universality itself is impossible. Instead, as noted above, he attempts to conceive of a
universal without meaning – universal as an empty place or space. He attempts to
identify a general transcendent principle devoid of any particularity by conceptualizing a
universal process. By suggesting that universality is an empty but ineradicable place, he
acknowledges its possibility but suggests it has no actual content (i.e. it includes no
particular). Laclau proposes that it is actually the absence of any such shared content that
constitutes the promise of universality. Laclau identifies a common condition to all
politicization: the condition by which any specific content fails to fully constitute an
identity, a condition of necessary failure which not only pertains universally, but is the
empty and eradicable place of universality itself. It is inevitable that a political
organization will posit the possible filling of that place and equally inevitable that they
will fail to do so. In doing so he may have arrived at two universals. What is universal is
both the inability to ever fully put content into the universal and the structural process
underlying such inability.
In other words, what is universal, for Laclau, is both this constitutive lack and his
process based explanation for why this lack exists. (His empty but ineradicable place is
similar to the promise theorized in Derrida’s democracy to come.)
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Laclau argues that “[c]ontemporary social struggles are bringing to the fore this
contradictory movement that the emancipatory discourse of both religious and modern
secularized eschatologies had concealed and repressed.”64 Laclau concludes that as a
result we are currently “coming to terms with our own finitude” and the political
possibilities this recognition opens.65 It is with this that Laclau then suggests that
“perhaps we are at the end of emancipation and at the beginning of freedom”.66 Is Laclau
then suggesting we ought to, in the name of progress, relinquish all claims to identity, all
closed meaning? In order to understand what he means by this it is important to
understand what Laclau means by freedom. By freedom Laclau does not mean a free
subject with a positive identity. By freedom he means something ambiguous, something
not necessarily positive and something that is not absolute; this is because for Laclau the
source of freedom is the dislocation of the subject that arises out of the differential
process by which identity is constituted.
The political possibilities that Laclau is suggesting will open up are those that will
arise if we recognize the following: that there is no subject with a positive (complete)
identity to emancipate; that what is universal is this structural failure in the constitution of
the subject; and that because actual freedom resides in the dislocation caused by this
structural incompletion, freedom is not wholly positive; it must be coupled with
'unfreedom' because absolute freedom would lead to an unrestricted dislocation and the
total disintegration of the social fabric.
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What does this suggest in terms of a theory of sexual justice? Laclau is not
arguing in favour of a total disintegration of the social fabric. Like Derrida, he is not
arguing in favour of the nihilistic tendencies sometimes associated with postmodern
thought. Indeed, in Emancipations he quite expressly critiques the limits of
postmodernism’s critique of meaning.
He does not suggest that there is no closed meaning – what he emphasizes is that
in terms of the constitution of meaning, the subject, and identity, the potential for change,
exists in those structural failures, those moments of dislocation, and the preservation and
promotion of spaces of ‘undecidability’. For Laclau no concept, including the concept of
universality is closed – all encompassing- and the potential, or political utility of
universality, is the open-endedness, the structural failure which results in a never ending
struggle for hegemony.
There are two unstated assumptions that under gird his chain of equivalence and
the assertion that a claim of particularity is at once a claim of inclusion and exclusion and
it is therefore impossible to claim a right to recognition of an identity of pure
particularity. A commonality or universality antecedent to that explicitly observed by
Laclau is reason –not only his own but also that which he imputes to the identity
claimant. Laclau’s paradox of claims to differential identity or pure particularity operates
within the framework of reason. More significantly perhaps, the type of reasoning that he
adopts and imputes to the identity claimant is premised on a notion of mutuality. And
what is more, it is an assumption of mutuality grounded in equity and parity. It is
reasoning that assumes, without articulating or defending such, that commonality requires
mutuality and therefore parity. He rightly asserts that a claim to a particular identity is a

362

recognition of other identities but doesn’t acknowledge that such an assertion is based on
reasoning which assumes that a recognition in oneself of commonality necessitates a
mutuality in the recognition of others. It is, in this respect, perhaps the case that Laclau’s
theory, not unlike Derrida’s democracy to come ends up at the same place: that of an
undefended assumption of fairness or what might be called justice –there is a content to
his constitutive lack.
iii) Butler’s Particular Universality
Butler ‘sets the stage’ for her exploration or restaging of the concept of
universality (and justice) by discussing hegemony.67 She suggests that hegemony
establishes the discourse for any particular setting, and the possibilities for articulation
within any given political circumstance.68 She argues that we ought to understand this
field of articulation – the possible ways in which we talk about things – to be ahistorical
and limitless. The notion that there may be a structural limit to the field of possible
discourses is problematic for Butler because, if the terms of both dominance and
opposition are limited in some underlying structural way, then so are the possible sites of
articulation for justice, equality and universality.69
Butler suggests that the radical possibilities for such an understanding of
hegemony lie in the fact that such a circumstance emphasizes the ways in which power
operates to form our everyday understanding of social relations. In this respect she gives
a Foucauldian account of power – power is neither stable nor static, but rather is remade
repeatedly within everyday life. It is “ensconced as the prevailing epistemes of a
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culture”.70 Butler argues that “social transformation occurs not merely by rallying large
groups in favour of a cause but through the ways in which daily social relations are
rearticulated and new conceptual horizons opened up by anomalous or subversive
practices”.71 She draws an analogy between her notion of performativity and her theory
of hegemony and suggests that both performativity and hegemony highlight the way in
which the social world is constituted through collaborative relations with power.72
Butler’s description of hegemony is grounded in a cultural context. Her
description seems to be one of the manner in which culture, dominant culture, is
constituted. This account of hegemony then leads into her discussion of universality and
the notion of cultural translation. Her account of universality, like Laclau’s, is premised
on the notion of constitutive exclusion. However, for Butler, what is universal is derived
from what she describes as a process of cultural translation. She suggests that we think of
universality “in terms of this constitutive act of cultural translation”.73
Butler discusses the impossibility of conceiving of universality as that which is
self-identical to all human beings and therefore constitutive of the general will because
under such a conception there is no place for the individual will. Instead what happens is
“universality must vanish the individual”; in other words, because it cannot have any
particular, those who remain radically unrepresented by the general will do not rise to the
level of recognizably human within its terms. It is, for example, an account of

70

Ibid. at 14.
Ibid.
72
Ibid.
73
Ibid.
71

364

universality that could coherently sustain the United States Supreme Court’s infamous
decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford.74 Butler argues that:
[t]o the extent that universality fails to embrace all particularity and
instead is built upon a fundamental hostility to particularity it continues to
be hostile to and to animate the very hostility by which it is founded – the
universal can be universal only to the extent that it remains untainted by
what is particular, concrete and individual – thus it requires the constant
and meaningless vanishing of the individual.75

Under Butler’s notion of universality, without the vanishing of the individual universality
would vanish; what is universal is this vanishing; once it is understood that this vanishing
of the individual is crucial to the operation of abstract universality then universality itself
vanishes as a concept which is said to include all life. She suggests that there is no way to
bring the excluded particularism into the universal without negating that particularism.
This account of the universal may be likened to what Laclau identified as one historical
understanding of the relationship between universality and polarity, that being as a
spectrum with universality on one pole and particularity on the other, with a distinct line
dividing the universal and the particular and no mediation between the two concepts – the
particular can only corrupt the universal.76
Under Butler’s account, what you end up with inside the term universal is nothing
and outside an inassimilable trace or remainder which forever haunts the term universal.
This, she suggests, is the problem with universality as an abstraction: it is impossible to
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eradicate the particular and so the thing that is universal is the fact that particularism is
ineradicable.
This leads her to conclude that universalism must be thought of in concrete form
and that in this context what is universal is the constitutive act of cultural translation.
And with this she suggests that
[i]f we are to begin to rethink universality in terms of this constitutive act
of cultural translation…then neither a presumption of linguistic or
cognitive commonness nor a teleological postulate of an ultimate fusion of
all cultural horizons will be a possible route for the universal claim.77

One distinction between Laclau’s theoretical approach and Butler’s is in relation to the
possibility of structure. While both work from the assumption that foundation as a
conceptual possibility is neither possible nor desirable (both are, in this respect, antifoundational), they diverge on the issue of structure. For Laclau, the structure of the
process of identity formation is the universal and the conflict inherent to the type of
process he identifies holds the only potential for social transformation. His theory is
similar to Derrida’s in this respect. Butler eschews any notion of a structural universality,
preferring instead to conceptualize universality purely in terms of process – or as a
performance. Whereas for Laclau universality is located in a structural incompletion
arising from the constitutive exclusion through which identity is formed, for Butler
universality is not to be located in a structure.
The notion that all identity is posited in a field of differential relations is
clear enough, but if these relations are pre-social, or if they constitute a
structural level of differentiation which conditions and structures the social
but is distinct from it, we have located the universal in yet another domain:
in the structural features of any and all languages. Is this significantly
different from identifying the universal in the structural presuppositions of
77
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the speech act, in so far as both projects elaborate a universal account of
some characteristics of language?78

Butler suggests that for a claim to universality to work, to become recognizable as a
claim, to compel consensus, “and for the claim, performatively, to enact the very
universality it enunciates, it must undergo a set of translations into the various rhetorical
and cultural contexts in which the meaning and force of universal claims are made”.79
That is to say, no assertion of universality occurs outside of a cultural norm and because
norms vary from society to society, no assertion can be made across cultures without a
corresponding translation. “Without translation, the very concept of universality cannot
cross the linguistic borders it claims, in principle, to be able to cross.”80 As a result, it is
impossible to separate out the cultural features of any universalist claim.81
In terms of law and projects of sexual justice, Butler’s account of universality and
its relationship to particularim is less promising than Laclau’s or Derrida’s. While under
none do we have an account of a stable subject or identity, Laclau does provide for us
some criteria for judgment. That is the desirability of recognizing and sustaining the
open-ended process of conflict through which identity and meaning is unendingly
constituted. Presumably, Derrida’s ‘democracy to come’ provides the same. Butler’s
theory does not leave space for the law to be operationalized – it provides no criteria by
which the law’s distributive functions might be guided. This is evidenced by her
simplistic and positivist treatment of law as formal, instrumental and ultimately
unsatisfying, in her discussion of Guantanamo Bay, American exceptionalism and notions
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of sovereignty, found in her recent work on international human rights.82 For instance,
Butler’s discussion of the American government’s decision to deny rights to detainees at
George Bush’s Guantanamo Bay makes undefended references to “the human
community” and accusations that the “uniqueness and exceptionalism of this kind of war
[that being the purported ‘war on terrorism’] makes it exempt from the presumptions and
protections of universality and civilization”.83 What civilization? What is the human
community? And what protections are offered by a universality that is located strictly in a
process of cultural translation?
Whether it is that the law can’t handle Butler’s theory or that Butler’s theory can’t
handle law, and despite her assertion that a theory of hegemony and universality ought
not be abstract (as she suggests Laclau’s is), her failure in Indefinite Detention to actually
apply her theory of universality to the concrete legal circumstance she discusses, suggests
the unlikelihood of it providing the basis for developing a coherent theory of sexual
justice.
If one was to compare, most queer theory would likely be closer to Butler’s
account of hegemony and universality than Laclau or Derrida’s theories. There is a
normative content to both Laclau and Derrida’s theories that may offer some criterion for
judgment – for law to be operationalized. This is not present in Butler’s theory of
82
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universality. Queer theory is most like Butler’s theory because it too lacks any normative
content. It is a relational concept –a positionality.
Conclusion
What should be taken from this discussion? Perhaps the following: queer theory
provides tremendous descriptive insight into the violence underpinning any social
meaning (that is the process of exclusion through which meaning is constituted); it
provides theoretical insight into how concepts such as gender and sexuality come to be;
and it demonstrates that because of this originary violence (in the formation of any law or
sexual norm) it is incumbent upon any just system or social structure to recognize that its
fairness depends on its ability to continually redefine and reinterpret itself and the social
context in which it operates.
This, however, still leaves at least two theoretical problems. First, how, in the
context of sexuality, does any system or institution or social structure ensure access to
that space between now and the future to come where meaning is constituted and
reconstituted continually? Second, by what criteria and through what method are the
meanings attached to sexuality or social evolutions of sexuality at any given moment,
accepted or rejected?
Accepting as necessary for law the need to judge, is there a way to stay open to
perfection without arriving at the paradox law faces when presented with such openness?
Recall the competing claims made throughout these chapters: first, that law ought to
continue its shift towards a constructivist conception of sexuality and second that it ought
to further embrace and rely upon the notion of sexual integrity by understanding it is a
common interest.
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Chapter Eight will argue that the notion of sexual integrity that the law ought to
rely upon should include at least two elements: a concept of protecting and promoting the
‘conditions for’ sexual integrity and a recognition that included in those conditions should
be always the possibility to re-examine, re-articulate, disrupt, subvert and replace both the
meaning of sexual integrity and the conditions thought necessary to promote that sexual
integrity. Derrida argued that the concept of democracy must remain open to the
possibility of perfection (it is in this sense self-annihilating). There is a similarity between
Derrida’s need for hospitality (friendship) and Laclau’s notion of mutuality. In Derrida’s
space between now and the future to come might reside Laclau’s infinite moments of
undecidability and the assumption of mutuality embedded in his constitutive lack. This
idea seems promising and will be relied upon in the next chapter to argue that through
concepts like iconoclasm we might identify the finite successes that are achieved as law
continues to try (and fail) to promote the conditions for sexual integrity.
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Chapter 8 – Conclusion

A number of claims, intended to build on one another, have been made throughout
the previous chapters. The first was that sexuality is typically conceptualized as either an
innate, naturally occurring, pre-social and essential element constitutive of who we are, or
as a product of norms, social practices, institutions and structures – much like language,
“diets, methods of transportation, systems of etiquette, forms of labor, types of
entertainment, processes of production, and modes of oppression”.1 The second claim
made was that, across different legal contexts, the Court has tended towards an
essentialist conception of sexuality.2 Following this claim was the assertion that legal
conceptions of sexuality as socially constructed are to be preferred over essentialist
conceptions of sexuality - that constructivist conceptions promote legal reasoning that is
less likely to understand and measure every sexual act, desire or identity through a
heterosexual paradigm, and is better able to accommodate the relational, contextual and
institutional factors which contribute to the regulation and production of sexuality (by
refusing to overemphasize biology, heterosexual arousal, romance, and sexual morality).3
The fourth claim was that where the Courts have shifted towards a more constructivist
account – such as in the context of adult sexual violence - the law’s moral focus has also
shifted - from a concern over sexual acts to a concern over sexual actors, from an interest
in protecting sexual propriety to an interest in protecting sexual integrity.4 Related to this
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fourth claim was the assertion that the law ought to understand sexual integrity as a
common good and be oriented towards promoting and protecting this common good. The
fifth claim was the assertion that constructivist approaches that remain firmly anchored in
a specific structure fail to remain open to perfection – they lack what Derrida would refer
to as hospitality and in doing so do not truly shift the law’s focus away from sexual
morality and towards political morality.5 Following this was the cautionary claim made
in the previous chapter. This was the claim that while constructivist theories are
methodologically invaluable, in that they demonstrate the need for any just system or
social structure to recognize that its fairness depends on its ability to continually redefine
and reinterpret itself and the social context in which it operates, queer theory and post
modernism do not meet the law’s need to establish or identify criteria by which to judge.6
As suggested at the end of Chapter Seven, this final chapter will argue that the
Court ought to continue this shift towards constructivist conceptions of sexuality. This
chapter will argue that the Court ought to continue this shift by embracing and relying
upon the notion of sexual integrity as a common good and that the notion of sexual
integrity it ought to rely upon should include at least two elements: a concept of
protecting and promoting the ‘conditions for’ sexual integrity (which will necessitate
criteria of judgment) and a recognition that included in those conditions should be always
the possibility to re-examine, re-articulate, disrupt, subvert and replace both the meaning
of sexual integrity and the conditions thought necessary to promote that sexual integrity
(which will require that it adopt approaches which remain open to perfection).
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This chapter will be broken into two parts. The first part will examine what it
means to suggest that the law conceptualize sexual integrity as a common good. It will
then explore the concept of iconoclasm and suggest how it might be used to deploy the
methodological insights of post modernism while accommodating the reality of law’s
judgment. Part two will attempt to further exemplify the rather theoretical claims made in
part one by examining how the conceptual approach suggested here either has or could in
the future be applied by the Court in a particular legal context. The theoretical approach
proposed in the pages to follow does not provide a perfect theory capable of responding
to every theoretical, conceptual and doctrinal critique to be made where law and sexuality
intersect. To suggest that it did (or assume that it could) would be inconsistent with the
claims made throughout this work and summarized in the previous paragraph. As
suggested in the introductory chapter, the objective here is to develop one account of how
a legal conception of sexuality as socially constructed might attempt to accommodate the
tension between the recognition that what sexuality is is constituted through the norms,
social practices, relationships and discursive regimes (including legal discourse) that
describe and regulate it and law’s need, despite this, to use those norms, social practices
and discourses to judge that which is constituted through them.
I. Sexual Integrity And Iconoclasm
i) Sexual Integrity As A Common Good
Throughout the previous chapters I have argued that the law ought to
conceptualize sexuality as a social construct and that more specifically where law and
sexuality intersect the law ought to concern itself with the promotion and protection of
sexual integrity. This, I have suggested, will better enable legal approaches that focus on
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the affective, interactional and contextual aspects of sexuality. I also argued that the law
should be oriented towards not only ensuring freedom from violations of sexual integrity
but also promoting and protecting the ‘conditions for’… sexual fulfillment, sexual
diversity, the safety necessary for sexual exploration and sexual benefit.7 I proposed that
this would include the need for a community of sexual actors with intact sexual
integrities, so that each of its members might have access to the relational aspects of
sexual integrity. This, I contended, suggests that sexual integrity is in part relational and
that it is in part relational suggests that it could be understood as a common good.
In fact, sexual integrity, like language, is one of those common goods that
individuals need in order to be autonomous. The purpose of this section is to further
expand upon the assertion that people require certain relational components to their lives
– such as a community with the ‘conditions for’ sexual integrity - to be autonomous.
Joseph Raz argues that autonomy (due to its integral connection to well being) is a
good that should dictate for society what constitutes the right. In other words, liberalism
(and the principle of personal autonomy) is a conception of the good; in fact, because it
fosters wellbeing8, it may be the best conception of the good. In making this argument
Raz has deviated from liberalism’s traditional principle of state impartiality whereby
legitimate state policies dictate what are and are not right actions but do not dictate what
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are and are not good lives. Raz suggests that it is not desirable to fully separate the right
from the good in public decision-making.9
Raz argues that freedom is intrinsically valuable10 and in doing so, he raises the
liberal ideal of personal autonomy to the highest normative level. However, he also
qualifies this assertion by suggesting that freedom or autonomy is valuable only if it is
exercised in pursuit of valuable projects.11 At first glance, this seems contradictory.
However, what he means is that freedom is morally valuable or intrinsically good but this
does not connote that any activity becomes valuable simply because it is chosen freely.
For Raz the overarching ethical conviction of individuals and society ought to be to foster
individual wellbeing. The wellbeing of individuals is constituted by the pursuit of their
relationships and projects, but only of those relationships and projects which are actually
valuable.12 Raz suggests that a project or relationship can only be valuable if it is
willingly embraced. However, that a project or relationship is willingly embraced does
not mean that it was autonomously chosen.13 He notes the parent-child relationship as an
9
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example of such. “It is a relationship most people willing embrace but do not freely
choose.”14
Raz identifies certain conditions for autonomy. A person must have certain
cognitive and affective capacities as well as a certain degree of health and physical
ability.15 An autonomous person must be free from coercion or manipulation by others
and they must have a range of valuable comprehensive goals available to choose from.16
“To be autonomous and to have an autonomous life, a person must have options which
enable him to sustain throughout his life activities which, taken together, exercise all the
capacities human beings have an innate drive to exercise, as well as to decline to develop
any of them.”17 However for Raz the conditions of autonomy are not enough. Raz
places great emphasis on the distinction between the capacity for autonomy and the actual
state of autonomy. He suggests that it is possible to have the capacity for autonomy and
yet not to have an autonomous life.18 What is important is achieved autonomy (what I
will refer to as ‘autonomy obtained’), not a mere capacity for autonomy - the capacity for
autonomy, the ability to act autonomously, does not an autonomous person make. Raz
argues that the value of the capacity for autonomy lies not in the capacity itself but in the
achievement for which that capacity is needed. The capacity for autonomy is a necessary
but not sufficient precondition for an autonomous person.19 What sort of person is this?
One who is of sound mind, capable of affectivity, rational thought and action (the
conditions for autonomy) and whose life circumstances have included a sufficient range
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of significant options at different stages of life some of which that person has willingly
embraced.20
Raz is, in a sense, more ends oriented than traditional liberal rights theorists such
as Ronald Dworkin. Dworkin, for example, advocates for an ex ante right to autonomy –
for the equal distribution of the right to conditions that allow the capacity for autonomy.21
Raz’s theory is not rights based. For Raz, morality, both political and personal, is about
the promotion of wellbeing – the pursuit of value.22 It is an argument in favour of the
proposition that there is a duty on states to promote wellbeing, to facilitate its citizens’
pursuit of their worthwhile goals – to promote, produce and protect those social forms
necessary for autonomy. He suggests that our wellbeing depends on our ability to pursue
valuable goals and that our ability to pursue valuable goals is limited by the social forms
of our society.23
As noted, for Raz, ‘autonomy obtained’ requires the existence of a range of
options for the pursuit of valuable projects and relationships.24 These options are derived
from the social practices that define activities and relationships. “The existence of many
options consists in part in the existence of certain social conditions.”25 My argument
would be that sexual integrity (on a community or a societal level) constitutes one of
those necessary social conditions - that a community, society, and legal system that
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promotes the conditions for sexual integrity is required in order to ensure that individuals
can “exercise all the capacities human beings have an innate drive to exercise, as well as
to decline to develop any of them”.26
Raz uses the examples of professional opportunities and gay marriage to illustrate
his point. “One cannot have an option to be a barrister, a surgeon, or a psychiatrist in a
society where those professions, and the institutions their existence presupposes, do not
exist.”27 In countries where same sex marriage is not available, gay couples cannot
“partake of a socially (and legally) recognized and regulated type of relationship. [They]
cannot do that if their society does not recognize and regulate a pattern of relationship
which could apply to them…they have to develop their relations as they go along, and do
not have the option of benefiting from existing social frameworks.”28 It is on this basis
that Raz argues that governments cannot ignore conceptions of the good or avoid
assessments of what is normatively valuable. To do so fails to account for the connection
between individual goals and societal conditions.
Raz argues that the goodness of one’s life will be enhanced by the fact that one
lives in a society of a certain kind. He argues that the state has an obligation to adopt
policies that promote and encourage personal autonomy – not because autonomy is an
individual right but because it is a social good (i.e. it furthers well being). If well being is
attained through the achievement of worthwhile projects and the state’s role is to promote
conditions for the well being of all of its citizens then the state has an obligation to create
social forms which make such projects and relationships available. Raz does not suggest
however, that individuals necessarily have a right to certain social forms - the reason
26
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being the collective nature of many of these social forms: “at least some of the social
conditions which constitute such options are collective goods.”29 For Raz, political
morality cannot be founded simply on individual rights to autonomy. There are certain
collective goods (he uses the example of the expression of a people’s self-determination)
that cannot be expressed in terms of individual rights because individuals, he argues,
cannot claim a right to a particular social form.30 Some values that are important at the
individual level are also important at the societal level and cannot be conceptualized
within a rights framework.31 The pursuit of excellence is a collective good that is needed
for autonomy but that is greater than the sum of individual rights.32 Similarly, I would
propose that a community of sexual actors with sexual integrity is necessary for
autonomy but I cannot really argue that I have a ‘right’ to my neighbors’ sexual integrity.
I would, of course, argue that I have a right to many aspects of my own sexual integrity,
such as bodily autonomy and freedom from discrimination. The point is not to suggest
that rights are anything other than essential. The point is that political morality cannot be
reduced simply to an account of rights. Raz argues that “[r]ights are tied to duties.
Reasons for action which do not amount to duties escape the notice of a right-based
morality…. [R]ight-based moralities cannot allow intrinsic moral value to virtue and the
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pursuit of excellence.”33 Political morality, he suggests, is not based simply on, for
example, a right to equality. For Raz, it must also contain duties regarding our
responsibility towards others and principles concerning the wellbeing of people. His
ideal of (what I have throughout this work labeled political) morality requires individuals
and the state to promote conditions of autonomy for other individuals through the creation
of an adequate range of valuable options.
Raz argues that any time a government encourages the pursuit of excellence it is
not acting neutrally as to the good; it is in fact identifying the pursuit of excellence as a
good. He suggests that governments frequently do this and that while there will be
disagreement as to what the conditions for pursuing excellence might be, most would
agree that having said conditions is a good we want the state (and the law) to encourage.
Recall that Chapter 5 and 6 discussed the distinction between political morality and
sexual morality and argued that where law’s moral compass is dictated by political
morality rather than sexual morality the focus of legal reasoning is focused more on
protecting sexual actors and sexual integrity than sexual acts and sexual propriety. Does
Raz’s approach problematically suggest that law ought to be guided by sexual morality
(what Dworkin would describe as first person ethics) rather than political morality (third
person ethics)?
In fact it does not. Raz says his approach will not free the state to impose its will
and infringe civil liberties to attain perfectionist goals because the promotion of a
conception of the good based on the ideal of personal autonomy must recognize the
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existence of, and the need for, value pluralism. Value pluralism recognizes that many of
the choices available to individuals are both valuable and incompatible. Raz
acknowledges the existence of incompatible values. How then, if this is the case, does his
liberal perfectionism avoid the imposition of majoritarian morality in the inevitable
eventuality of competing values?
He does so by adopting a version of John Stuart Mill’s harm principle. He
suggests that a theory which values autonomy highly can justify restricting the autonomy
of one person for the sake of greater autonomy of others or even of that person himself in
the future but cannot justify restricting autonomy on the basis of incommensurate
values.34 The harm principle “restrains both individuals and the state from coercing
people to refrain from certain activities or to undertake others on the ground that those
activities are morally either repugnant or desirable.”35 This is an argument in support of
negative freedoms. He suggests that the prevention of harm to anyone, including one’s
self, “is the only justifiable ground for coercive interference with a person.”36 This is not
premised on the assertion that a morally repugnant pursuit should be defended against
coercion if not harmful on the grounds that it was autonomously chosen and therefore has
value.37 It is not about value. (Recall, for Raz, autonomy is only valuable if used in
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and Dworkin’s distinction between first order and third order morality. In other words, I want to maintain
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pursuit of worthwhile goals.) Rather, he argues that the state ought not to use coercion to
stop people from engaging in morally repugnant, but harmless, activities because the
effect of coercion on the recipient’s autonomy is imprecise.38
That is, there is no practical way of ensuring that the coercion will restrict
the victim’s choice of repugnant options but will not interfere with their
other choices. A moral theory which values autonomy highly can justify
restricting the autonomy of one person for the sake of the greater
autonomy of others or even of that person himself in the future. That is
why it can justify coercion to prevent harm. But it will not tolerate
coercion for other reasons. The availability of repugnant options, and even
their free pursuit by individuals, does not detract from their autonomy.39

This aspect of the Razian harm principle is in keeping with Dworkin’s assertion
that a liberal society is one that draws a distinction between first person ethics and third
person ethics and may legislate on the latter but not the former.40 This element of Raz’s
reasoning, in addition to his thoughts on the value of tolerance as a common good as
discussed below, serve as criteria by which to judge and make assessments as between
sexual liberties a society wants to protect and those it wants to reject.
However, Raz extends the principle beyond concepts of negative freedom. He
does so in three respects. His harm principle includes an understanding of the harm to
autonomy caused by state inaction; secondly, his harm principle includes the possibility
of coercive interference against an individual for the sake of that individual’s own degree

the distinction between political and sexual morality and suggest that the promotion of sexual integrity as a
common interest, because it is essential to autonomy, is a necessary component of a political morality such
as the one reflected in our Constitution.
38
Raz argues that a state’s exercise of authority will only ever be legitimate where (inter alia) it is exercised
to fulfill a task (for which governance is needed), where the exercise of authority will succeed or is likely to
succeed in completing this task and where the authority is confined to actions aimed at discharging this
task. Joseph Raz, “About Morality and The Nature of Law” (2003) 48 Am. J. Juris. 1 [hereinafter “About
Morality”]. Coercion whose effect is imprecise doesn’t meet these criteria for legitimacy.
39
The Morality of Freedom, supra note 10 at 419.
40
See Chapter 5 for a discussion of the distinction Dworkin draws between first person ethics and third
person ethics.
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of autonomy. Finally, he includes in his notion of the harm principle an element of
futurity which opens up the possibility for greater positive action, including the
promotion (through non-coercive means) of perfectionist policies by the state.
For Raz, since autonomy is an intrinsic good and since autonomy requires a range
of valuable options, state inaction can also cause harm. That is to say, a government’s
failure to provide individuals with a range of valuable options also constitutes an
interference with autonomy. He notes that
[n]egative freedom, freedom from coercive interferences, is valuable
inasmuch as it serves positive freedom and autonomy…. Coercing another
may express contempt, or at any rate disrespect for his autonomy.
Secondly, it reduces his options and therefore may be to his disadvantage.
It may, in this way, also interfere with his autonomy. It may but it need
not: some options one is better off not having. Others are denied one so
that one will improve one’s options in the future. In judging the value of
negative freedom one should never forget that it derives from its
contribution to autonomy.41

For Raz then, the harm principle serves not as a restraint on the promotion of
moral goals42 by the state but rather as “indicating the right way in which the state could
promote the well-being of people.”43
There are two points arising from this aspect of Raz’s work that are particularly
relevant to this discussion. The first is his suggestion that autonomy obtained, as I refer
to it, requires certain social forms. The second is his account of a harm principle in which
a state’s failure to act – to create certain social forms or support aspects of community –

41

The Morality of Freedom, supra note 10 at 410.
Again, here the moral goals Raz is suggesting could conceivably include both sexual morality and
political morality. However, only if those goals promote social forms that further autonomy and autonomy,
he recognizes, requires value pluralism.
43
The Morality of Freedom, supra note 10 at 420. Notably, because Raz’s harm principle derives from the
value of autonomy “resort to manipulation [which also interferes with autonomy] should be subject to the
same condition as resort to coercion. Both can be justified only to prevent harm.” Ibid. at 20. This provides
another check and balance for those endorsing liberal perfectionism.
42
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also causes harm and therefore states have an obligation or duty to create certain social
forms. Raz’s theory is anchored in concepts not just of rights but also of duties, reasons
for action and the overall promotion of wellbeing. In other words, it is centered on the
pursuit of excellence and identifies the need for certain social forms as one prerequisite
for this pursuit.
The recognition of a need for certain social forms is a recognition of the value of
community; but under Raz’s theory it is a recognition whose teleological horizon is still
autonomy (because autonomy is needed for well being). To suggest that autonomy
obtained requires the availability of a range of options which can, in part, only be
provided through certain social forms, is to link the possibility of autonomy to some
concept of community and correspondingly such a theory, if it recognizes the value of
autonomy obtained implicitly recognizes the value of community. What is more, the
suggestion that the state has an obligation to create or protect certain social forms, certain
collectivities, because a failure to do so harms autonomy, also suggests that it would be
nonsensical to protect or promote the community in a way that diminishes autonomy.
Raz’s theory would not allow for the coercive enforcement of the majority of the
community’s sexual morality simply for the sake of community itself. Raz’s theory
identifies purpose in community for instrumental reasons. Communities (societies)
provide certain social forms necessary for the autonomous pursuit of a range of valuable
relationships and projects so as to promote individual wellbeing. Therefore, a Razian
approach to the notion of indecency for example would, as did the majority in R v
Labaye, reject a definition founded simply on the community’s standard of tolerance.
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However, it would do so in a manner that still recognizes and affirms the value of
community.
I have suggested that sexual integrity be thought of as a social form that is in the
common good. Raz makes a distinction between public interests and common goods.
While under Raz’s approach both are a function of individual interests, the common good
is a good that is in the interests (albeit perhaps to varying degrees) of everyone in a given
society while the public interest is based on a resolution of the conflicting interests of
various citizens. He uses the examples of the existence of pollution free air and the
existence of a network of railway tracks to illustrate the distinction. There may be a
public interest in a system of railway tracks. It is an interest possessed not only by
railway users but also by other members of the public, such as consumers. However
some people may derive no benefit from this good and others may actually be adversely
affected by the railway’s existence. For instance the railway may cause them to endure
noise or air pollution, or cause a decline in the value of their property. This does not
mean that there is any less of a public interest in the existence of a viable railway. “[T]he
judgment that the public interest is served by the existence of a railway network is based
on the balance of good and evil, on a resolution of the conflicting interests of different
people.”44 Raz contrasts this public interest with a common good such as the existence of
clean air. “Everyone has a health interest which benefits from unpolluted air. The benefit
is noncompetitive (one person’s enjoyment is not at the expense of anyone else) and it is
similar in nature for everyone.”45

44
45

“Rights and Politics”, supra note 31 at 35.
“Rights and Politics”, supra note 31 at 35.
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Is sexual integrity more like a railroad system or clean air? Is its benefit
noncompetitive and is it similar in nature for everyone? Recall that I characterized sexual
integrity as including not just freedom from bodily violation but also the conditions for
sexual benefit, fulfillment, diversity and exploration. I suggest that sexual integrity is
more like clean air. But what of the individual who receives sexual gratification by
violating the bodily integrity of another sexual actor for example? Does the fact of this
suggest that sexual integrity is not a common interest, that its benefit is competitive? No,
it does not. To argue such would be to misconstrue Raz’s claim. Raz’s argument is that a
common good is one in which one person’s enjoyment is not at the expense of anyone
else. A polluter may well receive financial benefit from dumping toxins into the air rather
than spending the resources to ensure a more environmentally friendly manufacturing
process. This does not mean that that polluter has less of an interest in inhaling clean air
into his lungs when he steps out of his office. That someone may take action (including
action from which they derive a benefit) that threatens something that is in the common
good does not make it less of a common good. A sexual actor who commit acts or
behaves in ways that deprive others of their capacity for sexual pleasure, their sense of
sexual self, their ability to relate in a sexually beneficial way to others in their
community, does threaten the common good of sexual integrity. That person’s actions do
not, however, change the nature of this common interest or even this particular sexual
actor’s interest in its benefit. An individual who behaves in this manner is not enjoying
the common interest in sexual integrity because they are not acting with sexual integrity.
A conflict in interests is not created. An individual may enjoy chain smoking in a
confined space with non-smokers present or hot boxing their parents’ car without their
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parents’ consent – this does not mean that by doing so they have transformed a common
interest in clean air into a competitive benefit not enjoyed similarly by everyone. It
simply means they are not breathing clean air.
Recall that for Raz a society serves an instrumental purpose – that is to provide
social forms that allow for a range of those valuable options needed for an autonomous
life that cannot be created individually. It seems to me that the value he identifies in
community is integrally related to the provision of common goods, while the service of
public interests is more of an ancillary function. This is obviously not to suggest that the
public interest is unrelated to community or the collective, but rather, that the promotion
of public interests – a balancing of competing interests - is an inevitable product of, rather
than a cause for, politics and government. That is to say, perhaps public interests are a
functional outcome of the collective rather than the inherent value in the collective.
Social forms can only be created through the collective, through community.
Some social forms originate from common goods (interests) and others from public
interests. Raz says there are certain social forms, necessary for individual wellbeing,
which the state has a duty to provide. I would argue that where a duty to provide a social
form exists what must be at issue is a social form related to a common good rather than a
public interest. In other words, the state (and a just system of law) has a duty to act in a
manner that is consistent with common goods. To do otherwise is to fail to maintain the
value of community and the collective. This seems to me to be consistent with the
instrumental value that Raz locates in the collective. Conversely, particular social forms
related to public interests rather than common goods are not necessarily duty based. That
is to say, the state may choose to pursue a particular public interest or not and regardless
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still act in a manner which maintains the value in community, provided whatever political
process of balancing they conduct is done fairly. (In other words, there may be a
common interest in a fair balancing process which gives rise to a duty on the part of the
state to serve the public interest with integrity but there is not a duty on the state to serve
any specific public interest.) However, where a common good is at stake the state must
act in pursuance of it, or consistent with it, in order to maintain value in the community
(and sustain their political legitimacy as a liberal democracy). If this is the case, then
where a common good is at stake, so long as the state adopts policies or enacts and
interprets laws in pursuit of such common good, some notion of community is maintained
and recognition of the value in collectivity is reflected in such laws and policies.
ii) Trouble - An Iconoclastic Approach
A different version of pages 387 to 410 were previously printed in (2009) 54 McGill L.J. 3.

Let us assume that I am right to say that sexual integrity is a common good, that it
is necessary for autonomy and that therefore the law ought to promote and protect the
conditions for a community possessed of sexual integrity because it is one of those social
forms necessary for the well being of individuals. Let us further assume, as I suggested in
Chapter 4, that the range of valuable options necessary to create this social form includes
as well as bodily integrity, the conditions for sexual fulfillment, sexual diversity, the
safety necessary for sexual exploration and sexual benefit. Raz would say that “one
particularly important type of common good is the cultivation of a culture and a social
ambience which make possible a variety of shared goods, that is, a variety of forms of
social association of intrinsic merit”.46 The common good referred to here is the
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“Rights and Politics” supra note 31. Some reference ought to be made in this context to the distinction
between laws that criminalize an activity, laws that decriminalize an activity and laws that actually promote
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availability of an adequate range of shared goods;47 in the context of sexual integrity this
would mean the autonomy to choose one’s forms of social (sexual) association (recall that
for Raz autonomy requires the availability of a range of meaningful options)48 and the
capacity for sexual benefit. (Shared goods are goods whose benefit for people depends on
people enjoying the good together and thereby contributing to each other’s good.49)
The difficulty with this suggestion is in ascertaining i) which forms of sexual
association are of intrinsic merit ii) which conditions are necessary for a community of
sexual actors possessed of sexual integrity and iii) what substantive concept of sexual
integrity should the law be operating under. By what criteria should the law distinguish
between social forms it is meant to promote and those it is meant to discourage or
prohibit? Can a legal theory of sexuality accept the possibility of the intrinsic merit of
some sexual social forms and still maintain a constructivist conception of sexuality? If
law ascribes to a constructivist account of sexuality – which understands sexuality as a
socially contingent product of norms and practices – by what criteria is sexual benefit to
be identified and assessed?
In other words, how can law stay open to perfection in the Derridean sense while
pursuing excellence in the Razian sense? My answer is that it cannot. But here is what it
can do. It can try and fail. More importantly, it can fail over and over and over and over
an activity. In terms of the promotion of social forms, decriminalizing, for example, group sexual activity
through the redefinition of indecency, cannot be equated with say offering tax incentives to swingers clubs
or legal recognition of polyamorous relationships; however, due to the unique character of the law as a
social form or potential good, the redefinition of a legal concept which regulates sexuality in a manner
which makes some sexual association now legally available does increase the range or variety of shared
goods available. In terms of the intersection between law and sexuality, coercively prohibiting, prohibiting,
remaining neutral towards, promoting and manipulating particular sexual associations do not reside within
distinct categories but rather lie on a spectrum.
47
“Rights and Politics”, supra note 31 at 36.
48
Raz recognizes the importance of sex as a form of social association. See Joseph Raz, Practice of Values,
(Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2003) at 153, FN 23.
49
The distinction between shared goods and common goods will be further discussed below at page 27.
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and over again…and in the space between failures we will find discrete moments of
success (such as power feminism’s intervention into sexual assault law) and finite
moments of meaning formation and then reformation (such as the inchoate valuing of
sexual minorities under section 15 of the Charter).
However, to fail over and over and over again – thus creating for a moment that
potentially hospitable space between failures – is a necessary but not sufficient condition.
Discrete moments of success, finite moments of meaning formation and then reformation
require, by their very definition, closure – that originary violence that is the constitution
of meaning. In each of those moments and in every failed attempt to stay open to
perfection while at the same time pursuing excellence that come both before and after
each of those moments, there is a need to judge - to say and to know what constitutes
sexual integrity.
As suggested in the previous chapter, law needs judgment to be operationalized.
Law cannot escape this. However, what law can do is drive itself (or be driven) to try
(over and over and over again…) to stay open to perfection while it pursues excellence.
A conception of sexual integrity measured against political morality rather than sexual
morality – using the aspirational principles of the Constitution rather than those of god or
nature – should drive law to keep trying (and failing). A relational standard of valuation,
which evaluates social forms based not only on how well a sexual association fits within
the standards of excellence for its genre but also on how it relates to its genre, should help
to keep the space between failures hospitable. What does it mean to evaluate based on
genre?
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Raz suggests that specific social forms belong to a kind.50 He notes that two
elements determine how items or activities can be evaluated: the definition of the kinds of
goods to which they relate (including the constitutive standards of excellence for each
kind) and the ways the item relates to that kind. In other words, something may be
evaluated based not on how neatly it fits within the standards of excellence for its genre
but also based on how it relates to its genre.
Genre-dependent evaluation is marked by the fact that objects are
evaluated by reference to kinds, to genres. But there are different relations
they can bear to the genre. Straightforward membership or
exemplification of the kind is only one of them. Two elements determine
how items can be evaluated. First is the definition of the kinds of goods to
which they relate, which includes the constitutive standards of excellence
for each kind. Second are the ways the item relates to the kinds. It may
fall squarely within them. Or it may, for example, relate to them
ironically, or iconoclastically, or as a source of allusions…51

As Raz suggested, one way in which an item, activity or law can relate to its genre
is iconoclastically. An iconoclast is one who challenges traditional or popular ideas or
institutions, on the basis that those beliefs or institutions are wrong. Iconoclasm is not the
same as subversion or deconstruction. Iconoclasm, unlike subversion, is about meaning
formation. Why is this the case? Because the site of its transgression is expressly and
concededly within a cultural construct not external to it. It is the intentional destruction
within a culture of one of the culture’s own icons, symbols or meanings. Unlike
subversion, which aims simply to deconstruct, its purpose is to attack a cherished belief
by relying on a new or different cherished belief. This is why it has the capacity to be a
shared value; it is about the collective – often done for political (or in the past religious)
reasons. Illuminating the distinction between iconoclasm and the notion of queer theory
50
51

Raz, The Practice of Values, supra note 48 at 39.
Ibid at 41.

391

(because of its reliance on the concept of subversion) helps to illustrate how iconoclasm
accommodates new meaning rather than simply disrupting old meaning. As
demonstrated in Chapter 7, while the post modern method of deconstruction used by
queer theorists is, in certain analytical instances, methodologically helpful, ultimately its
method is self-destructing. Queer theory does not allow for the notion of genre-based
evaluation. Judgment in kind necessitates the identification and affirmation of categories
and is antithetical to queer theory, and deconstruction generally. The distinction between
an iconoclastic approach and a queer approach is real. An iconoclast dissents against a
popular belief or tradition on the grounds that it is in error. To disrupt cherished beliefs
about sex, or to dissent against traditional sexual mores on the basis that they are wrong is
not to contest the normative validity of sexual mores, the possibility of meaning, the
existence of categories or the ability to judge – quite the opposite in fact. An iconoclastic
approach to the legal regulation of sexuality, unlike a queer approach, acknowledges the
inevitability of judgment; it recognizes the social fact that an icon once shattered will
undoubtedly and expediently be replaced by a new icon. And for this reason it is better
able to account for, contest and at times work within the liberal political context in which
the legal regulation of sexuality operates in Canada’s constitutional democracy.
As suggested in Chapter 3, the legal contest over same sex marriage provides a
good example of this. Certainly, gay and lesbian marriages operate within this particular
cultural construct (which is why queer activists opposed a social movement focused so
heavily on this issue). But this very fact reveals its iconoclastic impact. In Canada,
marriage no longer means the legal union of one man and one woman. It is true that gay
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and lesbian marriages did not deconstruct the institution of marriage in Canada but they
did change, to some degree, its icon.52
If, in the context of legal regulation, the evaluation of a given sexual act is based on
whether, and the way in which, it challenges traditional or popular ideas about sex, then
the benefit or detriment (the good or bad) of it is in its effect; it is relational. It is
dependent on there being a genre and the existence of a standard of evaluation for that
genre but it is not dependent on what that standard is. Its benefit or detriment is in the
process of reconsideration that its transgression perpetuates. This does not mean that
every transgression, every new meaning formation, will promote the common interest in
sexual integrity. It means only that the space between failures will be preserved and it
will be preserved in a manner that allows for the possibility of those finite moments of
meaning formation and then reformation.
This reasoning entails making two interrelated normative assumptions. First, it entails
an assumption that there exists substantive meaning to the concept of sexual integrity
albeit meaning which is constantly evolving and shifting and, due to its relational nature,
potentially plural in form.53 In other words, there need not be (nor could be) one account
of what constitutes the standards of excellence for sex; however, in any and all sexual
contexts there must (and will) be criteria constitutive of sexual integrity. Given that the
focus of this discussion is on the potential good of iconoclastic jurisprudence, a standard
under this account cannot be static. However, while it is not possible to assume one
standard of excellence for sex, it is possible to assume that in any sexual act there is
52

Some argue that same sex marriage does not change the meaning of marriage but merely expands the
scope of relationships to which it applies. Given that ‘marriage’ is the description of a particular type of
relationship this is not a persuasive argument.
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I am indebted to Professor Leslie Green for observing that under the argument I am making it must be the
case that any standards of excellence for sex be plural in form.
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always a standard. The suggestion that a standard can be objective yet unstable in this
way may create a certain degree of unease. The objective element of this assertion stems
from Raz’s observation that while a given value may not be universal, that people value
IS universal. Raz argues that the fact of this universalism suggests that, through reason,
pluralism can be accommodated.54 The normative element at play is an assumption that
judgment is both necessary and legitimate. Law needs judgment to be operationalized.
Its reforming, preventative and distributive functions all require judgment. And for law
to be just that judgment must not be arbitrary. To avoid arbitrary judgment requires
meaningful criteria. That is to say, it requires standards of excellence.
Secondly and correspondingly, it entails an assumption that some sexual dissent,
some challenges to social forms such as human sexuality, some degree of this process of
openness, is required.55 Evaluating how much, and when, dissent would be good, because
it too is a relational concept, can be determined by resorting to an external standard, such
as a harm principle or the promotion of community tolerance, rather than requiring
reliance on a standard of excellence which is internal to the genre itself. That is to say, it
is possible to articulate an impermanent content or meaning to what constitutes sexual
integrity without attempting to articulate a coherent account of what constitutes excellent
sex.
Part two, to follow, will revisit the Court’s approach to the Criminal Code definition
of indecency outlined in R v Labaye in an effort to reveal how the concepts and
54

Joseph Raz, “Reason, Reasons and Normativity” (University of Oxford Faculty of Law Legal Studies
Research Paper Series, January, 2008) at 22.
55
Dissent is an essential criteria for the progress of any community. This is no less true with respect to
sexual dissent than with respect to political dissent. Indeed to disaggregate sexual dissent from political
dissent is in many respects a false distinction. Provided an ability to judge is maintained (which is what the
first normative assumption I articulated achieves) it can fairly be said that sexual dissent is presumptively in
the common interest. Both a standard, achieved through practice, argument and reason, and dissent are
necessary to accommodate pluralism.
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theoretical approach just described might be applied (or are already at play) when the law
intersects with issues of sexuality and to demonstrate how the concept of iconoclasm
might be deployed to evaluate the Court’s reasoning.

II. In The Case Of Sexual Integrity And Iconoclasm: Laws Of Desire
R v Labaye, as discussed in chapter five, involved the re-interpretation of the
definition of indecency under the bawdy house provisions such that the community
standards of tolerance test was no longer part of the analysis. The majority of the
Supreme Court of Canada determined that only activities which pose a significant risk of
harm, of the type “grounded in norms which our society has recognized in its Constitution
or similar fundamental laws,” harm so serious as to be incompatible with proper societal
functioning, will be considered indecent.56 In what respect can the specific definition of
indecency prescribed by Chief Justice McLachlin in Labaye be said to respect and
promote the notion of sexual integrity as a common good?
There are two interrelated common goods one might argue are served by the
majority’s revised definition of indecency in Labaye. They are tolerance and the
iconoclastic legal recognition of sexual desire.57
The first, tolerance, is related to another type of good Raz discusses: shared goods.
As noted above, “shared goods are goods whose benefit for people depends on people
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enjoying the good together and thereby contributing to each other’s good.”58 He notes a
party or a dance, and the fact that such events are only enjoyable for their participants to
the extent that they can be enjoyed together, as examples of shared goods. It is certainly
the case that the sorts of sexual activities occurring at Club L’Orage and Coeur à Corps
would be of this shared character; at issue after all was the decency or indecency of
“orgies” to use the term employed by Chief Justice McLachlin.59 However, shared goods
are not to be confused with common goods. Common goods are those that serve the same
interest of every person in a non-competitive way. The ability to legally engage in group
sex in a semi-public setting does not serve the interests of every person in Canada. While
it is a shared good among those who desire to engage in group sex in semi-public settings,
it is not a common good. However, there is a common interest at issue in this case. The
common good referred to here is the availability of an adequate range of shared goods; in
the context of indecency and obscenity, the common interest in cultivating an ambience
of eclectic sexual associations (which is needed for autonomy).
This is the common good of toleration. It is a common good to live in a tolerant
society; in other words, we all benefit from living in a tolerant and non-discriminatory
society.60 This point becomes clearer “when we think of the failings of societies other
than our own.”61 Raz uses the example of an apartheid society and the ways in which
such a system detrimentally affects the lives of all of its members.
A prejudiced and intolerant society affects adversely the options available
to every one of its members. It colors the nature of the social relations
each can have. It threatens to make each member complicitous with its
bigotry through association with bigots, through involvement in projects
58
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which involve the display of prejudice and discrimination. It imposes
duties actively to fight prejudice and discrimination in one’s own society
in order not to be tainted by its failures through membership in it; duties
which are burdensome and limit one’s ability to pursue other options.62

The common good of living in a Canadian society that is not operating under a
system of apartheid seems obvious. To think of an extreme, analogous to an apartheid
society, in the context of sexual intolerance and repression, one might consider the
treatment of women under the Taliban’s regime in Afghanistan, or perhaps less
controversially, the fictional, futuristic theocracy of Margaret Atwood’s sexually
repressed Republic of Gilead in The Handmaid’s Tale:
What’s going on in this room, under Serena Joy’s silvery canopy is not
exciting. It has nothing to do with passion or love or romance or any of
those notions we used to titillate ourselves with. It has nothing to do with
sexual desire, at least for me and certainly not for Serena. Arousal and
orgasm are no longer thought necessary; they would be a symptom of
frivolity merely, like jazz garters or beauty spots.63

The common good of living in a Canadian society which has not relegated the female
orgasm to the status of unnecessary trend from a by-gone era seems obvious; less clear
for some is the common good of living in a society which tolerates sexual practices the
majority of Canadians find disgusting, depraved, repulsive and immoral. However, as
Raz notes, tolerance is not the approval of many incompatible forms of life; tolerance and
pluralism are not synonymous.64 “Toleration is a distinctive moral virtue only if it curbs
desires, inclinations and convictions which are thought by the tolerant person to be in
themselves desirable.”65 One is not exercising sexual tolerance by tolerating a particular
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sexual act even though it is an act that one would never engage in. One is only exercising
sexual tolerance where one tolerates a sexual act of which one disapproves.
Chief Justice McLachlin’s definition of indecency and obscenity requires that we
not criminalize as indecent or obscene any sexual act or depiction without an associated
harm even if we find it repulsive, disgusting, immoral and of no intrinsic merit. Contrast
this with the dissent’s approach to the definition of indecency and obscenity: “[s]ocial
morality, which is inherent in indecency offences and is expressed through the application
of the standard of tolerance, must still be allowed to play a role in all situations where it is
relevant.”66 To criminalize sexual conduct purely on the basis that it is, from a
majoritarian perspective, immoral (as in it is harmless to others but would nonetheless be
considered immoral by most citizens’ first person ethics), and this is what the dissent
suggests Canadian law should continue to do, cannot be an act of tolerance. To tolerate
sexual conduct and depictions despite considering them immoral is to act out of
toleration; it is to protect the common good of a tolerant society. To limit such tolerance
to within the bounds of harmlessness is to act in promotion of the community’s interest in
sexual integrity. Chief Justice McLachlin rejects the traditional ‘community standard of
tolerance’ and in doing so, instead sets a standard of tolerance for the community; a
standard which our Constitution dictates is necessary so as to avoid being tainted by
membership in an intolerant society. Her definition makes a demand for a standard of
tolerance for the community which it is in the common good or interest of each of us to
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pursue, and which it is incumbent upon any state dedicated to acting in the interests of the
community to maintain.67
Having acknowledged that group sex itself cannot be considered a common good in
Canadian society, does Chief Justice McLachlin’s decision offer value beyond the
common interest a society and each of its members have in promoting tolerance?
Recall that one way in which to evaluate the worth of an item or activity is to assess
how it relates to its genre. Can the reasoning adopted by Chief Justice McLachlin in
Labaye be evaluated based on an assessment of the iconoclastic effect the decision may
have on the legal regulation of human sexuality or sexual expression? Does the decision
produce an iconoclastic impact such that it serves the common interest in a community of
sexual actors possessed with sexual integrity?
In fact, given that an iconoclastic decision challenges and replaces cherished beliefs,
one could consider the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Labaye and Kouri to be
67

A consideration of the jurisprudential context in which this case was decided provides another way of
thinking about this case in relation to the positive obligation to create certain social forms, in this case the
promotion of some sexual relationships, born by the state. Any modicum of legal realism recognizes that
laws are never made, and cases are never decided, in a contextual vacuum. In considering this case one
ought to recall that the Court was making its determination in the context of a post Charter wealth of
jurisprudence defining which sorts of sexual relationships will be recognized, valued and promoted in
Canadian society (see for example Halpern, [2003] OJ No. 2268, Nova Scotia v Walsh [2002] 4 SCR 325,
M v H, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3, A.A. v B.B. [2007] O.J. No. 2 ). Both legislative and adjudicative branches of
the Canadian state have focused a great deal of attention in the last twenty years on debating, re-defining
and with respect to certain forms of sexual relationships (particularly same sex and non-married ostensibly
monogamous heterosexual relationships) formalizing and privileging through legal recognition, particular
types of sexual relationships; that is to say making available certain social forms that the state has
recognized as valuable. This is consistent with Raz’s suggestion that the state ought not to coercively
prohibit undesirable or valueless options that do not cause harm but most certainly should endeavor to
promote through incentive and preferential treatment those life options which are valuable and desirable
and therefore promote well being (Raz, Morality of Freedom, supra note 10). The Court decided Labaye in
an era where some would argue that as a society we have actually increased the role of law and government
in the definition, regulation and control of human relating (albeit through positive mechanisms such as tax
incentives, and property rights rather than negative legal mechanisms such as the criminal law). This may
be a context that makes it “safe” for the Court (and the community) to withdraw regulation in areas which
in a previous legal era might have seemed at least desirable if not outright needed. It is, as suggested, also
consistent with Raz’s assertion that the state ought to encourage, through incentive, certain common goods
(for example social forms such as marriage) that promote wellbeing by increasing individual autonomy,
rather than prohibit undesirable, but harmless, life choices.
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some of the most iconoclastic jurisprudence to date regarding the legal regulation of
sexuality in Canada. Why? Because in their outcome the decisions challenge two of what
are the most significant pillars of the societal regulation of sex in this society: they
transgress the heavily fortified sexual boundary of public/private and they challenge the
taboo against the commodification of sex. Most significantly, they do so NOT on the
basis of claims of anti-subordination, identity, privacy or safety.
Jeffrey Weeks suggests that our culture too often justifies erotic activity on some
basis other than desire, such as reproduction, or the consummation of relationships.68 The
same could be said with respect to the law’s relationship to sexuality. The law typically
adopts an approach to sexual desire and erotic activity that focuses on rights,
responsibilities and personal morality. Legal analyses concerning issues of sexual
activity and human sexuality are most frequently framed as either claims to privacy,69
claims to expressive rights70 or claims of identity (or anti-subordination claims more
generally.)71 As discussed in chapter three, in the case of sexual minorities, legal
arguments and analyses typically focus on claims of identity or relationship recognition.
In the case of sexual liberty more broadly the emphasis is usually on claims that reify the
public sphere/private sphere division or on claims premised on the expressive rights held
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Jeffrey Weeks, Sexuality, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2004).
See for example Bowers v Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) challenging Georgia’s anti-sodomy laws on
the basis of a liberty interest in sexual privacy; Lawrence v Texas,539 U.S. 558 (2003) striking anti-sodomy
law on basis of constitutional right to privacy under due process clause of the American Bill of Rights. In
the Canadian context this right to sexual privacy has more frequently been acquired legislatively (as in
Parliament’s decriminalization of sodomy in 1967) or through equality claims (see for example R v M (C)
(1995) 30 CRR (2d) 112). This may be, in part, due to the comparatively greater emphasis on equality in
the Canadian constitutional context than is the case in the American constitutional context.
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See for example the claims in obscenity cases such as R v Butler, [1992] 1 SCR 452 and Little Sister’s
Book and Art Emporium v Canada, [2000] 2 SCR 1120 (which also included an equality claim).
71
The most obvious two examples being claims of discrimination based on sexual orientation (Egan [1995]
2 SCR 513, Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493) and claims for relationship recognition made by same
sex and common-law couples (Halpern v Canada, [2003] OJ No. 2268, M v. H, [1999] SCJ No 23, Walsh v.
Bona [2002] 4 SCR 325).
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by individuals. Legal recognition of the bodily pleasures behind or outside of an
identity, relationship or sanctuary, of the significance of autonomously held and
experienced sexual arousal, is infrequently claimed and less frequently, if ever, granted.
However as noted earlier, neither privacy rights, expressive rights nor identity claims
aptly characterize the arguments or reasoning involved in Labaye. Both Labaye and
Kouri involve sexual activity in semi-public.72 Neither Labaye nor Kouri involve a group
of sexual actors that could reasonably be described as a sexual minority and neither
Labaye nor Kouri involve claims regarding freedom of expression.
The jurisprudential construction of sexuality – what sex means in the context of its
relationship to law – has taken different forms. At different times, in different legal
contexts sex, has been about morality, religion, identity, privacy, and class. It has been
about health, gender, expression, violence, family and love. It has even been about
communism!73 But it has never really been about the recognition of pleasure or desire.
As discussed in the paragraphs to follow, this is not something that the Court has typically
done and having done it in Labaye changes, at least to some degree, the meaning of the
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Kouri in particular involved sexual activity occurring in a location (a dance floor with seventy or more
people engaged in sexual activity at one time) that could hardly be labeled private in the sense of ‘acts
occurring in private’. The Court found that the procedure at the door – in which the bouncer only admitted
couples who declared themselves to be liberated couples – sufficiently ensured that individuals would not
be involuntarily confronted with deeply offensive sexual conduct such that it would prove harmful in the
sense defined under the first branch of harm in Labaye. This aspect of the decision related to a
consideration of the evidence of a risk of unwanted confrontation. It was not really an attempt to
reconstitute the boundaries between public and private such that a business open to the public, in which
anyone willing to declare themselves a liberated couple gained admittance to a bar in which upwards of one
hundred people were having sex together, is now considered private. If the decision were read in this latter
light then it would also have to be characterized as a radical revision of the law’s distinction between public
and private in which the private sphere is greatly expanded and the public sphere significantly contracted.
73
In the 1950s and 1960s in Canada (and elsewhere) gays and lesbians were perceived by the government
to be security risks due to purported close ties to communism (in addition to their supposed susceptibility to
blackmail). Hundreds of gays and lesbians were purged from the RCMP and other public servant positions.
By 1967 the government had a list of 9000 ‘suspected homosexuals’ in Canada. See Gary Kinsman,
“Challenging Canadian and Queer Nationalisms” in T. Goldie, ed., in a queer country: Gay and Lesbian
Studies In The Canadian Context (Vancouver: Arsenal Pulp Press, 2001) 209 at 220.
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legal regulation of sexuality in Canada. It is an example of the formation and reformation
of meaning, achieved at a discrete moment in a discrete context and as measured against
the political morality underpinning the Constitution.
In Labaye, Chief Justice McLachlin states that “sexual activity is a positive source of
human expression, fulfillment and pleasure”.74 A review of prior case law defining
obscenity demonstrates that legal recognition of the significance of sexual pleasure was
not the focus (or even a focus) of analysis prior to Labaye. In 1962, when the Supreme
Court first grappled with the British common-law definition of obscenity in a case
involving the novel Lady Chatterley’s Lover the analysis focused on the merits and
demerits of legal censorship.75 The Court in Brodie did not concern itself with the sexual
fulfillment and pleasure of Lady Chatterley, her lover, or the book’s readers. In 198576
and 199277 when the Court revisited the definition of obscenity the focus was on
incorporating a notion of harm into the Court’s analysis of the community’s attitude
towards a particular sexual act or depiction. Desire, pleasure and fulfillment were not
taken into account. In Little Sisters, in 1997, claims about pleasure and desire actually
were made by Little Sisters and certain of the interveners; however these claims were not
endorsed by the Court.78 Little Sisters, as discussed in chapter 5, involved a constitutional
challenge to obscenity laws based on the discriminatory manner in which they were
applied by customs officials to gay and lesbian material imported by the Little Sisters
Bookstore. The challenge was brought on the basis of freedom of expression as well as
an equality claim based on sexual orientation. Underpinning the equality argument in
74

Labaye, supra note 56 at 48.
Brodie, [1962] SCR 681.
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Towne Cinema, [1985] 1 SCR 494.
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Butler, supra note 69.
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Little Sisters, supra note 69.
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Little Sisters (which was premised on the assertion that pornography figures differently in
gay and lesbian communities than in straight ones) was a claim about desire – same sex
desire specifically. The equality claim was rejected by the Court.
It may be that, for doctrinal reasons, the Court was not well situated in any of these
pre-Labaye cases to give recognition to the significance of desire and sexual pleasure.
Take Little Sisters for example. Given the other section 15 jurisprudence regarding
sexual orientation developing at the time that Little Sisters was decided, it is not
surprising that the Court was unwilling to accept arguments suggesting that the sexual
needs (for pornography or particular sexual depictions) or the sexual acts of gays and
lesbians were different from those of heterosexuals. More generally, it may be that until
the Court had rejected the community standards of tolerance test there was not conceptual
space for considerations of desire. Considerations regarding desire and sexual pleasure
are more easily incorporated into a definition of indecency centered on actual, proven
harm to sexual participants or other members of society as measured against the values of
liberty, dignity, equality and autonomy but not so easily where harm is measured by the
community’s standard of tolerance.
As is the case with respect to the prior case law regarding obscenity, the prior
Supreme Court of Canada cases defining indecency cannot be said to have given rise to a
legal recognition of sexual desire. The lap dancing trilogy of the 1990s, R v Tremblay79,
R v Mara80 and R v Pelletier81 all involved charges against tavern owners whose
performers gave lap dances or private shows of some sexual variety. In R v Mara and R v
Pelletier the Court found, applying the community standard of tolerance test, that the acts
79

[1993] 2 S.C.R. 932.
[1997] 2 S.C.R. 630.
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[1999] 3 SCR 863.
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were not indecent, while in R v Tremblay the Court found that the lap dances were
beyond the community standard of tolerance. None of these decisions appear to take into
consideration, as Chief Justice McLachlin did in Labaye, that sexual activity is a source
of pleasure. However, this may be due in part to the factual patterns that gave rise to the
indecency charges in these cases. All of them involved the explicit exchange of money
for sexual contact of some type.82 It would perhaps be surprising to find that the Court
had provided reasoning which suggested a legal recognition of sexual desire in cases
involving the exchange of money for sexual contact where the sexual desire is
presumably not mutually experienced by both or all of the sexual participants.
But Labaye also involves an exchange of money for sex. However, the
interrelationship between sex, money and desire in Labaye is different than it is in any of
these cases. Unlike these older cases, Labaye involves reciprocal rather than unilateral
sexual desire and unlike these older cases it involves people paying money to have a
sexual interaction but where money is paid by all of the sexual actors to a third party.
Money isn’t the motivating factor for any of the sexual participants; mutual desire to
engage in the sexual activity at issue is the motivating factor. It is for this reason – the
mutual desire of the individual sexual actors - that Chief Justice McLachlin determined
that the commercial element of these activities was not a factor suggesting that the
activities were indecent.83 It may be that what distinguished the exchange of sex for
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The only other case in which the Supreme Court considered the definition of indecency was R v Clark,
[2005] 1 SCR 6. However Clark ultimately turned on the definition of public place. Moreover the case
involved charges against a man seen by his neighbors masturbating in front of his window. Justice Fish’s
decision is certainly a recognition of the right to privacy and an admonishment to nosy neighbors, but the
only sexual desire recognized in the Clark case was secondary, and well… not relational so to speak.
83
“On the present set of facts, the commercial aspect of the respondent’s operation is hardly relevant to this
type of harm. The entrance fee was not paid by some to secure the sexual services of others. It merely
enabled all the customers to gain access to the bar and to equally participate in the activities taking place
therein.” R v Kouri, [2005] 3 SCR 789 at para. 22.
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money in Labaye from the exchange of sex for money in the lap dancing trilogy (where
the exchange of sex for money was most certainly a determining factor – albeit under the
community standards of tolerance test) was the role of (type of) desire.
Labaye and Kouri represent Supreme Court of Canada decisions stipulating that,
absent an associated and provable harm, the law ought not to interfere with the exercise of
a sexual desire. In particular, a sexual desire which takes place in semi-public settings
and which includes a commercial element. The intrinsic worth of the shared goods
occurring at Club L’Orage and Coeur à Corps are manifested through the Supreme Court
of Canada’s decisions. That desire may be beyond reason and rationality, and therefore
not susceptible to valuation, does not suggest that the social forms which stem from
drives or capacities that exceed the limits of reason can not be evaluated based on
arguments regarding the standards of excellence for those social forms or their
iconoclastic implications for those standards. The recognition of desire is a recognition,
by law, of something outside of itself…something outside of law. Further, a legal
recognition of desire is itself prima facie iconoclastic, because the law’s legitimacy is
premised on reason. The iconoclastic effect of these social forms is reflected in the legal
recognition these pleasure seeking activities received from the highest court in the
country. It is not simply that these forms of human relating transgress dominant sexual
norms – many forms of human relating do so and may possess intrinsic worth (or be
detrimental) for reasons of their own. It is that the fact of their existence resulted in a
change or shift in the law’s relationship to human sexuality. In Labaye and Kouri the
Supreme Court of Canada shattered a long held and stridently protected legal (and social)
belief that a legitimate exercise of the criminal law power can be premised, either directly
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or indirectly, on sexual morality. In doing so it recognized if not for the first time, then in
a novel way, the value of desire.
But having established that the legal recognition of desire changes the law’s
relationship to sexuality, replaces old and forms new meaning regarding the legal
regulation of sex, in other words is iconoclastic, does not alone make it a common good.
Iconoclasm is not presumptively good. What makes this particular iconoclastic
jurisprudence a common interest? Why is changing the relationship between law and
sexuality, such that it recognizes the value and significance of sexual pleasure, an
iconoclastic effect of benefit and not detriment?
In “Queers, Sissies, Dykes and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of Sex,
Gender and Sexual Orientation in Euro-American Law and Society” Francisco Valdes
identifies the defence of desire as the next strategic move in the pursuit of “sex/gender
reform and equality”.84 He notes that “sexual and affectional intimacy, driven by erotic
desires, is integral to humanity and society because both intimacy and desire are
affirmations of life and therefore are diametrically opposed to dogmatic regimes such as
the dominant Euro-American sex/gender system.”85 As such, he suggests (speaking from
a pre Lawrence v Texas86 American legal context and more specifically within a claim to
the right to sexual privacy) that human intimacy and desire are neither frivolous nor
legally insignificant. Whether it is cross-sex or same-sex desire, he argues that the
defence of desire may be the most significant contribution queer theory87 has to offer:
84

83 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1995) at 368 [hereinafter “Queers, Sissies”].
Valdes, ibid. at 368.
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539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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Borrowing Valdes’ focus on the regulation of desire ought not to be taken as a reliance on queer theory
itself. While Valdes’ project is substantive – it imagines queer theory as the substantive work of subverting
sex and gender norms, recent writers argue that queer legal theory is not a substantive project but rather a
methodology for critique. See generally Janet Halley, Split Decisions, (Princeton University Press:
85
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The tactic of defending desire thus commits Queer legal theory to winning
respect for the range of yearnings regarding consensual affection and
intimacy that are felt by all humans in one form or another. But because
desire is not rational in the Western sense, this tactic also commits Queer
legal theory to engaging the law beyond the limits of (legal) rationality.
This tactic or method calls forth a joy in and for humanity that is distinct,
though not separate, from the notions (and the limits) of reason or logic
that characterize the very culture of the law. In this sense, this tactic may
be the most radical or subversive contribution of Queer legal theory to
critical legal thinking; defending desire effectively calls for us to “come
out of the closet” with respect to human pleasure and its worth.
Consequently, the defense of desire as such amounts to much more than a
challenge to the rationalized and selective version of instrumental
“privacy” that characterizes and delimits the protection of intimacy
afforded under the constitutional status quo….88

What common interest (that is not already met through a rights paradigm) is
served when the meaning of sexuality within the context of its legal regulation changes in
this way? That is to say, what common interest is served when law comes out of the
closet with respect to human pleasure and its worth.
When law comes out of the closet with respect to human pleasure and its worth a
common interest in human flourishing is served. A focus on desire and pleasure (in
conjunction with harm) locates wellbeing and human flourishing as central to the law’s
concern in this context. It allows for legal analysis that takes as one of its primary
considerations the quality of people’s lives. This is analogous, in some sense, to the way
in which a re-conceptualization of the harm caused by sexual violence allows for legal
analysis that takes as one of its primary concerns the perspective of all sexual actors
involved in a sexual interaction.

Princeton, 2006). As suggested above, queer theory, unlike iconoclasm, is less able to accommodate
theories of justice, reflect legal struggles as they actually transpire …or operate within a liberal framework
that operationalizes law through judgment.
88
Valdes, “Queers, Sissies”, supra, note 83 at 369.
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Incorporating concepts of pleasure and desire into the law’s conception of
sexuality reveals a more nuanced and truthful account of this human activity – an activity
the ubiquity of which is matched only by the historical degree to which it has been
socially and legally regulated. Why does this matter? Legal analysis that recognizes sex
as having the capacity to be positive, pleasurable and fun reflects a reality about sex that
the law has tended not to reveal. This is significant for a number of reasons. It is
significant not simply for its celebration of one of the very positive aspects of our
humanity but also because the law’s capacity to better recognize, account for and reflect
the good of sex might also lend itself to a capacity to better account for and reflect the bad
of sex, that is to say, the very real harms related to or caused by certain sexual behaviors
(particularly for women, children, and sexual minorities). A legal capacity to better
reflect these sexual realities facilitates a greater ability to handle those complex and
difficult legal circumstances in which pain and pleasure, desire and fear intersect, overlap
and at times blur.89
The decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada in Labaye and Kouri establish an
understanding of the regulation of public sex that is based in morality and that
acknowledges the value of community. Chief Justice McLachlin’s reasoning, far from
relegating Canadian values to the private domain, invokes our generally agreed-upon
fundamental ethical convictions for the very purpose of protecting them, and she does
so in a manner that continues to recognize the importance of community and common
interests without subjugating minority desires to majoritarian sexual morality.
Chief Justice McLachlin relies upon principles reflected in the constitution—
89

Issues such as sadomasochism and certain types of sex work for example, reveal circumstances where the
law has, to date, failed to develop a coherent theory or theories of sexuality that can account for the infinite
complexity that arises when human beings interact sexually.
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principles such as autonomy and equality—to redefine the legal regulation of public
sex in a manner that removes it from the community standard of tolerance test. She
establishes a standard that regulates sexual activity based on principles considered to be
agreeable to all or almost all members of a liberal society.
Labaye and Kouri are not premised on claims of identity, privacy, or expression,
and therefore they actually represent the potential for a more significant shift in the
jurisprudence. This interpretation of her decision identifies the iconoclastic implications
of her reasoning and illuminates a shift in the legal regulation of sexuality towards an
accommodation of concepts of pleasure and the significance of sexual desire. The
reasoning in Labaye thus protects our common interests in tolerance and human
flourishing, achieved through the recognition and affirmation of sexual pleasure, bounded
by both sexual dissent and liberal judgment.
The legal recognition of desire in Labaye and Kouri reveal a moment of meaning
formation and then reformation. The legal recognition of desire (even when confined by
the principles of the constitution) won’t solve every issue of sexual liberty anymore than
equality rights for gays and lesbians will give the law a complete answer to the social
conflict which inevitably arises from sexual diversity or than re-conceptualizing the harm
of sexual violence will resolve the many other tensions evident in sexual assault law (such
as the tension between the right to a fair trial and a complainant’s right to privacy). The
iconoclastic impact of the reasoning in Labaye reveals a moment of success – the legal
recognition of desire changes the way in which law and sexuality intersect. It is a
moment of success that must (in terms of law) be followed by a failure to stay open to
perfection. What does desire mean? What types of desire should be valued and

409

protected? Can equality claims be made based on desire? How does the legal recognition
of desire change what desire is?
Conclusion
Legal approaches to sexuality that understand sexuality as a product of social
context, norms and regulative practices tend, as demonstrated in the context of sexual
assault law and obscenity and indecency laws, to promote legal reasoning that is more
concerned with sexual actors and sexual integrity than sexual acts and sexual propriety.
Legal reasoning that identifies sexual integrity as the interest at stake when law and
sexuality intersect is legal reasoning that will focus on sexual interactions, on context, on
power dynamics, on affectivity not just bodily autonomy, on the perspectives of all sexual
actors involved. Where the notion of sexual integrity that courts adopt is understood as
social form that is in the common good, legal reasoning should reflect a concern over the
social conditions that produce whatever issue of sexuality has come before the court –
whether this is reflected in, for example, the development of remedies that are attuned to
the social factors that perpetuate the use of sexual hostility in the workplace or a legal
recognition that it is not only social categorizations such as ‘family’ that can evolve, shift,
(or shatter and reconstitute!) as social contexts change but also the legal categories that
reflect, regulate and in fact at times constitute these social categories.
Unavoidably, when law intersects with sexuality, morality will come into play.
Given this, as argued in Chapter five, what is most significant is what order of morality
legal reasoning is reliant upon. Where the common interest in sexual integrity is
understood as necessary for individual autonomy then there should be space to recognize
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a community’s role in producing this social form by relying on reasoning based on
political morality rather than resorting to legal reasoning reliant on sexual morality.
Finally, where it is recognized that sexuality is socially constructed through social
practices, norms, and discursive regimes it should also be recognized that law constitutes
one of the discursive regimes through which sexuality is constructed. This creates a
tension, given that with law must come judgment, that for judgment not to be arbitrary
there must be criteria by which to judge and that the criteria by which to judge are as
socially constructed as are the subjects of law’s judgment. There may not be a way to
maintain a constructivist legal theory of sexuality that can reconcile this tension. But then
there may not need to be.
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